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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second 
Intifada. Using a framework based in social movement theory it argues that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, not all parts of Israeli peace activism were paralysed in the period following the outbreak of the 
Intifada in 2000. By placing greater emphasis on the internal dynamics of social movement theory: 
collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures, and by building a three-fold 
typology of Israeli peace activism: a liberal Zionist component; a radical component; and a human rights 
component, it argues that it was only the liberal Zionist component that demobilised following the 
outbreak of violence in 2000. The radical and human rights component continued to mobilise, with new 
groups emerging, presenting alternative and innovative ways to challenge the prevailing situation.  
 This study is based on interviews with activists in Israel, participant observation and primary 
data from the publications and websites of the activist groups, focusing on the period between 2000 
and 2014. Through this, new empirical data to further the understanding of Israeli peace activism has 
been provided. This study further contributes to the literature on Israeli peace activism by unearthing 
new collective action frames, the evolution of tactical repertoires and a shift in the mobilising structures. 
Furthermore, by disaggregating the internal dynamics before analysing how they interact with the 
external environment, the political opportunity structures, this dissertation identifies different cycles of 
contention for the three components of Israeli peace activism.  
 The empirical analysis has also led to contributions in the field of social movement theory. It 
shows that impact should be conceived of beyond the policy arena, with emphasis given to other areas 
of impact, such as mobilisation, cultural shifts and norm entrepreneurship. It also identifies a number of 
aspects of social movement theory that require refinement: the relationship between the government 
and a social movement; the connection between the international dimension and a domestic social 
movement; and the role of gender dynamics.   
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A variety of studies and accounts of Israeli peace activism have been produced throughout 
Isƌael͛s histoƌǇ (Hermann, 2009, 2002; Kabasakal et al., 2004; Kidron, 2004; Gordon, 2003; Bar-On, 1996; 
Kaminer, 1996). The conventional perspective argues that the movement was paralysed following the 
second Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against Israel in 2000, unable and unwilling to respond to the 
unfolding events. As the 2000s progressed it is argued that the movement became politically irrelevant, 
leading to the disappearance of any significant peace activities, 
͚The peaĐe-minded ordinary people, who for nearly three decades could be relied 
on to come out in their hundreds and thousands once or twice a year (and 
sometimes more frequently when the situation clearly demanded it) have 
disappeared from the streets since that fatal time in 2000͛ ;Kelleƌ aŶd )ilǀeƌsŵidt, 
2008:13). 
 ͚ ...the ďitteƌ disappoiŶtŵeŶt ǁith the politiĐal Đhaos aŶd aĐĐeleƌatiŶg ǀioleŶĐe that 
folloǁed Isƌael͛s diseŶgageŵeŶt fƌoŵ the Gaza “tƌip aŶd the later electoral victory 
of Hamas in early 2006, led to a complete halt of peace activism in Israel. Not even 
the...Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006...nor the Annapolis peace 
initiative of late 2007, were successful in revitalising the movement, which is 
adŵittedlǇ a histoƌiĐal ƌeŵŶaŶt todaǇ aŶd Ŷo loŶgeƌ a ƌeleǀaŶt politiĐal aĐtualitǇ͛ 
(Hermann, 2009:10). 
According to similar accounts, exhaustion and disillusionment, alongside an inability for the peace 
movement to form an agenda in response to the outbreaks of violence in this period, marked the 
deĐliŶe of the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt, as ͚ŵaŶǇ of the ŵost pƌoŵiŶeŶt peaĐe aĐtiǀists, sileŶt aŶd 
disillusioŶed, ƌetiƌed to the seĐlusioŶ of theiƌ hoŵes͛ ;NeǁŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϮͿ. Whilst these sĐholaƌs aƌe ƌight iŶ 
arguing that Israeli peace activism has been in decline since the second Intifada and unable to revitalise 
activities to a level comparable to the 1980s and 1990s, this dissertation will argue that it has only been 
the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism that experienced this decline. Many of the 
existing radical groups and human rights groups have continued to mobilise and, alongside emerging 
groups, present different peace promoting voices and ways of challenging the current situation, showing 
that they are far from paralysed. In fact, the paralysis of the liberal Zionist component became the point 
of ĐƌeatioŶ of a ͚Đleaƌeƌ aŶd loudeƌ ŵessage of disseŶt͛ ;FƌidŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϴ:ϯϳͿ. 
In arguing this, the overall contribution of this dissertation will be to detail the emerging waves of 
activism for the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism, whilst explaining why the 
liberal Zionists did Ŷot ƌespoŶd to the pƌeǀailiŶg ƌealities. It ǁill pƌoǀide aŶ eǀolutioŶ of HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s 
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(2009) work by developing an in-depth understanding of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada 
through a comprehensive study of the transformation of the characteristics of Israeli peace activism post 
2000. This will bring to light an array of voices and groups actively promoting and working towards 
change in the region.  
The study of Israeli peace activism will be approached through a framework based in social movement 
theory. A peace movement is arguably a type of social movement, with a social movement defined as,  
͚“eƋueŶĐes of ĐoŶteŶtious politiĐs ďased oŶ uŶdeƌlǇiŶg soĐial Ŷetǁoƌks, oŶ ƌesoŶaŶt 
collective action frames and a capacity to maintain sustained challenges against 
poǁeƌful oppoŶeŶts͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϳͿ. 
Whilst Israeli peace activism might be too fragmented to fit the full definition and unable to maintain 
continuous challenges against the authorities, the tools of social movement theory still have explanatory 
power even in relation to activism falling short of a sustained large-scale movement and have been 
applied to studies of such activism successfully (Staggenborg and Lecomte, 2009; Tilly and Wood, 2009; 
Carty and Onyett, 2007; Snow et al, 2007; Bevington and Dixon, 2005; Meyer, 2004; Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld, 2002; Meyer, 2002; Smith, Chatfield  and Pagnucco, 1997; Markoff, 1996; Diamond, 1995). 
This dissertation ǁill ŵake use of Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, ǁhiĐh sǇŶthesises fouƌ faĐtoƌs fƌoŵ soĐial 
movement theory: collective action frames, the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh aĐtiǀists ͚fashioŶ shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͛ 
to encourage mobilisation (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:6); tactical repertoires, the tactics that 
activists know how to employ to achieve their shared goals (Tilly, 1995:41); mobilisation structures, the 
underlying infrastructures of a social movement (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:67) and political 
opportunity structures (POS), factors in the external environment that facilitate or constrain activism 
(Tilly, 1978). Whilst some scholars have applied aspects of social movement theory to their studies of 
Israeli peace activism (Ginsburg, 2009; Hermann, 2009, 2002, 1996; Meyer, 2004, 2002; Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld, 2002; Peleg, 2000), there is a general emphasis on the external factors that affect a social 
movement, such as the nature of the government, public opinion and perceptions on the peace process. 
A focus on these external factors has led scholars to conclude that the marginality of Israeli peace 
activism and their inability to influence policy change, confirm their political irrelevancy (Hermann, 2009, 
2002). Whilst the groups that have been operating since the second Intifada have had limited influence 
on the government or public, a heavy focus on the external factors that affect Israeli peace activism and 
contextualising it within the Oslo peace process, the process towards achieving a peace treaty between 
Israel and the Palestinians that began in 1993, leaves little attention to the internal features of Israeli 
peace activism, thus overlooking those groups formulating different ideas surrounding the conflict and 
the potential impact these groups are having beyond the policy arena. There are a variety of groups that 
have continued to operate and emerge since the outbreak of the second Intifada, providing new ways of 
confronting the realities that are less concerned with a political peace process.  
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There is therefore a need to give greater attention to the internal characteristics of a social movement to 
understand the internal dynamics and give weight to agency in social movement activities. In doing so, 
this dissertation will unearth new elements of Israeli peace activism: new collective action frames, 
tactical repertoires and mobilising structures, contributing to both the literature on Israeli peace activism 
and social movement theory. Once these have been explored, the connection with the external 
environment can be analysed. Giving equal attention to the internal characteristics will also unearth 
different areas of impact, beyond the policy realm. In doing so, this dissertation will further contribute to 
the literature on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory. 
This dissertation will approach Israeli peace activism through three components that it is comprised of: 
the liberal Zionist component, the radical component and the human rights component. Previous 
studies have distinguished between liberal Zionist and radical groups (Hermann, 2009; Kaminer, 1996) 
however, this study will go further. Firstly, it will be more detailed in outlining and analysing each 
component. Secondly, it will identify a third set of groups – the human rights component, which has 
experienced an alternative trajectory to the groups within the liberal Zionist and radical components, 
and thirdly it will analyse the differences between the categories, thus formulating a three-fold typology 
of Israeli peace activism. 
The groups were categorised through the ways in which they frame themselves, the problems and 
solutions to the conflict, their tactical repertoires and their mobilisation structures. Groups in the liberal 
Zionist component believe that the Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own but on the basis of 
a liberal democracy. They became the largest voice of Israeli peace activists proposing a two-state 
solution, although they did not initially consider the idea of a Palestinian state. They seek to ensure the 
peace and security of Israel through incisive debate and democratic practices. They tend to be the least 
confrontational in their tactical repertoires, aiming to mobilise the Israeli public and influence the 
government. The radical groups are those groups that consistently put the Palestinians at the centre of 
the problems of and solutions to the conflict, focusing on peace out of moral concerns for the 
Palestinians, either in ensuring their rights are acknowledged in peace agreements, helping alleviate the 
suffering on the ground, or acting in solidarity of their claims. They have always presented more 
confrontational collective action frames and tactical repertoires than the liberal Zionist component. 
There has not been a consistent political agenda amongst the radical groups and have included anti-
Zionists, those calling for a binational state and those who do not propose a political solution. However, 
their collective action frames have always been further from the mainstream Israeli public and state 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe thaŶ the liďeƌal )ioŶist gƌoups aŶd theƌefoƌe ͚ƌadiĐal͛ ƌefeƌs to theiƌ positioŶ oŶ the ŵaƌgiŶs of 
Israeli society, rather than their political perspective. The third category is the human rights component. 
͚HuŵaŶ ƌights͛ iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt ƌefeƌs to the eǀeƌǇdaǇ eŶtitleŵeŶts of PalestiŶiaŶs aŶd Aƌaď CitizeŶs of 
Israel, which are argued to be violated by the actions of Israel. These include, but are not limited to, 
freedom of movement, access to food and water, the right to education, and individual and collective 
security. A range of organisations and groups constitute this component, each highlighting the ways in 
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which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli occupation adversely affect the lives of Palestinians. 
Through their collective action frames and tactical repertoires they aim to hold the Israeli government 
accountable for their actions towards the Palestinians and Arab Citizens of Israel and ensure the Israeli 
public are aware of what is being done in their name. They do not tend promote a political solution to 
the conflict but focus on the realities of the situation. Whilst some of their tactics overlap with groups in 
the radical component, the efforts of the groups in the human rights component to speak to the Israeli 
government and public, places them in a different component, which experienced its own trajectory.  
Israeli peace activism is in a state of flux since the break-down of the Camp David talks and outbreak of 
the second Intifada in 2000 and so the demarcations into the different components may not be strict; 
some organisations may display characteristics that cross-over into the different components and the 
groups may peƌĐeiǀe theŵselǀes as ŵoƌe ͚ƌadiĐal͛ oƌ ŵoƌe ͚ŵodeƌate͛ thaŶ the other groups within 
their category however, key trends in the collective action frames and differences in their trajectories 
can be identified that enable the categorisation of the groups into this typology.
1
 Such typologies have a 
strong precedent in the study of peace movements (Ceadel, 1987, 1980) and it helps to understand in 
more detail how Israeli peace activism has transformed, as well as highlighting some interesting 
theoretical implications, particularly that groups with different internal characteristics, despite dealing 
with the same area of contention, can experience different trajectories. This typology has the potential 
to be used as a prism to study of other social movements, enabling more details to be uncovered and a 
more in-depth analysis to be given than when treating a social movement as one unit of analysis. 
In a study of Israeli peace activism from the first Intifada, Kaminer (1996) argues that the radical groups 
were the agenda setters and that whilst Shalom Achshav (Peace Now), the largest of the liberal Zionist 
groups, was able to mobilise mass demonstrations, such as 50,000 to 80,000 people in January 1988 
agaiŶst the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ƌespoŶse to the fiƌst Intifada, it ǁas the pƌessuƌe of the ͚sŵall ǁheel of the 
bicycle͛- the radical component - that pushed the ͚ďig ǁheel͛ – the liberal Zionist component - to take 
certain positions and mobilise sooner than they would have otherwise. Ideas that originated in the 
radical groups, such as recognition that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was the true 
representatives of the Palestinian people, eventually diffused into the liberal Zionist groups and later 
government policy. In the period beginning with the second Intifada, the ͚ďig ǁheel; little ǁheel͛ 
dynamic no longer holds true and a new trajectory in Israeli peace activism can be identified. Whilst, the 
͚ďig ǁheel͛ did sloǁdoǁŶ, this dissertation ǁill shoǁ that the ͚sŵall ǁheel͛, the radical component, 
along with the human rights component, continued to mobilise and developed new ideas, showing that 
not all components of Israeli peace activism became paralysed.  
The liberal Zionists did try to mobilise its previous support base but further moderated the way in which 
it presented the conflict and its solutions, in order to try and stay relevant to the mainstream Israeli 
public. This led to a polarisation in Israeli peace activism, as the radical and human rights groups moved 
                                                          
1
 Appendix 1 includes the category assigned to each group 
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further away from mainstream Israeli consensus. This polarisation can be identified in the immediate 
wake of the outbreak of the second Intifada, with the liberal Zionist and radical groups taking opposing 
perspectives on the situation. Polarisation deepened throughout the 2000s, as the liberal Zionist 
component moved towards the centre of the Israeli political spectrum, in order to stay in-line with 
mainstream public opinion. The liberal Zionist groups shifted to focus almost solely on the peace and 
security of Israel, removing any pro-Palestinian sentiments from their image whereas, the radical 
component focused even more directly on solidarity by emphasising the story of Palestinian suffering, 
which has presented an opportunity to re-posit the concept of peace and develop new motivations for 
acting. The human rights component of Israeli peace activism that developed in the first Intifada has in 
some ways attempted to balance the two poles created by the liberal Zionist and radical components by 
revealing the suffering of the Palestinians and confronting Israeli policies but without pushing a political 
agenda that challenges the fundamental tenets of liberal Zionism in order to try to influence the Israeli 
public and government. In doing so they too are finding new ways to confront the situation. 
Differences and shifts can also be noted in the tactical repertoires, with the liberal Zionist groups less 
willing to employ confrontational tactics, given their desire to influence the mainstream Israeli public. 
The radical groups were able to be more confrontational and experienced an evolution in their tactical 
repertoire. The human rights groups focused on issues relating to revealing human rights violations and 
providing humanitarian services and their tactics reflected their specific goals. Furthermore, whilst they 
presented more confrontational collective action frames, they still wanted to influence the Israeli public 
and therefore used more moderate tactics than the radical groups. In general there was an expansion in 
the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism however the decision to employ certain tactics was based 
on the collective action frames and target audiences. There was also an overall shift in the map of 
mobilisation structures, whilst certain remnants of mobilisation structures from the previous phases 
remained, such as the importance of informal, familiar networks. Many within the radical component 
have given up trying to influence the mainstream Israeli public and have instead attempted to mobilise 
individuals from marginalised sectors of Israeli society, as well as turning their attentions to the 
international dimension, through transnational social movements. The human rights component, as well 
as trying to attract the Israeli public, is also focusing on mobilising support in the international 
dimension. A dynamic is forming whereby, as the Israeli public and government turns away from the 
ideas of Israeli peace activism, the activists have begun to find alternative mobilising structures abroad.  
Having identified and explained the internal features of the components of Israeli peace activism, this 
study will then analyse how they interact with the external environment. The liberal Zionist component 
is more constrained by changes in the political opportunity structures, particularly the nature of Israeli 
public opinion and the government, which explains why they went through a period of demobilisation. 
The radical component has always been less constrained and tends to perceive opportunities to 
mobilise when the liberal Zionists do not and therefore react more quickly. The human rights groups 
react to the prevailing realities on the ground by challenging the policies and actions of the Israeli 
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authorities but are sensitive to the state of Israeli public opinion and therefore use more contained 
collective action frames. In the third phase of Israeli peace activism after the outbreak of the second 
Intifada, three waves of activism can be identified for each of these categories. The liberal Zionist 
component, as conventionally argued, went through a period of demobilisation and lost their ability to 
be political relevant. The radical groups experienced a new wave of activism, with an evolution in their 
tactical repertoires, more confrontational collective action frames and innovative mobilisation 
structures. The human rights groups continued with their focus on reporting on the realities, with new 
groups emerging and new tactical repertoires forming. 
Whilst Israeli peace activism in general and the radical and human rights components in particular are 
small and marginalised sectors of Israeli society, it is still important to study them. Firstly, given the 
dynamic highlighted above, whereby the radical groups acted as norm entrepreneurs, with the ideas of a 
few dozen activists in the late 1960s becoming government policy in the 1990s (Levy, 2013), how their 
ideas and activism develops is important for a long-term understanding of shifting discourse surrounding 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Secondly, although their marginalisation means they are unlikely to have 
an impact in terms of policy change in Israel, or influencing the public, at least in the short-term, impact 
should not only be identified in the political realm. Impact can be identified in other areas, such as the 
ability to mobilise and maintain activism, affect culture within society (Staggenborg, 1995) and in 
changing the dominant discourse (Bernstein, 2003).  
This chapter will continue by outlining the research questions of this dissertation; it will then clarify and 
define some key terms used throughout; it will provide justification for the period of study and then 
outline the methodology used for this study. It will identify the limitations inherent in this study before 
presenting an outline of the structure of the dissertation. 
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 This dissertation is framed by one overriding research question: How has the nature of Israeli 
peace activism transformed since the second Intifada? In answering this question a detailed account of 
certain aspects of Israeli peace activism will be explored. This will be compared with Israeli activism 
before the second Intifada, in order to highlight the key transformations. Four main aspects of a social 
movement will be explored in order to answer this question: the collective action frames, the tactical 
repertoires, the mobilisations structures and how these interact with the political opportunity 
structures. This will enable a detailed exploration of different characteristics of Israeli peace activism 
and thus its transformation. In order to answer this  question, this dissertation will make use of a variety 
of ŵeĐhaŶisŵs aŶd pƌoĐesses ǁithiŶ soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt theoƌǇ, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ͚dǇŶaŵiĐs of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ 
from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), further outlined by Tarrow (2011). This dynamic approach 
enables the study to move away from treating a social movement as a static phenomenon and will 
provide more detailed explanations for how Israeli peace activism has transformed. In doing so, this 
dissertation will contribute a further case study through which to apply these dynamics.  
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In answering this main question, insights will also be given to some secondary themes: the relationship 
between a government and a social movement; the connection between the international dimension 
and a domestic social movement; the role of gender; the nature of cycles of contention within a social 
movement; and the definition of impact.  
3 KEY TERMS 
Some clarification over the use of certain terms is necessary at this stage. Hermann (2009:63-4) 
eǆplaiŶs that the teƌŵ ͚Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ is aŶ ͚aŶalǇtiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐt ƌatheƌ thaŶ a ĐoŶĐƌete eŶtitǇ͛, 
ŶotiŶg that the ͚ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ǁas alǁaǇs Đoŵpƌised of ǀaƌious iŶdiǀidual oƌgaŶisatioŶs aŶd gƌoups that 
held different underlying beliefs and ideas about the conflict. She gives justification for the use of the 
term ͚peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ďeĐause the ŵaŶǇ gƌoups saǁ theŵselǀes as oŶe ďodǇ that ǁas opposed to the 
nationalist camp and that many outsiders also saw them as one movement. I have chosen, however, to 
use the teƌŵ ͚Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ͛ as the oǀeƌaƌĐhiŶg aŶalǇtical unit of this study. This is for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it helps in distinguishing periods in which the groups and components were more or less 
fƌagŵeŶted. “eĐoŶdlǇ, the teƌŵ ͚Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ has ďeĐoŵe a eupheŵisŵ foƌ the liberal 
Zionist component and therefore does not encapsulate the full range of groups that are operating.  I use 
the teƌŵ ͚peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ iŶ the peƌiod ǁheƌe theƌe ǁas aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ that ǁas Đapaďle of ƌallǇiŶg 
together hundreds of thousands of participants and when the other groups would join them for mass 
deŵoŶstƌatioŶs. I use the teƌŵ ͚Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ͛ at tiŵes ǁheŶ theƌe ǁas ŵoƌe fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ, 
such as in the first decades of the State of Israel and the period post-2000.  
Further complexities arise in using the teƌŵ ͚peaĐe.͛ Some of the radical and human rights components 
Ŷo loŶgeƌ use the teƌŵ ͚peaĐe,͛ haǀiŶg either rejected support for a peace process since the second 
Intifada over action on the ground, or focused on the human rights violations rather than a political 
agreement. The teƌŵ ͚aŶti-oĐĐupatioŶ͛ aĐtiǀisŵ is ŵoƌe aĐĐuƌate hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵaiŶtaiŶ aŶalǇtiĐ 
siŵpliĐitǇ aŶd a Đoŵpaƌatiǀe eleŵeŶt ǁith pƌeǀious studies, the teƌŵ Isƌaeli ͚peaĐe͛ aĐtiǀisŵ ǁill 
continue to be used. Further complexities arise when using certain labels to name events or realities as 
they come laden with ideological perspectives. For example, the war in 1948 can be referred to as the 
War of Independence or the Nakba (Catastrophe). In general attempts will be made to use the most 
neutral term available, for example all wars will be denoted by the year in which they occurred however 
terms used by the activists will be given where it helps identify their perspective. Hebrew or Arabic 
names for the organisations will be used throughout, unless a particular organisation is mostly known 
through their English name. Hebrew and Arabic words will be written in transliterations, using italics to 
highlight the foreign word or phrase. The English name of the organisation will be given in brackets after 
the first mention, which may not always be a direct translation of the Hebrew or Arabic term but is how 
the organisation is referred to in English. 
A Ŷote ŵust also ďe ŵade aďout the use of the teƌŵs ͚doŵestiĐ͛ aŶd ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal͛ ǁheŶ ĐoŶsideƌing 
the context within which Israeli peace activism operates and how the activists perceive changes in these 
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arenas. Both Intifadas and the construction of the separation barrier
2
 are considered Israeli domestic 
issues since the economic, social, political and political-geographical factors related to these are located 
in the polity called Israel. Furthermore, the peace activists consider the Intifadas and the construction of 
the separation barrier as domestic issues rather than related to an international ĐoŶfliĐt. ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal͛ 
refers to factors that are located outside the polity called Israel. The Gaza Strip post the Israeli 
diseŶgageŵeŶt iŶ ϮϬϬϱ is aŶ eǆaŵple of aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal͛ faĐtoƌ, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁith the Haŵas take-over 
and control of the territory.  
There are also a number of key terms within social movement theory which will be used throughout. 
͚ColleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵes͛ aƌe the shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs, ideas aŶd ŵessages used ďǇ a soĐial 
movement (Tarrow, 2011:44); ͚taĐtiĐal ƌepeƌtoiƌes͛ oƌ ͚ƌepeƌtoiƌes of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ aƌe the taĐtiĐs that a 
social movement or the individual groups have available to them (Tilly, 1978:41); ͚ŵoďilisatioŶ 
stƌuĐtuƌes͛ aƌe the iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌes that form a social movement (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 
1997:61); ͚politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes͛ aƌe eleŵeŶts of the eǆteƌŶal ĐoŶteǆt that ĐaŶ affeĐt the 
trajectory of a social movement (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:66); and a ͚ĐǇĐle of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ 
denotes the rise and fall of social movement activities (Tarrow, 2011:199). Further theoretical terms will 
be defined in chapter 2. 
4 PERIOD OF STUDY 
 This study of Israeli peace activism will begin with the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000. 
Given the focus of the dissertation on the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism, this starting point 
is appropriate since according to the interviews conducted and other accounts of Israeli peace activism 
in the second Intifada, a significant change, as a result of the outbreak of violence can be noted, 
͚WheŶ the Intifada came, there were two processes going on at the same time. There was 
the mainstream left [the liberal Zionist component], which became more right wing. The 
radical left became more and more radicalised at the same time. You can say that both the 
mainstream and radical left were becoming polarised. This process brought much more 
actions into the radical left. During the Oslo-era, the radical left was much quieter. Today, 
since the beginning of the second Intifada, there is a demo almost every day. So many new 
ŵoǀeŵeŶts Đaŵe to life, ǁoƌkiŶg ƌeallǇ haƌd agaiŶst the situatioŶ͛ ;Yossi iŶ Lakoff, [no 
date]). 
The period of study will end in Sept 2014, which marks a fourteen year time-frame for this study. 
This is a significantly large period in which to identify key shifts and characteristics. Hermann 
(2009) provides a similar time-frame of fourteen and a half years for her study, between 1993 and 
                                                          
2
 The separation barrier runs between Israel and the West Bank, although not directly along the Green 
Armistice Line. It was built by Israel, beginning in 2002, in response to the outbreak of Palestinian 
violence. The purpose and route of the barrier, as well as how it should be named, are highly 
contentious issues. In an attempt to avoid political connotatioŶs, I shall ƌefeƌ to it as the ͚separation 
baƌƌieƌ,͛ although it ĐaŶ ďe aƌgued that theƌe is Ŷo Ŷeutƌal teƌŵ foƌ this stƌuĐtuƌe. 
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2008, setting a suitable precedent to follow. By the end of this fourteen year period from 2000 to 
2014, the three distinct components can be clearly identified and their particular internal 
characteristics, and how they interact with the external environment, discernible. This period will 
be desĐƌiďed as ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt; thƌee cycles 
of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛. Future research should consider whether the differences and fragmentation 
identified between the components in this period have changed and should identify if and when 
the cycles shift. 
A historical overview will be provided that starts in 1967. This too reflects a significant change in 
the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism. Whilst there were some peace efforts prior to this, 
they were only the efforts of small groups of intellectuals. In 1967, Israeli peace activism 
developed a Đleaƌ ageŶda iŶ ƌespoŶse to the outĐoŵes of the ǁaƌ. The ĐoŶĐept of ͚ĐediŶg the laŶd 
foƌ peaĐe͛ ǁas deǀeloped, ǁith two categories of groups forming: the radical groups and the 
liberal Zionist groups. This phase ĐaŶ ďe desĐƌiďed as ͚iŶdiǀidual atteŵpts at peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ͛. IŶ 
1977/8 the next phase of Israeli peace activism can be identified, described as the ͚ďiƌth aŶd 
ĐoŵiŶg of age of a peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛. The laƌgest peaĐe gƌoup, Shalom Achshav, emerged at the 
beginning of this period to encourage the newly elected right-wing government to continue on 
the path to peace with Egypt. It was able to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli public and acted 
as a rallying point for the different groups that emerged in this phase (Simons, 2013a). Whilst 
three distinct components of Israeli peace activism emerged in the phase of the ͚ďiƌth aŶd ĐoŵiŶg 
of age of a peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛, at points they could be seen rallying together in support of a two-
state solution, particularly in the beginning of the Oslo peace process. It was in the outbreak of 
the second Intifada, which followed the failure of the Camp David II Summit, that the peace 
movement became fragmented and no longer able to rally together, signalling the start of the 
next phase, ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd fƌagŵeŶtation of the Israeli peace movement; three cycles of 
ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛.  
Whilst other scholars have identified different points to demarcate changes in Israeli peace 
activism, they do so through their focus on the external changes (Hermann, 2009). Accordingly, a 
change in government or the peace process signalled a new phase of Israeli peace activism. Given 
the focus on the internal characteristics of Israeli peace activism, this study has identified shifting 
phases according to larger changes inside Israeli peace activism; when the activists themselves 
experienced a change or there was a clear shift in activities or collective action frames.  
5 METHODOLOGY 
In gathering data to answer my research question, I adopted the qualitative methods that have 
been employed as the standard approach to studying these groups (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Hermann 
2009, 2002; Lamarche, 2009; Marteu, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; 
Bar-On, 1996, 1988, 1985a). It is important to follow the methods that have been previously employed 
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in order to provide a direct refinement and development of the analyses already conducted. 
Furthermore, quantitative research methods are based on fixed cases and aim to test and measure 
certain hypotheses of the relationships between set variables. This limits the flexibility to adapt the 
concepts according to the ways in which the relevant actors see themselves. It sets the variables before 
approaching the units of analysis. The study of a social movement requires more flexible research 
methods in order to allow for the refinement of the concepts that initiated the study, based on the 
perspectives of those actually involved in the social movement (Ragin, 1994:137).  Since the study of a 
social movement is in some respects the study of the narratives of those individuals and groups of 
individuals involved in the social movement, qualitative research methods are appropriate as they allow 
for an appreciation of the individuals͛ understandings and interactions, rather than testing the 
correlations between previously defined variables (Silverman, 2005: 9). It helps to unearth nuances and 
subtleties that may have been overlooked by more structured data gathering. Furthermore, one goal in 
studying social movements is to give a voice to certain marginalised sectors of society, which is best 
done through qualitative research methods (Ragin, 1994:83). Some quantitative measurement of certain 
aspects of social movements, such as calculating the amount of funding it receives per annum or 
referring to public opinion polls, will help to compare and contrast certain elements of and dynamics 
within a social movement and will be used in Chapter 6 when looking at organisational structures and 
Chapter 7 in identifying shifts in Israeli peace activism. However, it would be difficult to gain accurate 
quantitative data for other aspects, such as the number of events held, due to the informal and ad hoc 
nature of a social movement and its component parts. Such methods are only partially employed when 
researching social movements, with scholars favouring interviews, testimonials and participant 
observation (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Hermann 2009, 2002; Lamarche, 2009; Marteu, 2009; Pallister-
Wilkins, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Bar-On, 1996, 1988, 1985a). 
5.1 DATA SPECIFICATION 
A peace movement is made up of a number of organisational forms and individuals: peace 
organisations; networks and groups; peace activists, both those connected to an organisation as either 
core or periphery activists and those who consider themselves independent; intellectuals; and funding 
organisations. Recognising these parts of a peace movement helps the researcher to identify their 
particular unit of analysis, which will, in turn, inform their research methodology. Three main 
approaches have been most commonly taken in the study of peace movements. The first considers a 
single peace organisation or a few particular peace organisations. This requires detailed research in 
order to provide a narrow, in depth study of the singular organisation (Gordon 2010; Hallward, 2009; 
Lieberfield, 2009, 2009b; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Halperin, 2007; Grossman and Kaplan, 2006; Gordon, 
2003; Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Shadmi, 2000; Svirsky, 2001a; Helman and Rapoport, 1997). The second 
approach is to focus on one aspect of a peace movement. For example, Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld 
(2002) looked at the role of formal peace organisations in conflict resolution, not including the more 
informal networks. They, therefore, began by mapping and collecting data on the established peace 
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organisations in the countries of study. They then produced a representative sample to enable more 
detailed research. The third approach is to research a peace movement as one unit of analysis. This 
requires the gathering of data from and about all the constituent parts, as well as information and 
opinions about the movement as a whole. The researcher must cover a broader range of data, collecting 
information across the entire peace movement. The unit of analysis of this study is Israeli peace 
activism, on the aggregate level, similar to Hermann (2009) and Kaminer (1996) and therefore the third 
approach to data specification and collection will be taken. However, unlike Hermann (2009) and 
Kaminer (1996) the analysis of Israeli peace activism will be done through the three-fold typology 
outlined above. 
The first way to identify data sources is through the different organisations, both formal and informal, 
which are operating in Israel. A list of all the peace organisations that have been active in Israel since 
1967 was compiled (Appendix 1). This is based upon a list drawn up by Hermann (2009:267-275) and 
added to from useful internet resources, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ ͚IŶsight oŶ CoŶfliĐt͛ aŶd ͚Just VisioŶ͛, and prior 
knowledge of certain groups. Categorisation into the three components was not done at this stage. This 
was done following the initial analysis of the data collected and will be elaborated on further below. 
Identifying individual activists within these organisations and groups, as well as independent ones, is the 
second step. An initial list of individual activists was made from individuals I was already familiar with, 
individuals that were personally suggested to me and those who were mentioned on news and 
commentary websites. Further individuals were identified through a method of snowballing and referral 
and through my attendance at peace activities and events in Israel. Facebook also provided a useful way 
of identifying individuals by looking at the members of relevant groups. It was also an effective way of 
making contact with individuals not previously known to me.  
Funding organisations, which were identified through the websites of the peace organisations and the 
Rasham Ha͛amutot (Israeli Registrar for Non-Profits), were also consulted. Much of the funding of left-
wing Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) in Israel comes from the New Israel Fund and their 
initiative for social change, Shatil (Seedling), the Director of which I interviewed, who provided some 
useful information on the funding sources of Israeli peace activism and helped to identify further 
individuals and organisations for me to approach. Data related to government decisions and positions 
on the conflict are also useful. Government policy documents and speeches from Prime Ministers were 
used to detail the context in which Israeli peace activism is operating. These were easily accessed from 
the government website. Data from opposition forces was also gathered, both through interviews and 
through their publications and websites.  
Secondary sources were also useful in adding further details. This included studies and accounts from 
activists and academics, namely Gordon (2010), Kaufman-Lacusta (2010), Hallward (2009), Hermann 
(2009, 2002), Marteu (2009), Pallister Wilkins, (2009), Halperin (2007), Shulman (2007), Halper (2005), 
Gordon (2003), Peleg (2000), Bar-On (1996, 1985a, 1985b), Kaminer (1996). Newspaper articles, both in 
print and on the Internet, particularly from the left wing newspaper Ha͛aretz and online commentary 
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websites, such as +972mag, Bitterlemons, Occupation Magazine and other editorials were also useful. In 
some instances, primary sources, such as testimonies, were extracted from these, adding to the rich set 
of primary data for this study. 
5.2 DATA COLLECTION 
 Data was collected through both semi-ethnographic fieldwork and online research. 
Ethnography is a methodological approach within the field of qualitative research that uses a range of 
methods to gather data (Scott-Jones, 2010). The underlying facet of ethnography is the immersion of 
the researcher in the social setting or group that they are researching. During an extended period of 
time the researcher observes the behaviour of the participants; listens and records what is being said 
and asks ƋuestioŶs ;BƌǇŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϮͿ. Whilst soŵe iŶteƌĐhaŶge the teƌŵs ͚ethŶogƌaphǇ͛ aŶd ͚paƌtiĐipaŶt 
oďseƌǀatioŶ͛, ethŶogƌaphǇ is ŵoƌe thaŶ ŵeƌe oďseƌǀatioŶ of paƌtiĐipaŶts. EthŶogƌaphǇ iŶǀolǀes 
different levels of active or passive participation of the researcher in events and activities, with the 
researcher immersing themselves in the groups being studied. Direct involvement in social movements, 
particularly marginalised sectors of society, seems to be the most effective way to gain accurate and 
useful insights iŶto ŵoǀeŵeŶt aĐtiǀitǇ. BǇ deǀelopiŶg ƌelatioŶships ǁith the aĐtiǀists aŶd ďeĐoŵiŶg ͚oŶe 
of theŵ͛ it is possiďle to disĐoǀeƌ ǁhǇ theǇ joiŶ the aĐtiǀities aŶd ǁhǇ theǇ ƌeŵaiŶ aĐtiǀe. BuƌŶhaŵ et al. 
(2008) question why this method has not been employed more in the social sciences as it provides 
insider knowledge of the movement activity. This method was the main method through which 
Hermann (2009) gathered her data. Furthermore, the majority of studies on the Israeli peace 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt, iŶĐludiŶg HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s, ǁere written by self-proclaimed activists. In order for my research to 
gain credibility amongst these scholars I spent six months in Israel involving myself with the groups in a 
similar manner. Data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews with individuals and 
participant observation of active peace groups, as well as informal conversations.  
Interviews formed a large proportion of the data collected and included interviews with individual 
activists, both core and periphery across the spectrum of groups, organisation leaders, intellectuals, 
former Members of Knesset (Israeli Parliament) and journalists, all of which were held in English and 
most recorded. A total of fifty interviews conducted by the author informed this study. Ethical approval 
was received from City University London. The network of Israeli peace activists is small and most 
people know or know of each other, which enabled me to obtain the large number of interviews with 
activists across the spectrum of groups. I stopped meeting individuals once I felt that enough data was 
gathered to build a picture of Israeli peace activism. The interviews conducted were semi-structured and 
open-ended so that I could direct the conversation in a specific way whilst allowing for the respondent 
to elaborate with additional information. Structured interviews would have been too rigid and would 
not have allowed the respondent to fully express how they felt about the issues being asked. However, 
some direction was needed in order that I received the information to answer my research question. 
Experience found that the interviewees required only one or two questions and felt comfortable telling 
their story in their own way. Some interviewees were asked for specific details, depending on their 
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position in an organisation, or to clarify something another interviewee had said. Prior research into the 
organisation or the individual helped to direct the interview questions and to unearth information that 
was not possible to find through other methods. In situations where I was unable to meet face-to-face 
with an interviewee, I asked them to answer some questions via e-mail. It was, however, preferable to 
meet in person, as this allowed for the interviewee to elaborate further than e-mail correspondence 
allowed. One of the purposes of the interviews was to verify some of my working assumptions, 
particularly whether the second Intifada was a suitable starting point for a study of the transformation 
of the peace movement.  
During the period of fieldwork I attended a range of events and activities of the different groups. I 
attended three tours, with Emek Shaveh (Archaeology in the Shadow of Conflict) in the City of David and 
village of Silwan.  Ir Amim (City of Nation/People) through East Jerusalem and Jerusalem Peace Makers 
in Hebron. I went to demonstrations held by Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor (Women in Black) and Yesh Gvul (There 
is a Limit/Border). I attended solidarity actions with LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (Combatants for Peace), 
Solidariut Sheikh Jarrah (Solidarity Shiekh Jarrah) and Ta͛ayush (Life in Common/Partnership) and 
accompanied Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch). I went to discussion forums held by the Koalitziat 
Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (The Coalition of Women for Peace), LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ and Lo Metsaytot (We Do Not 
Obey). 
Whilst ethnography and the different methods it uses provide direct access to the activities and 
members of social movements, it has both analytical implications and practical difficulties. Analytically, 
participant observation impedes with researcher objectivity (Hermann, 2009:41) and should be taken 
into consideration when analysing the data. In particular, the issue of reflexivity has been stressed in the 
literature on ethnography (Scott-Jones, 2010; Gray, 2009; Coffey, 1999). One way to ensure that 
reflexivity was not overlooked was to record my own reflections on activities that I participated in and 
observed. This ensured that I was aware of my prejudices and biases with respect to the research. It is 
also iŵpoƌtaŶt to ŵaiŶtaiŶ a ďalaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŶsideƌ͛ aŶd ͚outsideƌ͛ ;GƌaǇ, ϮϬϬϵ:ϰϬϬͿ. HaǀiŶg ǁoƌked 
for a peace promoting NGO in Israel, facilitated and participated in peace activities, as well as 
developing relationships with Israeli activists, in conducting this study I cannot claim to be a complete 
outsider. However, I was not born in Israel nor have I become a citizen of Israel and am not emotionally 
connected in the way that some of the scholars clearly portray (Shulman, 2007; Kabasakal et al., 2004; 
Kaufman, 1988; Bar-On, 1988; Amit, 1983).  
Online resources were gathered in both English and Hebrew to gather further primary and secondary 
sources to ensure that there was detailed information about all the groups operating. Information was 
collected from their publications, websites, minutes of meetings, petitions, event advertisements and e-
mails sent to mailing lists. Articles written by intellectuals and journalists and lectures given added to 
this set of data. There are also two useful collections on Israeli peace activism that were also consulted, 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ foƌ gƌoups that ǁeƌe fouŶded ďefoƌe ϮϬϬϬ: ͚the Israeli-left archive͛, which has collated 
information on some of the main peace organisations from the sixties, seventies and eighties, including 
 14 
 
 
primary documents; and The Other Israel, a magazine which detailed the activities across the spectrum 
of groups between 1983 to today and is available online. Further primary resources were gathered from 
printed publications and flyers of the organisations and groups. Internet-based research was particularly 
useful when direct access to individual activists was restricted. In some cases the pages of certain 
ǁeďsites ǁeƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ aĐĐessiďle. IŶ suĐh iŶstaŶĐes the ͚WaǇ BaĐk MaĐhiŶe͛, an internet library of 
historical digital collections, was used to access these web pages and documents. Given that a large 
amount of primary data was collected through the internet, including collecting newspaper articles, 
alteƌŶatiǀe ŵedia pieĐes aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ the oƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ ǁeďsites, ǁhiĐh filled iŶ the gaps fƌoŵ 
the ethnographic fieldwork, this study is best described as semi-ethnographic. 
It should be noted that the breadth and depth of data gathered per group varied. For example, long-
time activists were able to provide more insight into Israeli peace activism than activists attending their 
first protest and the larger, more formal organisations had more available data than the informal 
networks of volunteers. This meant that some groups and individuals were researched in more detail 
than others. However, a combination of data from a variety of primary and secondary sources enabled 
the gathering of information for all the groups operating in this phase. Whilst there is a greater focus on 
some groups and individuals within the dissertation, this is due to their prominence and is done so 
alongside a broader, more general picture of each component of Israeli peace activism.  
5.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data has been analysed through traditional qualitative analysis. The conceptual framework 
based on social movement theory has helped to inform this analysis. The transcripts of the interviews 
conducted and the data collected was coded along the lines of the four powers of movement: collective 
action frame; tactical repertoires, mobilising structures and interactions with political opportunity 
structures. Each of these elements was then extracted from the interviews and other data sources to 
inform each of the empirical chapters. For example, the meaning work the activists and groups went 
through, the ways in which they perceived the origins of the conflict, the prevailing realities and any 
potential solutions, were extracted to inform the chapter on collective action frames. Framing processes 
and the mechanisms and processes outlined by Tarrow (2011) and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) 
were then used to analyse how and why the collective action frames had developed as suggested. A 
similar process was taken for each of the internal dynamics, extracting the characteristics based on the 
particular aspect of the social movement and then analysing them through the tools available in social 
movement theory. Finally, the interaction between these characteristics was analysed in relation to the 
political opportunity structures, first by referring to the data and then by applying the mechanisms and 
processes of social movement theory.  
Having identified the internal characteristics of each of the groups, commonalities between them were 
used to build the three-fold typology of the components of Israeli peace activism. The trajectory of 
Israeli peace activism was then analysed for each of these components. This three-fold typology not only 
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helped to detail empirically the distinct parts of Israeli peace activism, it also provided a further 
analytical lens through which to approach the study of Israeli peace activism. The combination of the 
analytic tools of social movement theory and the typology is useful for two main reasons. Firstly it 
enabled the separate characteristics to be disaggregated and explained in turn before analysing how 
they relate to each other. Secondly, as the typology developed, it provided further analytical tools with 
which to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. For example, in understanding why certain 
tactics were used by the radical groups and not the liberal Zionist groups or why the different 
components experienced different trajectories, their collective action frames were consulted.  
6 LIMITATIONS 
Hermann (2009:40-44) makes clear the extensive limitations in researching social movements. 
Firstly, she notes the difficultly in accessing past information due to the often unorganised nature of 
social movement organisations (SMOs) that fail to keep accurate records of activities. Whilst this meant 
that information from some groups was not accessible, the majority of the peace groups have now set 
up websites with access to archived information and publications. Furthermore some individuals have 
kept their own archives. Secondly, there is often a lack of a clear organisation structure which makes it 
hard to follow decision making processes or trace leaders. In order to acquire representative 
information, a number of different sources were consulted for each group. Thirdly, Hermann notes that 
activities tend to be sporadic and spontaneous, making it difficult to keep track of them. However, 
contacts I developed assisted me in finding information on these activities. Fourthly, she notes that 
some organisations do not have formal membership but operate an inclusive, open mode of 
participation. Furthermore, many participants tend to be active members of a number of organisations. 
I made sure to question participants on which groups they are involved with and what activities they 
have attended, in order to try and overcome this limitation. 
Despite potential to make adjustments in order to take into account these limitations, particularly by 
consulting a variety of data sources, it should be noted that the reliability and authenticity of data 
gathered cannot be determined beyond reasonable doubt.   
7 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 This dissertation is comprised of seven chapters, in addition to this one. Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the literature on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory. It first identifies 
developments in social movement theory, providing the foundations for the conceptual framework for 
this dissertation. It reviews the literature and builds a framework based on the four powers of 
movement: collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation structures and political 
opportunity structures. It then outlines the dynamic approach to social movements, which will also 
inform the framework of this dissertation. In addition, through a survey of the literature, this chapter 
identifies four key areas in which this dissertation will contribute to the theoretical literature, the role of 
the government, the international dimension, gender dynamics and cycles of contention.  The chapter 
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then surveys the available literature on Israeli peace activism and in doing so, highlights the overall 
argument of this dissertation in relation to the conventional perspective. Through a blended analysis of 
these two bodies of literature this chapter will also outline further areas in which this dissertation will 
shed new light: collective action frames, repertoires of contention, mobilisation structures and the 
impact of a social movement. 
Chapter 3 presents an historical overview of Israeli peace activism, divided according to the two phases 
identified above. Using existing studies it disaggregates the three internal characteristics of Israeli peace 
activism in each of these phases and how they interacted with the political opportunity structures for 
each component of Israeli peace activism. It identifies and explains in particular the role of the radical 
component as norm entrepreneurs, nipping at the heels of the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace 
activism; the ability for the liberal Zionists to mobilise large numbers and the emergence of the human 
rights component. This provides a useful point of comparison for the study of Israeli peace activism 
since the second Intifada in the following chapters. 
Chapters 4-6 are divided according to the internal characteristics of a social movement. Chapter 4 
outlines and analyses the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada, 
highlighting the polarisation between the liberal Zionist component, and the radical and human rights 
component. It also emphasises that, given the innovative collective action frames formed by the radical 
and human rights components, not all parts of Israeli peace activism was paralysed. It also identifies 
some key framing processes during this phase. Chapter 5 turns to the tactical repertoires, highlighting 
the contained forms that are used by the liberal Zionist groups, who are unable to organise the mass 
demonstrations that they had once been able to. It also tracks the evolution of tactics in the radical 
component, which has shifted from humanitarian aid to co-resistance with Palestinians, to elements of 
boycott, divestment and sanctions. A clear innovation across all components can be seen in the use of 
tours, which is specifically aimed at influencing foreign visitors and provides insight into the connections 
with the international community. Chapter 6 looks at the mobilisation structures, mapping those that 
are available to each component of Israeli peace activism, noting in particular that the target audience 
of the liberal Zionist groups, the Israeli public, has turned away from the ideas of peace activism. It also 
identifies the shifts in identities in the activists and in particular the increasing role of international 
mobilisation structures.  
Chapter 7 brings the study of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada together by providing an 
analysis of how the internal dynamics interact with the prevailing political opportunity structures. In 
doing so it identifies the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism, with a different cycle of contention 
developing for each of the components of Israeli peace activism; the liberal Zionist component 
demobilised, the human rights component continued with a similar cycle of contention and the radical 
component experienced a new cycle of contention. This is explained by the ways in which they 
perceived and responded to the political opportunity structures and their interaction with opposition 
forces. This chapter also highlights the role of the international political opportunity structures, an 
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understudied area of social movement theory. It also looks at the areas in which Israeli peace activism is 
having an impact, beyond the policy realm. 
Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the main findings of this dissertation. It summarises each of the 
chapters and provides an overall understanding of the nature of Israeli peace activism since the second 
Intifada. It also highlights the theoretical contributions of this study and points to areas for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Social movement theory will provide the theoretical foundations for the study of Israeli peace 
activism. The conceptual tools that constitute social movement theory provide a clear and logical way of 
analysing different aspects of contentious activity. There are a large variety of concepts with potential 
explanatory power that form social movement theory and I will extract, refine and build upon those 
elements which are most relevant and useful in understanding the case of the Israeli peace activism. The 
theoretical perspective will draw particularly on the work of Tarrow (2011, 2005), Tilly (1995) and 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). Their combined work provides a suitable and useful foundation on 
which to base my theoretical framework. The analytical tools they expound have been applied to case 
studies, which highlight their explanatory power in understanding certain elements of movement 
activity and activism (Tarrow, 2011, Tilly and Wood, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002).  
Tarrow (2011) has succeeded in synthesising the various analytical tools developed in social movement 
theoƌǇ. He outliŶes ͚fouƌs poǁeƌs of ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛: ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵes, ͚hoǁ soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶts 
ĐoŶstƌuĐt ŵeaŶiŶg foƌ aĐtioŶ͛ ;GoffŵaŶ iŶ Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϰϰͿ; taĐtiĐal ƌepeƌtoiƌes, ͚the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh 
people act together in puƌsuit of shaƌed iŶteƌests͛ ;TillǇ, ϭϵϳϴ:ϰϭͿ; ŵoďilisatioŶ stƌuĐtuƌes, ͚the 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌes that suppoƌt aŶd ĐoŶditioŶ ĐitizeŶ ŵoďilisatioŶ͛ ;“ŵith, Chatfield aŶd 
Pagnucco, 1997:61); aŶd politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes, ͚faĐtoƌs of the eǆteƌŶal environment in which a 
soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt opeƌates that faĐilitate oƌ ĐoŶstƌaiŶ aĐtiǀities͛ ;“ŵith, Chatfield aŶd PagŶuĐĐo, ϭϵϵϳ: 
66). These will frame this dissertation. However, as will be argued below, greater attention will be given 
to the internal dynamics: collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisations structures, in 
order to identify the characteristics of Israeli peace activism, before turning to how they interact with 
the external power of movement, political opportunity structures. This analysis will be supplemented by 
the theory of ͚dǇŶaŵiĐs of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ; MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, ϮϬϭϭͿ, ǁhiĐh puts the 
powers of movement in motion, enabling an understanding of the trajectories of Israeli peace activism, 
rather than single episodes. This will lead to the identification and analysis of cycles of contention, which 
denote the cyclical booms and busts of social movement activity. In addition, attention will be given to 
underexplored areas of social movement theory, the international dimension and gender dynamics. The 
nature of the government, which has often been posited as the key element influencing the trajectory of 
a social movement (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfield, 2002; Tilly, 1995; Wolfsfeld, 1988; McAdam, 1982), will 
also be considered to determine whether Israeli peace activism conforms to existing models. 
A number of scholars have also directly applied social movement theory to their studies of the Israeli 
peace movement (Ginsburg, 2009; Hermann, 2009, 2002, 1996; Meyer, 2004, 2002; Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld, 2002; Peleg, 2000) and whilst others do not refer directly to social movement theory, it is 
possible to relate some of their conclusions and evaluations to aspects of social movement theory 
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(Lieberfeld, 2009a, 2009b; Lemish and Barzel, 2000, Shadmi, 2000; Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer 1996, 
Sharoni, 1995). Although peace activism since the second Intifada maybe too fragmented to constitute a 
sustained social movement, the tools still have explanatory power even in relation to activism falling 
short of a sustained large-scale movement and have been applied to studies of such activism 
successfully (Staggenborg and Lecomte, 2009; Tilly and Wood, 2009; Carty and Onyett, 2007; Snow et al, 
2007; Bevington and Dixon, 2005; Meyer, 2004, 2002; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Smith, 
Chatfield Pagnucco, 1997; Markoff, 1996; Diamond, 1995). 
Studies on Israeli peace activism (Hermann, 2009, 2002; Halper, 2005; Gordon, 2000) have argued that 
the movement was paralysed following the outbreak of the second Intifada, unable and unwilling to 
respond to the prevailing events. However, exploring Israeli peace activism through the framework 
based on Tarrow (2011) will show that not all parts of the Israeli peace movement were paralysed. 
Whilst the groups in the liberal Zionist component were unable and unwilling to respond, which led to 
their demobilisation, groups within the radical and human rights components emerged and continued to 
challenge the prevailing realities.  
This chapter will first review the literature on social movement theory, identifying the key 
developments. It will consider each of the four powers of movement in turn, identifying useful analytic 
concepts with which to build a framework to approach this dissertation. The framework will continue to 
be developed by considering the interactive nature of the four powers of movements and a more 
dynamic approach developed by Tarrow (2011). It will then explore two main areas in which the theory 
is underdeveloped, the international dimension and gender dynamics, suggesting ways in which to 
incorporate them into this study of Israeli peace activism. Having outlined the theoretical framework of 
this dissertation, the review will move to studies on Israeli peace activism, identifying those that will 
help inform this study and areas in which this study will add to this body of literature. I will then outline 
some aspects of Israeli political culture that will be useful in understanding the trajectory of Israeli peace 
activism. I will then summarise the approach this dissertation will take. 
2 SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
There are a number of definitions of a social movement, dependent on where the focus lies. 
Some emphasise the external-facing nature of a social movement, based on the view that a social 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt seeks to iŶflueŶĐe eǆteƌŶal foƌĐes: ͚a social movement is a network of informal interactions 
ďetǁeeŶ a pluƌalitǇ of iŶdiǀiduals, gƌoups aŶd/oƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶs eŶgaged iŶ a politiĐal oƌ Đultuƌal ĐoŶfliĐt͛ 
(Diani, 1992:13). Others are explicit in noting that the social movement is in conflict with decision-
makers and authority-holders, statiŶg that the soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt is ͚eŶgaged iŶ ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith the poǁeƌ 
holders and other status-quo representatives. As such, movements develop collective identities…eǀeŶ 
thƌough theiƌ ǁagiŶg of ĐoŶfliĐt to ďƌiŶg aďout soĐial ĐhaŶge͛ ;CoǇ ϮϬϬϭ, ǀiiiͿ. These defiŶitioŶs aƌe 
ďased oŶ TillǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϴͿ ǁoƌk that aƌgues that a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt is defiŶed aĐĐoƌdiŶg to its ƌelatioŶship 
with politics and should be analysed as such. Tarrow (2011:9) also considers the interactions between a 
soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŶd the eǆteƌŶal foƌĐes as iŵpoƌtaŶt.  He defiŶes a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt as ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe 
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challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, 
oppoŶeŶts aŶd authoƌities.͛ This defiŶitioŶ, ǁhilst aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg the eǆteƌŶal foƌĐes, also poiŶts to a 
greater concern for the internal characteristics of a social movement by considering the shared goals 
and links between the activists. It is this approach that this dissertation will take, since giving preference 
to the external factors will not enable a detailed understanding of what is going on inside the 
movement. Whilst the external factors do play an important role, it is how the internal characteristics 
interact with the external environment that explains the trajectory of a social movement. 
Tarrow (2011) develops a synthesis of social movement theory that enables an understanding of each of 
the factors within his definition. This synthesis involǀes ͚fouƌ poǁeƌs of ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛: collective action 
frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation structures and political opportunity structures. This 
dissertation will be analysed and structured along these powers of movement. They were not initially 
theorised by Tarrow (2011) but are collated elements which had been advanced in the field of social 
movements. The development of each of the powers of movement will be outlined in turn, highlighting 
why disaggregating each of the powers of movement before assessing how they interact with each 
other, provides the most complete characterisation and understanding of a social movement.  
2.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
The ͚politiĐal pƌoĐess ŵodel͛, ǁhiĐh ƌefeƌs to the theoƌǇ of politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes, was 
deǀeloped to foĐus oŶ a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s ƌespoŶse to aŶd iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ǁith the ĐoŶteǆt iŶ ǁhiĐh it ǁas 
operating, particularly the political environment (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:16). This was based 
oŶ TillǇ͛s ǁoƌk ;ϭϵϳϴͿ iŶ ǁhiĐh he ideŶtified Đertain conditions for mobilisation, in particular whether the 
environment provides opportunities or threats for mobilisation and whether it will facilitate or repress 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt Đlaiŵs. This led to a tƌaditioŶ of lookiŶg at hoǁ the ͚politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes͛, the 
factors in the external environment that facilitate or constrain activism (Tilly, 1978), affect a social 
movement. Tarrow (1983) and McAdam (1982) continued to argue that there is a link between 
institutionalised politics and a social movement. However, criticisms arose that political opportunities 
were in danger of explaining everything, and therefore explaining nothing. According to Gamson and 
Meyer (1996:275), ͚the ĐoŶĐept of politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes is iŶ tƌouďle, iŶ daŶgeƌ of ďeĐoŵing a 
spoŶge that soaks up ǀiƌtuallǇ eǀeƌǇ aspeĐt of the soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͛   
Attempts were therefore made to build a schema of POS to narrow its explanatory scope (Tarrow, 1994; 
Kriesi, 1995). This focused mainly on the nature of the institutionalised political system. In particular, the 
role of the government was considered an important variable of political opportunity structures (Tilly 
1995; Wolfsfeld, 1988; McAdam, 1982), with some arguing this to be the main factor in affecting the 
ability of a social movement or group to achieve their goals and influence policy change (Gidron, Katz 
and Hasenfeld, 2002:213). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald identify four dimensions of the POS related to 
the institutionalised political system: 
  
 21 
 
 
 
1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; 
2) The stability of the broad set of elite alignments; 
3) The presence of allies within the elite 
4) The state͛s ĐapaĐitǇ aŶd pƌopeŶsitǇ foƌ ƌepƌessioŶ ;MĐAdaŵ, MĐCaƌthǇ aŶd )ald ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϬͿ 
This model argues that the government and political elites play a significant role in either facilitating or 
constraining movement activity and that a social movement aims to directly impact the government, 
either by encouraging elites to promote the message of the movement, in order to change policy, or by 
making the public aware of certain actions of the government. Furthermore, the government has the 
ability to quash or encourage specific extra-parliamentary activities through the police force or military. 
Whilst this model is useful in those instances where a social movement does wish to impact the 
institutionalised political system, it does not account for those cases where the activists are not 
interested in having influence in that arena or in circumstances where the relationship between the 
government and the social movement may be more complex than the model allows for. The relationship 
between Israeli peace activism and the institutionalised political system, in particular the relationship 
with the government, will be considered in order to determine whether it conforms to the theory. 
The political process model was criticised for ignoring social movement agency (Morris, 2000). Attempts 
have been made to attribute agency to social movements by focusing on how they respond to political 
opportunity structures. According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:15), whilst a movement may 
emerge from changes in the political opportunity structures, the trajectory of the social movement will 
depend upon their own strategies. Furthermore, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) argue that political 
opportunities and threats must be attributed to the external environment by social movement actors in 
oƌdeƌ to eǆist as suĐh. PolitiĐal oppoƌtuŶities aƌe defiŶed as ͚sets of Đlues that eŶĐouƌage people to 
eŶgage iŶ ĐoŶteŶtious politiĐs͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϯϮͿ aŶd politiĐal thƌeats aƌe ͚those faĐtoƌs…that 
disĐouƌage ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϯϮͿ. This ĐoŶfeƌs a sigŶifiĐaŶt aŵouŶt of ageŶĐǇ oŶ the soĐial 
movement. However, how they respond is not arbitrary but depends on their internal dynamics, 
particularly how they frame the prevailing realities. This dissertation will therefore focus on delving into 
the internal dynamics of a social movement prior to understanding how they perceive and respond to 
political opportunity structures in order to provide greater insights. These will now be outlined in the 
order they will be explored in the dissertation. Whilst there is no chronological order in which a social 
movement develops its internal characteristics, in trying to understand and explain their trajectories it 
serves well to begin with the collective action frames, to determine how the social movement views the 
external realities and themselves, then the tactical repertoires, which are often strongly related to the 
collective action frames, followed by the mobilisation structures, which identifies the organisational 
bases that the movement is built on. 
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2.2 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES 
A further dimension of social movement theory emerged based on criticisms that there had 
been a lack of attention to ideas, sentiments and culture in previous approaches, such as the political 
process model. Building from GoffmaŶ͛s ;ϭϵϳϰͿ ͚fƌaŵe aŶalǇsis,͛ a number of scholars brought a social 
psychological dimension to studies of social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988; Snow, et al. 1986). 
Framing refers to the ways in which social movements assign meaning to themselves and the prevailing 
ƌealities. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to MĐAdaŵ, MĐCaƌthǇ aŶd )ald ;ϭϵϵϲ:ϲͿ the teƌŵ ƌefeƌs to the ͚ĐoŶsĐious strategic 
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and themselves that legitimate 
aŶd ŵotiǀate ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ͛. It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to foĐus oŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶs fƌaŵes ďeĐause,  
͚Whateǀeƌ else soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt aĐtoƌs do, theǇ seek to affect interpretations of reality 
among various audiences; they engage in this framing work because they assume, 
ƌightlǇ oƌ ǁƌoŶglǇ, that ŵeaŶiŶg is pƌefatoƌǇ to aĐtioŶ͛ ;BeŶfoƌd, ϭϵϵϳ:ϰϭϬͿ.  
Benford and Snow (2000) identify a range of core framing tasks that will help in understanding Israeli 
peace activism. Diagnostic framing is the identification of the problems and causes of the issue of 
contention (Benford and Snow, 2000:616). Prognostic framing is the task of proposing a solution to the 
area of contention, or the strategies for reaching such a solution (Benford and Snow, 2000:616). 
Motivational framing is the task of presenting the ideas and messages that encourage people to act 
(Benford and Snow, 2000:616). Benford and Snow (2000) also identify a number of framing processes 
that will be useful in explaining the changes in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism over time.  Frame 
bridging is the process of connecting two previously unconnected frames related to a particular issue 
(Benford and Snow, 2000:624). Frame extension is the process of adding other issues to the primary 
concern of the social movement organisation (Benford and Snow, 2000:625). Frame transformation is 
the process of shifting old understandings and beliefs regarding an area of contention or creating new 
ideas ;BeŶfoƌd aŶd “Ŷoǁ, ϮϬϬϬ:ϲϮϱͿ. Fƌaŵe aŵplifiĐatioŶ is the pƌoĐess of ͚eŵďellishiŶg, ĐlaƌifǇiŶg oƌ 
iŶǀigoƌatiŶg͛ eǆistiŶg uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs aŶd ďeliefs ;BeŶfoƌd aŶd “Ŷoǁ, ϮϬϬϬ:ϲϮϱͿ. The core framing tasks 
and the framing processes will be analysed in relation to each of the components to help distinguish 
between them and to characterise and analyse their trajectories.  
The ability of a group or a movement to mobilise individuals and achieve change, whether in 
government policy or in challenging certain ideas and norms in society depends in part on the extent to 
which the message they present, the meanings they construct and the identity they portray, resonate 
with individuals and general trends in society (Benford and Snow, 2000:618-622). In order to mobilise 
the public, activists must frame their goals and purpose in a way that resonates with their target 
audience. Understanding how different groups seek to challenge Israeli political culture will be 
significant in analysing the relative success of different peace groups in achieving mobilisation and 
challenging prevailing opinions. The greater the extent to which a peace group can raise awareness of 
the issues, by leading public campaigns and gaining media attention, in a way that does not antagonise 
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the Israeli public but does shock them enough to re-focus on the continued occupation, the more likely 
they will be to mobilise individuals for their cause. A comparison of studies undertaken of two 
pƌoŵiŶeŶt Isƌaeli ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe groups, Arba Imahot and Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor, provide clear evidence of 
the effect of identity and issue framing, despite the fact that these scholars do not explicitly refer to 
framing as an analytical tool for understanding social movement groups (Ginsberg, 2009; Lieberfeld, 
2009a, 2009b; Lemish and Barzel, 2000, Shadmi, 2000; Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer 1996, Sharoni, 1995).The 
studies show that the ways in which these two groups framed themselves determined levels of 
mobilisation achieved and ability to influence policy change. Therefore, an understanding of the political 
culture of Israel and public opinion will help to understand whether Israeli peace activism is able to 
attract participants through their collective action frames. However, in some cases activists may have 
decided not to influence the public and therefore the level of resonation with them is not relevant in 
analysing their trajectory. However, they will have a target audience and so how they resonate with this 
will be important.  
In addition, the ability for a social movement to build a common message or goal will determine the 
level of cohesion amongst the different organisations and groups and therefore their potential for mass 
ŵoďilisatioŶ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt theoƌǇ, a ͚ŵasteƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵe͛, ǁhiĐh is ǁide 
enough in scope, with adequate cultural resonance to encompass smaller movements and organisations 
(Benford and Snow, 2000:618-619), helps to unite a movement. The collective action frames of Israeli 
peace activism will be analysed to determine whether a master frame was developed during the 
different phases. 
2.3 TACTICAL REPERTOIRES 
Studies that focused on the political process model also looked at the forms of contention that 
people eŵploǇed, ǁhiĐh Đaŵe to ďe kŶoǁŶ as ͚ĐoŶteŶtious ƌepeƌtoiƌes͛ oƌ ͚ƌepeƌtoiƌes of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ 
;TillǇ, ϭϵϵϱͿ. TheǇ aƌe ͚the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh people aĐt togetheƌ iŶ puƌsuit of shaƌed iŶteƌests͛ ;TillǇ, 
1995:41). These are not only ways in which actors act and the methods they employ but also what they 
know to do since, according to Tilly (1995), repertoires are culturally embedded and socially 
constructed. This means that activists build on previously known forms of collective action, 
deŵoŶstƌatiŶg ǁhat the aĐtoƌs ͚kŶoǁ hoǁ to do͛ aŶd ǁhat the audieŶĐe would expect them to do 
(Tarrow, 2011:39), rather than inventing tactics from nothing. Therefore, changes tend to be 
incremental. Studies that aim to synthesise the powers of movement tend not to treat repertoires of 
contention as a distinct factor but include them in one of the other powers of movement (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, 1996). However, in this dissertation they will be treated as a separate factor that 
provides further characterisation and explanation of the trajectory of a social movement, following the 
approach of Tarrow (2011).  
The relative success of different types of tactics is a contested issue, in particular whether violent 
methods are more likely to achieve change than non-violent methods. Adding theories of non-violent 
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activism to social movement theory can provide further understanding of why actors chose certain 
tactics and whether they brought about change and be will used in this dissertation. Pape (2005) and 
Arregún-Toft (2005) argue that movements choose violent methods because they are more effective in 
achieving their desired outcomes. However, studies on non-violent action have shown otherwise 
(Tarrow 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Sharp, 2003, 1973a, 1973b; Scott, 1985). The studies 
show that whilst violent action may attract more attention from the media and the authorities, fewer 
participants are likely to join in and the goals of the movement may be undermined, with the authorities 
having more leverage to suppress the action. Non-violent but disruptive behaviour, whilst not as news-
worthy, is likely to be a more acceptable form of action for the mainstream public as it is seen as less 
risky and a more legitimate form of demonstrating. Individuals often choose this form of action because 
they have understood that violent action is unnecessary and counterproductive (Stephan and 
Chenoweth, 2008). 
Whilst overtime non-violent action tends to lose its innovative edge, reducing the power it contained, 
which can result in periphery activists withdrawing their participation (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly and Tarrow, 
2007), the large variety of non-violent methods that are available to activists (Sharp, 1973a) can 
overcome the problem. Furthermore, if the authorities respond with repression and violence then, not 
only does this gain media attention but, empathy is directed towards the protestors (Gordon, 2010). 
One form of non-ǀioleŶt aĐtioŶ is kŶoǁŶ as ͚diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ͛, whereby activists aim to create change 
directly through their actions and not by making claims on authorities or another party. Direct action 
can be provocative enough to be suppressed but not violent enough to receive condemnation from the 
public. Scott (1985) in his study of the resistance of peasant communities argues that small-scale tactics 
can also be effective. He notes how ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ foƌŵs of ƌesistaŶĐe͛ ĐaŶ sloǁlǇ Đhip aǁaǇ at the aƌea of 
contention and can eventually lead to change, which will provide an interesting element to consider in 
studying Israeli peace activism. 
It must be noted that a social movement or group does not have an unlimited choice of tactics available 
to them but are constrained by the context within which they act and the resources they have available 
to them (Meyer, 2004). Levels of mobilisation are dependent on individuals͛ attitudes of what is an 
acceptable form of action (Wolfsfeld, 1988). This is based in the political culture, which influence what a 
society thinks is acceptable and therefore will determine whether certain tactics will encourage or 
dissuade individuals from participating. Political opportunity structures, organisational structures and 
ideological positions inform the range of tactics that may be available to actors, who then choose which 
of these to employ that aƌe ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith aŶd ƌeiŶfoƌĐe theiƌ ͚ideologiĐal ideŶtitǇ͛(Tilly and Tarrow, 
2007). The appropriateness of certain tactics in the eyes of Israeli society will be explored.  
2.4 MOBILISATION STRUCTURES 
Following renewed interest in social movements in 1960s, with the Civil Rights Movement and 
the Anti-war movement, McCarthy and Zald (1977) began to focus on the increasing availability of 
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resources to individuals and groups as means of explaining how social movements form and develop. 
Their resource mobilisation theory became a dominant paradigm in social movement studies (Tarrow, 
2011:24). They argued for the importance of the availability of resources if a social movement is to 
mobilise however, it was later noted that this is not sufficient; mobilisation also requires the 
coordination of available resources and a strategic attempt to convert these into collective action 
;Edǁaƌds aŶd MĐCaƌthǇ, ϮϬϬϳ:ϭϭϲͿ. ‘esouƌĐe ŵoďilisatioŶ also puts eŵphasis oŶ the ͚oƌgaŶisatioŶal 
ďases͛ of a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt ;MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, ϮϬϬϭ:ϭϱͿ that ƌefeƌ to the ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
infrastructures that suppoƌt aŶd ĐoŶditioŶ ŵoďilisatioŶ͛ ;“ŵith, Chatfield aŶd PagŶuĐĐo, ϭϵϵϳ:ϲϳͿ, ǁhiĐh 
aĐt as the ͚ďuildiŶg ďloĐks͛ of a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt ;MĐCaƌthǇ, ϭϵϵϲͿ.  
McCarthy (1996:145) stressed the importance of mapping the mobilisation structures in order to 
characterise the different forms and allow for a comparison across movements and over time. He maps 
fouƌ ͚diŵeŶsioŶs of ŵoǀeŵeŶt-ŵoďilisiŶg stƌuĐtuƌes͛ ;MĐCaƌthǇ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϰϱ; Figuƌe ϭͿ. His ŵodel brings 
together the range and variety of mobilisation forms that have been identified and developed by social 
movement scholars. He divides these along four dimensions: informal, non-movement structures; 
informal movement structures; formal non-movement structures; and formal movement structures. 
These incorporate the ďƌoad ƌaŶge of ŵoďilisatioŶ stƌuĐtuƌes fƌoŵ ͚soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt organisation 
foƌŵs͛ to the ͚ƌaŶge of eǀeƌǇdaǇ life ŵiĐƌo ŵoďilisatioŶ stƌuĐtuƌal soĐial loĐatioŶs͛ (McCarthy, 1996:145). 
This model will be used to map the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism. 
Figure 1 Dimensions of movement-mobilising structures 
 Non-movement Movement 
Informal Friendship networks 
Neighbours 
Work networks 
Activist networks 
Affinity groups 
Memory communities 
Formal Churches 
Unions 
Professional associations 
SMOs 
Protests committees 
Movement schools 
Source: McCarthy (1996:145) 
According to Clemens (1996) movement actors engage in debate over the most appropriate forms of 
organisation and must frame the appropriateness in order to mobilise individuals.  Social movement 
studies have developed generalisations over appropriateness of different organisation forms. 
Staggenborg (1995) finds that social movement organisations that have a radical ideology and are 
committed to participatory democracy and empowerment are likely to produce cultural change, 
whereas organisations with more formal structures are better able to achieve specific policy outcomes.  
Others look at the extent of centralisation within the organisation (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). 
They argue that a decentralised organisation will allow for greater fluidity and dynamism, which actually 
preserves the cohesiveness of the organisation. However, a stronger, more formal organisational 
structure may have greater success in mobilising participants and resources, thus increasing their 
potential to influence policy change. This is because it promotes a common objective and creates a 
strong degree of coordination amongst participants (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). The 
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organisational forms of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism will be explored, identifying 
their appropriateness in relation to the collective action frames and their ability to mobilise given 
certain political opportunity structures.  
2.5 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE POWERS OF MOVEMENT 
Initially these frameworks for understanding social movement theory were treated as different 
schools of thought. In the 1980s students in North America began to adopt a common agenda for 
studying social movements that brought together each of these factors (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 
2001). However, as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001:16) argue, they tended to put emphasis on one of 
the lines of thought and did not provide a full synthesis. Attempts were therefore made to synthesise 
each of these elements. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) argued that the three factors, collective 
action frames, political opportunity structures and mobilisation structures interact with each other, with 
changes in one affecting the others. Tarrow (2011) goes further to include repertoires of contention as a 
fouƌth ͚poǁeƌ of ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛.  It is these iŶteƌaĐtiǀe ƌelatioŶships that help to eǆplaiŶ the eŵeƌgeŶĐe, 
trajectory and impact of the movement and are therefore essential in understanding a social movement. 
For example, a collective action frame may shift in order to attract a new mobilisation target or the 
nature of public opinion may inhibit a collective action frame gaining resonance. Whilst the interactive 
nature of the powers of movement is essential to fully understand social movement activity, 
disaggregating the characteristics of a movement into the four separate factors enables a more detailed 
understanding of the social movement. Once they have been outlined and explained in turn, they can 
then be brought together to fully understand the trajectory of a social movement.  
2.6 CYCLES OF CONTENTION 
This classic social movement agenda served the basis of studies of social movements but has 
been criticised for being overly static and structural (Tarrow, 2011; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; 
McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, 2001; Snow and Benford, 2000). Attempts were put forward to develop a 
ŵoƌe dǇŶaŵiĐ appƌoaĐh to the studǇ of soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶts. ‘atheƌ thaŶ foĐusiŶg oŶ the ͚laďelled ďoǆes,͛ 
the dynamic approach to mobilisation looks more closely at the arrows that connect the boxes (Tarrow, 
ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϵϬ; MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, ϮϬϬϭ:ϭϴͿ, theƌeďǇ eǆplaiŶiŶg the ͚hoǁ͛ of soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt 
ŵoďilisatioŶ. MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ ;ϮϬϬϭ:ϭϴϵͿ deǀeloped a ͚dǇŶaŵiĐ, iŶteƌaĐtiǀe fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ 
aŶalǇsiŶg ŵoďilisatioŶ iŶ ĐoŶteŶtious politiĐs.͛ This led to the deǀelopŵeŶt of a theoƌǇ of ĐǇĐles of 
contention, which refers to the waves of activity in a social movement. A cycle of contention is defined 
as, 
͚ A phase of heighteŶed ĐoŶfliĐt aĐƌoss the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective 
action from more mobilised to less mobilised sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the forms 
of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ eŵploǇed aŶd the ĐƌeatioŶ of Ŷeǁ oƌ tƌaŶsfoƌŵed ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵes…͛ 
(Tarrow: 2011:199).  
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How ĐeƌtaiŶ ͚ďƌoad ĐhaŶge pƌoĐesses͛, ǁhiĐh aƌe shifts iŶ the politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes, aƌe 
perceived will determine the trajectory of the cycle of contention. Attributing an opportunity to mobilise 
to a shift in the political opportunity structures leads to a pƌoĐess of iŶŶoǀatioŶ, pƌoduĐiŶg ͚Ŷeǁ oƌ 
tƌaŶsfoƌŵed sǇŵďols, fƌaŵes of ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd ideologies to justifǇ aŶd digŶifǇ ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, 
2011: 204). Organisational and social resources, which include different types of mobilisation structures, 
are also appropriated in the process of innovation. How the authorities respond will then affect the 
continued trajectory of the social movement. 
Cycles of contention can be understood through the mechanisms and processes that are outlined in the 
dynamic approach. For example, exhaustion forms as a result of weariness and disillusionment due to 
the lack of progress of a movement (Tarrow, 2011:190). Exhaustion leads to arguments between 
activists and divisions over what methods should be used and what goals should be pursued, which can 
contribute to an attribution of threat to the shifting political opportunity structures and thus the 
demobilisation of the movement. Klandermans (2009:128) in researching union activism in the US in 
1991 notes that activists became burnt out, they lost motivation and became cynical, leading to an 
͚eƌosioŶ of suppoƌt͛.   Radicalisation is another mechanism that can be identified in a cycle of contention 
whereby there is a shift in ideological perspectives towards more extreme positions and the adoption of 
more disruptive tactics (Tarrow, 2011:190). This can lead to either the attribution of an opportunity to 
the prevailing realities or an attribution of threat, often depending on the extent of the radicalisation 
and the response from the authorities. 
The processes and mechanisms that are involved in the trajectory of a social movement tend to be 
determined by, and in turn determine, their collective action frames, tactical repertoires and 
mobilisation structures. Given that it is argued that the trajectory of a social movement is dependent on 
the ways in which they perceive the changes in the political opportunity structures, groups within the 
social movement that have different internal characteristics will therefore perceive the political 
opportunity structures differently. It is therefore possible for different parts of a social movement to 
experience different processes and therefore go through differing cycles of contention. This is not 
explicit in the theory of cycles of contention and therefore suggests an extension is needed whereby 
different components of the same social movement, who are engaged in the same overall struggle, can 
experience different cycles of contention in the same time period. Cycles of contention will be identified 
and explained for each of the components of Israeli peace activism. 
Whilst these mechanisms and processes are an important and useful progression of social movement 
theory and help explain further elements of the social movement trajectory, it does not require ignoring 
the classical social movement agenda. The four factors: collective action frames; tactical repertoires; 
and mobilisation structures provide a suitable way of unearthing the characteristics of a social 
movement and the analytical tools that can be taken from each of the original schools of thought still 
provide useful ways of understanding a social movement. The mechanisms and processes and the 
concept of cycles of contention can be used in addition to the classical social movement agenda, 
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providing further insights but not at the expense of disaggregating the powers of movement. This 
approach will be taken in this study of Israeli peace activism. The main empirical chapters of this 
dissertation will explore each of the internal factors for the three components of Israeli peace activism. 
Having identified and explained these characteristics, how they interact with the political opportunity 
structures and the cycles of contention will be explored using the mechanisms and processes 
highlighted by Tarrow (2011) and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). 
2.7 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA  
The links between a domestic movement and the international dimension have been shown to 
play an important role in movement trajectory (Poloni-Staudriger, 2014; Batliwala and Brown, 2006; 
Tarrow, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Smith, Chatfield and 
Pagnucco, 1997). Most of these studies look at transnational activism and how the domestic context 
affects transnational activism however, the broader connection between the international arena and a 
domestic social movement also needs to be explored. The international dimension in this case should 
not be conceived of as a separate structure that is located above the domestic level and determines the 
actions of states and domestic actors by virtue of the structural relationship as conceived by Waltz 
(1979) and Keohane and Nye (1977). For the purposes of understanding a social movement, it is more 
appropriate and useful to conceive the international dimension as the individual empirical elements that 
occur on international level and interact with and affect a domestic social movement. For example, 
events that occur amongst states in the international level such as wars or peace agreements; 
resolutions passed by international institutions; networks that cross borders and ideas that are spread 
globally. The connection between the international arena and a domestic social movement can be seen 
both in mobilising structures and political opportunity structures. 
2.7.1 INTERNATIONAL MOBILISING STRUCTURES 
International mobilising structures have mainly been conceived through the ways in which a 
domestic movement seeks to increase its material capacity and gain a new audience to help further 
their cause. Some do look at how and why a domestic social movement connects with international 
mobilisation structures and their studies will be useful in this case (Tarrow, 2005; Risse-Kappen, Ropp 
and Sikkink, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  Keck and Sikkink (1998) theorise the process by which 
domestic actors, who are unable to achieve change locally, appeal to the international dimension, most 
ofteŶ tƌaŶsŶatioŶal adǀoĐaĐǇ Ŷetǁoƌks, defiŶed as ͚aĐtoƌs ǁoƌkiŶg iŶteƌŶationally on an issue, bound 
togetheƌ ďǇ shaƌed ǀalues aŶd a deŶse eǆĐhaŶge of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd seƌǀiĐes͛ ;KeĐk aŶd “ikkiŶk, 
1998:89), to promote their cause and pressure their own governments to put pressure on the 
government of the country in which the soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt is opeƌatiŶg. This is kŶoǁŶ as the ͚ďooŵeƌaŶg 
pƌoĐess͛. Key mechanisms involved are diffusion, which allows for the spread of different forms of 
activism to different parts of the world and brokerage, which creates links between previously 
unconnected actors to allow for transnational communication. Through these processes domestic actors 
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are able to gain access to new resources, information and legitimacy (Tarrow, 2005:190-199). Such links 
can create the possibility for domestic activists to increase their material capacity and benefit from the 
diffusion of collective action frames. Furthermore if transnational networks are promoting similar 
causes to that of a social movement, this will increase their chances of achieving policy change and 
challenging dominant perceptions of the conflict. 
Risse-KappeŶ, ‘opp aŶd “ikkiŶk ;ϭϵϵϵͿ Ŷote that ofteŶ ǁheŶ the ͚ďooŵeƌaŶg͛ Đoŵes ďaĐk, it is still 
unable to achieve an impact in the domestic arena and therefore they ĐoŶĐeiǀe of a ͚spiƌal ŵodel͛, 
where the boomerang is continuously thrown back out to the international dimension, until change is 
achieved locally. Tarrow (2005) suggests a ƌefiŶeŵeŶt of the ďooŵeƌaŶg pƌoĐess thƌough his ͚Đoŵposite 
ŵodel of eǆteƌŶalisatioŶ͛. This aƌgues that the Ŷatuƌe of the Đlosed opportunity structures domestically 
will affect how the boomerang is framed. Tarrow (2005:195) notes that the validation and legitimisation 
of transnational activism on domestic soil is difficult because foreign intervention of any kind is viewed 
as suspect and has the potential to threaten power asymmetries. He identifies two possible domestic 
blockages, either a lack of responsiveness or repression, arguing that these will lead to different 
trajectories for the social movement.  
Each of these theories provides interesting insights into how a domestic movement appeals to 
mobilisation structures in the international dimension. However, it would be useful to combine the 
spiƌal ŵodel ǁith Taƌƌoǁ͛s ŵodel iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoǀide a ŵoƌe detailed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the trajectory of 
the domestic social movement. In some cases the nature of the blockage may shift each time the 
boomerang returns home and therefore the trajectory, framing and potential impact of the social 
movement will shift. This will be particularly useful in understanding how the way in which the domestic 
realm perceives connections between a social movement and the international arena affects the social 
movement. Attention will be given to the international mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism, 
as well as how this is perceived by domestic structures, which will shed new light on this area of social 
movement theory. 
2.7.2 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
The international dimension of political opportunity will also arguably play a role in determining 
the extent to which a group is able to mobilise or achieve their goals in a similar way that domestic 
structures do. Whilst a number of scholars refer to political opportunity in their accounts of the Israeli 
peace movement (Hermann, 2009, 2002, 1996; Meyer, 2004; Peleg, 2000), there is not an explicit 
reference to international political opportunity structures. Some scholars do make reference to the 
effect of the Gulf War on Israeli peace activism, arguing that the Gulf War was a severe blow for Israeli 
peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ siŶĐe Aƌafat͛s suppoƌt of “addaŵ HusseiŶ ĐhalleŶged the legitiŵaĐǇ of the peaĐe 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s Đlaiŵ that the PalestiŶiaŶs ǁaŶted peaĐe ǁith Isƌael ;HeƌŵaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϵ; KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲͿ.  
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However, there is a lack of attention, in both the theoretical literature and the literature on Israel, to the 
various factors of the international dimension that are not immediately connected to the situation in 
Israel, that could shape and in turn be shaped by a domestic peace movement.  Domestic movements 
do not only occur within the domestic arena but also within an international context. There are certain 
opportunities and threats in the international dimension that, if perceived as such, can facilitate or 
constrain domestic activities. This can be as a result of the international environment, within which the 
movement operates, shiftiŶg oƌ eǀeŶts that diƌeĐtlǇ affeĐt the ŵoǀeŵeŶt. Whilst Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱ:ϴϬͿ 
process of internalisation, which describes the migration of international pressures and conflicts into 
domestic politics, makes an important step towards understanding the role of international pressures, it 
focuses on aspects of the international dimension that directly impact a social movement, namely 
pressure from international institutions on a government, which will elicit a certain response from the 
social movement. This concept does not cover general shifts in the international arena that are not 
directed at the country in which the movement is operating but can still impact the trajectory of the 
social movement, which requires further theorisation. This dissertation will consider shifts in the 
international dimension, both direct and indirect to Israeli peace activism, and how they impact the 
trajectory of the social movement, again shedding new light.  
2.8 THE ROLE OF GENDER DYNAMICS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Gender dynamics can also be identified as an important factor affecting and explaining social 
movement activity. Ferree and Mueller (2007) argue that gender needs to be incorporated into social 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt theoƌǇ. Whilst theƌe haǀe ďeeŶ studies oŶ Isƌaeli ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ aŶd theiƌ ƌole aŶd 
dynamics in relation to the gender dynamics in Israeli society (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 
2011; Levy, 2007; Werczberger, 2001; Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Shadmi, 2000; Sharoni, 1995), there has 
been less attention given to incorporating a gender dynamic in understanding the peace movement as a 
whole.  
Studies have noted that historically there has been greater participation of women than men in extra-
parliamentary activity in Israel, with many peace groups being started and sustained by women (Bar-On, 
1996; Kaminer, 1996). Cohen (2001:95) argues that perhaps men find it easier to compartmentalise 
their emotional reactions to suffering, whereas women are less able to do so and feel the need to act in 
response to their moral reactions. The conventional explanation, however, seems to be that 
institutionalised politics in Israel is relatively closed to women (Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Shadmi, 2000) 
and that they tend to be excluded from issues of national security (Halperin, 2007; Shadmi, 2000), partly 
ďased oŶ theiƌ eǆĐlusioŶ fƌoŵ Đoŵďat aŶd elite uŶits iŶ Isƌael͛s ŵilitaƌǇ uŶtil the ŵiddle of the ϭϵϵϬs 
(Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011; Levy, 2007). The stress placed on the unequal and inferior 
position of women in Israeli society needs to be considered further to ensure that the gender roles they 
assign are not overly rigid.  
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Sharoni (1995) and Werczberger (2001) confirm the arguments put forward above, noting that women 
have historically been excluded from the negotiating table, a symptom of the underlying gender 
relations in Israeli society. The rhetoric in Israel is one which stresses the masculine image of men 
fighting and protecting, with women and children representing victims in need of protection (Sharoni, 
1995:23-24). Prime Minister David Ben Gurion referred to these gender roles in public speeches, 
highlightiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s feƌtilitǇ as a ŶatioŶal pƌioƌitǇ.3 The importance placed on the military in Israeli 
society further embeds these gender dynamics, with women excluded from high ranking positions, 
ǁhiĐh spills iŶto ĐiǀiliaŶ life thƌough the ĐƌeatioŶ of aŶ ͚old ďoǇ͛s͛ Ŷetǁoƌk ;WeƌĐzďeƌgeƌ, ϮϬϬϭͿ. IŶ states 
with prominent militaries, it is argued that the social hierarchy of citizens is structured by the republican 
ethos, ǁheƌeďǇ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s status iŶ soĐietǇ is diƌeĐtlǇ ƌelated to theiƌ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the ĐolleĐtiǀe 
͚ĐoŵŵoŶ good͛ ;“hafiƌ, ϭϵϵϴͿ. The ŵale Đoŵďat soldieƌ teŶds to be the main recipient of social status 
through the republican ethos. Women have generally been restricted from gaining the benefits of the 
ƌepuďliĐaŶ ethos siŶĐe theǇ ǁeƌe ďaƌƌed fƌoŵ Đoŵďat duties. This theƌefoƌe ĐoŶstƌaiŶs ǁoŵeŶ͛s ǀoiĐes 
on issues of national security and renders males voices the dominant authority (Sasson-Levy, Levy and 
Lomsky-Feder, 2011). This was the prevailing situation for the first four and a half decades of Israel, with 
women not having access to combat roles in the military. However, women began to gain access to 
these roles in the 1990s, partly as a result of the demand from women to be allowed access to all 
military roles, including combat, in order to re-structure their status in society (Sasson-Levy, Levy and 
Lomsky-Feder, 2011: 745). 
This changing situation has resulted in many examples where Israeli women have obtained equal 
opportunities as men and are not excluded from institutionalised politics or debates on national 
security. At the beginning of 2012 the three leaders of the opposition parties were all women and there 
are a number of women in other influential positions in Israeli society. However, whilst women do have 
access to positions of power in Israeli society, they are arguably not struggling for underlying gender 
eƋualitǇ ďut foƌ the ͚ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of theiƌ aďilitǇ to appeaƌ ŵasĐuliŶe͛ ;LeǀǇ, ϮϬϬϳ:ϭϭϯ; “haƌoŶi, ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϳͿ. 
One prominent example was Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was considered a woman playing at being 
a man and did not challenge the dominance of the patriarchy in Israel nor empower women to advance 
their status (Sharoni, 1995:99). Furthermore, the Israeli military has not become a site for gender 
equality, with women being faced with a sometimes hostile environment (Sasson-Levy, Levy and 
Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Within certain activist networks, a similar criticism has been posed, whereby a 
Đultuƌe has ďeeŶ Đƌeated ǁhiĐh ƌeƋuiƌes feŵale paƌtiĐipaŶts to aĐt iŶ a ǁaǇ that ͚eŵulates the self-
confidence, space-takiŶg ďehaǀiouƌs of ŵeŶ͛ ;GoƌdoŶ, ϮϬϭϬ:ϰϮϱͿ. GiǀeŶ these findings a gender-
sensitive lens is needed to unearth the role of gender inequalities in shaping the way we have come to 
understand women in Israeli society and therefore how to understand the role of women in Israeli 
peace activism.  
                                                          
3 David Ben Gurion stated that, ͚increasing the Jewish birth-rate is a vital need for the existence of 
Israel, and [that] a Jewish woman who does not bring at least four children into the world is defrauding 
the Jeǁish ŵissioŶ͛ ;iŶ “haƌoŶi, ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϭϵͿ. 
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However, this Ŷeeds to go fuƌtheƌ. Most studies oŶ Isƌaeli ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ haǀe foĐused iŶ 
paƌtiĐulaƌ oŶ the ƌole of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ ǁithout ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the ǁideƌ issue of the ƌole of 
gender dynamics within the Israeli peace activism as a whole. Ferree and Mueller (2007) argue that 
beyond an understanding of the socio-political role of women in society, social movement theory needs 
to consider the gender dimension from the outset iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoǀide a ͚ŵoƌe dǇŶaŵiĐ, loŶg-term and 
less state-centred approach͛ ;Feƌƌee aŶd Muelleƌ , ϮϬϬϳ:ϱϳϳͿ. TheǇ suggest a ƌefiŶeŵeŶt of the ĐlassiĐal 
soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt ageŶda aŶd adopt a ͚geŶdeƌed ƌepeƌtoiƌe of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ that addƌesses ͚geŶdeƌed 
opportunities through gendered structures of mobilisation with gendered rhetoric of ŵeaŶiŶg͛ ;Feƌƌee 
and Mueller, 2007:587). They argue that the powers of movement are not gender neutral and therefore 
the study of all social movements should be looked at through a gendered lens.  Ferree and Mueller 
(2007) also make an important distinctioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚feŵiŶisŵ͛ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶts, ǁhiĐh is 
Ŷeeded to eŶaďle studies oŶ hoǁ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶts ƌelate to feŵiŶisŵ. This distiŶĐtioŶ is 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ, ǁheƌe Ŷot all ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups ǁeƌe feŵiŶist aŶd Ŷot all 
feŵiŶist gƌoups ǁeƌe ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups. FolloǁiŶg Feƌƌee aŶd Muelleƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ appƌoaĐh, this 
dissertation will be attentive to gender dynamics in the use of social movement theory to study Israeli 
peace activism, providing further insights to build on their approach.  
2.9 UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
In understanding the trajectory of a social movement activity, some understanding of impact is 
needed. However, analysing the impact of a social movement is difficult since there is no agreed upon 
criteria with which to assess these outcomes (Hermann, 2009:35). Furthermore, it is almost impossible 
to determine causal links between social movement activity and a change in policy, public opinion or 
facts on the ground, as there are inevitably other factors that influence the situation. Additionally, as 
noted by Johnson (2000:1) in writing about the anti-war movement against US action in Vietnam, 
leaders are often reluctant to admit that any decision they make were directly influenced by public 
pressure oƌ disseŶt. This is ĐoŶfiƌŵed ďǇ HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮ: ϵϰ-95) analysis of the role of the Israeli peace 
movement in the Oslo peace process, in which she notes that the Israeli peace movement was not given 
any recognition for the role it played.   
Despite these limitations, there have been attempts to define social movement impact by both studies 
on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory (Golan, 2014a; Hermann, 2009, 2002; Bernstein, 
2003; Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer, 1996; Gamson, 1990; McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978; Melucci, 1989; Touraine, 
1982; Staggenborg, 1995; della Porta, 1999). Gamson (1990) outlined impact in political terms and 
studies followed that considered impact as the ability for a social movement to have their claims 
acknowledged and met by the political elites and in policy changes (McAdam, 1982; Tilly 1978). 
However, studies moved beyond this to consider impact in terms of challenges to dominant beliefs 
(Melucci, 1989; Touraine, 1981), particularly with the increased emphasis on the connections between 
culture and social movements (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995). Efforts were therefore made to 
encapsulate a broader understanding of social movement impact (Bernstein, 2003; della Porta, 1999; 
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Staggenborg, 1995). Some have argued that success or failure should be attributed to smaller, more 
specific areas, such as the success of Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor (Women in Black) in simply forcing passers-by to 
question their assumptions (Svirsky, 2001aͿ oƌ the ƌeĐeŶt suĐĐess of the aĐtiǀists iŶ the ǀillage of Bil͛in in 
getting the route of the separation barrier moved (Hallward, 2009). Others argue that the process is just 
as significant as the outcome and success should not be determined solely on specific achievements 
(Hallward, 2009:535). Therefore, attention will be given to the more limited areas in which Israeli peace 
activism might be having success.  
Staggenborg (1995) provides the most useful framework that considers different areas in which 
movements can have impact; in the policy arena, in mobilisation and through culture. These open up 
the potential to view social movement impact in a variety of ways, including the ability to mobilise 
individuals, achieve policy change, achieve change on the ground, shift public opinion, stop human 
rights abuses and end a conflict. Bernstein (2003) adds that included in this framework should be a 
discursive impact, such as the work of della Porta (1999), since a movement can also shift the ways in 
which ideas, problems and solutions are presented. This can be described as norm entrepreneurship 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and will be useful in understanding the impact of Israeli peace activism. 
UsiŶg “taggeŶďoƌg͛s ;ϭϵϵϱͿ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, ǁith the additioŶ of Ŷoƌŵ eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌship, alloǁs foƌ a ŵuĐh 
broader appreciation of social movement impact than solely focusing on the policy arena.  
This dissertation will make use of this understanding of impact, considering if Israeli peace activism has 
impacted the policy arena, if they have succeeded in mobilising the public, whether they have affected 
the prevailing culture and if they have engaged in norm entrepreneurship. By disaggregating the internal 
dynamics, impact in each of these areas will be considered, as well as in the overall situation. While 
claims of success cannot be conclusively attributed solely to Israeli peace activism, some attempt will be 
made at emphasising the influence it has had in the past and the potential for the current activities to 
create change. 
3 ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
The empirical body of literature that looks at Israeli peace activism can be divided into four 
areas: the work of Tamar Hermann, studies on individual peace groups, studies on activism after the 
second Intifada and first hand experiences of activists. The most significant analysis of Israeli peace 
aĐtiǀisŵ foƌ the puƌpose of this studǇ is HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ detailed aŶalǇsis of the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt 
from 1993 to 2008. This is a culmination of a number of works she has produced on the topic (2002, 
1996). Her analysis is based on an interesting combination of a theory of political opportunity structures 
and theories of public opinion. She provides a comprehensive overview of the trajectory of the Israeli 
peace movement in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, identifying in particular its role in the 
peace process. She does give attention to all the groups operating in her period of study but overall 
focuses more closely on the story of the liberal Zionist parts of the Israeli peace movement, tracing their 
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foundations, the euphoria in witnessing the Oslo peace process and their demise as the process began 
to break down. 
Of paƌtiĐulaƌ iŶteƌest iŶ HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s theoƌetiĐal fƌaŵeǁoƌk is heƌ use of Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϭϵϵϲͿ diǀisioŶ of 
political opportunity structures into state-centred and proximate opportunities and threats. State-
centred opportunity structures enable a comparison of the relationship between state and movement 
aĐƌoss ĐouŶtƌies ǁheƌeas pƌoǆiŵate oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes ƌefeƌ to the ͚sigŶals that gƌoups ƌeĐeiǀe fƌoŵ 
the immediate political environment oƌ thƌough ĐhaŶges iŶ theiƌ ƌesouƌĐes oƌ ĐapaĐities͛ ;HeƌŵaŶŶ, 
2009:19). Whilst Hermann acknowledges that proximate opportunity structures include the 
oppoƌtuŶities speĐifiĐ to iŶdiǀidual gƌoups aŶd that this ǁill affeĐt the gƌoups͛ ŵoďilisatioŶ poteŶtial and 
strategies, she does not explicitly identify that the opportunities are perceived differently depending on 
the collective action frames of the groups. Whilst Hermann acknowledges framing and resource 
ŵoďilisatioŶ, she Đhooses to folloǁ Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭ:6) remark that social movement theory would 
benefit from integrating it with other concepts that have illuminated social movements and chooses to 
integrate theories of public opinion with political opportunity structures.  
Since Hermann (2009) is an established pollster in Israel, it is unsurprising that she aims to connect the 
plight of the peace movement with mainstream public opinion. She claims that political opportunity 
structures are insufficient in fully explaining the fate of the peace movement and a theory of public 
opinion needs to be integrated, particularly due to the role that public opinion has in influencing policy 
decisions (Hermann, 2009:26). She notes that in issues of peace and security, the public has been shown 
to play a specific role iŶ tƌaŶsfoƌŵiŶg ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ the sides iŶ a ĐoŶfliĐt ;Bell aŶd O͛‘ouƌke iŶ 
Hermann, 2009:27). She therefore argues for a pluralist theory of democracy in which a variety of 
͚iŶteƌest oƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ tƌǇ to iŶflueŶĐe poliĐǇ, ǁhiĐh plaĐes a peaĐe ŵoǀement in the pool of actors 
trying to have influence and who are in competition with other actors to mobilise the public behind 
their particular cause (2009:29). The importance of public opinion is therefore highlighted when trying 
to achieve policy change. However, this does not take into account those groups that may not wish to 
influence the public or policy, at least in the short term. Therefore, whilst it is a useful addition to 
political opportunity structures, the combined theory that Hermann (2009) puts forward is not sufficient 
as a framework that provides the whole picture of a peace movement. It fails to appreciate the 
usefulness of the internal powers of movement in illuminating social movement characteristics and how 
the interaction between these and political opportunity structures can provide more details of the 
trajectories and dynamics of different parts of a social movement.  
IŶ HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s aŶalǇsis of Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ ďetǁeeŶ ϭϵϲϳ-1998 as part of Gidron, Katz and 
HaseŶfeld͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ Đoŵparative study of peace and conflict resolution organisations in South Africa, 
Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, she does make more reference to the four powers of movement, 
although without explicit reference to the individual conceptual tools. She does this in order to explain 
the failure of the movement to become a significant political actor during this time. Again, her focus is 
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on the factors that enabled or inhibited the peace movement from influencing decision-makers, rather 
than an analysis of the internal characteristics in and of themselves.  
A number of useful studies have been conducted on the emerging groups since 2000 (Svirsky, 2012; 
Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Hallward, 2009; Marteu, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Fridman, 2008). This 
body of literature provides interesting insights into the new phenomenon of joint activism between 
Israelis and Palestinians however, they focus solely on the joint Israeli-Palestinian peace activism and do 
not consider the many other Israeli groups actively promoting peace across a broad ideological, 
organisational and tactical spectrum. Furthermore, these studies do not place the contemporary 
activism in the context of the overall trajectory of the Israeli peace movement and thus do not make a 
comparison with the earlier peace activities of pre-2000 activism. This dissertation will provide an 
overview of Israeli peace activism before the second Intifada as a point of comparison for activism post-
2000, allowing for an understanding of the similarities and differences over time. 
There are a number of other empirical studies that detail and analyse individual peace groups from both 
periods of activism (Perry, 2011; Gordon, 2010; Halperin, 2007; Grossman and Kalpan, 2006; Kidron, 
2004; Seitz, 2003; Svirsky, 2001a; Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Helman and Rapoport, 1997). These will 
provide some empirical details to add to both the historical overview and the study of Israeli peace 
activism post-2000. There is also a body of work that looks at the effect of the second Intifada on 
dialogue groups (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007; Bar-On and Awan, 2006; Kaufman, Salem and Verhoeven, 
2006; Baskin and Al-Haq, 2004; Halabi and Sonnenschein, 2004; Maoz, 2004). Dialogue groups between 
Israelis and Palestinians became one of the most prolific forms of activism during the Oslo peace process 
however, as these studies argue, the second Intifada led to the severe decline in such activities due to 
restriction of movement and increased mistrust and fear.   
There also a number of useful publications providing first-hand experience of Israeli peace activism. 
Some provide autobiographical accounts (Bardin, 2012; Shulman, 2007; Warschawski, 2005; Reshef, 
1996), which detail the experiences of some key activists of Israeli peace activism. There are also some 
collections of interviews and blog posts from Israeli peace activists (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Kabasakal 
et al. 2004; Kidron, 2004; Diase, 1992; Rosenwasser, 1992), which include the personal reflections of 
activists in different periods of time. Whilst they provided limited analyses, they will help to inform the 
empirical details of this study.  
4 ISRAELI POLITICAL CULTURE 
The political culture of a society helps to determine what may or may not be acceptable to the 
mainstream public and therefore what messages may or may not resonate. It is useful to have a general 
understanding of this when considering the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. The teƌŵ ͚politiĐal 
Đultuƌe͛ is a ďƌoad ĐoŶĐept ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ iŶĐoƌpoƌate a faiƌlǇ laƌge ǀaƌietǇ of faĐtoƌs. OŶ a geŶeral level it 
refers to the elements of a society that have an impact on the ways in which an individual chooses to 
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aĐt. These eleŵeŶts iŶĐlude a soĐietǇ͛s histoƌǇ, its soĐial deŵogƌaphiĐs, its Đultuƌe aŶd tƌaditioŶs, its 
religion, its ideological foundations, the relationship between the individual and the collective and the 
importance placed on certain institutions. These elements tend to determine what is or what is not 
considered an appropriate way to act in both the public and private sphere, either consciously or 
uŶĐoŶsĐiouslǇ. This, iŶ tuƌŶ, affeĐts the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh iŶdiǀiduals Đhoose to aĐt. The ͚politiĐal͛ aspeĐt of 
͚politiĐal Đultuƌe͛ ƌefeƌs to the ďeliefs aŶd attitudes of the ĐolleĐtiǀe aŶd the iŶdiǀidual ǁith ƌespeĐt to 
politics and tends to guide political and extra-parliamentary opinions and actions. Some studies of Israeli 
peace activism have provided useful outlines of Israeli political culture and the socio-political context 
within which the peace promoting groups are functioning (Hermann, 2009; Norell, 2002; Bar-Tal, 2000, 
1998; Wolfsfeld, 1988) that will help to inform the empirical chapters.  
Of greatest significance in helping to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism is the 
psychological aspect of Israeli political culture. The Jewish people and Jewish Israelis have developed a 
paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe psǇĐhologiĐal ĐoŶsĐiousŶess as a ƌesult of a seŶse of ͚ǀiĐtiŵisatioŶ͛ thƌoughout the 
ancient and modern history of the Jewish people, combined with being involved in an intractable 
conflict (Fridman, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2000, 1998). Furthermore, the deep mistrust that has formed between 
Israelis and Palestinians and the perception of a personal security threat, as well as the ways in which 
certain governments have framed the conflict, has informed the way in which the Israeli public view the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Stan Cohen (2001) explains that the 
defensive self-iŵage of Isƌaelis aŶd the stƌoŶg seŶse of ǀiĐtiŵhood haǀe led to a ͚deŶial of the ǀiĐtiŵ,͛ 
ǁheƌeďǇ the pƌeseŶĐe of otheƌs͛ suffeƌiŶg is soŵetiŵes eǆĐluded fƌoŵ the Isƌaeli ĐoŶsĐiousŶess. IŶ 
some instances societies block out certain occurrences, not because they do not believe that they are 
occurring but, as a coping mechanism for continuing with everyday life. A collective state of denial has 
ďeĐoŵe eŵďedded ǁithiŶ Isƌaeli soĐietǇ aŶd aŵouŶts to soŵe degƌee of ͚sǁitĐhiŶg off͛ fƌoŵ the 
situatioŶ ;FƌidŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϴ:ϯͿ. A ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ͚ǀiĐtiŵhood͛ aŶd ͚gettiŶg oŶ ǁith life͛ uŶdeƌlies this 
collective state of denial of Israeli society and will help to explain the immobilisation of Israelis and why 
certain peace groups were seen as more legitimate than others.  
5 CONCLUSION 
 Through an analysis of certain variables of social movement theory within the context of Israel 
peace activism, this chapter has produced a development and refinement of a theoretical framework 
with which to assess the changes and continuities in Israeli peace activism from 1967 to 2014. In 
paƌtiĐulaƌ Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ fouƌ poǁers of movement help to identify the characteristics of a social 
movement in order to understand its trajectory. This review has shown that an appreciation of the 
internal dynamics provides greater understanding of a social movement, which can then be further 
analysed through the interaction with the political opportunity structures. Furthermore, this chapter has 
shown that using the mechanisms and processes involved in the theory of cycles of contention provides 
an additional way to explore Israeli peace activism and enables a more detailed understanding of the 
differences between the different component parts. This review has also shown that there are some 
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aspects of social movement theory that need to be assessed with relation to the case of Israeli peace 
activism, namely the relationship between the government and how to approach impact. In addition it 
has shown that there are some underdeveloped areas of social movement theory that will be explored 
in this dissertation, namely the international dimension and gender dynamics. 
This dissertation will pay detailed attention to each of the internal dynamics in turn, in the order set out 
in this review, before analysing how they interact with each other and the political opportunity 
structures. Cycles of contention will then be identified, using the mechanisms and processes from the 
dynamic model. In approaching the transformation of Israeli peace activism through this framework, this 
study will show that unlike the conventional argument, not all components of Israeli peace activism 
were paralysed in the second Intifada. This will provide a refinement to current studies of Israeli peace 
activism. In addition, the empirical chapters will add further details to the existing studies on Israeli 
peace activism, further adding to this body of literature. It will also identify new framing processes, 
tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures that contribute to both the literature on Israeli peace 
activism and social movement theory. 
This dissertation will now turn to an historical overview of the first two phases of Israeli peace activism, 
appƌoaĐhed thƌough Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ fouƌ poǁeƌs of ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŶd the additioŶal theoƌetiĐal 
considerations outlined in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS AT PEACE ACTIVISM TO THE BIRTH OF A PEACE MOVEMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an historical overview of Israeli peace activism between the aftermath of 
the 1967 war, in which the surrounding Arab nations went to war with Israel and Israel experienced a 
͚stuŶŶiŶg ǀiĐtoƌǇ,͛ ĐaptuƌiŶg the “iŶai Deseƌt, the Gaza “tƌip, the GolaŶ Heights aŶd the West BaŶk iŶ siǆ 
days (Bregman, 2002:91), and the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000. This chapter will examine 
Israeli peace activism in the period between 1967 and 2000 by identifying the internal dynamics: the 
collective action frames, the tactical repertoires and the mobilisation structures and how they interact 
with the political opportunity structures to form cycles of contention.  This will provide a clear point of 
comparison for the analysis and exploration of Israeli peace activism post-2000 and highlight some of 
the origins and legacies of Israeli peace activism, from which much of the more recent peace activism 
has developed.  
This chapter will begin with the aftermath of the 1967 war. Whilst there were some attempts by 
individuals to alleviate tensions between Arabs and Jews in the pre-state era and the first decades of the 
State of Israel and some of the individuals involved in peace activism prior to 1967, such as Martin Buber 
and Uri Avneri, have influenced future generations of peace activism, this period will not be considered, 
since their attempts can at best be described as proto-activism and in reality were not more than the 
intellectual debates of a handful of individuals (Hermann, 2009:74). Therefore, the historical outline will 
begin following the 1967 war when attempts at activism began. It will end in 2000 with the outbreak of 
the second Intifada. According to conventional wisdom it was this point that marked the paralysis of the 
Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt, desĐƌiďed ďǇ HeƌŵaŶŶ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ as the ͚shatteƌed dƌeaŵ͛ of the Isƌaeli peaĐe 
movement, since it signified the failure of the peace process that the movement had pushed for. This 
study will show however, that this point did not lead to the paralysis of the whole movement but led to 
the emergence of new forms of activism, accelerating the fragmentation and polarisation of Israeli 
peace activism, with new voices emerging.  
Two distinct phases of activism can be identified between 1967 and 2000. The period between 1967 and 
1977 can be described as, ͚iŶdiǀidual, dispaƌate atteŵpts at peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ͛ aŶd the period between 
1977 and 2000 can be described as, ͚the ďiƌth aŶd ĐoŵiŶg of age of a peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt.͛ A different 
demarcation of phases could have been made within this period. Hermann (2009), for example, takes 
the approach of dividing her study according to changes in political opportunity structures, in particular 
the potential of the movement to influence the government and public opinion in Israel. Her divisions 
therefore correlate with changes in government and public opinion, which create more than two distinct 
phases. However, given this study aims to provide a greater focus on the internal dynamics of Israeli 
peace activism, the divisions are made based on the internal changes and evolution of Israeli peace 
activism itself.  
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The first phase is characterised by individual, disparate peace initiatives that formed into two 
components, liberal Zionist groups and radical groups, distinguished through their collective action 
frames; the ways in which they framed themselves and the prevailing realities. For both components, 
the outcome of the 1967 war, which involved a shift from an existential conflict to a limited conflict over 
the fate of the territories that the Arabs lost in the 1967 war, was perceived as an opportunity to 
present a tangible solution to end the conflict through conceding territories acquired in the war. The 
liberal Zionist component focused oŶ a geŶeƌal ĐoŶĐept of ͚laŶd foƌ peaĐe,͛ ǁheƌeas the radical 
component began to concentrate on a two-state solution that put the Palestinians at the centre of 
negotiations and solutions. The two components were loosely connected and both were marginal within 
Israeli society. They were both based on a variety of informal, familiar networks and later expanded to 
include other mobilising structures, such as reservist soldiers for the liberal Zionist component and 
immigrant students for the radical component. A repertoire of contention began to form, mainly around 
demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities, with the radical component also engaged in meetings with 
Palestinian representatives. The initiatives gradually developed into more sustained challenges against 
the Israeli government, with expanded mobilising structures and more complex collection action frames. 
The ideas of the activists from both components however did not resonate with the Israeli public and 
whilst the opportunities for extra-parliamentary activity expanded in this phase, particularly after the 
1973 war, where Israel was unprepared for an attack by Egypt and the decisions makers were criticised 
for not anticipating the strike, it was not widely accepted in Israeli society, which meant both 
components were unable to develop into a movement with a strong support base (Hermann, 2009:79-
88). 
In 1977 the Avoda (Labour) government experienced its first defeat, which created the opportunity for 
the individual attempts at peace activism to morph into a movement. This marked the beginning of the 
second phase, with the creation of Shalom Achshav in 1978, the largest peace group in Israel, the 
emergence of an Israeli peace movement and a new cycle of contention. In this phase three 
components of Israeli peace activism can be identified: ͚liďeƌal )ioŶist͛, ͚radical͛ aŶd ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛, each 
presenting a different framing of themselves, the prevailing problems and potential solutions. In this 
phase, the liberal Zionist component, represented by Shalom Achshav, was the most prominent and had 
the greatest mobilising potential, focusing on the mainstream Israeli public. As well as an expanded 
repertoire of contention, they continued to use demonstrations in significant locations in Israeli cities, 
which became a common part of the liberal Zionist repertoire of contention. However, as Kaminer 
(1996) argues, it was the radical ĐoŵpoŶeŶt that ǁeƌe the ageŶda setteƌs, aĐtiŶg as the ͚sŵall ǁheel͛ of 
the ďiĐǇĐle that pushed the ͚ďig ǁheel͛ – the liberal Zionist component - to take certain positions and 
mobilise sooner than they would have otherwise. Ideas that originated in the radical component, such 
as recognition that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was the true representatives of the 
Palestinian people, eventually diffused into the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism and 
later government policy. This highlights the role of the radical component as norm entrepreneurs, 
signalling the importance of studying the radical component, despite their small numbers and position 
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on the margins of Israeli society. They also developed more confrontational tactical repertoires, such as 
direct action and boycott. A human rights component also emerged that found innovative ways to 
frame and challenge the situation through revealing the realities on the ground and challenging 
government policies. They tended to use less confrontational tactics than the radical groups, focusing on 
reporting, protesting human rights violations or providing humanitarian services. At times the three 
components unified into a movement, with strong coordination however, in other periods of this phase, 
there was disunity and fragmentation both between components and within the components (Kaminer, 
1996).  
Towards the end of the phase, ͚the ďiƌth aŶd ĐoŵiŶg of age of the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt,͛ the Israeli 
government, headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, made peace its goal and following secret talks it 
signed the Declaration of Principles in 1993. This marked a huge success for the Israeli peace movement, 
since it put forward plans for a negotiated agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, with a two-
state solution at its core. The peace movement unified around this however, in the years that followed, 
there was stalling in the implementation of the agreements, particularly when Benjamin Netanyahu was 
elected in 1996. This gave all components of Israeli peace activism an impetus to mobilise and 
encourage the government to continue on the path to peace. However, Palestinian attacks in the mid-
1990s made it difficult for the liberal-Zionist component to mobilise the public (Hermann, 2009). Hope 
was put into the Camp David II summit in 2000 where Ehud Barak met with Yasser Arafat and Bill Clinton 
to discuss some of the outstanding issues, such as the issue of refugees and Jerusalem, in order to reach 
a ͚fiŶal-status agƌeeŵeŶt͛. 
The failure of Camp David II and the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 marked the end of the 
second phase of Israeli peace activism and the beginning of the third phase, ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd 
fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ: thƌee ĐǇĐles of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛. Ehud Barak left the negotiations 
ĐlaiŵiŶg that, ͚theƌe ǁas Ŷo paƌtŶeƌ foƌ peaĐe͛ ;ABC News, 2000). The public were quick to accept these 
words, which meant the liberal Zionist component, which was focused on mass mobilisation, was unable 
to present a strong peace promoting voice.  The outbreak of violence served to confirm this rhetoric. In 
such an atmosphere of violence and antagonism the liberal Zionist groups became paralysed (Hermann, 
2009). However, groups in the radical and human rights components continued to act and new groups 
emerged in response to the second Intifada. This marks the end of the second phase and the beginning 
of the thiƌd phase, ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt: thƌee ĐǇĐles of 
ĐoŶteŶtioŶ.͛  
This chapter will consider each of the two phases between 1967 and 2000 sequentially. For each, it will 
identify and explain the internal dynamics in turn: the collective action frames, the repertoire of 
contention and the mobilising structures. It will then consider how these internal dynamics interacted 
with the political opportunity structures and cycles that formed. For each of these factors, differences 
between the three components of Israeli peace activism will be identified and explained in order to 
build a clear typology and characterisation of the state of Israeli peace activism in each phase. Once 
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each of the phases has been examined, implications and points of comparison for the next phase of 
Israeli peace activism will be outlined. 
This chapter mainly makes use of existing studies of the Israeli peace movement, both overall accounts 
(Hermann, 2009; Bar-On, 1996, 1985a, 1985b; Kaminer, 1996; Hall-Cathala, 1990), as well as studies on 
specific peace groups or themes (Kaufman, Salem and Verhoeven, 2006;  Adwan and Bar-On, 2000; 
Sharoni, 1995; Rosenwasser, 1992) and autobiographies of peace activists (Bardin, 2012;  Warshawski, 
2005). Information from websites has been used to provide further details on individual peace 
organisations. Interviews conducted by the author in Israel between January 2013 and July 2013 for the 
empirical study of Israeli peace activism from 2000 have also been referred to in this chapter, in 
instances where the activists had been previously involved and had further insights to add to the 
histoƌiĐal ĐoŶteǆt. ͚The Otheƌ Isƌael,͛ aŶ EŶglish-language newsletter that has documented Israeli peace 
activism since 1982 was also consulted.  
2 THE FIRST PHASE: INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS AT PEACE ACTIVISM 
This phase of Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ is ďest ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ͚iŶdiǀidual aŶd dispaƌate atteŵpts 
at ĐƌeatiŶg peaĐe.͛ Whilst theƌe ǁeƌe aƌe Ŷuŵďeƌ of gƌoups that eŵeƌged aŶd a ǀaƌietǇ of activities 
promoting peace organised, including a few notable public protests, a sustained campaign of 
contentious politics cannot be identified and there was not a coordinated effort between groups and 
activities (Hermann, 2009:81). The peace activism that occurred in this phase cannot therefore be 
defined as a peace movement. However, there was a clear development in the collective action frames 
of the peaĐe aĐtiǀists, ǁith the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of tǁo distiŶĐt ĐoŵpoŶeŶts, the ͚liberal Zionist͛ aŶd the 
͚radical͛ (Figure 2). The radical component tended to present more confrontational collective action 
frames however, the differences between the two components were not particularly stark in this phase 
due to the infancy of Israeli peace activism in Israel. Some opportunities to mobilise were perceived in 
the political opportunity structures, which alongside a gradual expansion of mobilisation structures for 
both components, laid the foundations for a movement to emerge in the following phase. However, 
certain constraints, particularly fear and mistrust of the Arabs as a result of the wars in this phase, 
meant this was not possible during this phase. 
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Figure Ϯ: The ŵaiŶ ĐharaĐteristiĐs of the first phase: ͚iŶdividual atteŵpts at peaĐe aĐtivisŵ͛ 
 
2.1 NEW COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES: CEDING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
The main framing of Israeli peace activism in this phase was based on returning the territories 
occupied in the 1967 war. The shift from an existential conflict to a limited one that focused on the 
realities created by the war created a polarisation in Israeli society between those who wanted to annex 
the territories occupied by Israel in the war and those who saw an opportunity to make peace with the 
Arab countries. Peace activism centred on ceding the territories acquired in the war. Two collective 
action frames emerged around this, signalling the division of Israeli peace activism into two 
components. The liberal Zionist ĐoŵpoŶeŶt fƌaŵed the situatioŶ thƌough the doĐtƌiŶe of ͚laŶd foƌ 
peaĐe,͛ ǁheƌeďǇ the teƌƌitoƌies Isƌael aĐƋuiƌed iŶ the ǁaƌ, the Gaza “tƌip, GolaŶ Heights, West BaŶk aŶd 
Sinai Desert, should ďe ĐoŶĐeded to Isƌael͛s Aƌaď Ŷeighďouƌs iŶ eǆĐhaŶge foƌ peaĐe agƌeeŵeŶts to 
ensure peace and security for Israel (Hermann, 2009:80). The peace groups now had a tangible solution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict that presented a direct link between the security of Israel and peace, enabling 
the groups to gain more legitimacy than previous attempts at peace activism. Whilst the proto-peace 
aĐtiǀisŵ of the pƌe state aŶd eaƌlǇ state Ǉeaƌs ǁas ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ ŵaƌgiŶalised, ͚radical͛ gƌoups aŶd 
individuals, this framing created a liberal Zionist component that was closer to the political mainstream, 
promoting peace for the long-term security of Israel. This discourse continued to underlie the framing of 
the liberal Zionist groups. 
Two examples characterise the liberal Zionist framing of peace activism in this phase. HaTŶua l͛Shaloŵ 
uBitachon (The Movement for Peace and Security) emerged in Israel in July 1968 and cautioned against 
permanent Israeli presence in the territories occupied during the war (Kaminer, 1996: 9) and proposed 
 Liberal Zionist Component Radical Component 
Collective  
Action 
Frames 
 ͚LaŶd foƌ peaĐe͛ ǁith Aƌaď 
neighbours 
 
 Solution through direct negotiations 
with the PLO, the legitimate 
representatives of the Palestinian 
people. 
 
Repertoire  
of Contention 
 Demonstrations/vigils in Israeli towns 
and cities 
 Demonstrations/vigils in Israeli towns 
and cities  Meetings with Palestinians officials  Discussion groups 
Mobilising  
Structures 
 Informal, familiar networks  Non-movement networks e.g. 
Reservist soldiers 
 Informal, familiar networks  Non-movement networks e.g. student 
immigrants 
Political  
Opportunity  
Structures  
 Gradual opening for extra-
parliamentary activism  Affected by changes in the 
government/public 
opinion/perceptions of the Arabs 
 Gradual opening for extra-
parliamentary activism  Affected changes in the 
government/public opinion/ 
perceptions of the Palestinians  Continued activities despite 
unfavourable environment 
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contact with Arab leaders or groups that were willing to engage in dialogue with the aim of using the 
territories as a bargaining chip for peace (Hermann, 2009:80). Furthermore, distancing themselves from 
the experience of the earlier radical groups, it attempted to not be seen as an elitist intellectual group 
but opened itself up to the general public, with debates and pluralism encouraged and no fixed 
organisational commitments required for participation (Hermann, 2009:79).  
This more moderate framing continued in response to other events. Following the 1973 war a protest 
group formed out of the spontaneous vigil of reserve soldier Motti Ashkenazi, which called for the 
dismissal of Moshe Dayan, the Defence Minister, and for responsibility to ďe takeŶ foƌ Isƌael͛s 
miscalculations in anticipating the Egyptian attack (Bar-On, 1996:73). This resonated with public reaction 
to the war that called for investigations into the Israeli government and military for their failure to 
anticipate the attacks (Bregman, 2002:143). The vigil developed into a peace group, Yisrael Shelanu, 
HaTnua Letmura (Our Israel: The Movement for Change), of which a significant proportion were 
reservist soldiers. The way in which the group framed themselves, as patriotic soldiers, fresh from the 
ďattlefield, fightiŶg foƌ ͚Ouƌ Isƌael͛ ;Baƌ-On, 1996:73), highlighted their liberal Zionist framing and helped 
them to mobilise support. They received more support than other extra-parliamentary attempts at 
criticising or questioning the government to date (Bar-On, 1996:73).
4
 In addition, they did not take a 
partisan line nor involve themselves in policy questions (Kaminer, 1996:18). This broad framing meant 
they did not alienate potential participants who held certain perspectives on the conflict and could 
therefore draw on a wide support base.
5
 Furthermore, the demand they were making was seemingly 
modest compared to some of the previous examples of contentious activity, with the group simply 
asking for those who were responsible for the mistakes of the war to take responsibility for their 
decisions and actions. Golda Meir and her government resigned in 1974, in part due to public pressure 
(Kaminer, 1996:19).  
The identity of the peace activists was also in opposition to the identity of the annexationist groups that 
emerged in this phase. The annexationist groups tended to be made up of religious-nationalists, 
particularly the most prominent group, Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faithful).
6
 This was in contrast to the 
mainly secular make-up of the peace groups. The link between identity, religious affiliation and political 
ideology and the stereotypes that developed with it, run deeply through Israeli society. In order to try to 
combat this, Oz ǀ͛Shaloŵ (Strength and Peace), a small religious peace group, was formed in 1975 to 
show that not all religious individuals argued for annexation of Judea and Samaria. Through a process of 
                                                          
4
 By the end of the first week there were more than 5000 signatures calling for the dismissal of Dayan 
(Bar-On, 1996:73).  
5
 Although the group did not propose a particular political agenda, Ashkenazi, in an interview with 
Ha͛aretz, stated that theƌe ŵust ďe, ͚aŶ aĐtiǀe ǁƌestliŶg ǁith the PalestiŶiaŶ pƌoďleŵ, aŶd that ŵeaŶs 
acknowledging that this problem is at the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that there is room for a 
soǀeƌeigŶ PalestiŶiaŶ state oŶ the soil of histoƌiĐ Eƌetz Yisƌael͛ ;AshkeŶazi iŶ ‘aďiŶoǀiĐh & ‘eiŶhaƌz, 
2008:286).  
6
 For detailed studies of Gush Emunim, see Newman (1985, 1982). 
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frame extension they aimed to persuade religious Zionists that annexation and control of another 
people ran counter to Jewish values and teachings (Hermann, 2002:100).  
The radical component that developed in this phase also argued that the land acquired in the war must 
be conceded for the sake of peace (Bar-On, 1996:46). However, in addition they proposed direct 
negotiatioŶs ǁith the PLO, as the tƌue ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes of the PalestiŶiaŶ people, iŶstead of ͚Aƌaď͛ 
leaders, placing the Palestinians at the centre of the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This came 
directly from the ideas and activities of individuals and intellectual groups from earlier years, such as 
HaMoatza haYisraelit l͛Shaloŵ Yisrael-Falestin (The Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace), which had 
begun considering the idea of a two-state solution (Hermann, 2009:85-ϲͿ. These ideas ǁeƌe hoǁeǀeƌ ͚a 
total taboo͛ iŶ Isƌaeli soĐietǇ, eǀeŶ aŵoŶgst ŵost peace activists (Hermann, 2009:85), highlighting their 
͚ƌadiĐal͛ Ŷatuƌe.  
2.2 THE BEGINNINGS OF A REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION 
This phase built the foundations for the repertoire of contention of the Israeli peace 
movement, drawn from experiences of the Jewish community in Europe and influenced by protest 
groups and individuals from around the world. Tactics were initially limited, with little strategizing 
behind them, characterised more by spontaneous actions and mainly involved demonstrations in Israeli 
towns and cities for both components. Protests were often sparked off by the actions of small groups of 
individuals, which had simply wanted to express their personal dissatisfaction or concerns and were not 
aiming at mass mobilisation. However, when their actions resonated with the public, such as the vigil of 
the reservist soldier Motti Ashkenazi (Bar-On, 1996:73) or the letter from high school teenagers 
eǆpƌessiŶg theiƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs foƌ fightiŶg iŶ a ͚fƌuitless ǁaƌ͛ ;“heŵ Tov cited in Bar-On, 1996:57), the public 
were drawn to the street to voice their common dissatisfaction (Bar-on, 1996:73). These 
deŵoŶstƌatioŶs ǁeƌe ofteŶ held outside the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ͛s residence in Jerusalem, which became a 
well-used and symbolic location for protests. Protest became the most common tactic used and it began 
to be seen as a legitimate way of expressing concerns in the public sphere (Wolfsfeld, 1988). The advent 
of television brought further legitimacy to demonstrations due to exposure to anti-war protests in the 
United States and Europe (Wolfsfeld, 1988:11); providing an example of how the international 
dimension can influence a domestic social movement.  
In addition, groups of intellectuals mobilised around debates and discussions and the more radical of 
these, such as Uri Avneri, developed contacts and meetings with Palestinians.
7
 The idea of meeting with 
PLO officials was completely rejected by Israeli society, since it was regarded as a terrorist organisation 
(Hermann, 2009:85). Hermann (2009:86) argues however, that these informal meetings provided a 
                                                          
7
 Avneri began meetings with Palestinians in the mid to late 70s, leading to a meeting in Beirut between 
Avneri and Yasser Arafat. See Avneri (1985) for a personal account of the secret meetings from 1974 to 
1982 between the two sides. See Avneri et al. (1975) for a transcription of a discussion held by some of 
these iŶtelleĐtuals iŶ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϭϵϳϰ iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoǀide a ͚͛doǀish͛ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the ŶatioŶal 
assessment which followed the war they had warned against (1975:vi). 
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precedent for the informal channels that led to the Oslo Declaration of Principles between Israel and the 
Palestinians in 1993. This is an example, of which more arise in the next phase, of where the radical 
groups take more risks than the liberal Zionist groups and push the boundaries for the sake of peace. 
2.3 BUILDING MOBILISING STRUCTURES 
The mobilising structures during this phase were also limited. Initially, both components of 
Israeli peace activism tended to be built around familiar networks, some of which were activist networks 
from the previous phase, including university academics and reservist soldiers. There were little 
attempts to mobilise the public at large and there were no sophisticated mobilising strategies (Bar-On, 
1996:73). However, following the 1973 war, the public was more willing to listen to criticisms of the 
government and therefore became a more available target (Hermann, 2009:82-3). There were some 
examples of attempts to reach out to a wider participant base. For example, HaTŶua l͛Shaloŵ uBitaĐhoŶ 
defined itself as a grassroots initiative and advertised its meetings to the public (Hermann, 2009:79). 
Mobilising structures gradually expanded as peace activism became more common, with the 
formalisation of some networks into organisations, such as HaGesher: Nashiŵ Yehudiot ǀ͛Araǀiot 
l͛shaloŵ ď͛HaŵizraĐh HatiĐhoŶ (The Bridge: Jewish and Arab Women for Peace in the Middle East) and 
the creation of forums for discussion, such as HaMoatza haYisraelit l͛Shaloŵ Yisrael-Falestin (Herman, 
2009:85). 
The radical groups were boosted by a wave of student immigration from Latin America, the United 
States and Europe between 1967 and 1977 (Kaminer, 1996:10). Many of these individuals were involved 
in radical student activism in their home countries and influenced student groups in Israel, particularly 
the oƌgaŶisiŶg pƌiŶĐiples aŶd taĐtiĐs of the Isƌaeli studeŶt ŵoǀeŵeŶt. TheǇ ǁoƌked oŶ ͚the pƌiŶĐiple of 
spoŶtaŶeitǇ,͛ ǁith a ͚paƌtiĐipatoƌǇ stǇle of oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ that ǁas faƌ ƌeŵoǀed fƌoŵ tƌaditioŶal 
oƌgaŶisatioŶ stƌuĐtuƌes, suĐh as eleĐted ďodies ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϮͿ. The ŵoǀeŵeŶt had ͚eŶthusiasŵ aŶd 
eŶeƌgǇ͛ ďased oŶ the pƌiŶĐiple that ͚ideologǇ disuŶites͛ aŶd ͚aĐtioŶ uŶites͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭ996: 12) and 
employed tactics of confrontation. This made it attractive and exciting to the younger generation and 
helped create a role for itself on the far left of Israeli peace activities. There are clear legacies from this 
in the radical activism post-2000. 
Mobilisation structures in general expanded with the advent of television, creating the opportunity for 
mass exposure. However, exposure requires the media to report on peace activities or present the 
realities of the situation in ways that were in line with how the peace activists perceived them. This was 
more common following the 1973 war, when the media began a process of self-reflection and adopted a 
much more critical view of the government (Mann, 2015:87), after concluding that they had been part 
of ͚the ĐoŵplaĐeŶĐǇ, the eǆĐessiǀe self-ĐoŶfideŶĐe… [aŶd] the igŶoƌiŶg of the ƌealitǇ͛ that led to the 
miscalculations of the events leading up to the 1973 war (Ben Porat et al. in Mann, 2015:87). 
By the end of this period the mobilising structures had ripened and expanded in such a way that would 
enable the mass mobilisation of a peace movement in the beginning of the following phase: networks of 
 46 
 
 
activists presenting different peace agendas and ideological perspectives had been built; the experience 
of spontaneous mobilisation in direct response to certain situations provided a new formula for 
activism; the public accepted extra-parliamentary activities as a means of political expression; 
dissatisfaction with the government grew; and solidarity and support for some of the ideas promoted by 
peace activists developed within the Israeli public. 
2.4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: MIXED OPPORTUNITIES 
During this phase, the political opportunity structures had a very strong impact on the 
trajectory and internal dynamics of the peace movement. Activism emerged and formed directly out of 
changes in the political opportunity structures, which gradually opened throughout this phase for all 
forms of extra-parliamentary activity (Hermann, 2009). The political opportunity structures of this phase 
constrained the ability for a peace movement to emerge but both components still perceived 
opportunities to mobilise and to pursue their individual peace-building attempts. Whilst differences can 
be identified in their collective action frames and tactical repertoires, which were more confrontational 
amongst the radical component, both components were faced with similar political opportunity 
structures. This was because the ideas of both components were marginalised and the previous decades 
had not seen an active civil society (Bar-On, 1996:72). The radical component however, still maintained 
their contact with Palestinian officials, despite the unfavourable environment. 
The nature of the government played a significant role in affecting peace activism. Political opportunity 
structures were closed to extra parliamentary activity until the late 1960s, due to the centrality of the 
governing authority in the pre-state era and early state Ǉeaƌs, ǁhiĐh ǁas eleǀated to a ͚supƌeŵe sǇŵďol 
of )ioŶisŵ͛ ;LeǀǇ, ϭϵϵϳ:ϯϲͿ aŶd eŵďedded thƌough a poliĐǇ kŶoǁŶ as Mamlachtiyut (Statism) (Don-
Yehiya, 1995:171). This constrained the potential for an active civil society. The aftermath of the war in 
1967, in which Israel achieved an unexpected victory, was perceived as an opening of the political 
opportunity structures for Israeli peace activism firstly, because a tangible solution for the achievement 
of peace with security emerged and secondly, because all forms of extra-parliamentary activity received 
greater legitimacy and were tolerated more than they had been previously (Norell, 2002:75). This was 
because the authority of the Israeli government had been established and therefore it was more 
accepting to an active civil society.  
The failure of Israel to anticipate the attack from the neighbouring Arab countries in the 1973 war 
further provided an opportunity for extra parliamentary activity and peace activism. It highlighted that 
the Israeli government and security apparatus were prone to mistakes, undermining the hitherto 
omnipotence of the state (Lebel and Lewin, 2015:1-2). Gradually, civil society groups in Israel achieved 
greater legitimacy than before to critique the government, especially on foreign policy issues, allowing 
discourse over security issues and foreign affairs to enter the public realm (Hermann, 2009:82-3). These 
factors encouraged further proliferation of a variety of peace groups and initiatives from the mid-70s 
(Hermann, 2009:83; Appendix 1).   
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The opening of political opportunity structures can also be seen with the shift in the political culture of 
Israel that occurred with the younger generation gaining aspirations of personal mobility (Wolfsfeld, 
1988:11), which meant they were less willing to accept the situation they were in and more willing to 
appeal to the government for change. Furthermore, this new generation were not Holocaust survivors 
or the founding generation of the state and therefore more willing to criticise the authorities (Kaufman, 
Salem, and Verhoeven, 2006:41).  
However, whilst these more favourable political opportunity structures might suggest that the Israeli 
peace efforts could develop into a substantial force, two main factors in the prevailing political 
oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes iŶhiďited ďoth ĐoŵpoŶeŶts͛ ability to mobilise into a movement or convince the 
government into entering peace negotiations with the Arabs. Firstly, the perceived and experienced 
threat from the Arab countries, as a result of the wars in this phase, created hostility and fear among 
Israelis. The 1967 war created a stimulus for increased radicalisation in the Palestinian quest for 
liberation, particularly since the Israelis were now occupying the land that had been set aside for an 
Arab state in the 1947 Partition Plan so, despite the David and Goliath victory of Israel, Israelis were still 
fearful of the Arab threat (Bar-On, 1996:72). Secondly, the War of Attrition from 1968 to 1970, during 
which there were a number of confrontations between Israel and Egypt mainly along the Suez Canal, 
only sought to re-emphasise to the Israeli government and public that the Arabs were enemies of Israel 
aŶd the possiďilitǇ of peaĐe ďeĐaŵe eǀeŶ ŵoƌe ƌeŵote, ǁith ŵaŶǇ Isƌaelis ĐlaiŵiŶg ͚theƌe is ŶoďodǇ to 
talk to aŶǇhoǁ͛ ;Baƌ-On, 1996:33). The surprise attack from the Arab countries in the 1973 war 
confirmed their fears. This marginalised both components of Israeli peace activism since they were 
proposing negotiations with the enemy, whether the Palestinians or the Arabs. The difference between 
the components is that the radical component engaged with Palestinian officials despite the taboo 
behind it, thus pushing their activism forward when the liberal Zionist component was unable to. 
The second constraining factor of the political opportunity structures was the strength of the opposition 
forces and counter framing. The euphoria that followed the unprecedented victory of Israel in defeating 
the Arab countries in the 1967 war created a spike in nationalistic feelings, which at the time reduced 
the likelihood of individuals wishing to challenge the government. Furthermore, those who felt a 
religious and historical connection with Judea and Samaria were not willing to hand over the land they 
had ďeeŶ ǇeaƌŶiŶg foƌ ŵilleŶŶia aƌguiŶg that ͚Ŷo Isƌaeli goǀeƌŶŵeŶt had the right to forfeit sovereignty 
oǀeƌ this saĐƌed teƌƌitoƌǇ͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϴͿ.  
Whilst there was a development in the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism, with two components 
forming and building collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures, the 
emergence and trajectory of these were constrained by the political opportunity structures. The 
discourse of security and the threat felt by Israelis from their Arab neighbours were strong forces in 
constraining the potential for peace activism to influence government policy or mobilise the public. 
However, both components continued in their attempts to develop and present peace promoting 
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voices, which laid the foundations for a peace movement to emerge, signalling the start of the next 
phase of Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ, ͚the ĐoŵiŶg of age of a peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt iŶ Isƌael͛. 
3 THE SECOND PHASE: THE COMING OF AGE OF A PEACE MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL 
In this phase the individual attempts at peace activism morphed into a movement, signalling a 
new cycle of contention, with an increase in size of contention and innovative collective action frames 
and with the development of three components, ͚liďeƌal )ioŶist,͛ ͚radical͛ aŶd ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ (Figure 3). 
The movement as a whole expanded, with the liberal Zionist component becoming the most prominent 
ǁithiŶ Isƌaeli soĐietǇ aŶd ofteŶ ďeiŶg ŵistakeŶlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚the Isƌael peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt,͛ ǁheƌeas it 
only represented one part of the movement, with the other components presenting different 
characteristics and dynamics.  
The liberal Zionist component continued with the framing that presented peace as necessary for the 
continuity and security of Israel. A new grassroots group, Shalom Achshav, emerged with the loudest 
voice in the peace movement. It was able to mobilise the Israeli public and became a rallying point for 
the other peace groups from across the components (Simons, 2013a). It later recognised the PLO as the 
representatives of the Palestinian people, something the radical component had already been 
promoting. The radical component continued to focus on peace out of moral concerns for the 
Palestinians, having identified them as both the victims of and the solution to the conflict. The radical 
component tended to act as the agenda setters, pushing the boundaries and taking greater risks than 
the liberal Zionist component for the sake of peace, pushing the liberal Zionists to be more 
confrontational (Kaminer, 1996:48). A third component also emerged presenting further ways through 
which to frame and challenge the situation. It encompassed a variety of collective action frames that 
mobilised around revealing the realities of the situation particularly human rights abuses and policies of 
the Israeli government, as well as providing humanitarian services. Some overlap can be identified with 
the other two components however; they also exhibit significantly different characteristics which 
justifies treating them as a separate component.  
The peace movement as a whole fluctuated between periods of unity and coordination and periods of 
disunity and dispersal, depending on both external and internal developments. As the phase progressed, 
all ĐoŵpoŶeŶts Đould ďe seeŶ ƌallǇiŶg togetheƌ uŶdeƌ the ďƌoad ďaŶŶeƌ of ͚tǁo-states foƌ tǁo people͛. 
Despite the general perception of an opening of the political opportunity structures, there were periods 
in which the ability to mobilise large numbers and influence policy was more likely than at other times 
and different for each component, with the radical and human rights components often continuing with 
their activities when the liberal Zionist component did not perceive an opportunity to mobilise. This is 
mainly due to the ways in which they framed themselves, with the radical and human rights 
components less constrained by the prevailing attitudes and more willing to be confrontational, 
highlighting their role as agenda setters. 
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Figure ϯ. The ŵaiŶ ĐharaĐteristiĐs of the seĐoŶd phase: ͚The ďirth aŶd ĐoŵiŶg of age of a peaĐe 
ŵoveŵeŶt͛ 
 Liberal Zionist 
Component 
Radical Component Human rights Component 
Collective  
Action 
Frames 
 ͚PeaĐe͛ foƌ the 
security and 
continuity of the 
Jewish state  Strategy of not being 
͚too faƌ iŶ fƌoŶt͛ of 
the mainstream   Two-state solution 
for survival of Israel 
(towards late 1980s)  Gendered frames 
 ͚PeaĐe͛ out of ŵoƌal 
concerns for the 
Palestinians  PLO as representatives 
of Palestinians  Two-state solution for 
Palestinian self-
determination   Gendered frames 
 ƌeseƌǀist soldieƌs ͚pƌoǀeŶ 
worth but not willing to 
Đƌoss ƌed liŶe;͛   Human rights 
organisations - dealing 
ǁith ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ Ŷot 
͚peaĐe͛  
 
Repertoire  
of 
Contention 
 Demonstrations in 
Israeli towns and 
cities  Documenting the 
settlements  Research  People-to-people 
activities  Meeting Palestinians 
 Demonstrations in 
Israeli towns and cities  Protests in Palestinians 
areas  Research  People-to-people 
activities  Direct Action  Settlements boycott 
 Documenting Human 
Rights Violations  Conscientious Objection  Specific forms of protest 
in Israeli towns and cities  Humanitarian services 
 
Mobilising  
Structures 
 Mainstream Israeli 
public  Rallying point  Process of 
institutionalisation in 
1990s  International funding 
 Informal networks  Ad hoc coalitions and 
committees  Arab Citizens of Israel   Palestinians  Former liberal Zionist 
activists  Gendered mobilisation 
structures 
 Former liberal Zionist 
activists  Single 
identity/professional 
networks  Coalitions 
Political  
Opportunity 
Structures  
 Affected by state of 
public opinion  Complex relationship 
with the government  More hesitant in 
attributing 
opportunities  Quiet when peace 
process progressing  Affected by 
international POS 
 Continuously 
confrontational no 
matter state of public 
opinion/government/p
eace process  Bypass the 
government  Early risers  Affected by 
international POS 
 Continuously 
confrontational no 
matter state of public 
opinion/government/pea
ce process   Attributed opportunity 
to emerge in first Intifada  Reactive to changes in 
the situation  Affected by international 
POS 
 
 
3.1 MULTIPLE COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES 
3.1.1 THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: SHALOM ACHSHAV IS FOUNDED 
The liberal Zionist component, most closely associated with Shalom Achshav, came of age in 
this phase, developing collective action frames that were able to mobilise hundreds and thousands of 
 50 
 
 
Israelis for the cause of peace. As explained in an interview with one of the core leaders of Shalom 
Achshav, the group strategically framed itself and the messages it portrayed in ways that would 
resonate with the Israeli public in order to mobilise them to put pressure on the government (Golan, 
2013), rather than forcing a message that the public would not be ready to accept and therefore would 
not mobilise around. They urged for peace with Israel͛s Ŷeighďouƌs as the only way in which Israel could 
exist securely in the region and they flew Israeli flags at demonstrations, using broad, inclusive slogans 
(Bar-On, 1996:106). An example can be seen with the first Lebanon war in 1982, in which Shalom 
Achshav were hesitant in voicing opposition to the war until the negative consequences of the war 
became apparent to the Israeli public (Kaminer, 1996:35). In general Shalom Achshav tended to take a 
step back if peace talks were moving forward (Bar-On, 1996:114), partly because they did not want to 
hinder the efforts, partly because they did not want to give leverage to the opposition and partly 
because they wanted to frame their response in line with the prevailing mood amongst the Israeli public 
(Bar-On, 1996:114).
8
   
Unlike the radical groups, Shalom Achshav was initially reluctant to recognise the PLO as the body to 
negotiate with and they did not focus on the plight of the Palestinians as an impetus for achieving peace 
in the region. The first Intifada presented an opportunity for frame transformation, where they 
acknowledged that a new situation had been created, which required condemnation of Israeli policies 
and even dialogue with Palestinian representatives (Kaminer, 1996: 99-101). After the PLO publicly 
proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in terms that meant alongside Israel and also denounced 
terror in November and December 1988 (Kaminer, 1996: 110-111), Shalom Achshav openly called for 
diƌeĐt ŶegotiatioŶs ǁith the PLO aŶd foƌ Isƌael to ƌeĐogŶise ͚the ŶatioŶal eǆisteŶĐe of the PalestiŶiaŶs iŶ 
the West BaŶk aŶd Gaza͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϭϯͿ. Whilst this ǁas still a marginalised concept within Israeli 
society, the shift in the PLO position presented an opportunity to try to influence the public. 
Instances of frame bridging can also be identified in the liberal Zionist component in order to mobilise 
previously immobilised sectors of Israeli society by finding an issue that directly resonated with their 
everyday lives and connecting it to peace activism or mobilising around a related issue when they were 
not able to mobilise around peace activism. Three interesting examples can be identified. 
MizraĐh l͛Shalom (East for Peace), a group of Mizrachi (Jews of Arab origin) peace activists advocated 
similar views to Shalom Achshav with regards to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
However, its leaders were aware that in order to attract members of the Mizrachi community they 
would have to also advocate for social justice (El Baz cited in Bar-On, 1996:167) to connect the struggle 
for peace to issues relevant to the Mizrachi community, who tended in this period to be part of the 
lower socio-economic strata of Israeli society where social justice was at the heart of their concerns. 
This was the first instance of frame bridging amongst Israeli peace groups. Another example can be seen 
following the election of Rabbi Meir Kahane as a Member of Knesset, who promoted racist ideas and 
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 See Wolfsfeld (1988) for a theory of extra-parliamentary participation based on public dissatisfaction 
with the political establishment. 
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policies and gained some committed supporters (Sprinzak, 1991: 169-187). The liberal Zionists, as well 
as some radical groups, made a link between the cause of the growing racism and the occupation (Hall-
Cathala, 1990:62). Anti-racist activities were organised by members of the liberal Zionist groups in 
response to the rising popularity of Kahane, including a number of co-existence projects. These included 
activities run by Givat Haviva (The Centre for a Shared Society), an Arab-Jewish education centre; Neve 
Shalom/Wahat-al-Salam (Oasis of Peace), a joint Israeli-Arab village and Sadaka ‘e͛ut (Friendship), a 
joint Israeli-Arab youth movement. These groups, whilst focusing on the relationship between Arab 
citizens of Israel and Israeli Jews and attempting to combat racism in Israeli society, also framed their 
efforts as promoting peace in the region. 
A further attempt questioned the level of democracy in Israel. Keshev (The Centre for the Protection of 
DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ iŶ IsƌaelͿ ǁas fouŶded out of a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ the ͚deteƌioƌatioŶ of the puďliĐ disĐouƌse aŶd 
thƌeats to deŵoĐƌaĐǇ iŶ Isƌael afteƌ the ‘aďiŶ assassiŶatioŶ͛ ;Kesheǀ, [no date]). In the latter half of the 
2000s as anti-democratic laws were discussed and passed in the Knesset, the liberal Zionist component 
ďegaŶ to ďƌidge issues of ͚peaĐe͛ aŶd ͚deŵoĐƌaĐǇ,͛ ǁith Keshev acting as a key resource and foundation.  
3.1.2 PUSHING THE AGENDA: THE RADICAL COMPONENT 
Shalom Achshav, despite its growth and prominence in this phase, did not represent all the 
peace promoting voices in Israel and was not able to satisfy those who felt that the Palestinians were at 
the heart of the conflict and at the heart of the solution (Kaminer, 1996:31). The radical component 
continued to operate, pushing more confrontational collection action frames of the origins and solutions 
to the conflict, acting as norm entrepreneurs and agenda setters.
9
 
The radical groups had always been supporters of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and 
following the 1967 war became increasingly convinced of the need for a separate Palestinian State, 
where the Palestinians could achieve self-determination without compromising Israeli sovereignty 
(Kaminer, 1996:27). The first Intifada later provided a concrete example for them that the occupation 
must end because of the injustice being done to the Palestinians (Warschawski in Bar-On, 1996:224). 
The radical component were the first to respond to the first Intifada based on the idea that, ͚those ǁho 
refused to be against the Intifada…uŶdeƌstood that the Intifada ǁas Ŷot agaiŶst theŵ͛ (Jerusalem Post 
in Kaminer, 1996:48). They framed the Intifada as an expected and justified response to the occupation.  
Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc), a group made up of activists involved in the radical left, became one of the 
leading voices of the radical ĐoŵpoŶeŶt iŶ the ϭϵϵϬs, ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ͚ĐhalleŶgiŶg the hegeŵoŶǇ͛ of the 
liberal Zionist component (Kaminer, 1996:48). They were critical of Shalom Achshav for having been 
drawn into the Avoda-Meretz (Vigour) coalition that was elected in 1992, and argued there was a need 
for a genuinely independent peace group that was willing to challenge the government (Bar-On, 
1996:308). This group has maintained a presence within the peace movement, made up of key activists 
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 See Hermann (2009), Sofer (1998) Hattis (1970), Bar-On, (1996), Kaminer (1996) and Mendes-Flohr 
(1987) for details of such individuals and groups. 
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from the 1970s and 1980s, including Uri Avneri, Michel Warschawski and Matti Peled. Much of their 
work was put into producing newsletters and bulletins and they were always present at peace 
demonstrations with highly visible signs that depicted the Israeli and Palestinian flags side by side 
(Hermann, 2009:109). They tried to ensure that the peace movement was constantly challenging the 
situatioŶ ǁith AǀŶeƌi statiŶg that ͚Gush Shalom was formed to put the peace movement back on the 
stƌeet aŶd giǀe the left a seŶse of diƌeĐtioŶ͛ ;Avneri in Bar-On, 1996:308). 
One group in the radical component, HaShana HaEsrim V͛Achat (The Twenty First Year), founded in 
1988, presented an even more critical and radical framing of the situation. They argued that Israeli 
soĐietǇ as a ǁhole had deǀeloped iŶto a ͚sǇsteŵ of oĐĐupatioŶ͛, ǁhiĐh should ďe oǀeƌĐoŵe thƌough 
resistance to military service and other areas such as consumerism and language (Kaminer, 1996:54). 
They lacked, however, the clarity of how to implement their total opposition to the system (Hermann, 
2009:100), providing an example of where overly ideological framing can hinder pragmatic strategies. 
However, the ideas they promoted were later given tangible actions in the radical component with the 
boycott movement that initially formed in the late 1980s and fully developed in the mid-2000s.  
Although Shalom Achshav also began to frame the solution along the lines of a two-state solution, which 
blurred some of the difference in framing between the two components (Bar-On, 1996:263), the radical 
groups ĐoŶtiŶued to pƌopose aŶ eŶd to the oĐĐupatioŶ foƌ ͚ŵoƌal͛ ƌeasoŶs ǁheƌeas the liberal Zionist 
groups were largely focused on ending the occupation to ensure the security and stability of Israel. This 
underlies one of the main distinctions between the liberal Zionist component, which was often faced 
with the dilemma between promoting universal human rights that is concerned with the plight of the 
Palestinians and particularistic values inherent in Zionism (Simons, 2013a) and the radical groups, which 
promoted universal values of human rights above all else and therefore focused on the plight of the 
Palestinians. This division was never healed and continued to deepen throughout more recent years of 
Israeli peace activism. 
Although the government also began promoting a two-state solution, many within the radical groups 
did not accept the Oslo agreements as a fair solution to the situation, arguing that the details of the Oslo 
Accords were biased towards Israel. They published a petition in the lead up to Camp David II in Ha͛aretz 
stating,  
͚We Đall oŶ the Isƌaeli peaĐe Đaŵp to aĐt iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐhaŶge daŶgeƌous goǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
policy which pretends to lead to peace, but which might continue indefinitely and 
even exacerbate the reality of historic injustice, robbery, inequality and dependence, 
and conclusively prevent peace and reconciliation between the two peoples͛ ;The 
Other Israel, 2000:9).
10
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This position caused deep ideological divisions between the liberal Zionist and radical components of the 
peace movement (Hermann, 2002:103). 
3.1.3 NEW WAYS TO FRAME THE SITUATION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT 
A number of groups emerged focusing broadly on the issue of Palestinian rights, presenting 
new ways to frame and challenge the prevailing realities. They form the human rights component and 
can be distinguished by their specific focus on revealing the realities of the situation, challenging human 
rights violations and the policies of the Israeli authorities. They emerged particularly during the first 
Lebanon War and the first Intifada. Two emerging parts of the human rights component were 
particularly prominent in this phase: a refusal movement and a human rights movement.
11
 
3.1.3.1 The refusal movement 
Yesh Gvul (There is a limit/border) emerged out of the dissatisfaction with the actions of the 
government and out of the perceived over-cautiousness of Shalom Achshav in the first Lebanon War in 
1982 (Bar-On, 1996:149). For many reservist soldiers the Lebanon War had crossed a line they were not 
willing to and so Yesh Gvul was formed based on selective refusal to serve in the Israeli Defence Forces 
(IDF).
12
 The group began with a petition by reservists objecting to service in Lebanon and, after receiving 
some initial support, began a range of activities, which focused on providing support, assistance and 
publicity to those who chose to refuse. Kidron (2004:5) notes that Yesh Gvul has never been the largest 
group in the peace movement but it gained moral and political weight, in part because the refusers it 
supported were prepared to go to prison for their cause, a practical act that often speaks louder than a 
protest of slogans. Whilst questioning military service and refusing to perform a national duty was 
beyond what was deemed acceptable for the majority of Israelis at this time (Levy, 2008), the fact that 
the leadeƌs had all alƌeadǇ seƌǀed iŶ the aƌŵǇ aŶd ͚pƌoǀeŶ theiƌ ǁoƌth iŶ aĐtioŶ͛ ;Yuǀal NeƌiǇa iŶ Hall-
Cathala:39), meant they were not ignored.  
Despite the radical act of refusing, many of the refusers did not consider themselves part of the radical 
component but closer to the liberal Zionist activists (Warschawski in Rosenwasser, 1992:171). However, 
refusal was not accepted by the liberal Zionist component in this phase, including Shalom Achshav, who 
framed themselves as ͚ƌefƌaiŶ[iŶg] fƌoŵ tƌaŶsgƌessiŶg the liŵits of the laǁ aŶd deŵaŶd[iŶg] that its 
supporters maintain military discipline despite political opposition to steps of the governmeŶt͛ ;Baƌ-On 
in Kaminer, 1996:77). Since they wanted to appeal to mainstream public opinion, they felt that 
disobeying the law would be counterproductive and would push the movement to the margins 
(Kaminer, 1996:78). This led some Shalom Achshav activists, who did not agree with this to become 
active in Yesh Gvul (Bar-On, 1996:230). 
                                                          
11
 Some of the clusters of groups within the human rights component are commonly referred to as 
͚ŵoǀeŵeŶts.͛ Whilst theǇ ŵaǇ Ŷot fit uŶdeƌ the defiŶitioŶ of a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt, this term will be used 
in line with the existing literature (Kaminer, 1996; Bar-On, 1996; Hermann, 2009). 
12
 See Kidron (2004) for a study of the history of the Israeli refusal movement. 
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3.1.3.2 Human rights organisations 
A number of groups emerged reframing the conflict as a human rights issue. In particular, the 
deterioration of the situation in the territories for the Palestinians during the first Intifada led some to 
argue that it was imperative to focus on the immediate and troubling policies within the territories 
rather than develop long term political solutions (Kaminer, 1996:174). Many were critical of the routine 
protests of the peace movement and the political battles they centred on (Kaminer, 1996:174) and 
aimed to create more stable, apolitical organisations that focused on human rights and revealed the 
hidden realities of being an occupying force. The main group to emerge was B͛Tseleŵ ;͚IŶ the Iŵage 
of͛/the Isƌaeli IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CeŶtƌe foƌ HuŵaŶ ‘ights iŶ the OĐĐupied TeƌƌitoƌiesͿ, estaďlished iŶ MaƌĐh 
1989 by Dedi Zucker, a member of Shalom Achshav. It was set up to,   
‘Endeavour to document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about 
human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon of 
denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in 
Isƌael͛ ;B͛Tseleŵ, [no date, a]). 
Many of the human rights groups argue that they are not part of the Israeli peace movement but 
identify themselves as part of a separate human rights movement (Hary, 2013). This is to ensure focus is 
given to their reports on human rights violations rather than being caught up in partisan politics (Bar-
On, 1996:245). Whilst they claim to have no political orientation and frame themselves as nonpartisan, 
their work in documenting various human rights violations in the occupied territories appeared to the 
public as political opposition to the occupation (Bar-On, 1996:245) and therefore part of the peace 
movement. B͛Tseleŵ was able to build its credibility through maintaining close relations with the IDF, 
who did not often deny the reports that were sent to them (Kaminer, 1996:177). Despite this many of 
the reports were criticised as exaggerations (Bar-On, 1996:244). 
3.1.4 GENDERED COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES 
 This phase saǁ the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶt ǁho ĐhalleŶged the 
prevailing situation.
13
 Some parts of the movement can be aligned with the liberal Zionist component, 
focusing on the safety and security of Israel and of Israeli citizens; others are more closely aligned with 
the radical component, particularly due to their feminist perspective, whilst others are part of the 
human rights component, focused on revealing the realities on the ground and provide humanitarian 
services. This section will consider the specific gendered framing of these groups across the spectrum of 
the three components. Studies on the Arba Imahot, which was created in 1997 following an accident in 
Southern Lebanon where two Israeli helicopters collided, killing 73 Israeli soldiers, have argued that this 
                                                          
13
 Theƌe haǀe ďeeŶ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of aƌtiĐles aŶd ďooks dediĐated to the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peace movement in Israel 
during the Intifada (Micallef, 1992; Sharoni, 1995; Helman & Rapoport, 1997; Helman, 1999; Shadmi, 
ϮϬϬϬ; “ǀiƌskǇ, ϮϬϬϭaͿ “ee “haƌoŶi ;ϭϵϵϱͿ foƌ a histoƌǇ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌesistaŶĐe iŶ Isƌael up to the Oslo 
Accords. See Aharoni (2001) foƌ a ĐolleĐtioŶ of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, letteƌs, poeŵs aďout ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe 
building and women peace builders from Haifa. 
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group was successful in achieving its goals, mainly in pressuring the Israeli government to withdraw 
forces from Southern Lebanon (Lieberfeld, 2009a, 2009b; Lemish and Barzel, 2000, Kaminer 1996). They 
fƌaŵed theŵselǀes as ͚ŵotheƌs,͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚ĐitizeŶs͛, ǁhiĐh seƌǀed as a ŵeaŶs of legitiŵisiŶg 
themselves in the public sphere (Lemish and Barzel, 2000:153), voicing their concerns from the 
perspective of mothers of those who were fighting and dying in the war. It was through this maternal 
identity, their perceived contribution to the state through motherhood, and their role in bringing-up 
Israeli warriors (Ginsberg, 2009:99) that the movement gained legitimacy within Israeli society. Their 
pƌotest ǁas ďased oŶ the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ƌepuďliĐaŶ ŵotheƌhood,͛ ǁheƌeďǇ ǁoŵeŶ eaƌŶ theiƌ ĐitizeŶship 
and legitimisation to protest against the state through their contribution to the demographic struggle 
(Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Through this legitimisation the women were conferred the 
right to express their views on peace and security in the public sphere (Lieberfeld, 2009b:153).  
Furthermore, they chose a single issue, which focused not on support for the enemy but on the concern 
for the safety of their sons, which gained empathy across the sectors of society with compulsory 
ĐoŶsĐƌiptioŶ. BǇ ǁoƌkiŶg ǁithiŶ ͚the ƌules of the gaŵe͛ aŶd eŵphasising identities and issues which 
resonated with the public rather than antagonising them, they were able to mobilise widespread 
support, which some have argued helped lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (Lieberfeld, 2009a; 
Lemish and Barzel 2000; Shadmi 2000).  
In the first Intifada, the fƌaŵiŶg of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶt shifted aǁaǇ fƌoŵ suĐh tƌaditioŶal geŶdeƌ 
diǀisioŶs. The ǁoŵeŶ deĐided to ͚step out of pƌeǀailiŶg ƌoles as ŵotheƌs͛ ;“haƌoŶi, ϭϵϵϱ:ϭϭϭͿ aŶd eŶteƌ 
the discourse on national security and the Israeli Palestinian conflict as equal citizens. There was also a 
ƌealisatioŶ that ͚ǁoŵeŶ͛s issues͛ ǁeƌe iŶteƌtǁiŶed ǁith ŵilitaƌisŵ, iŶeƋualitǇ aŶd oppƌessioŶ aŶd 
reinforced by the occupation (Sharoni, 1995:111). The women were also able to transcend their national 
identities and identify with the Palestinian women in their roles as women in their respective 
patƌiaƌĐhies. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to oŶe aĐtiǀist, ͚iŶ geŶeƌal ǁe [Isƌaelis, PalestiŶiaŶs, Aƌaď ĐitizeŶs of Isƌael], haǀe 
the same ideas and the same struggle͛ ;AŶoŶǇŵous iŶ ‘oseŶǁasseƌ, ϭϵϵϮ:ϳϱͿ.This ͚sisteƌhood ĐoŶĐept͛ 
led to the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of ŵaŶǇ joiŶt Isƌaeli, PalestiŶiaŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐtiǀities ;HeƌŵaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϵ:ϭϬϭͿ.14  
Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor ;WoŵeŶ iŶ BlaĐkͿ ǁas the ŵost pƌoŵiŶeŶt gƌoup ǁithiŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe 
movement and the first to form in response to the first Intifada.
15 
The modern feminist movement that 
had eŵeƌged iŶ Isƌael iŶ the eaƌlǇ ϭϵϳϬs ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϴϮͿ aŶd the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌadiĐal ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
movements, such as the women of Plaza de Mayo (Kaminer, 1996:82) influenced the innovative way in 
which they framed the prevailing realities. Whilst not all their members viewed themselves as feminists 
(Helman and Rapoport, 1997:683), they developed a very specific feminist framing of their protests 
(Shadmi, 2000: 25-26). First, the women expressed themselves through their bodies, standing in a 
                                                          
14
 Sharoni (1995:13-14) notes however, that the feminism of the Palestinian and Israeli women are 
shaped by their particular contexts and must Ŷot ďe igŶoƌed thƌough a geŶeƌalised ͚sisteƌhood͛ ĐoŶĐept. 
This is a radical perspective which seeks to highlight the asymmetries between the Palestinians and 
Israelis and is reflective of the framing of the radical component in the next phase.   
15
 See Helman & Rapoport (1997) and Shadmi (2000) for personal accounts of the activities, role and 
trajectory of Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor. 
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public, central area, which sought to challenge the traditional position of women as being reserved for 
the private sphere; their physical presence in public areas blurred the distinction between the public 
and private spheres. Second, they wore all black, partly as an expression of grief and also to renounce 
the image of women as pure and angelic. Third, the constant presence at a particular time and place 
exposed their protest to the many passers-by from different backgrounds. This mode of protest, the 
ways in which the women framed themselves and their message through the use of particular symbols, 
͚pƌeseŶted aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the plaĐe of ǁoŵeŶ iŶ Isƌaeli politiĐs aŶd soĐietǇ͛ ;HelŵaŶ 
aŶd ‘apopoƌt, ϭϵϵϳ:ϲϴϱͿ. TheǇ suĐĐeeded iŶ ideŶtifǇiŶg the liŶks ďetǁeeŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s issues aŶd politiĐs, 
ďoth loĐal aŶd iŶteƌŶatioŶal, thus ͚opeŶiŶg Ŷeǁ possiďilities foƌ soĐial aŶd politiĐal ŵoďilisiŶg͛ ;“haƌoŶi, 
1995:122). They also aĐted as a puďliĐ ͚ŵoƌal ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛, ͚ŵakiŶg it diffiĐult foƌ people, ǁho [did] Ŷot 
ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ, to Ŷot kŶoǁ͛ ;HaŶŶah “afƌaŶ iŶ Diase, ϭϵϵϮ:ϮϬϬͿ. The reaction of the public to Nashim 
ď͛ShaĐhor, however, was much less welcoming than towards Arba Imahot and they were less able to 
mobilise large numbers or contribute to government policy change. 
These two cases clearly highlight the effect of framing and identity construction on the levels of 
mobilisation and support and on the ability to impact policy change. Sharoni (1995:107-109) presents a 
siŵilaƌ aŶalǇsis, ǁith siŵilaƌ ĐoŶĐlusioŶs, iŶ heƌ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ ďetǁeeŶ the tǁo eaƌlieƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
movements, Horim/Imahot Neged Shtika (Parents /Mothers Against Silence) and Nashim Neged Plisha 
l͛LeǀaŶoŶ (Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon). 
3.2 EXPANDING AND RADICALISING THE REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
Demonstrations were the main form of activism employed in this phase, although there was 
some innovation in the specific forms of protest, particularly by the radical component. Non-protest 
based tactical repertoires were also developed, providing alternative avenues for individuals to become 
involved in peace activism. A number of tactical innovations also emerged towards the end of this 
phase, aiming to create change without having to influence the government. 
3.2.1 DEMONSTRATIONS 
In an effort to influence the mainstream Israeli public, Shalom Achshav was careful to employ 
tactics that would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. Demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities 
therefore became the main form of activity for Shalom Achshav, with an emphasis on keeping within the 
legal framework of protest in Israel and avoiding overly confrontational signs
16
 or chants in order to 
attract as many participants as possible (Bar-On, 1996:148). In instances where the actions of some 
members of the demonstration became more confrontational, their moderate position and their 
connections to Members of Knesset meant the response from the authorities was restrained and only a 
cautionary tone was taken (Hall-Cathala, 1990:55).  
                                                          
16
 See Simons (2013b) for a study of Shaloŵ AĐhshaǀ͛s use of political images for peace. 
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The actions of the radical groups were often more confrontational and during this phase they began to 
protest alongside Palestinians in Palestinian areas, which made them even more marginalised. Whilst 
their tactics were considered more confrontational, they still used protest as the core of their 
contentious activity but often more provocative than the liberal Zionist protest groups. Two examples 
highlight the protests of the radical groups.  HaVaad l͛Solidariut iŵ Bir Zeit (The Committee for Solidarity 
with Bir Zeit) rallied alongside Palestinians and in solidarity against the collective closure enforced 
against the University of Bir Zeit and HaShaŶa HaEsriŵ V͛Achat held a solidarity protest outside one of 
the pƌisoŶs, ǁith a ŵass ͚Đaŵp-out͛ of the aĐtiǀists ;Baƌ-On, 1996:225). The concept of Israelis travelling 
to pƌotest iŶ ͚solidaƌitǇ͛ ǁith PalestiŶiaŶs at the loĐatioŶs ǁheƌe the PalestiŶiaŶs ǁeƌe affeĐted ǁas a 
novel innovation in the protest formation. At this stage it was only sporadic but it became the main 
method of protesting of the radical groups in the mid to late-2000s.  
3.2.2 NON-PROTEST BASED TACTICS 
Whilst demonstrations had become the main method of voicing political contention in Israel, it 
was not the only tactic available to the peace movement. The groups that were focusing on different 
aspects or ways of solving the conflict, with alternative targets across the components, used different 
methods to achieve their goals, such as ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd adǀoĐaĐǇ, ͚people-to-people͛ aĐtiǀities aŶd 
humanitarian aid, highlighting the link between collective action frames and tactical repertoires.  
In 1990 Shalom Achshav estaďlished a ͚“ettleŵeŶt WatĐh͛ pƌojeĐt, ǁith the aiŵ of ŵoŶitoƌiŶg aŶd 
reporting on settlement building in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Bar-On, 1996:267). This was a 
departure from their traditional method of mass mobilisation in demonstrations and enabled them to 
continue to operate and challenge the situation in periods where mass mobilisation was unlikely. This 
project continued and became the central activity of Shalom Achshav as participation dramatically 
declined in the 2000s. 
Many of the groups that formed in the first phase of Israeli peace activism were intellectual groups that 
acted as informal think-thanks. In this phase, these groups developed into more formal, institutionalised 
organisations. For example, the Merkaz BeŶleuŵi l͛Shaloŵ ď͛haMizraĐh Hatichon (International Centre 
for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME)) was established by some prominent members of the radical left, 
such as Avneri and Flapam, with the aim to provide more innovative approaches to solving the conflict, 
in order to push the debate and encourage the leaders to take more daring initiatives (Bar-On, 
1996:189). During the first Intifada, as the need for a political solution became even clearer, two 
influential think-tanks involved in informal diplomacy emerged, aligned with the liberal Zionist 
component. The Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI)
 17
 was founded in 1988 
and, whilst direct causality cannot be established, many of the policy ideas that the organisation 
developed were included in the Oslo Declaration of Principles (Baskin in Bar-On, 1996:256). The 
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 The author was an intern and employee of IPCRI Sept 2009 – June 2010. 
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Economic Cooperation Foundation was established in 1990 by senior officials, including Dr Yair 
Hirschfeld, the initiator of the Oslo process. 
A new element to the human rights component emerged in the first Intifada, providing humanitarian 
services to the Palestinians, in order to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians in the short term. 
Whilst they showed elements of solidarity with the Palestinians, they differed from the radical groups in 
that they also provided reports on the human rights situation in the occupied territories, provided 
services to Israelis and had more formal organisational structures. The groups tended to form along 
professional lines, using their skills in a particular service area to provide support for Palestinians. 
Examples include Imut (Mental Health Workers for the Advancement of Peace), a group of mental 
health professionals, providing services to those suffering mental illness and researching the 
psychological barriers to peace (Kaminer, 1996:143). They were criticised for taking a political position 
as psychologists however, they provided important services and brought new ideas into the discourse of 
the Israeli peace movement. Of particular importance was the work of Professor Stan Cohen, who put 
forward a theory of denial amongst Israeli soĐietǇ, ďased oŶ the seŶse of ͚peƌŵaŶeŶt ǀiĐtiŵhood͛ of 
Jewish Israelis (Kaminer, 1996:145).
18
 ‘ofiŵ l͛Zhuyot Adam (Physicians for Human Rights), a local branch 
of the International Non-Governmental Organisation, provided medical services in the territories where 
facilities were inadequate (PHR, [no date]); ‘aďaŶiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ ZĐhuyot haAdaŵ (Rabbis for Human Rights), 
a group of Reform and Conservative Rabbis originally from the United States provided invaluable 
assistance to Palestinians in the territories (Kaminer, 1996:151) and Ossim Shalom (Doing Peace/ Social 
Workers for Peace and Welfare) felt that social work was political work and worked with individual 
communities providing support and using their professional expertise to promote welfare, peace and 
human rights (Sheffer, 2013). Kaǀ l͛Oǀed ;Woƌkeƌ͛s HotliŶeͿ ǁas foƌŵed ǁith the aiŵ of pƌoǀidiŶg legal 
aid to Palestinians from the territories who worked in Israel. They highlighted the frequent violations of 
ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ƌights. ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϴϰͿ. Whilst Ŷot directly connected to the peace movement, the 
organisation can be linked to the way the human rights component challenged the first Intifada, since 
the prevailing realities caused further discrimination with many Palestinians losing their jobs within 
Israel due to the growing animosity.  These gƌoups ͚suƌǀiǀed͛ thƌough the Ŷeǆt phase of Isƌaeli peaĐe 
activism, continuing to provide services as a means to challenge the occupation. 
The human rights organisations began to document and report on what was going on in the occupied 
territories, as a means of holding the government accountable. B͛Tseleŵ has provided regular reports 
on the situation in the occupied territories since its founding
19
 and has become a significant force in 
challenging the policies and practices of the Israeli authorities, laying the way for a number of other 
human rights groups to emerge. Another prominent human rights group founded in this phase was 
haVaad haZiburi Neged Inuyim (the Public Committee Against Torture (PCATI)). PCATI was established in 
response to allegations made by Palestinians about psychological and physical torture during Israeli 
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 See Cohen (2001). 
19
 See B͛Tseleŵ ([no date, b]) for their publications from 1989 to present. 
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interrogations (Cohen in Rosenwasser, 1992:165). PCATI, with the help of B͛Tseleŵ, undertook a special 
research project into Palestinian interrogations, which concluded that almost every prisoner they 
interviewed had been subjected to some form of torture.  The report received an unprecedented 
amount of coverage, although a lot of criticism for defending Palestinian prisoners (Kaminer, 1996: 178-
182).  
When the Rabin government began to put forward, to some degree, the agenda that the peace 
movement was promoting, it became unclear for some what the purpose of the peace movement was. 
Some groups therefore shifted their activities to peace-buildiŶg thƌough ͚people to people͛ aĐtiǀities, as 
part of the reconciliation process.
20
 These activities were based on the contact hypothesis,
21
 whereby 
ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith the ͚Otheƌ͛ ŵakes it haƌdeƌ to feel hatƌed oƌ ŵistƌust ;Kuriansky, 2007; Hewston and 
Brown, 1986). Tǁo ďasiĐ teŶets of ͚peaĐe-ďuildiŶg͛ iŶ this phase ĐaŶ ďe deteƌŵiŶed. FiƌstlǇ, the aiŵ ǁas 
to ŵeet the ͚Otheƌ͛ oŶ a peƌsoŶal leǀel oŶ the basis of a feeling that the ͚…fates [of Isƌaelis aŶd 
PalestiŶiaŶs] aƌe iŶteƌtǁiŶed͛ ;VeƌoŶika CoheŶ iŶ ‘oseŶǁasseƌ, 1992:24), but avoided talking about 
aŶǇthiŶg ͚politiĐal͛ ;“toloǀ, ϮϬϬϱͿ. “eĐoŶdlǇ, the ĐoŶĐept of ͚Đo-eǆisteŶĐe͛ uŶdeƌliŶed ŵaŶǇ of the 
activities, with groups promoting co-existence through dialogue and getting to know each other.  
One example is Hug Horim Shakulim ;PaƌeŶt͛s CiƌĐle-Families Forum), which was set up by Yitzhak 
Frankenthal, a bereaved father, in 1994, as a support group for Israelis and Palestinians who had lost a 
child as a result of the conflict and to promote peace and coexistence (Hermann, 2009:142). The public 
perception of the group was mixed. On the one hand, the fact that parents whose children had been 
killed as a ƌesult of the ĐoŶfliĐt Đould ŵeet aŶd ƌeĐoŶĐile ǁith the ͚Otheƌ͛ shoǁed that it ǁas possiďle 
but, on the other hand, it was seen by some as abnormal and even unnatural (Hermann, 2009:143). 
Other examples include haMoatza Bein Datit Meta͛eŵet ď͛Yisrael (The Inter-religious Coordination 
Council in Israel), which aims to use religion as a positive force towards peace; Kav Adom (Red Line), 
which brought together Arabs and Jews from the Galilee; and Seeds of Peace, a youth encounter 
programme. Informal dialogue groups were also formed by individuals who had a desire to meet with 
the ͚Otheƌ͛.22 Towards the end of this phase people-to-people activities were the most prolific form of 
peace activity and were supported by the two governments but, as the situation in the occupied 
territories failed to improve, dialogue often turned into action (Bardin, 2012). 
 
 
                                                          
20
 See Adwan & Bar-On (2000); Baskin & Al-Qaq (2004) and Dajani & Baskin (2006) for overviews of 
people-to-people activities and an assessment of their impact. There have also been a number of case 
studies conducted on Israeli and Palestinian people-to-people activities between 1993 and 2000. See 
Maoz (2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
21
 The contact hypothesis takes a psychological approach to reconciliation and involves individuals in 
conflict meeting each other and getting to know each other on an equal footing, based on the belief 
that, ͚it is ŵuĐh haƌdeƌ to hate the people Ǉou ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ͛ ;KuƌiaŶzskǇ, ϮϬϬϳ:ϭ-2). 
22
 See Bardin (2012) for an account of his participation in dialogue and solidarity activities with 
Palestinians in the West Bank. 
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3.2.3 TACTICAL INNOVATIONS 
A number of tactical innovations were seen in the radical component towards the mid to late 
1990s, particularly when Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister. These innovations were different 
attempts to create change without appealing to the government, which was not receptive to the ideas 
they were promoting. 
3.2.3.1 Non-violent direct action 
The peace movement had been criticised in the past for not taking risks and for not being able to 
provide practical measures to counter the right-wing opposition. In particular, Shalom Achshav was 
ĐƌitiĐised foƌ ͚Ŷot [ďeiŶg] ǁilliŶg to pay foƌ ĐhaŶge͛ ;Naďila EspaŶoli iŶ ‘oseŶǁasseƌ, ϭϵϵϮ:ϭϱϬͿ. Toǁaƌds 
the end of this phase of Israeli peace activism, when the government was actively carrying out steps to 
undermine the Oslo peace process, the radical component employed tactics that went beyond 
traditional demonstrations and began using practical acts of solidarity to challenge the occupation at the 
place of the violations, a tactic known as non-violent direct action. This mode of action, whilst on a small 
scale during this period, increased in scope as the violations increased overtime.  
House demolitions, in particular, became a significant rallying point for direct action. A joint newspaper 
advertisement signed by Bat Shalom (Daughter of Peace), Gush Shalom, Shalom Achshav and Meretz 
against the perceived government campaign of house demolitions created the basis for the creation of 
the haVaad haYsiraeli Neged Harisat Batim (Israel Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD)), 
which carried out a number of actions in the late 1990s (The Other Israel, 1996a:6). Activists employed 
͚diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ͛ ďǇ pƌotestiŶg iŶ fƌoŶt of the PalestiŶiaŶ houses that had ƌeĐeiǀed deŵolitioŶ oƌdeƌs, iŶ 
some cases helping to rebuild the Palestinian homes following the demolitions.
23
 This group remained 
active throughout the 2000s and 2010s. In this phase, the distinction in tactics between the components 
is less clear and the core, radical fringe of Shalom Achshav was involved in going to West Bank 
demonstrations and engaging in non-violent direct action (Golan, 2013). However, this was not their 
main method of challenging the situation and promoting peace. 
3.2.3.2 Boycott 
Boycotting became a tactic of Gush Shalom, developed from the ideas of HaShana HaEsrim 
V͛Achat. This tactic became more significant and widespread in the 2000s and 2010s, highlighting the 
role of the radical component as norm entrepreneurs. They initiated a call to the Israeli public to refrain 
from buying products that were produced in the Israeli settlements within the West Bank or Gaza Strip 
(Avneri, 1997:7). This coincided with the start of the international boycott movement, as a means of 
pressuring the Netanyahu government into halting settlement construction and implementing the Oslo 
agreements. However, even amongst the peace movement, the idea of a boycott was not wide spread 
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 See The Other Israel (1997a, 1997b) for examples of some of the activities organised by ICAHD in this 
period. 
 61 
 
 
aŶd ǁas a highlǇ ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial issue siŶĐe it ͚iŶtƌoduĐes the ďƌeakiŶg of ethŶiĐ ƌaŶks, [aŶd shoǁs a] 
refusal to regard the struggle between peace seekers and settlers as ͚a faŵilǇ Ƌuaƌƌel aŵoŶg Jeǁs͛ ;The 
Other Israel, 1998:12), as the peace activists are treating the settlers as the enemy, rather than working 
with them to overcome their problems, as meŵďeƌs of the saŵe ͚ethŶiĐ ƌaŶk͛. 
3.3 EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING MOBILISATION STRUCTURES 
Mobilising structures were also divided along the three components. The radical and liberal 
Zionist components used their informal networks and grassroots social movement organisations from 
the previous phase from which to draw support. The human rights component accessed new mobilising 
structures, in particular along professional lines. Of significance for all components were the expatriate 
networks, particularly those from North America, academic networks, professional networks and 
students. In this phase all three components targeted the Israeli public and government. The movement 
as a whole fluctuated between periods of unity and coordination and periods of disunity and dispersal, 
depending on both external and internal developments. 
The liberal Zionist ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ taƌget audieŶĐe ǁas the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ puďliĐ aŶd Shalom 
Achshav developed the material, human and moral resources to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli 
public, more than had been seen previously, with hundreds of thousands drawn to the streets for 
different demonstrations in the early 1980s (Hermann, 2009:92). Furthermore, it actively sought to 
mobilise previously immobilised or unconnected members of the Israeli public, through publicity 
campaigns. As suĐh, it ďeĐaŵe the ͚faĐe͛ of the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŵoŶgst the Isƌaeli puďliĐ, ǁith 
the peace movement and Shalom Achshav often being treated as one and the same thing. Shalom 
Achshav feared that the emergence of new groups would lead to a splintering of the peace movement, 
increasing competition and reducing the potential for mass participation in their demonstrations. They 
therefore made efforts to communicate and coordinate with the smaller groups, particularly those that 
reached out to sectors of Israeli society that they were unable to (Bar-On, 1996:168-9). In this sense it 
acted as a centralising organisation, as is often witnessed in social movements (Smith, Pagnucco and 
Chatfield, 1997:64).  
A distinguishing mobilising structure of the radical components was the formation of committees or ad 
hoc coalitions, particularly in instances when then wanted to focus on a particular campaign. There was 
a realisation that if there was an issue that the different groups could rally over together, their 
mobilisation potential would be greater. Two committees emerged in the first years of this phase, 
HaVaad l͛Solidariut iŵ Bir Zeit and HaVaad Neged haMilĐhaŵa ď͛LeǀaŶoŶ (The Committee Against the 
War in Lebanon), bringing together activists from across the radical components in support of these 
issues. Dai l͛Kiďush (Enough of the Occupation/End the Occupation) was formed out of activists from 
across the spectrum of the radical groups and was a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee. It set the bar of 
intense activities during the first year of the Intifada, holding weekly vigils protesting the brutality of the 
Israeli response to the Intifada and conducting visits to villages, refugee camps and hospitals in the 
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territories, in acts of solidarity (Kaminer, 1996:50-51). The radical collective action frames and tactics 
opened the possibility for Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel to join this committee (Bar-On, 
1996:224). 
The human rights component tended to be built out of those who had been active in the liberal Zionist 
component but were looking for different avenues from which to challenge the situation. For example, 
some of those who set up B͛Tseleŵ had come from Shalom Achshav but wanted to focus on the human 
rights violations or refuseniks joining Yesh Gvul. The emergence of new groups is typical in a cycle of 
contention (Tarrow, 2011) and opened up avenues for new participants to be mobilised. 
During the first half of this phase, all components of the movement were mainly characterised by 
horizontal, voluntary groups, with decisions made through consensus. The movement as a whole was 
rich in human resources, particularly individuals skilled in public relations, which helped the groups 
achieve media attention (Hermann, 2009). As the phase continued there was an increase in 
professionalization and institutionalisation amongst the groups, particularly alongside the increase in 
international interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the late 1980s and therefore an increase in the 
flow of funding to the region. Shalom Achshav took on paid staff after a period of deliberation over 
whether this might compromise its grassroots focus and consensus-orientated decision making (Golan, 
2013). A higher proportion of the budget of the peace organisations became directed towards salaries 
as opposed to funding activities (Hermann, 2002:114) and the peace movement received the criticism of 
ďeĐoŵiŶg a ͚peaĐe iŶdustƌǇ,͛ ǁith aĐtiǀists ͚ďeŶefittiŶg͛ fƌoŵ the ĐoŶfliĐt. MaŶǇ of the Ŷeǁ gƌassƌoots 
groups that emerged in the 2000s were particularly critical of this development in the peace movement 
(Neiman, 2013). Contrary to the conclusion of Kaminer (1996:217), who believed that the increased 
institutionalisation of the Israeli peace movement brought an increase in knowledge and tools that 
enabled it to reach out to a wide support base, Hermann (2002:114) argues that the institutionalisation 
of peace groups in the 1990s actually led to a decline in their grassroots support, due to centralisation of 
power within the organisation. 
3.3.1 GENDER DYNAMICS AND MOBILISING STRUCTURES 
With the emergence of a ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt, the ƌole of geŶdeƌ iŶ the Isƌaeli peaĐe 
movement became apparent. Gender had a clear impact on the mobilisation structures.  Many of the 
women who built the iŶdepeŶdeŶt ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups had ďeeŶ pƌeǀiouslǇ aĐtiǀe iŶ the ŵiǆed-gender 
groups. However, they argued that the Israeli peace movement was guilty of reproducing the unequal 
gender dynamics of Israeli society, with women often doing the menial work within the peace 
organisations, whilst the men held the leadership positions, 
͚WoŵeŶ ďeĐaŵe ŵaƌgiŶal iŶ theiƌ oǁŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶs, foƌĐed to deal ǁith tƌiǀial ŵatteƌs 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg. WoŵeŶ felt that ǁithiŶ the fƌaŵeǁoƌk of ͚ŵiǆed 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ theǇ ǁeƌe stifled͛ ;Ostƌoǁitz iŶ MiĐallef, ϭϵϵϮ:ϮϯϴͿ. 
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This theƌefoƌe led soŵe of the ǁoŵeŶ to deĐide to ďuild theiƌ oǁŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶt.  
A paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ distiŶĐtiǀe Ŷatuƌe of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt, Đoŵpaƌed ǁith the Isƌaeli peaĐe 
movement at large, was the level of cooperation amongst the different groups (Kaminer, 1996: 96), due 
to their ability to put aside ideological differences and act based on shared experiences as women 
;“haƌoŶi, ϭϵϵϱͿ. A Ŷuŵďeƌ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s Ŷetǁoƌks aŶd ĐoalitioŶs foƌŵed, including Shani-Nashim Neged 
haKibush (Women against the Occupation) and RESHET (Israeli WoŵeŶ͛s PeaĐe NetͿ. The ǁilliŶgŶess of 
the ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups to Đoopeƌate aŶd soŵetiŵes shaƌe ƌesouƌĐes eŶaďled it to ďeĐoŵe stƌoŶgeƌ thaŶ if 
the individual groups acted alone.  
A fuƌtheƌ ŵoďilisiŶg aďilitǇ paƌtiĐulaƌ to the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶt ǁas the high leǀel of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, 
cooperation and solidarity they had with Palestinian women, directly connected to their framing, This 
was seen in the involvement of Israel and Palestinian women in international conferences and the 
founding of an umbrella organisation Nashiŵ ǀ͛Shalom (Women and Peace) to coordinate between the 
different Israeli and Palestinian ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups ;“haƌoŶi, ϭϵϵϳ:ϭϭϳͿ.  
3.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
In the late 1980s, the international community became more involved in the Arab-Israeli and 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, in coordination with the Oslo agreements, invested money into the 
various peace activities, particularly the organisations that involved cooperation or dialogue with 
Palestinians (Dajani and Baskin, 2006:87).
24
 The increase in funding gave the organisations the 
opportunity to expand both their organisational structures and their activities, enabling them to reach 
out to more members of the public. In some instances, the involvement of international organisations 
went deeper, with the funders directly influencing the organisational and operating structures of the 
organisations they funded (Hermann, 2002:114). For example, Bat Shalom was formally established in 
1994 as a feminist group and is the Israeli side of the Israeli-PalestiŶiaŶ Jeƌusaleŵ LiŶk WoŵeŶ͛s JoiŶt 
Venture for Peace. It benefitted financially from foreign funding but was required to build its 
organisational structures and modes of action based on recommendations from the donors, resulting in 
professional structures with paid staff (Hermann, 2006:50), thus losing some of their autonomy as 
grassroots activists. 
Whilst international funding may have aided mobilisation and improved the efficiency of the 
organisations, due to the strict target requirements of the funders, foreign funding also helped cause 
fragmentation within the peace movement in this period, with smaller groups unable to compete with 
the larger, more developed organisations for the available funding (Hermann, 2002:115). One 
organisation that received a significant amount of criticism from the smaller organisations was Merkaz 
Peres l͛Shaloŵ (Peres Centre for Peace), which was set up by former Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
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 Between 1993 and 2000 $26 million was given by international donors to people-to-people activities 
(Dajani and Baskin (2006:95). 
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during the Oslo process, and managed to raise significant amount of funds. Much of the international 
funding that the smaller groups had received was redirected to the centre (Hermann, 2009: 150-153).  
3.3.3 THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE MEDIA 
After the 1973 war the media was more open to criticising and holding the government to 
account than before and therefore made more effort to document the Israeli peace movement (Mann, 
2015), which assisted in its ability to mobilise the Israeli public. For example, it was due to the positive 
and widespread response of the media to the campaign of Arba Imahot that the group was able to 
mobilise participants and influence public opinion and government policy in Lebanon (Lieberfeld, 
2009a:318). A number of groups also paid for weekly advertisements in national newspapers in order to 
spread their ideas, Gush Shalom being a prominent example. Hermann (2009:161) notes that the media 
in the second half of the 1990s lost interest in most of the peace activities, as the activities became less 
news-worthy and as Israelis became less interested in alternative views to the mainstream, which 
arguably contributed to the beginnings of the demobilisation of the liberal Zionist component. 
Israeli peace activists began to use the Internet as a mobilisation tool, as well as a tactical repertoire, in 
oƌdeƌ ͚to fiŶd ǁaǇs to ĐiƌĐuŵǀeŶt the Ŷegatiǀe effeĐts of dissipatiŶg iŶteƌest of the ŵedia aŶd the 
deĐƌeasiŶg leǀel of gƌassƌoots paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ pƌotest aĐtiǀities͛ ;Hermann, 2009:162). The internet is 
argued to help facilitate collective action by assisting in mobilising individuals and making them aware of 
what is going on by distributing resources (McCaughey and Ayers, 2003; Bennet 2003). It also connects 
people who cannot meet physically, which became particularly useful as the restriction of movement for 
Palestinians increased (Hermann, 2009:162). However, Hermann (2009:162) also notes that shifting to 
attempts at online mobilisation can actually inhibit the mobilisation of participants and increase the 
isolation of the activists, as online forums often only involve those who are already active and the 
general public is no longer confronted by flyers and billboards. However, if used alongside traditional 
methods of disseminating information and mobilisation, the internet can be used to expand mobilising 
structures and enable the rapid dissemination of information. The peace movement in Israel was quick 
to make use of the new technological resources that became available to them in the late 1990s 
(Hermann, 2009:162). 
Initially, alternative media centres developed, beginning with a basic website Ariga (Weave) as early as 
1995, which was founded by a veteran journalist in Israel and as of January 1997 claimed to reach an 
estimated audience of 5,000 people (Ariga, 1998). Other websites include, The MidEast Web for 
Coexistence, with the aim to ͚ǁeaǀe a ǁoƌld-wide web of Arabs, Jews and others who want to build a 
Ŷeǁ Middle East ďased oŶ ĐoeǆisteŶĐe aŶd ŶeighďouƌlǇ ƌelatioŶs͛ (MidEast Web, [no date]). On the 
more radical spectrum, Gush Shalom had an active discussion forum on their website (Hara and Shachaf, 
2008) and Indymedia Israel was set up in 1999, as one of the autonomous local outlets of the 
Independent Media Centre, whiĐh gƌeǁ out of the gloďal justiĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s Đoǀeƌage aŶd ƌepoƌts oŶ 
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various social injustices and social movements (Morris, 2004:326). This is one of the first examples of 
the connection of radical peace groups in Israel to the transnational anti-globalisation movement.   
3.3.4 COORDINATION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT 
At the beginning of this phase the peace movement was characterised as a diverse, yet 
coordinated movement, with the different components mobilising together and seeking to influence the 
mainstream Israeli public, for example in response to the continuation of the Lebanon War (Kaminer, 
1996:40). However, the way in which the groups framed other events such as the first Intifada, the Gulf 
War and the Oslo Agreements, led to instances of fragmentation in the movement but, they were able 
to rally together on other occasions to promote ͚tǁo states foƌ tǁo peoples͛.  
The relationship between the radical component and Shalom Achshav with respect to coordinated 
mobilisation was more complex. Activists within the radical component often criticised Shalom Achshav 
for their hesitancy in responding to certain events, such as the Lebanon War and the first Intifada (Bar-
On, 1996:148). The radical groups therefore mobilised their own networks independently of Shalom 
Achshav. On occasion, some activists from within Shalom Achshav would join these radical groups when 
they felt that Shalom Achshav were too hesitant or even set up splinter groups, such as Yesh Gvul (Bar-
On, 1996:148-49). The radical component was also seen at the rallies of Shalom Achshav in this phase, 
albeit with their own banners and chanting their own, more confrontational slogans (Hermann, 
2009:109). However, during the Oslo period, such coordination between the radical and the liberal 
Zionist components was less common as the ideological positions became incompatible. In the next 
phase, the radical component began to actively refuse to join the liberal Zionist activities (Neiman, 
2013). Their absence was often welcomed by the liberal Zionist activists, who argued that their 
confrontational approach gave the peace movement a bad name. 
3.4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: A NEW CYCLE OF CONTENTION 
The election of the first right-wing government in Isƌael͛s histoƌǇ in 1977 provided the 
opportunity for a mass movement to emerge from the individual attempts of peace activism that had 
been operating previously. The three components each perceived and experienced the political 
opportunities of this phase differently, highlighting three cycles of contention. However, at certain 
points, particularly in coordinating in favour of peace agreements, the cycles converged. The liberal 
Zionist component was most sensitive to the prevailing political opportunity structures, given their 
desire to mobilise the public and influence the government. The radical groups were less concerned 
with changes and continued to operate despite unfavourable conditions, creating a spiral of 
opportunities for themselves, which is where the perception of one opportunity to mobilise and the 
collective action that follows, leads to the perception of further opportunities to mobilise and so on. The 
human rights component emerged directly from a shift in the political opportunity structures during the 
first Intifada but formed their own trajectory in the period following. Given these differences, certain 
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changes in the political opportunity structures were more or less significant depending on how they 
were perceived by each component. 
3.4.1 THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: SENSITIVE TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
3.4.1.1 Public opinion 
The framing of Shalom Achshav was directly linked to their strategy of mass mobilisation. 
Shalom Achshav aimed to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli public and therefore they had to be 
sensitive to the prevailing mood of the public at large (Bar-On, 1996:101).Their ability or decision to 
organise a demonstration, in response to a certain event or the actions or inaction of the Israeli 
government, was therefore determined by whether they would be able to mobilise large numbers. They 
were careful to stay within the legal boundaries of protest, in order not to discourage potential 
individuals from participating and to gain some legitimacy amongst the authorities. It should be noted 
that whilst Shalom Achshav was able to mobilise the largest amount of participants within the peace 
movement, due to its ability to resonate with the mainstream Israeli public, it was still marginalised 
amongst Israeli society as a whole and experienced much opposition. 
3.4.1.2 The government 
Given the desire for the liberal Zionist component to influence the government, it tended to be 
impacted by changes in the government. However, the changes that occurred within the Israeli peace 
movement in response to or alongside the changes in the government are not fully explained by the 
political process model, suggesting the need for greater nuance when approaching the relationship 
between a social movement and the government.  
Firstly, the perception of an opportunity in the political opportunity structures is argued to play an 
important role in leading to the emergence of a cycle of contention (Tarrow, 2011). However, in this 
case, it was actually the shrinking of the political opportunity structures with respect to the government 
that enabled a movement to develop, which marks the beginning of the second phase of the Israeli 
peace movement and a new cycle of contention. In 1977 Israel witnessed the first defeat of an Avoda 
government and the election of the right wing Likud (Consolidation)-led government. The increased 
levels of concern for the stalling of the new government with respect to peace with Egypt provided a 
suitable impetus for protest, with the peace movement situated firmly in opposition and able to criticise 
and pressure the new government (Hall-Cathala, 1990:16). This, combined with the internal 
developments of the previous phase, explains how the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace 
activism matured into a movement.  
Secondly, in cases where the agenda of a social movement is facilitated by the government, it is argued 
that the movement tends to demobilise, since they are no longer needed (Tarrow, 2011:190). For 
example, when the Declaration of Principles was signed in 1993, which attempted to set a framework 
that would form the basis of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the peace movement had 
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achieved their goal since the government was putting forward, at least in general, a similar agenda to 
the one that the peace movement had been promoting. In Israel, many within the liberal Zionist 
component therefore argued that the role of the movement in promoting peace had become obsolete 
(Bar-On, 1996:299). However, despite some promotion of similar goals, the government may not be 
fully implementing their obligations. This was the case in Israel, where the government was stalling in 
implementing their side of the agreements. In such a case, a movement is faced with a dilemma; 
whether to mobilise or not. In Israel, despite the agreements not moving forward as they had wanted, 
the liberal Zionist component felt that vocalising criticism at this point would undermine the 
government which was moving forward with a peace process. Furthermore they did not want to 
associate themselves with the government, since the negative perception of the peace movement may 
have harmed the image of the government. 
Members of the liberal Zionist component decided not to publicly criticise the government, although 
some privately met with Rabin to voice their concerns (Golan, 2013). In this situation, according to the 
political process model, the political opportunity structures were open, since Meretz, the political party 
closest to the liberal Zionist peace movement was a senior partner in the coalition. However, other 
factors meant that the liberal Zionist component of the peace movement were unable to publicly 
question the government or try to influence their policies, even when it strayed from their agenda. This 
suggests that access to elites does not, in all cases, make the opportunities greater for a social 
movement to mobilise and have an influence on government policy. In some instances it seems that if 
the movement becomes too close to the government it can paralyse its ability to challenge the 
government for fear of undermining it and strengthening the opposition, which is viewed as a worse 
scenario.  
The election of Barak and his Yisrael Ahat (One Israel) government in 1999 provides a further example. 
The liberal Zionist component did not perceive an opportunity to mobilise since they believed that 
Barak, with his commitment to renew peace negotiations and his celebrated military career, was the 
man to fulfil what Rabin had started (Hermann, 2009:174-5). Some members of the peace movement 
were willing to overlook Baƌak͛s ͚Đouƌtship of the settleƌs͛ as loŶg as the peaĐe pƌoĐess ǁas ŵoǀiŶg 
forward (Keller, 1999:11). This was a similar situation as when Rabin came to power, where the peace 
movement questioned both the necessity and effectiveness of demonstrating when the government 
was promoting their ideas, at least in general. 
Overall therefore, the liberal Zionist component tended to feel more confident when a right-wing 
government was in power since they were free to criticise them. For example, the assassination of Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 created a new impetus for action for the liberal Zionist 
component of the peace movement (Hermann, 2009:143). In the wake of the death of the first Israeli 
Prime Minister to seriously pursue peace with the Palestinians, the opportunities were expanded for the 
liberal Zionist peace movement to mobilise the public to ensure that the peace process was not 
derailed. Many of the liberal Zionist peace activists who had been quiet in the past two years took to the 
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stƌeets, iŶ paƌt ďeĐause of the guilt plaĐed oŶ theŵ that theǇ had Ŷot doŶe aŶǇthiŶg to ĐouŶteƌ the ͚hate 
Đaŵp͛ that had ďeeŶ eŵeƌgiŶg agaiŶst ‘aďiŶ ;HeƌŵaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϵ:ϭϰϰͿ. Mishmarot haShalom (Guards of 
Peace) and Dor Shalom (Peace Generation) emerged to protect the peace process and counter those 
who were against it. 
3.4.1.3 The international dimension 
The effect of the Gulf War on the trajectory of the Israeli peace activism points to important 
theoretical implications with respect to the relationship between international political opportunity 
structures and a domestic social movement. Similar dynamics can be identified in the following phase of 
Israeli peace activism, which will help to shed light on the theoretical approach to the international 
arena. 
Although the peace movement peaked in the late 1980s and had developed and strengthened its 
internal mechanisms and resources, the Gulf crisis and then the Gulf War in 1991 almost immediately 
closed the political opportunity structures to liberal Zionist peace activism, causing the movement to 
become paralysed. The liberal Zionist component decided to ally itself with the US version of the 
situation and argued that Saddam Hussein was a significant threat to Israel. Shalom Achshav believed 
that certain threats must be dealt with by military means (Bar-On, 1996:280) and therefore did not 
protest against the war. They also understood that whilst missiles were landing in Israel, the possibilities 
for peace activities were remote, primarily because during periods of direct threat, Israeli citizens tend 
to unite under the national consensus. The lack of condemnation of the war from Shalom Achshav 
caused a number of schisms between the liberal Zionist groups and other peace actors, particularly the 
radical component of the peace movement and international peace movements (Bar-On, 1996:280).  
The perceived and actual responses from the Palestinians to the Gulf War had the effect of deepening 
the fear and mistrust of Israelis towards Palestinians, which further affected the peace movement. The 
PLO showed support and sympathy for the position of Iraq (Kaminer, 1996:189), even Palestinian 
͚fƌieŶds͛ of the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt, Faisal HusseiŶi aŶd “aƌi Nusseiďeh, eǆpƌessed theiƌ sǇŵpathǇ ǁith the 
Iraqi predicament (Bar-On, 1996: 272). Whilst Shalom Achshav did attempt to continue as normal with 
respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order that the issue would not be forgotten in the midst of 
changing realities (Kaminer, 1996:201), in the eyes of the Israeli public, this was not the time to be 
speakiŶg ǁith the ͚eŶeŵǇ.͛ PalestiŶiaŶ suppoƌt foƌ “addaŵ HusseiŶ ƌeiŶfoƌĐed the sĐeptiĐisŵ that ŵaŶǇ 
Israelis had towards the real intentions of the Palestinians. This sentiment was deepened when the 
media exaggerated reports that PalestiŶiaŶs ǁeƌe ͚daŶĐiŶg oŶ ƌooftops͛ as “Đud ŵissiles ǁeƌe lauŶĐhed 
towards Israel (Bar-On, 1996:282; Kaminer, 1996:202).  
3.4.2 THE RADICAL COMPONENT: CONTINUOUSLY CRITICAL 
For the radical component of Israeli peace activism, the way in which they framed the origins of 
the conflict often enabled it to act in times when the liberal Zionists remained silent. They were 
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interested in influencing the government but felt confrontation was needed and therefore continued 
acting according to their ideological perspectives and framing of the situation, no matter the prevailing 
political opportunity structures. This allowed them to act as agenda-setters, rather than be hesitant and 
solely reactive. Furthermore, growing international interest in the conflict, in part because of the 
repressive response to the first Intifada from the Israeli authorities, led to increased funding and media 
attention to peace activities in Israel, which strengthened the mobilising structures of the groups. Also, 
as protest became routinized, new and innovative methods of contentious activities were developed in 
order to achieve greater visibility and groups were organised along new dimensions, which enabled 
more personal paths for political involvement (Kaminer, 1996:48).  
The influence of the radical left on Shalom Achshav can in part be explained through the theoretical 
eǆplaŶatioŶ that ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌs͛ haǀe the effeĐt of tƌiggeƌiŶg ͚pƌoĐesses of diffusioŶ, eǆteŶsioŶ, iŵitatioŶ 
aŶd ƌeaĐtioŶ͛ aŵoŶg otheƌ paƌts of a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt ;TillǇ and Tarrow, 2007:205). The acceptance of 
the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians by Shalom Achshav and their proposal of a two-state 
solution found its origins in the radical groups. This is explained by social movement theory whereby, 
͚Old oƌgaŶisatioŶs do not necessarily give way to new ones in the course of a cycle, 
many exiting organisations adopt the radical tactics of their competitors and adjust 
theiƌ disĐouƌse iŶto a ďƌoadeƌ, ŵoƌe aggƌessiǀe puďliĐ staŶĐe͛ ;TillǇ and Tarrow, 
2007:205) 
3.4.2.1 The government 
The relationship between the radical component and the Israeli governments in this phase was 
less complicated as their framing meant that in general they were continuously critical of the actions of 
the governments and would continue to confront them until the aspirations of the Palestinians were 
realised and their suffering, as a result of the occupation, ended. The radical component did initially 
question their purpose when the Rabin government came to power with a policy of peace (Zilversmidt, 
1994:3) but, their framing of the situation reflected a rejection of the content of the Oslo agreements 
and therefore they had an impetus and ability to criticise the government for the imbalanced nature of 
the agreements.  
The radical component also questioŶed the aĐtioŶs of Baƌak fƌoŵ the staƌt of his eleĐtioŶ ǁith ͚the 
atŵospheƌe of optiŵisŵ, good ǁill aŶd high eǆpeĐtatioŶs that folloǁed Baƌak͛s eleĐtioŶ…ǁiped out 
oǀeƌŶight…the ŶiĐkŶaŵe ͚BaƌakǇahu͛ [referencing Netanyahu] ƋuiĐklǇ ďeĐaŵe a ďǇǁoƌd͛ ;Keller and 
)ilǀeƌsŵidt, ϭϵϵϵ:ϭͿ. TheǇ aƌgued that Baƌak͛s plaŶs to aŶŶeǆ the ďig settleŵeŶt ďloĐs to Isƌael ǁould 
Đut the PalestiŶiaŶ teƌƌitoƌǇ iŶto ͚disĐoŶŶeĐted eŶĐlaǀes, ŵakiŶg a ŵoĐkeƌǇ of the statehood aŶd 
sovereignty which Barak [was] supposedly ready to offeƌ the PalestiŶiaŶs͛ ;Kelleƌ aŶd )ilǀeƌsŵidt, 
1999:5). They therefore did perceive an opportunity and necessity to mobilise against the government. 
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Whilst, in the general, the successive Israeli governments of this phase and the Israeli political system 
were not repressive towards peace activism and were more accepting than previously to extra-
parliamentary activism, the radical groups were sometimes the targets of government repression, 
restricting their ability to organise activities and implement their strategies. The authorities were not 
willing to allow voices that stepped over a certain line, particularly those who promoted anti-Zionist 
ideas or liaised too closely with the Palestinians (Warschawski, 2002). HaMerkaz l͛IŶforŵatzia 
Alternativit (The Alternative Information Centre), a joint Israeli-Palestinian organisation, experienced 
such repression from the authorities. It was closed by Israeli authorities and the Director of the centre 
ǁas aƌƌested, uŶdeƌ the thƌeat that, ͚if Ǉou ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk ǁith them [Palestinians], you will be treated 
exactly the way they aƌe͛ ;WaƌsĐhaǁski Đited iŶ ‘oseŶǁasseƌ, ϭϵϵϮ:ϭϱϳͿ.  
3.4.2.2 The international dimension 
The radical component continued their activities against the occupation and presented an anti-
war voice during the Gulf War, which placed them apart from the liberal Zionist component and even 
more marginalised from the Israeli public. They argued that the Gulf War simply proved that the Israeli 
peace camp, referring to the liberal Zionist component, was not a ͚tƌue peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ oƌ a ͚tƌue 
huŵaŶ ƌights ŵoǀeŵeŶt,͛ siŶĐe theǇ oŶlǇ saǁ huŵaŶ ƌights aŶd self-determination as a means to 
achieve their values of security, Zionism and Jewishness (Warschawski in Rosenwasser, 1992:226-250). 
This further highlights that the radical component were continuously critical, tending to continue to 
operate and push their agenda even when the prevailing realities were unfavourable to the ideas they 
were presenting.  
3.4.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: EMERGING FROM A SHIFT IN THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURES 
During the first Intifada, the Israeli peace movement reached its peak in terms of numbers of 
organisations and groups that were active, the intensity of their activities, the variety of tactical 
repertoires, the diverse forms of mobilising structures, the attention that was given to it by the 
international media and the division in ideological perspectives (Hermann, 2002).
25
  Alongside the 
proliferation in groups, cleavages within the peace movement were deepened during the Intifada 
(Kaufman, 1988:77), with a number of smaller organisations finding different ideological paths to base 
their activism on or innovative tactics to employ. 
The first Intifada was also perceived as an opportunity for alternative ways of challenging the situation 
to emerge, since the authorities were preoccupied with dealing with the first Intifada and the public 
were more open to alternative perspectives on the emerging events (Hermann, 2009:98), and led to the 
emergence of the human rights component. The human rights organisations became an integral part of 
                                                          
25
 See Hermann (2002:105) for a graphical representation of this dramatic increase in the emergence of 
new peace groups. 
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the peace movement,
26
 broadening its remit and providing tangible and credible data to justify political 
protests. The work of B͛Tseleŵ was particularly significant for the peace movement in Israel during the 
first Intifada. It brought to the attention of the public, media and authorities the extent of human rights 
violations in the territories and provided something tangible for the peace movement to present to the 
public as a mobilising resource (Kaminer, 1996:178).  
A debate emerged within the B͛Tseleŵ over whether to publish its reports in English and disseminate 
them abroad. Some felt that it was one thing to criticise your own government but quite another to 
pƌoǀide ͚pƌopagaŶda aŵŵuŶitioŶ͛ to eŶeŵies ďǇ ͚ǁashiŶg Ǉouƌ diƌtǇ liŶeŶ͛ aďƌoad ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϳϳ). 
Despite the potential to further turn public opinion away from the organisation, developments in the 
international arena encouraged the human rights movement to continue their efforts. For example, in 
April 1988, Amnesty International held a global tour to promote the Universal Declaration of Human 
‘ights aŶd the UŶited “tates foĐused iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ oŶ ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ aďuses iŶ ĐƌitiĐisiŶg Isƌaeli poliĐǇ 
towards the first Intifada (Kaminer, 1996: 174). These factors highlight the influence the international 
dimension can have on a domestic social movement, either through diffusion of ideology and tactics 
from transnational social movements, or due to the opinions and rhetoric of the international 
community aligning with those of the social movement.  
The tactics of the human rights component were also affected by shifting political opportunity 
structures and perceptions of them. The Intifada had a direct effect on some of the tactics employed. In 
the first instance, building on its foundations from the Lebanon war, Yesh Gvul found a specific method 
with which to resist the occupation, which was selective refusal to serve in the occupied territories 
(Kaminer, 1996:64). The repression of the Intifada led to a situation in which individuals marked a 
diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚legitiŵate͛ duties of the IDF iŶ defeŶdiŶg Isƌael aŶd heƌ ĐitizeŶs aŶd ͚uŶaĐĐeptaďle͛ 
assignments in the occupied territories (Kidron, 2004: 55). The concept behind the movement was 
͚iŶdividual choice-ĐolleĐtiǀe suppoƌt͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϳϮͿ, ǁheƌeďǇ the ŵoǀeŵeŶt uŶdeƌstood the 
difficult decision that is involved in refusing to serve yet, once the decision had been made, they would 
provide full backing. During the Intifada they expanded their activities to publications to raise awareness 
of the motivations behind selective refusal. Close to 200 reservists were jailed, with even more refusing 
(Kidron, 2004:23). 
Overall, the groups that comprised the human rights component experienced changes in political 
opportunity structures differently, based on the type of activity. The human rights groups and 
professional groups were able to maintain continuous activities, since they were dealing with the effects 
of the Israeli occupation. The refusal movement continuously supported conscientious objection but 
their numbers often increased in times of conflict, such as the first Intifada (Kidron, 2004) 
                                                          
26
 Not all of the human rights group would accept that they come under the umbrella of the Israeli 
peace movement, arguing that they are simply part of the human rights movement. However, the Israeli 
puďliĐ teŶded to tƌeat theŵ as paƌt of the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŶd ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ ďeĐaŵe aŶ issue of the 
political left. 
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3.4.4 THE CONVERGENCE THEN FRAGMENTATION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
The international political opportunity structures shifted again following the Gulf War and 
created opportunities for the Israeli government to take-up the ideas of the Israeli peace movement and 
turn it into policy, highlighting how international political opportunity structures can affect a domestic 
social movement. The regional and global changes that resulted from the Gulf War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union resulted in the Bush administration pushing for a new world order that was void of 
violent regional conflicts (Hermann, 2009:107). This led to the Madrid conference in 1991, a multilateral 
peaĐe ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ Aƌaď ĐouŶtƌies aŶd Isƌael, ŵediated ďǇ the UŶited “tates. A ͚Terms of 
‘efeƌeŶĐe͛ was drawn up and a decision was made to continue discussions. This caused the Israeli right-
wing parties to pull out of the coalition leading to the collapse of the government and a call for new 
elections in Israel. An Avoda coalition government, with Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister was elected. 
The government made peace its main goal and in August ϭϵϵϯ the ͚DeĐlaƌatioŶ of PƌiŶĐiples͛ ;DOPͿ were 
signed and the following month the Oslo framework was adopted. It seemed that after decades of 
activism the peace movement had achieved its goals and therefore especially for the liberal-Zionist 
component, there was less need to come out to demonstrate. 
During the Camp David summit between Barak, Arafat and Clinton in 2000, the political opportunity 
structures were temporarily opened to groups across all three components, with Barak issuing an appeal 
to the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt askiŶg theŵ ͚Ŷot to aďaŶdoŶ the stƌeets to the ƌight-ǁiŶgeƌs͛ ;Baƌak iŶ Keller, 
2000a:10).
27
 This led the components to join together under the banner of Mate Tnuot haShalom (Peace 
Movement Headquarters). Whilst the radical groups may have been more critical and sceptical of 
Baƌak͛s ŵotiǀes, theǇ fouŶd ĐoŵŵoŶ gƌouŶd to ƌallǇ ǁith the liberal Zionist groups, mainly a desire to 
see the suŵŵit ƌeaĐh a suĐĐessful ĐoŶĐlusioŶ, although ͚suĐĐessful͛ ŵaǇ haǀe had diffeƌeŶt 
interpretations amongst the groups (Keller, 2000a:10). However, as news of the failure of the summit 
reached the peace movement, the opportunity for cooperation between the components was closed. 
According to long-tiŵe aĐtiǀist Adaŵ Kelleƌ, as sooŶ as theǇ heaƌd Baƌak͛s pƌess ĐoŶference where he 
placed the blame entirely on Arafat,  
͚It ďeĐaŵe oďǀious that, at least foƌ the iŵŵediate futuƌe, the tiŵe had Đoŵe foƌ a paƌtiŶg 
of ways [of those involved in the Peace Headquarters]; the Peace Headquarters had been 
built on the assumption that Barak would return with a peace agreement, around which 
ŵodeƌates aŶd ƌadiĐals Đould uŶite iŶ fuƌtheƌ ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg.͛ ;Kelleƌ, ϮϬϬϬa:12).  
Without a peaĐe agƌeeŵeŶt, ǁith the Isƌaeli puďiĐ aĐĐeptiŶg Baƌak͛s ƌhetoƌiĐ that theƌe ǁas Ŷo paƌtŶeƌ 
for peace and the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Israeli peace movement splintered with the 
various groups responding to and experiencing the shifting political opportunity structures differently. 
This led to the polarisation and fragmentation between the components of the peace movement. This 
                                                          
27
 It must be noted that Barak was not in general sympathetic to the peace movement (Hermann, 
2009:177). 
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polarisation, which is common to social movements, made it extremely difficult for the components to 
rally together, marking the start of the next phase of Israeli peace activism, ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd 
fragmentation of Israeli peace activism: three cycles of contention͛. The liberal Zionist component 
continued to demobilise, the human rights component maintained their challenges and the radical 
component experienced a new cycle of contention. 
4 IMPLICATIONS 
During these first two phases of Israeli peace activism individual attempts at promoting peace 
ǁith Isƌael͛s Aƌaď Ŷeighďouƌs ŵoƌphed iŶto a ŵass ŵoǀeŵeŶt that ďeguŶ to pƌoŵote the ĐoŶĐept of a 
two-state solution. Some key characteristics of each component developed, as well as the dynamics 
between them, which will act as points of comparison for the next phase of Israeli peace activism. Some 
interesting theoretical implications also emerged from this overview of Israeli peace activism from 1967 
to 2000. 
The liberal Zionist component evolved and expanded from its emergence in the first phase of Israeli 
peace activism. They developed more complex collective action frames, based on the initial concept of 
͚laŶd foƌ peaĐe͛ aŶd eǀolǀiŶg to ͚tǁo states foƌ tǁo peoples.͛ Fƌoŵ the first Intifada they began to 
recognise the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people but experienced showed that framing 
the message of peace activism as upholding the future of Israel was more likely to achieve mobilisation 
than calling for negotiations with the PLO. They aimed to build mass mobilisation beginning with 
informal networks and expanding to the general public through publicity campaigns but made sure they 
did not present overly confrontational views or tactics in order to have greater resonance with the 
Israeli public. They built a repertoire of contention that became gradually more accepted by Israeli 
society as extra-parliamentary activity became more common, focusing on demonstrations and vigils in 
Israeli towns and cities, with some more radical members meeting with Palestinians and conducting 
actions in the West Bank. Overall they were very sensitive to the prevailing political opportunity 
structures, since they did not want to present positions that were too far ahead of the Israeli public and 
wanted to influence the government and support it when it was on the path to peace. This meant that 
the activists were often hesitant to be critical in order not to antagonise their targets. 
The radical component on the other hand was constantly critical of the prevailing realities. From the 
beginning of their activism they recognised the PLO and met with Palestinian officials. They tended to 
pƌeseŶt ͚peaĐe͛ out of ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐeƌŶs foƌ the PalestiŶiaŶs, plaĐiŶg theŵ at the ĐeŶtƌe of ďoth the Đauses 
and solutions to the conflict. Their tactics gradually became more confrontational, developing some key 
innovations that became more prominent in the third phase of Israeli peace activism. In particular, their 
role as norm entrepreneurs was highlighted thƌough the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚ďoǇĐott͛ as a ŵeaŶs to 
challenge the occupation. They also began with informal networks but were able to include Palestinians 
and Arab citizens of Israel amongst their networks. Overall they were less sensitive to the political 
opportunity structures. Whilst they were, in these phases, interested in influencing the Israeli public and 
government, they did not moderate their positions in order to do this. This meant they continued to 
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operate even when the public and government were not willing to accept their ideas or were hostile 
towards them. 
The human rights component emerged in the second phase, in response to the first Intifada, recognising 
that the uprising required different responses than the liberal Zionist and the radical components had 
been presenting. They developed collection action frames that focused on revealing and reporting on 
the realities and policies of the occupation. The conscientious objectors did not want to be part of these 
policies and therefore refused to serve, in doing so highlighting what was happening on the ground. The 
human rights organisations became particularly prominent and laid the foundations of a growing human 
rights movement in the following phase. The tactics in the human rights component were reflective of 
the particular identity they developed, allowing for innovation in the repertoire of contention, such as 
the provision of humanitarian services to the Palestinians. Many of these organisations and groups were 
formed by activists who had been previously active but wanted a different way to challenge the 
situation. The human rights component, although they emerged from a change in the political 
opportunity structures, took a similar trajectory to the radical component, continuously being 
confrontation and reacting to changes in the situation, no matter the state of Israeli public opinion or 
the nature of the government.  
Key dynamics between the components can be identified across these two phases. In general the radical 
groups were more confrontational, developing more innovative collective action frames and tactics than 
the liberal Zionist component. Whilst causality cannot be determined, the radical component can be 
defined as norm entrepreneurs, since ideas that originated amongst them diffused into the liberal 
Zionist component of Israeli peace activism, which mobilised the public to pressure the government into 
making those ideas policy. The liberal Zionist component throughout these phases was not far behind 
the radical component, tending to take-up the positions and tactics of the radical component when they 
felt the moment was ripe, such as recognising the PLO and meeting with Palestinians. The human rights 
component that emerged in the first Intifada specialised in revealing the realities of the occupation and 
holding the government of Israel accountable for its policies and actions, providing new avenues to 
challenge the prevailing realities and therefore also pushing the agenda of Israeli peace activism. 
Despite experiencing different cycles of contention in the second phase of Israeli peace activism, the 
components converged in support of the peace agreements. However slow developments with the 
peace agreements and the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 led to the fragmentation of Israeli 
peace aĐtiǀisŵ aŶd ŵaƌked a Ŷeǁ phase, ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ: 
thƌee ĐǇĐles of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ.͛ 
In outlining and explaining the characteristics of Israeli peace activism prior to 2000, this chapter has 
unearthed some interesting theoretical implications. Firstly, that the connection between international 
political opportunity structures and a domestic social movement requires further theorisation and will 
be explored in Chapter 7. Secondly, the particular role of gender dynamics in the powers of movement 
was given more attention than conventionally done so in social movement theory and will continue to 
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be explored within each of the following chapters. Thirdly, complexities in the relationship between the 
government and the peace movement were discovered, particularly in the second phase of the peace 
movement. Similar dynamics can be identified in the following phase, requiring some refinements to the 
political process model and will be explored further in Chapter 7.  
Having laid out some of the key elements and dynamics in the history of Israeli peace activism, it is now 
possiďle to delǀe iŶto Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ post ϮϬϬϬ: ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of the Isƌaeli 
peace movement; three cycles of conteŶtioŶ͛. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 BEYOND PARALYSIS: A NEW FRAMING OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This Đhapteƌ appƌoaĐhes Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ thƌough ͚fƌaŵiŶg͛ ǁhiĐh ƌefeƌs to the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg 
collective action frames and framing processes that highlight and account for the ideas, beliefs, problem 
identification and solutions of the groups and organisations. In looking at the collective action frames 
and framing processes, this chapter will provide a detailed study of the meaning work that Israeli 
activists are engaged in, unearthing a different angle from which to understand the trajectory of Israeli 
peace activism from those focused on external factors. Furthermore, it adds to the literature on the 
framing perspective, in particular by providing a dynamic approach that looks at transformations in the 
collective action frames through framing processes rather than a static approach, which has been 
subject to much criticism by frame analysis theorists (Snow and Benford, 2000; McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, 2001; Benford, 1997).  
As aƌgued ďǇ KaŵiŶeƌ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, it ǁas the pƌessuƌe of the ͚sŵall ǁheel of the ďiĐǇĐle͛- the radical 
component - that pushed the ͚ďig ǁheel͛ – the liberal Zionist component - to take certain positions and 
mobilise sooner than they would have otherwise. In the period beginning with the second Intifada, the 
͚ďig ǁheel; little ǁheel͛ dǇŶaŵiĐ Ŷo loŶgeƌ holds tƌue aŶd a Ŷeǁ tƌajeĐtoƌǇ iŶ Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ ĐaŶ 
be identified. As conventionally argued, the ͚ďig ǁheel͛ ďegaŶ to sloǁdoǁŶ, ďeĐoŵiŶg paƌalysed in the 
ϮϬϬϬs. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this Đhapteƌ ǁill shoǁ that the ͚sŵall ǁheel,͛ the radical component, along with the 
human rights component, continued to move and develop new ideas, showing that not all components 
became paralysed.  
The consequence of this shifting dynamic has been the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace 
activism (Figure 4). This polarisation can be identified in the immediate wake of the outbreak of the 
second Intifada, with the liberal Zionist and radical components taking opposing perspectives on the 
situation. This polarisation deepened throughout the 2000s, as the liberal Zionist component moved 
towards the centre of the Israeli political spectrum, in order to stay in-line with mainstream consensus. 
The radical component, in contrast, further radicalised and, in doing so, has developed new collective 
action frames through different framing processes that challenge mainstream consensus, highlighting 
theiƌ ƌole as ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌs͛ aŶd Ŷoƌŵ eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs. This is ŵost ĐleaƌlǇ seeŶ through an analysis of the 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶts͛ positioŶs ǁith ƌegaƌds to concerns for the Palestinians versus particularistic principles 
inherent in Zionism. The liberal Zionist component shifted to focus almost solely on particularistic 
concerns, removing any pro-Palestinian sentiments from their image whereas, the radical component 
focused even more directly on emphasising the story of Palestinian suffering, which has presented an 
opportunity to re-posit the concept of peace and develop new motivations for acting but, placing them 
even further away from mainstream Israeli public opinion. The human rights component has in some 
ways attempted to balance the two poles created by the liberal Zionist and radical components, by 
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revealing the suffering of the Palestinians but by also trying to reach out to the Israeli public and lobby 
the government. In doing so they too are finding new ways to confront the occupation.  
The polarisation and fragmentation in the ways in which the components frame and confront the 
situation in this phase, as exemplified in their different approaches to criticising the IDF and the 
criticisms they level at each other, as well as the lack of a solution that could be backed by all the 
components, has meant that cooperation or coordination across the components in this phase has been 
limited and unlikely. However, one area in which the framing of the situation enabled the components 
to mobilise together was in the neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah between 2010 and 2012, which began 
with a radical approach to an injustice frame and led to the mobilisation of individuals from across the 
peace components. This highlights the role of the radical ĐoŵpoŶeŶt as ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌs,͛ deǀelopiŶg Ŷeǁ 
ways to confront the realities but, also points to the potential for cooperation of all components in the 
future.  
This chapter will first consider the shift in Israeli peace activism from a fairly unified movement to the 
polarisation and fragmentation of the components in the wake of the outbreak of the second Intifada by 
identifying the ways in which they framed this. I will then identify the collective action frames of each 
component in this phase. The chapter will then turn to the relation between the components, focusing 
on how they challenge each other through the issue of normalisation and how they view the IDF. It will 
then turn to a case in an East Jerusalem neighbourhood where the components were able to reconcile 
their differences and protest together. The chapter will then consider the role of gender in the collective 
action frames of Israeli peace activism, identifying shifts from the gendered frames in the previous 
phases. This chapter will conclude with some of the key changes in the collective action frames of Israeli 
peace activism.  
Figure 4. Collective action frames of the third phase: ͚The polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli 
peace activism; three cycles of contention͛. 
 Liberal Zionist 
Component 
Radical Component Human rights 
Component 
Collective Action 
Frames 
 Particularism of 
Zionism   Settlements as the 
main obstacle for 
peace  Peace for the future 
of a Jewish 
democratic State  Two-state solution 
 
 Universal values – 
justice and equality  Rejection of term 
͚peaĐe͛  Harm reduction of 
Palestinian suffering  Co-resistance, 
solidarity  Against oppression  Some radical 
feminism 
 Balance between 
universal values and 
particularism of 
Zionism  Rights-based framing  Gendered framing  Revealing hidden 
realities 
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2 POLARISATION IN THE WAKE OF THE SECOND INTIFADA 
Despite the brief alignment of the components of Israeli peace activism in supporting Barak at 
Camp David II, the failure of the summit sparked a progressive polarisation between the liberal Zionist 
and radical ĐoŵpoŶeŶts, ǁith the tǁo takiŶg opposiŶg positioŶs iŶ ƌespoŶse to Baƌak͛s ƌhetoƌiĐ that 
theƌe ǁas ͚Ŷo paƌtŶeƌ foƌ peaĐe oŶ the PalestiŶiaŶ side͛ ;ABC Neǁs, ϮϬϬϬͿ. AŶ iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ to a 
chronicle of pamphlets by Anarchistim Neged HaGader (Anarchists Against the Wall) explains that, 
͚IŶ Isƌael, the failuƌe of the Oslo AĐĐoƌds ƌesulted iŶ a geŶeƌal ŶatioŶalist entrenchment 
and shift to the right, including within the so-called Peace Camp [liberal Zionist 
component]. This had the opposite effect on those at the far Left end of the spectrum, 
however, as the realization of why Oslo failed led many to permanently let go of the 
Đoattails of the )ioŶist Left͛ ;GoƌdoŶ aŶd Gƌietzeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
Shalom Achshav and the liberal Zionist component maintained a similar prognostic framing from the 
previous phase, particularly the strategy of not positioning themselves too far in front of public opinion 
ǁith ƌespeĐt to the ĐoŶfliĐt iŶ oƌdeƌ Ŷot to ͚lose the puďliĐ͛ ;GolaŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. This ŵeaŶt that, giǀeŶ puďliĐ 
opinion at the time, which showed the all-time lowest Israeli Jewish public support for the Oslo process 
(Yaar and Hermann, 2001; Hermann, 2009:276), they strategicallǇ aĐĐepted Baƌak͛s ƌhetoƌiĐ aŶd, as 
explained in an interview with a veteran Shalom Achshav activist, they ŵade a ͚ǀeƌǇ stƌoŶg effoƌt, a 
diƌeĐt effoƌt to ĐhaŶge [theiƌ] iŵage to ďe ŵodeƌate͛, ďǇ ƌiddiŶg the ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of any pro-Palestinian 
sentiments (Golan, 2013). The suicide bombings by Palestinians only reinforced this shift, with many 
within the movement feeling betrayed by the Palestinians (Hilsum, 2001), including some of the 
leadership (Golan, 2013). Throughout this phase Shalom Achshav chose a pragmatic as opposed to a 
principled approach, which meant a reduction in calls for large scale protests and a shift in their 
diagnostic framing to even greater focus on the settlements as the main obstacle to peace. The strategy 
of Shalom Achshav is summed up by Hagit Ofran, the Director of the Shalom Achshav Settlements 
Watch Project, 
 ͚We tƌǇ to iŶflueŶĐe puďliĐ opiŶioŶ. IŶflueŶĐiŶg puďliĐ opiŶioŶ ƌeƋuiƌes that ǁe 
relate to the political agenda so our message resonates within public discourse... 
[we] attempt to speak the language mainstream Israelis might be able to listen to – 
oƌ at least the ŵedia that Ŷouƌishes ǁhat the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ ĐaŶ aĐĐept͛ ;OfƌaŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ. 
In stark contrast, the radical groups ƌefused to aĐĐept Baƌak͛s rhetoric and shifted their prognostic 
framing, which involved giving up promoting a political solution and further radicalising as the Intifada 
progressed. According to peace activist Irit Halperin, 
͚The seĐoŶd Intifada showed that the peace camp had to use a much more radical 
perspective that would be able to confront the mainstream belief about the reasons 
for the conflict and the ways to resolve it. Resisting the mainstream ideology gave 
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these groups the capability to confront the traditional meaning of the Israeli-
PalestiŶiaŶ ĐoŶfliĐt͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ:ϯϯϱͿ. 
This radicalisation can be identified in the shifts in the way in which the radical component framed the 
conflict, through a number of framing processes. These shifts provide evidence for the argument that 
the radical component of Israeli peace activism was not paralysed following the outbreak of the second 
Intifada but continued to challenge the realities, finding different ways to confront the situation. In 
direct response to the second Intifada and the failure of the Camp David II Summit, Reuven Kaminer 
explained in an interview with the author that some activists stated that, ͚ǁe Ŷo loŶgeƌ do politiĐs; ǁe 
did and we got screwed over. Now if we want to do something to make a difference, we do something 
direct, we fill up a tƌuĐk͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. This emphasises the shift towards a primarily reactive role in 
this phase, with the radical component framing themselves and their activities in response to the 
realities on the ground, in an attempt to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians and raise awareness 
of their situation. This set them further apart from the liberal Zionist component and in many ways 
brought them into confrontation with them, whilst bringing them closer to the human rights 
component. 
3 POLARISATION DEEPENED 
 Since the outbreak of the second Intifada the polarisation between these components has 
deepened and can be most clearly determined and understood through an analysis of the extent to 
which concern for the Palestinians are emphasised in the framing of each of the components. Whilst all 
components are acting with the aim to end the occupation, there is a difference in the motivations 
behind this; whether removing the occupation is an end in itself, as the radical component would argue, 
or a means to an end, as the liberal Zionist component has always proposed. A tension had been present 
in the Zionist movement between universal principles of humanity and the particularism of Zionism 
(Greenstein, 2014) and this tension was historically reflected in the Israeli peace movement, with 
Shalom Achshav in particular struggling to reconcile the two (Simons, 2013a). Its public framing in its 
peak years prioritised the importance of peace for the sake of the security of Israel whilst internally, 
members were often involved in activities in the West Bank that were solely aimed at reducing harm 
experienced by the Palestinians. Since the second Intifada, Shalom Achshav has shifted towards an even 
more particularistic approach, focusing on the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in its 
attempt to stay within mainstream consensus but, as Hermann (2009) argues, has been unable to 
present a relevant position for individuals to mobilise around, given the prevailing realities. The radical 
component however, is exclusively centred on universal principles, which emerges as a focus on the 
suffering of the Palestinians, which releases it from the state narrative. This enables them to present 
innovative and confrontational collective action frames yet, ones that are too far removed from 
mainstream Israeli public opinion. The human rights component seems to be attempting provide a 
balance by confronting the policies of the Israeli authorities towards the Palestinians, without 
prioritising their claims oǀeƌ Isƌael͛s. 
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3.1 THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: STICKING WITH CONSENSUS 
Shalom Achshav has continued its efforts to rid itself of pro-Palestinian sentiments since the 
second Intifada and a public relations team was involved in making the organisation seem ͚ŵoƌe Isƌaeli͛ 
(Golan, 2013). This is exemplified by a new Shalom Achshav flag. The main logo of Shalom Achshav uses 
a combination of black Hebrew letters in the traditional font used in religious text and red newspaper-
style font,
28
 whereas the new flag has the ǁoƌld ͚Shalom͛ ;peaĐeͿ ǁƌitteŶ iŶ ďlue iŶside tǁo hoƌizoŶtal 
blue lines.
29
 This is a close mirroring of the Israeli flag, used as a means of representing Shalom Achshav 
as patriotic towards Israel.  
A number of framing processes can be identified in the liberal Zionist ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s atteŵpt to staǇ 
relevant to their target audience, the Israeli public. Frame extension can be seen in Shaloŵ AĐhshaǀ͛s 
ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the West BaŶk settleŵeŶts as the ͚ŵaiŶ oďstaĐle foƌ peaĐe͛ ;OfƌaŶ iŶ Gal, ϮϬϭϮͿ. Theiƌ 
Settlement Watch Project has become the central raisoŶ d͛être of Shalom Achshav, and arguably the 
only effective strategy it currently has in promoting a two-state solution. This situates them in direct 
opposition to the settlement movement, similar to the situation following the aftermath of the 1967 
war. The Settlement Watch Project gives Shalom Achshav a tool with which to highlight to the Israeli 
public the extent to which the settlements, their continued expansion and government support for 
them, hinder the possibility of a two-state solution. 
However, the aftermath of the 2005 unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza, which Shalom 
Achshav supported, saw Hamas take-over the Gaza Strip and rockets fired into Southern Israel, which 
meant that the doctrine of ͚laŶd foƌ peaĐe,͛ oŶ ǁhiĐh the ĐƌitiĐisŵ of settleŵeŶts is ďased, Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
holds resonance amongst the Israeli public. Furthermore, the concept that peace would bring security 
was questioned since arguably the peace process only led to increased personal insecurity for Israeli 
citizens. In recognition of this the liberal Zionist component tried to re-sell the two-state solution 
thƌough fƌaŵe tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd fƌaŵe aŵplifiĐatioŶ that aƌgues foƌ its ŶeĐessitǇ as ͚the oŶlǇ solutioŶ 
that will ensure the futuƌe of Isƌael as Jeǁish aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ͛ ;Bar, 2013). According to Yariv 
Oppenheimer, Director General of Shalom Achshav, ͚if Isƌael ǁill ĐoŶtiŶue to ĐoŶtƌol the West BaŶk, ǁe 
[Israel] are going to lose our identity either as a Jewish State or as a democratiĐ state͛ ;OppeŶheiŵeƌ, 
2011). This is in contrast to some of the radical groups who argue that by definition Israel cannot be 
͚Jeǁish aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ͛,  
͚BeĐause a ͞Jeǁish͟ state – as opposed to a state ǁhose Đultuƌe is Jeǁish oƌ is ͞a 
ŶatioŶal hoŵelaŶd͟ for Jews – ǁill alǁaǇs ďe a ƌaĐist, disĐƌiŵiŶatoƌǇ state… A state that 
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 See Simons (2013b) for a detailed analysis of this logo. See Tartakover (1978) for the original logo. 
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 See Shelef (2010) for pictures of the new flag.   
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sees itself as ͞a Jeǁish “tate͟ is iŶheƌeŶtlǇ aŶ eǆĐlusiǀe state, ďeĐause a peƌsoŶ ĐaŶŶot 
become Palestinian-Jewish or Muslim-Jeǁish͛ ;“heizaf, ϮϬϭϯa).30  
A sense of urgency is added to the framing given by Shalom Achshav, ǁith the Đlaiŵ that ͚the ǁiŶdoǁ of 
oppoƌtuŶitǇ͛ foƌ a tǁo-state solution is coming to an end.31 The severity of this is further exaggerated by 
appealiŶg to gƌoǁiŶg iŶteƌŶatioŶal isolatioŶ ǁith aƌguŵeŶts suĐh as, ͚the eŶlightened world is slowly 
ǁisiŶg up to the ͞Isƌaeďluff͟…aŶd is Ŷo loŶgeƌ ǁilliŶg to Đoopeƌate aŶd fiŶaŶĐe aŶ uŶdeŵoĐƌatiĐ pƌojeĐt 
that ŵoƌallǇ ĐoŶtƌadiĐts its ǀalues͛ ;OppeŶheiŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
The liberal Zionist component was able to further articulate this message during a wave of laws that 
were passed in Israel between 2010 and 2012, which were considered anti-democratic by many of the 
left wing organisations. These laws, which included a Basic Law that declares Israel as the Nation State of 
the Jewish People and a bill that proposed limiting foreign funding to human rights NGOs, were 
desĐƌiďed as ĐƌeatiŶg a ͚tug of ǁaƌ ďetǁeeŶ Ŷeo-ŶatioŶalist Isƌael aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ Isƌael͛ ;ChazaŶ, ϮϬϭϮͿ. 
The issue of democracy became relevant for civil society groups dealing with a range of issues including 
gender inequality and racism. This gave the liberal Zionist peace component the opportunity to create a 
master frame of democracy to bring together different organisations with the potential to suggest that 
the occupation is the biggest threat to democracy for Israel. This was exemplified in a small wave of anti-
deŵoĐƌaĐǇ pƌotests iŶ ǁhiĐh OppeŶheiŵeƌ deĐlaƌed, ͚this is ǁheƌe the deŵoĐƌatiĐ ƌeǀolutioŶ ǁill staƌt͛ 
(Oppenheimer in Cohen, 2011).  However, these protests did not maintain any significant momentum. 
There has also been an attempt by the liberal Zionist component to connect issues of economics with 
the peace process, through frame bridging. Kol Echad (One Voice), a student organisation, held a protest 
following the 2011 social protests on Rothschild Boulevard, which was the main and symbolic location of 
the social protest. They built an ice wall which had images and items inside related to social issues, such 
as public housing. According to an interview with their Jerusalem coordinator, theiƌ slogaŶ ǁas, ͚soĐial 
issues aƌe fƌozeŶ as loŶg as the ŶegotiatioŶs [ďetǁeeŶ Isƌael aŶd PalestiŶe] aƌe fƌozeŶ͛ ;Peƌetz, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
Shalom Achshav directly connected the socio-economic problems in Israel with the occupation and in 
particular the settlements, responding to the public outrage over the increase in the price of cottage 
Đheese iŶ ϮϬϭϭ ǁith the slogaŶ, ͚this cottage will cost you more͛ ;“helef, ϮϬϭϭͿ, referring to houses in 
the West Bank settlements. However, the main part of the social justice movement actively refused to 
make the connection with the occupation for fear of alienating or discouraging wide-spread mobilisation 
of the puďliĐ. IŶ the pƌotests, ͚to aǀoid aŶǇ ͞politiĐal͟ staiŶ, the pƌotest leadeƌs ǁƌapped theŵselǀes in 
Israeli flags and concluded the vigils with Hatikva, Isƌael͛s ŶatioŶal aŶtheŵ, iŶ a shoǁ of ĐoŶseŶsual 
patƌiotisŵ͛ ;BeŶ Efƌat, ϮϬϭϮͿ. “oŵe saǁ the ĐoŶsĐious eǆĐlusioŶ of the oĐĐupatioŶ fƌoŵ the ĐolleĐtiǀe 
action frame of the social justice protests as strategically wise, 
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 This issue eŵeƌged paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŶ ƌespoŶse to NetaŶǇahu͛s ĐoŶditioŶ foƌ the PalestiŶiaŶs to ƌeĐogŶise 
Isƌael as a ͚Jeǁish “tate͛ ;Haƌel, IssaĐhaƌoff aŶd Eldaƌ, ϮϬϬϵͿ. 
31
 See for example Baskin (2013). 
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͚Theƌe ǁas Ŷeǀeƌ a ĐhoiĐe ďetǁeeŶ a soĐial stƌuggle foĐused oŶ the oĐĐupatioŶ aŶd a 
social struggle temporarily putting the conflict aside, because the first attempt would 
haǀe flopped͛ ;‘eideƌ, ϮϬϭϭa). 
This blocked the liberal Zionist peace component from using the social justice protests to 
mobilise against the settlements. Despite some shifts in their framing, the liberal Zionist peace 
component has not been able to develop a collective action frame that resonates with the 
Israeli public to encourage their mobilisation. 
3.2 THE RADICAL COMPONENT: CHALLENGING CONSENSUS 
The radical groups are less concerned with resonating with the Israeli public and are therefore 
able to be more confrontational in challenging the realities and policies of the Israeli government, 
presenting new ideas and understandings of the conflict. Polarisation from the liberal Zionist component 
can be identified in their rejection of some of the frames that the liberal Zionist component put forward. 
In particular, some are critical of the liberal Zionist component for accepting the basic concepts behind a 
Jewish state, which entails some non-universalistic characteristics (Gordon, 2003). The radical groups 
chose instead to focus on telling the story of Palestinian suffering, criticising Shalom Achshav for not 
aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg the PalestiŶiaŶ histoƌiĐal Ŷaƌƌatiǀe aŶd foƌ Ŷot ͚ĐoŶfƌoŶt[iŶg] histoƌǇ fƌoŵ the staŶdpoiŶt 
of the oppƌessed͛ ;GoƌdoŶ, ϮϬϬϯ:ϰϯͿ. These ideas haǀe ŵaŶifested thƌough a Ŷuŵďeƌ of fƌaŵiŶg 
processes, which present examples of norm entrepreneurship in practice. 
According to an interview between the author and a writer and activist, ͚haƌŵ ƌeduĐtioŶ͛ ďeĐaŵe a 
central tenet of the radical left (Ben Ami, 2013). Activities following the second Intifada involved, ͚goiŶg 
to plaĐes ǁheƌe the oĐĐupatioŶ aŶd eǆpulsioŶ aĐtuallǇ take plaĐe͛ ;IŶďaƌ iŶ DaŶa aŶd “heizaf, ϮϬϭϭͿ, 
ǁith the eǆpliĐit aiŵ to ͚ĐoŶfƌoŶt ƌaĐisŵ aŶd disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ ǁheƌe theǇ happeŶ͛ ;IŶďaƌ iŶ DaŶa aŶd 
Sheizaf, 2011). This is reflective of some of the radical groups and often members of Shalom Achshav in 
the previous phase, which began demonstrating at the place of violations. However, in this current 
phase, such solidarity actions define the identity of the activist groups and are not merely a part of their 
taĐtiĐal ƌepeƌtoiƌe, ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg a pƌoĐess of fƌaŵe tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ. The teƌŵs ͚Đo-ƌesistaŶĐe͛ aŶd 
͚solidaƌitǇ͛ haǀe ƌeplaĐed the ĐoŶĐept of ͚Đo-eǆisteŶĐe͛ that ĐhaƌaĐteƌised the ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s aiŵs aŶd 
tactics in previous phases.
32
 One of the first groups to emerge along these lines, and as a result of the 
events of the second Intifada, was Ta͛ayush (Partnership/life in common), which created the framework 
of joint Arab-Jewish humanitarian solidarity activism that underlay much of the collective action frames 
and tactical repertoires of the radical groups in this phase.
33
  
Some groups within the radical component have also begun to ƌejeĐt the teƌŵ ͚peaĐe͛, citing it as an 
abstract concept and one only to be associated with Shalom Achshav and the Oslo Peace Accords, which 
they argue favoured the Israeli side (Matar, 2013; Alghazi, 2004). A number of activists explained to this 
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 See in particular Anarchistim Neged haGader and Solidariut. 
33
 See speech by Gadi Alghazi (2004), founder of Ta͛ayush. 
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author that many groups within the radical component iŶstead ƌefeƌ to theŵselǀes as ͚aŶti-occupation, 
anti-apartheid, anti-ǁall͛ aĐtiǀists as opposed to ͚peaĐe͛ aĐtiǀists, ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg ǁhat oŶe aĐtiǀist Đalled 
the maturation of the peace movement, as opposed to its death (Baum, 2013; Matar, 2013). Some have 
also transformed their prognostic framing of the situation to ĐeŶtƌe oŶ ͚justiĐe͛ aŶd ͚eƋualitǇ,͛ ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ 
be seen in a number of mission statements of the radical groups. For example, 
͚Togetheƌ ǁe stƌiǀe foƌ a futuƌe of eƋualitǇ, justice and peace through concrete, daily, 
non-violent actions of solidarity to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territories aŶd to aĐhieǀe full Điǀil eƋualitǇ foƌ all͛ ;Ta͛aǇush, [no date]).   
͚The ǀisioŶ of peaĐe is iŶdiǀisiďle fƌoŵ the ǀisioŶ of justiĐe aŶd eƋualitǇ. We seek to 
iŶstall all thƌee pƌiŶĐiples iŶto all aspeĐts of Isƌaeli soĐietǇ͛ (Coalition of Women for a 
Just Peace, 2001). 
OŶe eǆaŵple of hoǁ the laŶguage of ͚justiĐe͛ aŶd ͚eƋualitǇ͛ has influenced the radical groups is the 
emphasis on 1948, when the State of Israel was declared, as the beginning of the Israeli occupation as 
opposed to since the aftermath of the 1967 war, which is the starting point for the liberal Zionist groups. 
Zochrot (Remembering) is an Israeli organisation that seeks to raise awareness of the Palestinian Nakba 
(Catastrophe) of 1948 in the Israeli Jewish consciousness and supports the right of return for Palestinian 
refugees, something that is widely opposed within Israeli society, with 80.5 percent of respondents in 
2014 opposing that Israel accepts a limited number of Palestinian refugees in return for a final peace 
agreement (Yaar and Hermann, 2014). The focus on historical narratives represents a frame 
transformation that can be linked to the work of New Historians, such as Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappé. 
According to Gush Shalom, the role of the new peace camp following the collapse of Camp David was to 
͚lead puďliĐ opiŶioŶ to a ďƌaǀe ƌeassessŵeŶt of the ŶatioŶal ͞Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͟ aŶd ƌid it of false ŵǇths͛ ;Avneri, 
2001), something the radical component has been attempting to do. In framing themselves in this way, 
they have developed joint actions with Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel that acknowledges the 
perspective of the Palestinians.  
The collective action frames of the radical component have extended to include the discourse of ͚haǀes͛ 
aŶd ͚haǀe-Ŷots͛ that is particularly prevalent in the young generation of activists. A process of frame 
bridging can be identified in the connections that the activists make between the oppression inherent in 
the occupation with oppression in other areas of Israeli society, such as the lower socio-economic sector 
of the Mizrahi community, women, refugees and migrant workers. These groups seek to combat all 
forms of oppression whilst being constantly aware of their privilege as mainly Ashkenazi (Jews from 
Eastern Europe), educated Jews. This is also an example of frame extension, whereby the identified 
struggle has extended beyond that of peace or ending the occupation to one of combatting all forms of 
oppression, which are seen as intertwined with each other. Tarabut-Hithabrut (Come 
Together/Associate) was formed out of members of Ta͛ayush with these principles in mind. A member 
of Tarabut-Hithabrut explained to the author that whilst the goals and work of Ta͛ayush was extremely 
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important and had managed to shift the discourse amongst the radical groups, something that could 
mobilise a wider participant base and form into a political movement was needed (Ball, 2013). Tarabut-
Hithabrut is a front of the Hadash (Communist) political party and seeks to empower those from 
oppressed coŵŵuŶities to ͚fƌee theŵselǀes͛ aŶd to see theŵselǀes Ŷot as ǀiĐtiŵs of diffeƌeŶt ills of 
society but, as activists struggling against their shared oppression (Ball, 2013). This frame extension has 
had the effect of shifting the identity of activists within the radical groups. The division between those 
who are represented within the movement and those who are not was explained to the author as more 
closely associated with class division than the ethnic divisions of the previous phases (Anonymous, A., 
2013). Whilst the peace activists still remain predominantly Ashkenazi, middle class Jews, there is a 
greater awareness of the need to shift their framing in order to expand the membership to marginalised 
groups. 
The social justice movement could have been a platform to connect oppression and inequalities within 
Israeli society with the occupation. However, as noted, only a small part of the social justice movement 
bridged this protest with the fight against the occupation. Members of the radical groups against the 
oĐĐupatioŶ ǁeƌe ƋuiĐk to ŵake the ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ aŶd ĐƌitiĐise those ǁho Đhose to igŶoƌe the ͚politiĐal͛ aŶd 
foĐus solelǇ oŶ the ͚soĐial.͛ MataŶ KaŵiŶeƌ, a ĐoŶteŶtious oďjeĐtoƌ aŶd paƌt of a faŵilǇ of ƌadiĐal leftists 
wrote, 
͚)ioŶisŵ is a ĐoloŶial ŵoǀeŵeŶt, which has over its history shifted from expropriation of 
land from the native Palestinians (roughly 1917-1967), to their exploitation as a cheap 
labour force (1967-1993), and finally to their exclusion and marginalization (1993 to the 
present day). Any class struggle in Israel, which ignored this oppressive relationship 
ǁould ďe, iŶeǀitaďlǇ, a false oŶe͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϭͿ. 
The ŵaiŶ aƌguŵeŶt uŶdeƌlǇiŶg the ƌadiĐal gƌoups͛ ƌespoŶse to the soĐial justiĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt ǁas that Ǉou 
simply cannot have social justice without an end to the occupation. However, as noted this discourse did 
not infiltrate the mainstream social justice movement, who chose to attempt mass mobilisation by 
actively ignoring the role of the occupation in issues of social justice. 
The collective action frames of the radical component since the second Intifada has led to further 
marginalisation in Israeli society and the liberal Zionist component has been quick to disassociate 
themselves from the radical component, although they too are considered as a marginal sector of 
society. The liberal Zionist component is critical of the radical ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s sole focus on the 
Palestinians, arguing that the radical component has gone too far in acknowledging injustices towards 
Palestinians, only contributing to the delegitimisation campaign against Israel in the international 
community. One activist retold a joke circulated about the current state of Israeli peace activism since 
the second Intifada, whereby ͚Ǉou ďƌiŶg togetheƌ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of PalestiŶiaŶs ǁho do Ŷot like Israelis with 
a gƌoup of Isƌaelis ǁho do Ŷot like theŵselǀes, so Ǉou haǀe a ĐoŵŵoŶ deŶoŵiŶatoƌ͛ ;Boŵs, ϮϬϭϯͿ. The 
criticism levelled is that the radical component has adopted a narrative that became only concerned for 
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the Palestinians and in doing so presented to the Palestinians a message that Israel is solely at fault and 
the Palestinians are the victim and need not take responsibility for the conflict. These criticisms highlight 
the increased polarisation between these two components and the difficulties in reconciling the 
differences, as well as the unlikelihood that the Israeli public will adopt the ideas of the radical 
component. 
A joint Israeli-Palestinian group emerged towards the end of the second Intifada that is situated on the 
more moderate end of the radical component. LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (Combatants for Peace) was founded 
as a group of ex-combatants from both sides. It began with Israelis who had recently decided to refuse 
to conduct their reserve army duty in the occupied territories however, they felt that the debate needed 
to extend beyond the Israeli side and to reach those Palestinians who had been involved in violence for 
the Palestinian struggle and who were now opposed to it (Perry, 2011). In defining themselves as bi-
national, acting both in solidarity with the Palestinians and out of concern for the peace and security of 
Israel, LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ has succeeded in attracting significant numbers of new members (Perry, 
2011). In particular, they conduct solidarity and resistance activities in order to show their 
condemnation for the suffering of the Palestinians but are clear in their goal of a two-state solution that 
allows Israelis participants to maintain a Zionist outlook, highlighted by the bi-national identity of the 
group, as opposed to a Palestinian solidarity group. They conduct dialogue activities in order for the two 
sides to get to kŶoǁ eaĐh otheƌ ďut aƌe Đleaƌ that theǇ aƌe Ŷot a ͚dialogue͛ gƌoup ďased oŶ the ĐoŶtaĐt 
hypothesis. The group is also open to non-combatants; the reason, as explained to the author, is that in 
͚ŵilitaƌized soĐieties suĐh as ouƌs [Isƌaeli aŶd PalestiŶiaŶ] eǀeƌǇoŶe ǁas iŶ oŶe ǁaǇ oƌ aŶotheƌ iŶǀolǀed 
iŶ the ǀioleŶĐe aŶd ǁe Ŷeeded eǀeƌǇďodǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐhaŶge that͛ ;WishŶitzeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. The ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ 
of these collective action frames has shown signs of success in terms of resonance with the Israeli 
public. Around 2,500 people attended their joint Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony in 2013 
(Combatants for Peace, 2013), including this author. In an interview between the author and one of the 
core leaders of Shalom Achshav, she explained that she felt the organisation should have abandoned 
their strategy of not reaching too far beyond the Israeli consensus, and instead taken the direction 
similar to LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (Golan, 2013). 
3.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: FOCUSING ON HIDDEN REALITIES 
Groups within the human rights component seem to be responding to the criticisms levelled at 
the liberal Zionist and radical components by focusing their attention on revealing hidden realities and 
challenging policies rather than prioritising either the claims of the Palestinians or of Israel. In doing so, 
they try to speak to the Israeli public, whilst also developing more confrontational collective action 
frames. Whilst they attempt to provide this balance, their ideas have not had much resonance amongst 
Israeli society and furthermore, as will be explored in Chapter 7, they have received a significant amount 
of criticism. 
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Whilst the radical component has framed itself in a way that does not try to appeal to Israeli public and 
the liberal Zionist component tries not to develop frames that are too confrontational for the Israeli 
public, groups in the human rights component are challenging the Israeli public by reporting on what 
goes on in the occupied territories. It is argued that Israeli society has become oblivious of the 
oĐĐupatioŶ oƌ at least iŶ deŶial of its eǆisteŶĐe, ǁith ͚Isƌaeli soĐietǇ ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg to tuƌŶ a ďliŶd eǇe aŶd to 
deŶǇ ǁhat is doŶe iŶ its Ŷaŵe͛ ;Ir Amim, [no date]). Since terrorist attacks within Israel became minimal 
aŶd the ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ ǁas sepaƌated ǁith a ďaƌƌieƌ, it is ƌelatiǀelǇ easǇ foƌ a ŵeŵďeƌ of the geŶeƌal Isƌaeli 
public to ignore the continuing occupation in the West Bank. According to CoheŶ͛s ͚“tates of DeŶial͛ 
(2001), Israelis tend to block out what is happening in order to continue with their everyday lives so, the 
aim of the human rights component is to bring the occupation back to the attention of the Israeli public.   
The human rights groups continued their efforts from the previous phase to raise awareness of the 
occupation by providing information to both Israeli society and the international community. The human 
rights groups are keen to differentiate themselves from the political groups by taking a rights-based 
approach as opposed to a solidarity approach and work on cases or issues that are seen as a violation of 
these rights. Whilst the radical component of Israeli peace activism have become less concerned with 
appealing to Israeli puďliĐ opiŶioŶ, the huŵaŶ ƌights oƌgaŶisatioŶs aƌe aĐtiǀelǇ seekiŶg to ͚eǆpaŶd aŶd 
diversify its base of public suppoƌt͛ ;El-Ad in Surrusco, 2013a), by bringing the Israeli public out of its 
apathy, ignorance or denial. Many human rights issues relating to the Palestinians, such as military 
courts, are inaccessible to Israelis and therefore little attention is paid towards it (Montell in Surrusco, 
2013b). Therefore, part of mission of the human rights organisations is to make the Israeli public aware 
of the human rights situation in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, with the hope that something will 
make them enraged. There is an understanding however, that the Israeli public may not be open to the 
laŶguage of huŵaŶ ƌights aŶd so these oƌgaŶisatioŶs ͚Ŷeed to think about how to make human rights 
relevant to people that are less secular, less liberal and have a different set of values than the liberal, 
secular set of values͛ ;El-Ad in Surrusco, 2013a). This affects the way in which they present their mission 
and activities. According to an interview between the author and Tania Hary of the human rights 
organisation, Gisha (Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement), 
͚We defiŶe ouƌselǀes iŶ the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ of huŵaŶ ƌights oƌgaŶisatioŶs…ǁe do Ŷot 
see ourselves as a peace organisation or a political organisation per se because we 
are working within the framework of human rights and international law. It is 
important for us to do that and maintain that professionalism in order to make the 
message heard. Of course we are ideŶtified ǁith the left ďut…ǁe aƌe tƌǇiŶg to saǇ 
that respect for human rights should not be an issue that is reserved for the left or 
leftist disĐouƌse͛ ;HaƌǇ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
A number of groups, such as B͛Tselem and haAguda l͛ZĐhuyot HaEzraĐh b͛Yisrael (The Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) were involved in these activities in the previous phase of Israeli peace 
activism, particularly since the first Intifada however, given the shifting political context, more self-
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defined human rights groups have emerged with this aim (Appendix 1). A number of other Israeli NGOs 
have also emerged with the goal of combatting the ignorance of many Israelis, motivated by the belief 
that, ͚people Ŷeed to kŶoǁ ǁhat is goiŶg oŶ to ŵake ĐhaŶges, to tƌǇ aŶd aĐhieǀe soŵethiŶg͛ (Ir Amim 
Tour Guide, 2013). Ir Amim (City of People) and Emek Shaveh (Valley of Worth) focus their efforts on 
Jerusalem to raise awareness about the situation there (Tatarsky, 2013). Ir Amim looks at the 
ramifications of the policies in Jerusalem in terms of politics, security and humanitarian issues, 
highlighting the complexities and the differences between Jewish neighbourhoods and Palestinian 
neighbourhoods. Emek Shaveh focuses on the role of archaeology in political conflict, arguing that 
archaeology is political because the archaeologists get to decide what gets seen and what does not 
(Emek Shaveh Tour Guide, 2013). In an interview with the Director, he outlined to the author that the 
aiŵ of the oƌgaŶisatioŶ is to ͚eǆplaiŶ the ƌole of aƌĐhaeologǇ iŶ the conflict and to understand how it has 
influenced life heƌe͛, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ siŶĐe the oƌgaŶisatioŶ ďelieǀes that ͚Isƌaelis aƌe Ŷot aǁaƌe that 
aƌĐhaeologǇ is a politiĐal tool͛ ;Mizƌahi, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the Silence) is a unique organisation that is centred on the testimonies of 
Israeli soldiers who have served in the West Bank and Gaza, starting with those who were active in the 
second Intifada. TheǇ aiŵ to, ͚ŵake heaƌd the ǀoiĐes of these soldieƌs, pushiŶg Isƌael to faĐe the ƌealitǇ 
whose creatioŶ it has eŶaďled͛ aŶd ͚take it upoŶ theŵselǀes to eǆpose the Isƌaeli puďliĐ to the ƌealitǇ of 
eǀeƌǇdaǇ life iŶ the oĐĐupied teƌƌitoƌies͛ ;BƌeakiŶg the “ileŶĐe, [no date]). They have gathered thousands 
of testimonies from combat soldiers, starting with those who served in the second Intifada, in order to 
highlight the detƌiŵeŶtal effeĐts of the oĐĐupatioŶ oŶ ǇouŶg Isƌaelis due to the ͚ƌealitǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ǇouŶg 
soldiers face a civilian population on a daily basis, and are engaged in the control of that populatioŶ͛s 
eǀeƌǇdaǇ life͛ ;BƌeakiŶg the “ileŶĐe, [no date]), the details of which are often not spoken about when 
the soldiers return to civilian life. 
In revealing hidden realities, the human rights component is placing itself in confrontation with 
mainstream consensus, which either ignores or denies these realities. However, they try to make the 
public aware of what is being done in their name, in order to hold the government accountable, without 
being too confrontational. Whilst this shows an attempt at balancing the poles of the liberal Zionist and 
radical components, the groups within the human rights component have not succeeded in engaging 
the Israeli public, due to the high ƌegaƌd toǁaƌds the IDF iŶ Isƌaeli soĐietǇ as a ͚people͛s aƌŵǇ͛ ďased oŶ 
compulsory conscription. Some have also received criticism from the radical component for only dealing 
with the day-to-day problems of occupation and not seeking to confront its fundamental causes (Bar-
On, 1996:245), further showing that Israeli peace activism continues to be fragmented.   
4 CHALLENGING EACH OTHER: NORMALISATION 
The criticisms that each component of Israeli peace activism presents to the other components 
has resulted in an increased inability to reconcile differences and furthered the polarisation and 
fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. One of the strongest criticisms of the radical component 
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towards both the liberal Zionist and the human rights components is their engagement in normalisation. 
The anti-normalisation discourse within the context of Israeli-Palestinian peace building represents a 
variety of attitudes (Salem, 2005). The radical component have appropriated the Palestinian perspective 
ǁheƌe ͚ŶoƌŵalisatioŶ͛ is, ͚the pƌoĐess of ďuildiŶg opeŶ aŶd ƌeĐipƌoĐal ƌelatioŶs ǁith Isƌael iŶ all fields, 
iŶĐludiŶg the politiĐal, eĐoŶoŵiĐ, soĐial, Đultuƌal, eduĐatioŶal, legal, aŶd seĐuƌitǇ fields͛ ;“aleŵ iŶ “aleŵ, 
2005). The radical groups have used this to distinguish their joint actions from those of the liberal Zionist 
and human rights components, as well as to criticise such activities. Some groups within the radical 
component also criticise LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ since, despite their solidarity activism, their bi-national 
identity means they are engaging in normalisation (Gur, 2013). 
The radical component believes that the situation from which the Palestinians and Israelis come from is 
not equal and that such asymmetries should not be reproduced when conducting joint activities. They 
argue that the people-to-people dialogue activities based on the contact hypothesis are guilty of 
tƌeatiŶg the tǁo paƌties as if theǇ ǁeƌe ŵeetiŶg eaĐh otheƌ oŶ aŶ eƋual footiŶg aŶd this ͚ďeŶefits the 
well placed and powerful (the Israeli side), and exacerbates the asymmetry of power in the dialogue 
ƌooŵ͛ ;PoppǇ, ϮϬϭϮͿ. The laŶguage of ͚pƌiǀilege,͛ ͚oppƌessioŶ͛ aŶd ͚justiĐe͛ iŶ the radical component is 
extended towards the relationship with Palestinian activists, with the Israeli activists ensuring that they 
aĐkŶoǁledge theiƌ ͚pƌiǀileged status as Isƌaeli Jeǁs͛ ;DaŶa aŶd “heizaf, 2011). This connects to their 
fƌaŵiŶg of ͚peaĐe͛, siŶĐe it is aƌgued that, ͚iŶ tƌǇiŶg to talk to eaĐh otheƌ, ͞as eƋuals͟ dialogue posits 
peaĐe ǁithout justiĐe ;͞ŶoƌŵalisiŶg the oĐĐupatioŶ͟Ϳ͛ ;PoppǇ, ϮϬϭϮͿ. Theƌefoƌe, aŶǇ aĐtiǀities that 
involve joint actions between Israelis and Palestinians must show solidarity with Palestinian suffering 
uŶdeƌ the oĐĐupatioŶ ;“aleŵ, ϮϬϬϱͿ aŶd ďe pƌeseŶted iŶ the fƌaŵeǁoƌk of ͚Đo-ƌesistaŶĐe͛. One activist 
explained to the author that in the radical component, Jews and Palestinians ͚deŵoŶstƌate togetheƌ, get 
aƌƌested togetheƌ aŶd get shot at togetheƌ͛ ;Mataƌ, ϮϬϭϯ). 
A common response from Israeli Jewish members of the liberal Zionist peace component with respect to 
accusations of normalisation is that it is not their place to be discussing the issue; that it is part of the 
Palestinian discourse and that it is the prerogative of individual Palestinians to decide with whom they 
do and do not work (Goldenblatt, 2013; Finkel, 2013; Fuchs, 2013). The issue of normalisation and the 
different stances towards it amongst Israeli peace activists have the effect of further entrenching the 
polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. 
5 CHALLENGING MAINSTREAM INSTITUTIONS: THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES 
Fragmentation can also be identified through the ways in which the different components of 
Israeli peace activism challenge the IDF. Whilst the standing of the IDF in the eyes of the Israeli public 
fluctuates in response to different events, as an institution it is still regarded as one of the most 
important of Israeli society (Levy, 2007). Therefore, the challenges that the components pose to the IDF 
places them on the margins of Israeli society. However, there are differences in the ways in which the 
components challenge the IDF, which has enabled the liberal Zionist component to retain some 
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credibility amongst centre-left Israelis, whilst further marginalising and delegitimising in the eyes of the 
Israeli public the radical component. Shalom Achshav was founded out of the OffiĐeƌ͛s Letteƌ ǁƌitteŶ ďǇ 
reservist officers pleading with the Israeli government to continue on the path to peace with Egypt 
(Reshef, 1996). This gave the group legitimacy in the eyes of the Israeli public, since the individuals 
involved had the necessary security credentials and patriotism (Golan, 2013). As evidence for the more 
moderate approach of Shalom Achshav in the 2000s, the current General Director of Shalom Achshav 
continues to do his reserve duty in the West Bank (Blumenthal, 2015).   
In the middle of the spectrum, although still a marginalised position in Israeli society, is the perspective 
of LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (Combatants for Peace), who request that its members do not serve in the 
occupied territories (Reich, 2013) and often protest in front of the IDF in their solidarity activities with 
Palestinians. Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the Silence) also sits in the middle and is fairly unique in that it 
provides a space for soldiers to give testimonies of their experiences serving in the occupied territories. 
Whilst they have gained interest in Israeli society, the group was criticised following Operation Cast Lead 
iŶ ϮϬϬϵ foƌ ͚aiƌiŶg diƌtǇ lauŶdƌǇ iŶ puďliĐ,͛ as soŵe of the testiŵoŶies iŶfoƌŵed paƌt of the GoldstoŶe 
report.
34
 
Two groups that present the most critical challenges towards the IDF are Anarchistim Neged haGader 
and Profil Hadash (New Profile). As explained to the author by some core activists, although Anarchistim 
Neged haGader as a group do not have an anarchist vision or goals (Wagner, 2013), its anarchism frames 
the mode of operation (Snitz, 2013a), which has brought them into direct confrontation with the Israeli 
army at West Bank demonstrations. Whilst their role was to initially act as shields between the army and 
the Palestinians (Anarchists Against the Wall, [no date]), with the army less likely to harm Israelis, this 
has become less effective and the Israeli activists have become to also be considered a threat. Profil 
Hadash takes the most radical perspective, presenting a collective action frame of de-militarisation of 
Israeli society. They have bridged a radical feminist frame with one of de-militarisation, arguing that 
there is a direct link between militarism and patriarchy and only a de-militarisation of Israeli society will 
foster values of tolerance and democracy (New Profile, [no date]). They support conscientious objectors 
and take issue with some of the more veteran refusal groups, such as Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit/Border), 
firstly, because it is made up of mainly male reservist refusers and secondly, because the refuseniks 
͚heƌoised͛ the ĐoŶsĐieŶtious oďjeĐtoƌs ǁith slogaŶs suĐh as, ͚I haǀe loǀe iŶ the ƌefuseƌs elite uŶit.͛ 
Heroism is seen as a masculine value, which they seek to remove through feminisation (Vardi, 2013).  
Challenging the IDF, both through refusal and in criticising its actions, is considered anti-patriotic in 
Israeli society. In the recent Gaza crisis in summer 2014, those who voiced opposition received harsh 
criticism, the most public being Ha͛aretz journalist Gideon Levy, who criticised those involved in the air 
force bombings in Gaza, and was accused of treason and received death threats (Fraser, 2014). This 
explains why Shalom Achshav is careful to minimise their criticism of the IDF in order not to stray too far 
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 A United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza conflict in 2008/9 (UN, 2009).  
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from mainstream consensus. However, it means that they are not continuously acting as an opposition 
force, thus failing to either challenge the government or criticise the prevailing realities. 
6 RECONCILING DIFFERENCES: INJUSTICE FRAMING PROVES TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
Despite the fragmentation in Israeli peace activism, in 2009 members of the radical groups 
succeeded in framing a particular issue in a way that resonated with a larger audience, including those 
from the liberal Zionist and human rights components, and succeeded in mobilising the largest radical 
group that they have managed to gather in this phase, with an estimated peak of 5000 participants in 
March 2010 (Shabi, 2010). This episode in Israeli peace activism provides an example of successful 
framing, which was based on an injustice frame that did not directly challenge a Zionist ideology or the 
state narrative.  
The protest began with a small group of radical left wing Israeli students showing their solidarity for 
Palestinian families who were being evicted from their homes in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of 
Sheikh Jarrah. This was followed by some veteran activists who, as explained in an interview with the 
author, saw the opportunity to frame this situation in a clear, accessible manner that would encourage 
the involvement of not only the radical fringes of Israeli peace activism (Sharon, 2013). It was the 
obvious and simple injustice of the situation in Sheikh Jarrah, where Palestinian residents were being 
evicted from their homes to be immediately replaced by Jewish settlers, who claimed ownership from 
before the State of Israel was created, that helped to mobilise participants. Following Israeli annexation 
of East Jerusalem in 1967, the law enabled Jews who had lost property in East Jerusalem in the 1948 war 
to be able to reclaim it. However, Palestinian property that was abandoned in the 1948 war, could not 
be reclaimed and became state property (Gorenberg, 2010). Whilst the initial involvement of activists 
was borne out of the framing of Palestinian solidarity, an activist explained to the author that the ͚Đleaƌ 
Đut stoƌǇ͛ ďƌought out ŵeŵďeƌs of the liberal Zionist groups (Benninga, 2013), temporarily bridging the 
chasm that had become entrenched between the liberal Zionist and radical component of Israeli peace 
activism. He explained that the location of the injustice, a fifteen minute walk from the centre of Jewish 
West Jeƌusaleŵ aŶd aloŶg the ďus ƌoute to the Heďƌeǁ UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of Jeƌusaleŵ, iŶ a ͚faiƌlǇ safe ŵiddle-
class Palestinian neighbouƌhood͛ ;BeŶŶiŶga, ϮϬϭϯͿ, eŶĐouƌaged fuƌtheƌ paƌtiĐipatioŶ.  
The swell of Israeli peace activism in Sheikh Jarrah however, did not last more than a few years. A 
number of reasons can explain this and there is a fair amount of gossip and finger pointing over why it 
fell apart (Benninga, 2013; Sharon, 2013). With respect to the issue of framing, an ideological 
disagreement arose within the core group between those who wanted to use the opportunity to push 
the solidarity ageŶda aŶd those that felt that ͚puƌitǇ of heaƌt͛ ǁould ďe at the Đost of effeĐtiǀeŶess iŶ 
ďuildiŶg a ŵass ŵoǀeŵeŶt ;“haƌoŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. ͚PuƌitǇ of heaƌt͛ ƌefeƌs to ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg solidaƌitǇ ǁith the 
Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah, in case of future eviction orders, as opposed to moving on to other 
cases of injustice, even if it would help build a movement. This is connected to a common phenomenon, 
particularly within left wing movements, whereby critique and ideological commitment can cause 
fragmentation and are sometimes in contradiction with pragmatic developments.  
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7 SHIFTING GENDE‘ DYNAMICS: F‘AGMENTATION AND ‘ADICALISATION IN THE WOMEN͛S 
MOVEMENT 
A feminist framing of Israeli peace activism became prominent in the first Intifada, with the 
foundation of Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor (Women in Black) and gender dynamics have continued to play a role in 
the framing of Israeli peace activism. Significant shifts can be identified that reflect some of the overall 
shifts in Israeli peace activism iŶ this phase of ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of Isƌaeli peace 
aĐtiǀisŵ: thƌee ĐǇĐles of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛, as well as shifting dynamics in Israeli society and a radicalisation of 
the feminist movement in Israel.  
More recent testimonies of Shovrim Shtika have helped to unearth a new gender dynamic in anti-war 
voices (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Increasing opportunities for women in the military 
service provides a new source of anti-war criticism that moves beyond the existing two frames for 
female anti-ǁaƌ ǀoiĐes, those of ͚ŵotheƌhood͛ aŶd ͚feŵiŶisŵ ĐoŶŶeĐted to huŵaŶ ƌights,͛ ǁhiĐh ďoth 
dƌeǁ theiƌ legitiŵaĐǇ fƌoŵ the faĐt that ͚theǇ Đould ƌeŵaiŶ ͞ĐleaŶ͟ of soƌdid ŵilitaƌǇ affaiƌs͛ ;“assoŶ-
Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011:741). The new avenue for gendered criticism of Israeli militarism 
comes directly from the military experience of women, with criticism levelled towards the macho and 
immature behaviour of the male soldiers that they serve alongside, combined with their empathy for 
the Palestinians (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011:750). According to Sasson-Levy, Levy and 
Lomsky-Fedeƌ ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϳϱϵͿ, ͚iŶ usiŶg a ͞feŵiŶiŶe͟ ǀoiĐe deƌiǀiŶg fƌoŵ the ͞ŵasĐuliŶe͟ aƌeŶa, [the feŵale 
soldiers] propose an alternative framing of soldiering, of gender identities and of anti-ǁaƌ disĐouƌse.͛ 
Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch) emerged as part of the human rights component dealing with 
revealing and confronting hidden realities, particularly human rights abuses, in direct response to the 
second Intifada. Members of Machsom Watch stand at checkpoints, reporting what goes on in order to 
͚shake ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ, ŵiddle of the ƌoad puďliĐ opiŶioŶ fƌoŵ its deŶial aŶd ƌefusal to see ǁhat is aĐtuallǇ 
doŶe iŶ its Ŷaŵe to the PalestiŶiaŶ populatioŶ͛ ;KaufŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϴ:ϱϯͿ. A core member explained to the 
author that they also try to make life better for the Palestinians, such as through persuading the army to 
build a shelter at a checkpoint so the Palestinians do not have to stand in the rain (Linder, 2013). Gender 
plays a significant role in a mainly practical sense. As a group that situates themselves almost physically 
between the IDF or Border Police and the Palestinians, their identity as women enables them to 
disassociate themselves from the Israeli soldiers and present themselves as assisting the Palestinians, 
whereas, as explained to the author, Israeli men are mostly regarded by Palestinians as their enemies; as 
people who were or still are in the army (Linder, 2013). Furthermore, their fast response to the second 
Intifada, establishing themselves three months after it began, can be closely linked to their identity as 
ǁoŵeŶ, ǁith the ǁoŵeŶ ͚listeŶiŶg to the PalestiŶiaŶ puďliĐ ŵood͛ aŶd ƌeĐogŶisiŶg theiƌ ͚peƌsoŶal 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ͛ to ͚ĐƌitiĐise the oĐĐupatioŶ as aŶ iŵŵoƌal sǇsteŵ͛ ;HalpeƌiŶ, ϮϬϬϳ:ϯϯϳ-338). 
There has also been a radicalisatioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ. A Ŷeǁ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐoalitioŶ foƌŵed iŶ the 
second Intifada that can be described as more radical than the previous phase and is a significant driving 
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force within the radical component. The Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (The Coalition of Women for Peace) 
foƌŵed out of eǆistiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe gƌoups, ǁith diffeƌeŶt ideŶtities aŶd politiĐal ďaĐkgƌouŶds ďut, as 
told to the author, all ͚ĐƌitiĐal ǁoŵeŶ, ƌadiĐal feŵiŶists ǁho haǀe ĐƌitiƋues aďout eǀeƌǇthiŶg, iŶĐludiŶg 
[themselves], especiallǇ theŵselǀes͛ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. Although a ĐoŶtiŶuatioŶ of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶt 
from the 1980s and 1990s, particularly Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor, under the coalition they adopted an explicitly 
feminist vision of peace, including ͚oppositioŶ to the ŵilitaƌisŵ that peƌmeates both societies, an equal 
role for women in negotiations for peace, and a society that cares more about education, health, art and 
the pooƌ thaŶ it does aďout ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg aŶ aƌŵǇ͛ ;“ǀiƌskǇ, ϮϬϬϰͿ. CoŶsisteŶt ǁith deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ the 
global feminist movement, feminism within the radical component of the Israeli peace movement does 
Ŷot eƋuate to highlightiŶg aŶd loďďǇiŶg foƌ ͚ǁoŵeŶ͛s issues͛ ďut soŵethiŶg ŵuĐh ďƌoadeƌ aŶd 
structural; radical feminism underlies every aspect of the coalition, from its organising principles to its 
theatrical tactical repertoires (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), to their attention to emotions (Epstein in 
Meyer and Whittier, 1994) and the direct link made between militarism and patriarchy. 
For the younger generation of radical activists, some of whom grew up in the youth movements of 
Meretz and Shalom Achshav but were radicalised by the events of the second Intifada, the gender 
dimension became an inherent aspect of their discourses surrounding the conflict and Israeli society. 
According to an interview with a radical aĐtiǀist, ͚the stƌuggle agaiŶst the oĐĐupatioŶ aŶd apaƌtheid 
should not put aside the struggle against sexual violence and discrimination and the oppression of 
ǁoŵeŶ ďeĐause…theǇ aƌe ǀeƌǇ iŶteƌliŶked͛ ;‘othsĐhild, ϮϬϭϯ). She argues that even amongst the radical 
component there is sexism and misogyny and still male dominance. However, unlike the generation 
ďefoƌe heƌ ǁho ďuilt aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ǁoŵeŶ͛s peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt to oǀeƌĐoŵe these issues, ‘othsĐhild 
believes that the radical component should be a feminist movement consisting of both men and 
women.  
8 MOVING FORWARD: NEW IDEAS 
Part of the inability for cooperation amongst Israeli peace activists is due to the fact that there is 
no tangible shared solution that all the groups aƌe aďle to ƌallǇ uŶdeƌ, ďeǇoŶd ͚eŶdiŶg the oĐĐupatioŶ͛. 
The radical component, despite the continuous ideological debates and shifts in discourse, has not put 
forward any new solutions and has not developed tangible prognostic or motivational frames. In an 
interview with a central member of the radical component she explained to the author that, 
͚The ƌadiĐal ŵoǀeŵeŶt does not have a clear agenda, a clear solution, a clear plan to 
put in front of people and say, ok, here is our vision for the future, this is what we are 
tƌǇiŶg to aĐhieǀe͛ ;‘othsĐhild, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
Yet, most of the radical groups are critical of the two-state solution, which remains the focal solution for 
the liberal Zionist component. In recent years some groups within the liberal Zionist component of 
Israeli peace activism have been attempting to put forward new paradigms or at least acknowledge the 
need for a new paradigm with respect to the two-state solution in order to present something new for 
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the Israeli mainstream public to rally behind. According to an interview between the author and Yael 
Patir, former employee of the Merkaz Peres l͛Shaloŵ, former Director of the Forum Irgunei haShalom 
(Peace NGO Forum) and currently the Israeli link for J-Street, 
͚The left Ŷeeds a Ŷeǁ pƌoduĐt to sell. The product the peace camp sold to the public, 
you cannot sell it anymore, it is done, and it is dead. The two-state solution is still the 
oŶlǇ ǁaǇ foƌǁaƌd as I see it ďut Ǉou haǀe to ďuild it ǁithiŶ a paƌadigŵ that ƌesoŶates͛ 
(Patir, 2013).  
This shift comes as a result of three factors: one, the realisation that Oslo cannot be sold to the Israeli 
public anymore; two, the understanding that the left has lacked a clear political agenda since the Oslo 
years; and three, calls from within the Palestinian comŵuŶitǇ foƌ Isƌaelis to ͚go ďaĐk hoŵe aŶd ĐhaŶge 
Ǉouƌ puďliĐ͛ ;Patiƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. Foƌ Patiƌ, heƌ ǁoƌk ǁith J-Street is an attempt in this direction. She argues that 
the new realities demand for American engagement, which requires American politics to shift so the 
President has enough space to act. Whilst not presenting a new paradigm for the two-state solution, she 
is presenting a new approach which seeks to appeal to the Jewish diaspora, particularly in the United 
States, thus representing a re-framing of the targets of the Israeli peace movement. 
Dan Goldenblatt, the new co-Director of the Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information 
(IPCRI), which changed its name in 2013 to Israel Palestine Creative Regional Initiatives, is working on a 
new paradigm. He argues that the separation paradigm is unrealistic and his team is therefore 
deǀelopiŶg a ͚shaƌiŶg paƌadigŵ͛ that is Ŷot a oŶe state solutioŶ ďut soŵe foƌŵ of ĐoŶfedeƌatioŶ 
resolution (Goldenblatt, 2013). IPCRI was involved in developing some of the ideas that underlay the 
Oslo Agreements but has now recognised that the realities require an alternative framing of the solution 
to the conflict.  
A new organisation, Molad (The Centre for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy) that was established by 
activists who became active in the radical component of Israeli peace activism in the 2000s, is 
attempting to coordinate the fragmented peace groups and to provide fresh ideas and policies. The 
leaders understand, in line with the theoretical perspective, that a delicate framing balance is needed, 
explaining to the author that,  
͚The ĐhalleŶge is that Ǉou ǁaŶt to ďe as ďƌoad as Ǉou ĐaŶ ďut at the saŵe tiŵe Ŷot ďeiŶg 
so broad that you are losing your identity and you are not actually trying to advance 
aŶǇthiŶg…it is a fiŶe ďalaŶĐe͛ ;“haƌoŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
This is a challenge that Shalom Achshav succeeded in achieving in the 1980s and 1990s, developing a 
clear master frame of a two-state solution that enabled the mass mobilisation of Israeli participants but, 
has not been replicated since.  
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9 CONCLUSION 
The challenge of developing a master frame that all components and groups can rally under 
together is particularly difficult in this current phase of the Israeli peace activism due to the polarisation 
and fragmentation between the radical, liberal Zionist and human rights components, and even within 
each component. The ways in which they frame themselves, the underlying problems and their proposed 
solutions are in stark contrast with one another, making any formal coordination or unification unlikely. 
However, despite the inability to present a unified front or to affect government policy, Israeli peace 
activism has experienced interesting and potentially important framing processes, which has created 
new collective action frames that have opened up new opportunities for mobilisation and change.  
This is particularly true for the radical component, which through a process of radicalisation, are 
reassessing the origins of the conflict and re-framing ways in which to confront it. By focusing on 
uŶiǀeƌsal ǀalues, suĐh as justiĐe aŶd eƋualitǇ, theǇ aƌe shiftiŶg the ŵeaŶiŶg of ͚peaĐe͛ aŶd hoǁ it ĐaŶ ďe 
achieved. They are more focused on 1948 as the start of the Israeli occupation and acknowledge the 
suffering of the Palestinians by focusing on harm reduction and emphasising the privilege of the Israeli 
activists. This has increased the activism that is centred on solidarity with the Palestinians. Although at 
present their activities are focused on alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians and ignoring the Israeli 
puďliĐ, this pƌoĐess of Ŷoƌŵ eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌship poiŶts toǁaƌds the ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌ͛ ƌole that the radical 
component has traditionally played.  
Given the paralysis of the liberal Zionist component, having moved towards the centre of the Israeli 
political spectrum and no longer presenting a truly critical position, the human rights component and the 
moderate end of the radical component could be arguably starting to fit the role the liberal Zionist 
component once did, reflecting the begiŶŶiŶgs of the ͚ďig ǁheel-sŵall ǁheel͛ dǇŶaŵiĐ that KaŵiŶeƌ 
(1996) identified between the radical and liberal Zionist component in previous phases of Israeli peace 
activism. These groups attempt to influence the Israeli public but using collective action frames and 
tactical repertoires that are more confrontational, such as protesting alongside Palestinian activists, 
which were developed from the radical component. This can already be seen firstly, in the human rights 
component͛s focus on revealing hidden realities, through which they are able to confront the Israeli 
puďliĐ to ͚ǁake-up͛ to the PalestiŶiaŶ suffeƌiŶg ǁithout prioritising the Palestinian cause, presenting a 
more radical position than the liberal Zionist component but, without being too contentious. Secondly, 
those groups on the moderate end of the radical component, particularly LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ, who are 
attempting to balance the particularism of Zionism with concerns for the Palestinians, suggesting they 
are not incompatible and neither should be ignored. They are, however, ďeiŶg ͚Ŷipped at the heels͛ ďǇ 
the more radical groups within the radical component to ensure they are continuously critical, through 
issues such as normalisation or pushing for more confrontational challenges towards the IDF. The effect 
of these shifting dynamics has meant the liberal Zionist component has become redundant, particularly 
since the concept of the two-state solution has been adopted by mainstream Israeli discourse and they 
are not presenting anything more confrontational, as conventionally argued (Hermann, 2009). However, 
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the human rights component and radical component have maintained their momentum, with new ideas 
and new framing of the causes, problems and solutions to the conflict, confirming the argument that not 
all components of Israeli peace activism became paralysed. This can be further seen in the shifts in 
tactical repertoires, which will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN EXPANDED REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION FOR ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism provides a further avenue through which to 
understand the trajectory of peace activism since the second Intifada, as well as offering an additional 
means of demarcating between the components and highlighting the ways in which they interact and 
iŶflueŶĐe eaĐh otheƌ. TaĐtiĐal ƌepeƌtoiƌes aƌe the ͚ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh people aĐt togetheƌ iŶ puƌsuit of shared 
iŶteƌests͛ ;TillǇ, ϭϵϵ5:41). Shifts in tactical repertoires are most likely to be incremental and directly 
related to the framing of the groups, their mobilising structures and both the domestic and international 
context within which they operate. Furthermore, the tactics that are available to a social movement 
depends both on the internal characteristics of the groups and how extra-parliamentary activity is 
perceived in the society in which they operate. Israel is considered an intensely political society (Shamir 
and Shamir, 2000; Arian, 1995) in which protest is an acceptable form of political action (Norell, 2002; 
Wolfsfeld, 1988). Therefore, in general, protest in Israel, is not a barrier to mobilisation. However, 
tactics that are seen as more confrontational are not widely accepted.  
Tarrow (2011:99) identifies three overarching types of tactics: violent, which are the most dramatic and 
employ methods using violence; contained, which are built on routines people are most familiar with 
and aƌe aĐĐepted ďǇ the authoƌities; aŶd disƌuptiǀe, ǁhiĐh ͚ďƌeak ǁith ƌoutiŶe, staƌtle ďǇstaŶdeƌs aŶd 
leaves elites disoƌieŶtated, at least foƌ a tiŵe͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ: ϮϬϭϭ:ϵϵͿ. Disƌuptiǀe taĐtiĐs aƌe ǁheƌe iŶŶoǀatioŶ 
is most likely to occur but there is a high probability of them turning either violent or becoming 
contained. Israeli peace activism is centred on disruptive and contained. In this phase, the liberal Zionist 
component has mainly continued with their known routines, employing tactics that were once 
disruptive but overtime became contained. They continued with tactics based on nonviolent 
demonstrations and persuasion in Israeli towns and cities, which aimed to stay within the legal limits of 
protest in Israel, representing a contained action. Whilst the frequency and volume of these activities 
were less than the previous phases, they were still employed when deemed appropriate. Groups in the 
human rights component have also continued with contained tactics but with more confrontational 
collective action frames. The radical groups have employed more disruptive tactics, experiencing an 
evolution in their nonviolent action repertoire and developing slight innovations. They were at the 
forefront of employing new means with which to challenge the situation. In particular, their focus away 
from influencing public opinion has enabled them to use even more confrontational tactics, highlighting 
the connection between collective action frames and tactical repertoires. One innovation in the tactical 
repertoire of all three components is the use of tours to highlight the situation in the West Bank. Whilst 
tours had been used on a small scale previously, in this phase of Israeli peace activism, its use and 
purpose expanded, in particular in an attempt to mobilise the international community. According to 
theoretical studies, it is common for social movements to employ both innovative and contained tactics 
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in the course of a cycle of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:50), as seen in the case of Israeli 
peace activism.  
Although the activities and participant numbers of Israeli peace activism may be smaller than in previous 
phases (Hermann, 2009), the fact that both an evolution and innovation in tactics has occurred further 
supports the argument that Israeli peace activism as a whole was not paralysed following the second 
Intifada but took a new trajectory. Whilst the evolved tactics highlighted in this chapter, particularly the 
use of non-violent direct action and resistance by Israeli activists alongside Palestinian activists, has 
been documented (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Marteu, 2009), it has not been done so in conjunction with 
the other tactics that are available, both innovations and the continuation of known tactics. This chapter 
considers the full array of tactics used by Israeli peace activists, providing a more comprehensive study 
of the repertoire of contention of Israeli peace activists since 2000 (Figure 5). Furthermore, by analysing 
these tactics through the lenses of the different components of Israeli peace activism and in conjunction 
with an application of theories of repertoires of contention, this chapter gives an in-depth 
understanding of how the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism has developed over time. Some 
attention is given to how the framing of the components influenced the tactics available to them and 
how the shifting environment affected the trajectory, in order to provide some interesting explanations 
at this stage. However, effort has been made to focus solely on the tactical repertoires themselves using 
theories of repertoires and dynamics of contention (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001; Tilly, 
1995). This will enable a more detailed study of the repertoires themselves to be brought to a discussion 
of the interactive nature of the powers of movement in Chapter 7.  
This chapter will consider three forms of tactics in turn. It will begin by examining and outlining the 
contained tactics, identifying in particular those tactics that have continued from the previous phase and 
become routine within the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, namely demonstrations, 
conscientious objection, people-to-people activities, research and information and legal means. These 
have been most commonly employed by the liberal Zionist component and the human rights 
component. This chapter will then turn to the evolution of the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace 
activism, tracing the development from demonstrations to humanitarian action, to non-violent direct 
action (NVDR) to non-violent resistance (NVR) to boycott. This evolution is most clearly seen amongst 
and directed by the radical component. A consideration of the evolution of online activism across all 
components of Israeli peace activism will also be considered. The chapter will then turn to the key 
innovation in this phase, which can be identified across all components; the use of tours. Finally the 
chapter will conclude by identifying and explaining the overall expansion and fragmentation in the 
tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, highlighting the greater potential for achieving change 
through the use of multiple tactics. 
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Figure 5 The repertoires of contention in the third phase of Israeli peace activism 
 Liberal Zionist 
Component 
Radical Component Human Rights Component 
 
Repertoires of  
Contention 
Contained  Demonstrations in 
Israeli towns and 
cities  Settlement Watch 
Project  People-to-people 
activities  Tours  Research  Online activism 
Disruptive  Occasional 
demonstrations in Israeli 
towns and cities  Tours  Online activism  Humanitarian aid  Nonviolent direct action  Nonviolent resistance 
(sometimes turns 
violent) at place of 
violation  Spectrum of boycott, 
divestment and 
sanctions 
Disruptive/contained  People-to-people 
activities  Research  Tours  Online Activism  Conscientious objection  Documentation and 
reporting  Humanitarian aid  Nonviolent resistance  Legal measures 
 
2 CONTINUATION: CONTAINED COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Demonstrations, vigils and lobbying are some of the contained tactics in the repertoire of Israeli 
extra-parliamentary activity and can be identified at some point across all components. However, it is 
the liberal Zionist and human rights components that have more commonly employed contained tactics 
due to their attempts to influence the Israeli public and government. Demonstrations in Israeli towns 
have been held to mark certain events; some Israelis periodically continue to refuse to conduct their 
military service; people-to-people activities based on the contact hypothesis resumed towards the end 
of the second Intifada; think tanks and track-II initiatives continue to work on developing a solution to 
the conflict; human rights organisations maintain constant reports and documentation of human rights 
abuses and legal means have been used to challenge policies and practices of the occupation. This 
ĐoŶfoƌŵs to TillǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϱͿ theoƌǇ that ƌepeƌtoiƌes of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ aƌe ĐultuƌallǇ eŵďedded aŶd theƌefore 
do not change dramatically. However shifts in social interaction and environment will mean that no 
tactic is employed in the same way overtime (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:50), which creates the 
opportunity for small scale innovations even in contained and known tactics. 
2.1 DEMONSTRATIONS 
Demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities had traditionally been the main tactic of Israeli peace 
activism, most commonly employed by the liberal Zionist component that rallied hundreds of thousands 
of Israelis in the late 1980s. Whilst demonstrations are no longer the core tactic employed since the 
second Intifada, in particular because the liberal Zionist component lost the ability to mobilise the same 
numbers as in the 1980s and 1990s, and therefore limited their decision to call for demonstrations, 
peace organisations still held demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities throughout this phase. However, 
as has been argued (Hermann, 2009), overall the numbers have declined, particularly since the building 
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of the separation barrier and end of the second Intifada, as shown in the declining numbers at the 
annual Rabin memorial rallies. In 2002 there were 60,000 to 100,000 Israelis demonstrating (Zilversmidt, 
2003/4:24); in 2003 there were between 100,000 to 150,000 people in the square (Zilversmidt, 
2003/4:24); in 2005 it was estimated at 200,000 (Keller and Zilversmidt, 2006:4); in 2007 there were 
about 150,000 protesters (Keller, 2007a:12). In the 2010s, there have been signs of waning interest in 
the annual rally (Jeffay, 2010), with only 20,000 reported to have attended the annual rally in 2012 (Lior, 
2012). 
For the liberal Zionist component, their use of demonstrations conforms to the theoretical perspective 
whereby people tend to employ tactics that are known and easy to deploy; demonstrations in Israel are 
seeŶ as ͚ǁoƌthǇ aŶd tiŵe-hoŶouƌed foƌŵula iŶ the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ;Kelleƌ, ϮϬϬϳb:14). 
However, what was once a disruptive tactic has now become institutionalised with both demonstrators 
and the authorities playing by the rules of the game, losing much of its effectiveness in challenging the 
authorities (Tarrow, 2011:112). Furthermore, given the difficulty in being able to mobilise large numbers 
of the Israeli public in this phase, the aim of demonstrations as a mobilising tool for the liberal Zionist 
component has become less significant and the role of demonstrations has shifted from a mobilising 
tactic to an expression and reaffirmation of the very existence of the activists. As explained to the 
author by one activist, theǇ aƌe a ǁaǇ ͚foƌ us to heaƌ ouƌselǀes, see ouƌselǀes, ŵeet ǁith people, 
reaffirm our existence to ourselves and somewhat to the outside world, to say we are still here, we 
haǀeŶ͛t giǀeŶ up͛ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. TheǇ theƌefoƌe ƌetaiŶ soŵe sigŶifiĐaŶce for Israeli peace activism, 
although different from previously. 
In the previous phases of Israeli peace activism certain locations became symbolic for demonstrations. 
For example, Rabin Square in Tel Aviv, as it was so named following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, 
became the central site for mass demonstrations of the peace movement. Since the square had 
previously been filled with hundreds and thousands of protesters, caution was given to choosing this as 
a site for demonstrations following 2000, when it was acknowledged that participation was unlikely to 
reach such numbers (Peace Now, 2001a:11-12). Use of the square was therefore mainly limited to the 
aŶŶual ‘aďiŶ Meŵoƌial deŵoŶstƌatioŶ, ǁhiĐh is ĐoŶsideƌed the ͚aŶŶual ŵoŵeŶt ǁheŶ the PeaĐe Caŵp 
staŶds up to ďe ĐouŶted͛ ;Shlomot in Keller, 2007a:11).  
The anniversary of the beginning of the occupation and the anniversary of the start of the second 
Intifada were explained to the author as two additional symbolic events that the peace activists from 
across the components felt needed a large public demonstration (Baum, 2013). The forty year 
anniversary of the occupation was a particularly poignant event. Activists had long prepared a week of 
ĐoŶseĐutiǀe pƌotest eǀeŶts, ǁith aŶ uŵďƌella gƌoup, ͚OĐĐupatioŶ ϰϬ,͛ puďliĐisiŶg the list of aĐtiǀities 
(Keller, 2007b:14). Despite ideological differences between the range of activists, a rally and a march 
were held on Saturday 9 June 2007, with a number of speakers, mainly veteran peace activists such as 
Naomi Chazan, former Member of Knesset and Director of the New Israel Fund (Keller, 2007b:13-16). 
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In addition to these annual mass rallies, smaller rallies were organised by organisations and coalitions in 
response to certain actions of the Israeli government. These were held in the smaller symbolic locations, 
suĐh as outside the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ͛s ƌesideŶĐe aŶd iŶ Paƌis “Ƌuaƌe iŶ Jeƌusaleŵ, the site of the Nashim 
B͛ShaĐhor vigils since 1988. Marches were also conducted in an attempt to draw attention from the 
Israeli public. For example, in March 2001, Shalom Achshav organised a picket line against settlements 
in front of Jerusalem town hall (Peace Now, 2001b:15). Demonstrations were also called in 2002 at the 
height of Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli governmeŶt͛s largest military operation against the 
Palestinian population in the West Bank since 1967 (The Other Israel, 2002a:16-17).  
Despite the organisation of these demonstrations it was acknowledged by all components that 
demonstrations had lost their impact as a mobilisation method and as a disruptive tactic. In the previous 
phase demonstrations were not only used to portray a message to the government and broader public 
but as a means of mobilising individuals into acting. However, it is no longer used as a mobilising tool or 
the main tactic employed by Israeli peace activists to challenge the situation. 
2.2 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
Refusing to enlist in military service, either reserve duty or post-high school national duty, has 
continued to be a way to challeŶge the Isƌaeli goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s poliĐies aŶd the IDF͛s aĐtioŶs, ǁith a steadǇ 
continuation of individuals or groups publicly announcing their refusal, as well as those who avoid 
service without declaring themselves as conscientious objectors. ͚‘efuseŶiks͛ are a key part of the 
human rights component, presenting a specific means of challenging the conflict that highlights their 
objection to the policies of the Israeli authorities. These anti-war voices, however small, confirm the 
existence of some form of Israeli peace movement. According to the left-wing magazine, The Other 
Israel, 
͚‘efusal had ďeeŶ oŶ the upsuƌge siŶĐe the ďegiŶŶiŶg of the pƌeseŶt ĐǇĐle of ďloodshed iŶ 
October 2000. Throughout 2001 Yesh Gvul, the long-standing refusers' support group, got 
on its hot line hundreds of calls from soldiers who could not stand the occupation duty to 
which they were ordered. There was also an unprecedented increase of youngsters 
refusing military service altogether, with their cases getting the support of New Profile, 
founded in the 1990s. And in June 2001, there was the Refusal Letter signed by 62 high 
school pupils facing conscription. Altogether, in the past year and half more than a 
thousand soldiers have signed various personal or collective declarations of refusal, and 
seǀeƌal dozeŶ haǀe uŶdeƌgoŶe teƌŵs of iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt͛ ;Yesh Gvul, ϮϬϬϮ:ϮϱͿ.͛ 
Whilst conscientious objection is part of the human rights component of Israeli peace activism, 
differences can be noted amongst different refusal groups; either the motivation behind the act or the 
extent of refusal. On the more moderate side is a group of reservists refusing to serve that emerged in 
2002, Oŵetz l͛Sareǀ (Courage to Refuse), who framed their refusal by declaring themselves as patriots 
aŶd )ioŶists, ͚speakiŶg ǁith authoƌitǇ of haǀiŶg Đoŵe diƌeĐtlǇ fƌoŵ the field͛ ;The Otheƌ Isƌael, 2002b:25) 
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and arguing that in fact, refusal to serve in the occupied territories is Zionist (Courage to Refuse, 2003). 
They tended to continue to serve in defensive operations but refuse to serve in the West Bank or the 
Gaza Strip. Slightly more radical is the veteran group, Yesh Gvul, which extends back to the first Lebanon 
war in 1982 and supports those that have previously done their compulsory service post High School and 
are now refusing to conduct their reserve duty. However, they support all forms of selective refusal 
ďased oŶ the ďelief that, ͚eǀeƌǇ soldieƌ is ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ his aĐtioŶs͛ ;KidƌeŶ iŶ GoƌeŶďeƌg, ϮϬϬϮͿ. 
Throughout the current phase of Israeli peace activism, reservist soldiers and pilots have selectively 
refused to serve, both in the occupied territories and in Gaza
35
 and in 2014 the first intelligence unit 
voiced their objections (Cohen, 2014). 
OŶ the ŵoƌe ƌadiĐal eŶd of the ͚ƌefuseŶiks͛ speĐtƌuŵ aƌe high-school refusers, those who refuse to enter 
the IDF altogether. According to an interview with an activist who is very critical of compulsory national 
service, some teenagers find ways around having to serve, such as through psychiatric discharge, known 
as Profile 21 (Golany, 2013), whereas others have chosen to publicly declare themselves as conscientious 
objectors, risking imprisonment but, gaining the attention of the public and authorities in the process. 
These ͚ƌefuseŶiks͛ aƌe kŶoǁŶ as the Shministim (Seniors). In 2014 there was an estimated three 
thousand Shministim (Chelala, 2014) with fifty teenagers writing to Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2014 
declaring their refusal to serve (AFP, 2014).  Although the occupation is part of the reason why the 
Shministim refuse to serve in the IDF, there are often many other reasons for not wanting to serve, 
including feminist politics and pacifist ideals however, one recent contentious objector told that author 
that attention to the occupation is seen as a strategic reason for refusal (Vardi, 2013), in order to create 
a puďliĐ aĐt of pƌotest, foƌĐiŶg Isƌaelis to ͚look at the haƌsh daǇ-to-daǇ ƌealitǇ of oĐĐupatioŶ͛ ;White, 
2008). One of the most recent signatories explains that part of her motivation in refusing to serve was to 
raise awareness, declaring that ͚it͛s eŶough foƌ ŵe to kŶoǁ that oŶe otheƌ peƌsoŶ ƌead the letteƌ aŶd 
ĐhaŶged his oƌ heƌ ŵiŶd [aďout the oĐĐupatioŶ]. That͛s hoǁ I kŶoǁ I͛ǀe doŶe ŵǇ joď͛ ;Laǆ iŶ KoŶƌad, 
2014). 
Whilst refusal is significant in that it challenges and confronts an important institution in Israeli society, 
the authorities have found a means of responding to reduce their impact, either by not jailing the 
reservist refusers, as this only brings them attention, oƌ usiŶg ͚fiƌŵ aĐtioŶ͛ to delegitimise the high-
school refusers in the eyes of the public (Baruch, 2014).  
2.3 PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ACTIVITIES 
The use of people-to-people activities can mainly be seen in the liberal Zionist component. 
They were a prolific form of peace activity in the years both leading up to and during the Oslo 
Agreements (Kaufman, Salem, Verhoeven, 2006) and had the aim of breaking down barriers between 
the tǁo sides, huŵaŶisiŶg the otheƌ aŶd ͚tƌaŶsfoƌŵiŶg the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the paƌties͛ ;Maoz, 
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 See the website of Profil Hadash and the website of Yesh Gvul (Appendix 1) for examples of 
conscientious objectors in these operations. 
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2004:565). The second Intifada dealt a severe blow to these activities with many of the groups unable to 
continue (Maoz, 2004), due to a combination of fear and mistrust between the two sides, the increased 
taboo of meeting with the enemy who were in the midst of fighting with each other, and the restriction 
of movement. Furthermore, theƌe ǁas a ƋuestioŶiŶg of the ͚ǀalue͛ of aĐtiǀities that ďƌought the tǁo 
sides together, given the new violent reality (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007:198). However, there were those 
who wished to continue since theǇ felt that ͚the past Ǉeaƌs of ǀioleŶĐe iŶ the Middle East ŵake psǇĐho-
political dialogue and people-to-people contacts more necessary than eǀeƌ͛ ;“pielďeƌg, ϮϬϬϳ:ϮϱϯͿ. 
The gƌoups ĐaŶ ďe diǀided iŶto those that ǁeƌe aĐtiǀe ďefoƌe aŶd suĐĐeeded iŶ ͚suƌǀiǀiŶg͛ the Intifada 
and those that emerged during or following the Intifada. The groups that managed to maintain some 
activities needed to make adjustments in how they conducted their dialogue activities, which represent 
small scale innovations in the face of shifting realities. The Director of a youth encounter group 
explained to the author that their activities had to confront the realities, rather than ignore them 
(Atsmon, 2013) and they had to shift how the activities were practically conducted. For example, Seeds 
of Peace created virtual forums since it was more difficult for Palestinians and Israelis to travel to meet 
with each other (Kuriansky, 2007). Halonot: Afikim Letikshoret (Windows: Channels for Communication) 
developed a system of writing letters between Israeli and Palestinian youth, encouraging the teenagers 
to express their feelings about the conflict around them (Atsmon, 2013) and the Hug Horim Shakulim set 
up a chat-line called Hello Shalom, Hello Salam in order for Israelis and Palestinians to be able to 
continue to speak to each other (Hello Shalom, Hello Salaam, 2002). 
Three groups emerged during the second Intifada aimed at creating a physical and psychological space 
foƌ Isƌaelis aŶd PalestiŶiaŶs to ŵeet aŶd ͚eǆpeƌieŶĐe eaĐh otheƌ͛s huŵaŶitǇ͛ ;VazaŶa, ϮϬϬϵͿ, ǁhiĐh 
follows the contact hypothesis that formed the basis of people-to-people contacts in the 1990s. The 
Sulha Peace Project is an encounter group that brings the two sides together and is based on a 
traditional Palestinian peace makiŶg pƌoĐess that Đƌeates aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ iŶdiǀiduals to ͚Đool doǁŶ͛ 
until a conflict is resolved (Jabbour, 1996). The author met with individuals active in two further groups 
to understand the motivation behind them. The All Nations Café was set up with the aiŵ of ͚ďƌeakiŶg 
ďaƌƌieƌs͛ ;Oƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ aŶd aĐted as a ŵeetiŶg plaĐe foƌ people fƌoŵ diffeƌeŶt ĐouŶtƌies, ďaĐkgƌouŶds aŶd 
ethnicities. The Centre for Emerging Futures was set up in 2004 under the principle that the more 
people get to know each other, the ďetteƌ ;FuĐhs, ϮϬϭϯͿ. TheǇ hold ͚Gloďal Village “Ƌuaƌe͛ ŵeetiŶgs foƌ 
those who are curious to meet with someone from the other side. As a tactic, these meeting points for 
Israelis and Palestinians aim to break down general preconceptions that Israelis and Palestinians have of 
each other and create a space where individuals can vent their frustrations.   
2.4 RESEARCH, INFORMATION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Professional organisations have continued to develop projects that focus on producing 
research, information and policy recommendations and often involve cooperation between Israelis and 
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Palestinians. This includes think tanks, track II diplomacy initiatives and human rights research. These 
have tended to come from the liberal Zionist and human rights component. 
 The think tanks of the liberal Zionist component that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s continued to 
operate, such as the Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), the Economic 
Cooperation Foundation (ECF) and Ecopeace Mizrach Tichon (EcoPeace Middle East). They have 
continued to develop policy recommendations and position papers, mainly based on the issues that 
remained unsolved following Camp David II, in an attempt to push forward with the peace process.
36
 
The Foreign Media Officer of Ecopeace Mizrach Tichon explained to the author that the organisation has 
focused specifically on environmental issues, dealing with sustainable regional development in the 
context of peaceful relations (Edelstein, 2013). Some of the publications are made available to the 
public, while others are restricted since they were developed in closed-door track II meetings with 
recommendations solely for the viewing of decision makers. Two conflict resolution initiatives released 
in the early 2000s were developed from track II negotiations. In 2002, HaMifkad HaLeumi (The People͛s 
Referendum) was set up to canvass support for the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Initiative, which put forward 
proposals for a peace initiative that deal with the sticking points between the two sides, such as the 
issue of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem. Yozmat Geneva (Geneva Initiative) was released in 2003 
and led by Yossi Beilin, the initiator and architect of the 1993 Oslo Accords, when he was Deputy Foreign 
MiŶisteƌ iŶ ‘aďiŶ͛s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt, who decided to continue negotiations with Palestinians after the official 
process had broken down, despite not having authority to do so. In opinion polls Yozmat Geneva was 
recorded to have gained the support of thirty to forty percent of the Israeli public in 2003 in part simply 
because people were made aware of the initiative as the organisation produced millions of copies of the 
document and posted it through every door in Israel (Keller and Zilversdmidt, 2003/4:11). On a more 
grassroots level is Mohot shel Shalom (Minds of Peace), which holds public negotiation congresses in 
town centres, giving the opportunity for the general public to discuss the situation and come up with 
agreements (Handelman, [no date]). The tactics of informal diplomacy directly shoǁ that theƌe is ͚a 
paƌtŶeƌ foƌ peaĐe͛ oŶ ďoth sides aŶd theǇ highlight to the puďliĐ aŶd to the tǁo goǀeƌŶŵeŶts that 
agreements can be reached between Israelis and Palestinians, even on the most difficult points. 
Think tanks have historically played a significant role in the development of peace activities and in 
generating new ideas, seen by some as being prefatory to any people-to-people activities. The new Co-
Director of IPCRI explained in an interview that, ͚ƌight Ŷoǁ to talk aďout pƌopeƌ peaĐe eduĐation without 
having an alternative plan, I think it is difficult to do, once we do have a plan, then we will be able to get 
back into peace eduĐatioŶ͛ ;GoldeŶďlatt, ϮϬϭϯͿ. The leaders of Molad, who were heavily involved in a 
variety of radical grassroots initiatives since the second Intifada, in groups such as Shovrim Shtika, also 
explained to the author that they have come to the realisation that a, 
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 See ECF ([no date]) for selected project publications from the Economic Cooperation Foundation and 
see (IPCRI, [no date]) for a list of research and information conducted by IPCRI. 
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͚Gƌassƌoots ŵoǀeŵeŶt has its liŵitatioŶs…it is tiŵe aŶd eŶeƌgǇ ĐoŶsuŵiŶg [aŶd]… the 
peace movement, if we can call it that, is very lacking in ideas and you cannot hope to 
expand without really being able to articulate new ideas and being able to convey those 
ideas͛ ;“haƌoŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
TheǇ aƌe theƌefoƌe shiftiŶg to ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd aŶalǇsis iŶ oƌdeƌ to ͚iŶjeĐt ƋualitǇ Đontent into the Israeli 
puďliĐ disĐouƌse͛ ;Molad, [no date, a]Ϳ. This shift is eǆplaiŶed ďǇ Taƌƌoǁ as, ͚the luƌe of politiĐs [ǁhiĐh] 
dƌaǁs aĐtiǀists toǁaƌds ŵoƌe ĐoŶtaiŶed foƌŵs [of aĐtiǀisŵ] suĐh as loďďǇiŶg [aŶd] puďlishiŶg,͛ 
(2011:104).  
Reporting on human rights abuses has a similar goal in generating information but is focused on the 
problems of the occupation rather than the solutions. This continued to be a significant tactic for the 
human rights component, namely the human rights organisations, as a means of revealing hidden 
narratives. B͛Tseleŵ and ACRI, the two oldest and most established human rights organisations, 
continue to publish and disseminate reports on the civil and human rights situation in the West Bank, 
Gaza and Israel. Machsom Watch also focus much of their attention on writing reports of their 
oďseƌǀatioŶs at the ĐheĐkpoiŶts. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to oŶe aĐtiǀist, ͚the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of this aĐtiǀitǇ [ďeiŶg pƌeseŶt 
at checkpoints] is documentation of the very routine, the dark reality of daily life in the ĐheĐkpoiŶts͛ 
(Yehudit Kirsten-Keshet in Isachar, 2003). Yesh Din (There is Justice) was founded in 2005 by members 
from Machsom Watch and also focuses on human rights violations but with an expanded area of 
research to cover the whole of the West Bank. Theiƌ aĐtiǀities ͚focus on the extent of Israel's 
implementation of its duty to protect the Palestinian civilians under its armed forces'  (Yesh Din, [no 
date]), providing regular reports on the situation for the Palestinians. Whilst not directly related to 
human rights, Shalom Achshav is also involved in disseminating on the ground information from the 
West Bank. Particularly since the 2005 disengagement of Israel from Gaza, it has become a specialist 
professional organisation focused on revealing problems of the occupation by reporting on settlement 
aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd has ďuilt up a ͚ƌeputatioŶ as a Đƌediďle aŶd aĐĐuƌate iŶfoƌŵatioŶ souƌĐe aďout the 
settleŵeŶts͛ ;OfƌaŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ.  
2.5 LEGAL TACTICS 
The research of the human rights organisations and the Settlement Watch Project is often used 
to inform the legal actions that continued to be used by all three components in this phase. This is not a 
new method of confrontation, with ACRI usiŶg legal taĐtiĐs fƌoŵ its iŶĐeptioŶ iŶ ϭϵϳϮ to ͚set pƌeĐedeŶts, 
raise issues of principle, and affect broad-ďased poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge͛ ;AC‘I, [no date]). In 1987 they dealt with 
issues of deportation of Palestinians considered a threat to Israel (HCJ, 785/87); in the first Intifada they 
offered legal assistance to those involved in nonviolent actions (Bardin, 2012:13) and throughout the 
2000s they have petitioned the Supreme Court on issues that cover their three goals, with ACRI citing 
eleǀeŶ ͚laŶdŵaƌk Đases͛ ďetǁeeŶ ϮϬϬϮ aŶd ϮϬϭϭ ;AC‘I, 2013). Other human rights groups followed their 
lead: PCATI petitioŶed the High Couƌt of JustiĐe agaiŶst the legalitǇ of ŵethods of ͚ŵodeƌate phǇsiĐal 
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pƌessuƌe͛ duƌiŶg iŶteƌƌogatioŶs of PalestiŶiaŶs ;HCJ ϱϭϬϬ/ϵϰͿ; B͛Tseleŵ and ‘ofiŵ l͛ZĐhuyot Adaŵ, along 
with five other human rights organisations, petitioned for state authorities to explain the use of 
PalestiŶiaŶs as ͚huŵaŶ shields͛ duƌiŶg ŵilitaƌǇ opeƌatioŶs iŶ the West BaŶk ;HCJ ϯϳϵϵ/ϬϮͿ; Shalom 
Achshav lodged a Supreme Court appeal against the Migron settlement outpost, with evidence of 
Palestinian land ownership (HCJ, 8887/06); and Gisha has a legal centre to assist Palestinians from Gaza 
who need to travel outside of Gaza. They provide lawyers to sign affidavits and if that does not work, 
they take the case to court (Hary, 2013). One of the biggest successes of using legal action was the 
Supreme Court order for the route of the planned separation barrier in Bil͛iŶ to be moved so that it did 
not separate Palestinians from their land (HCJ 8414/05). However, Michael Sfard, the lawyer for the 
case, notes that it was not the legal petition alone that achieved this but a combination of the legal 
route and the demonstrations (Sfard in Surrusco, 2013c), with legal work and the grassroots activism on 
the ground often used in strategic collaboration (Vardi, 2013).  
The use of legal challenges by more groups against the occupation in this phase can be linked to the 
decision made by the International Court of Justice in 2004 to declare the building of the barrier on 
PalestiŶiaŶ laŶd illegal uŶdeƌ the ͚Legal CoŶseƋueŶĐes for the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
PalestiŶiaŶ Teƌƌitoƌies͛ ;ICJ, 2004) and the attention that the case brought to the situation. This gives the 
activists some weight when taking related cases to the Israeli Supreme Court.  
Legal means have also continued to be a necessity for those activists in the radical component, both 
Israeli and Palestinian, who are arrested during actions in the West Bank, with legal representation 
provided to both Palestinians and Israelis by some of the human rights groups.
37
 Similar legal 
representation was provided to Palestinians by Israeli groups in the first Intifada (Cohen in Kaufman-
Lacusta, 2010:38). 
There is significant debate over the effectiveness of using legal means to challenge the occupation. 
According to some, if a principled petition is brought to the High Court and the case fails, then it 
legitimises and legalises certain practices under the Law of Occupation (Hary, 2013; Sheizaf, 2012a). 
Some therefore tend to avoid the more principled cases for fear of rubber stamping elements of the 
occupation by the High Court of Justice (Hary, 2013) and argue the goal is to focus on individual cases. 
Others argue that the High Court should not be used at all as a means of challenging the occupation 
since it is just ͚oŶe of the ďƌaŶĐhes that iŶstitutioŶalises it [the oĐĐupatioŶ]͛, as the High Court of Justice 
͚Ŷeǀeƌ ƋuestioŶs oƌ stops Isƌaeli poliĐies. At ďest, it asks foƌ soŵe adjustŵeŶts to ďe ŵade͛ ;“heizaf, 
2011a). According to this argument, even when a petition is successful the rulings can actually make it 
easier for certain practices to be carried out. For example, ACRI took a case to the High Court over a 
segregated road in the West Bank and won. However, the decision actually enabled the IDF to legally 
continue as they had been, siŶĐe the JustiĐes ƌuled that, ͚the ŵilitaƌǇ ĐoŵŵaŶdeƌ doesŶ͛t haǀe the 
authority to completely – highlight completely – ďaŶ the ƌoad to PalestiŶiaŶ tƌaffiĐ͛ ;El-Ad in Surrusco, 
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 “ee foƌ eǆaŵple, “hulŵaŶ͛s ;Ϯ007) account during early years of the second Intifada and the arrest of 
Ta͛ayush activist Ezra Nawi (Ha͛aƌetz, 2012). 
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2013a). The Commander did not completely close the road, thus following the ruling but, only on rare 
occasions allowed Palestinians to use the road.  
However, whilst acknowledging legal tactics will not end the occupation, others argue that appealing to 
the High Court of Justice is worthwhile, despite some negative consequences (Kretzmer, 2012; Wiener, 
2012). Kƌetzŵeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ƌeǀieǁ of the ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ of the High Couƌt of JustiĐe iŶ the laǁ of ďelligeƌeŶt 
occupation in dealing with petitions relating to the occupied territories argues that in bringing these 
cases to Court, often the authorities will reconsider their actions in the face of a judicial review. Wiener 
(2012) argues that cases that assist individuals, such as preventing the demolition of a house are 
worthwhile in and of themselves because even if not suĐĐessful, theǇ ͚pƌoǀide aŶ additioŶal ǀoiĐe to the 
ǀiĐtiŵ of the oĐĐupatioŶ.͛ Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, it helps iŶ giǀiŶg atteŶtioŶ to these issues, ǁhiĐh aƌe ofteŶ Ŷot 
dealt with in the Israeli public sphere.  
3 EVOLUTION: DISRUPTIVE NON-VIOLENT ACTION 
From the early days of the second Intifada, an evolution in the tactical repertoire available to 
the radical component can be identified. This is reflective of and connected to the shifts in collective 
action frames of the radical component, which made available more confrontational modes of 
operation. Building on the initial developments in the tactics of the radical component in the late 1990s, 
the central tactics shifted from nonviolent demonstrations in Israeli towns to nonviolent direct action in 
the West Bank. Israeli activists use the term nonviolent direct action (NVDA) to describe those tactics 
that Sharp (1973a, 1973b) would define as nonviolent intervention, which is where the opponents are 
more directly challenged by the activists physically seeking to change a situation in the present through 
certain actions, rather than demonstrating for the authorities to make a change. 
This started in the form of humanitarian action with the aim, similar to the emerging activities of the 
human rights component in the first Intifada, of alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians in the short-
term and evolved into nonviolent direct action, aimed at directly changing the realities on the ground. 
Although the activists continued to label their activities as nonviolent direct action, it has become more 
accurate to describe most of the tactics employed since the early days of the separation barrier as 
nonviolent resistance (NVR), which have elements of both direct action and demonstrations. Israeli 
activists make a distinction between nonviolent direct action and nonviolent resistance to denote the 
difference between actively changing a situation in the present and protesting against a situation. These 
ǁould ďoth fall uŶdeƌ “haƌp͛s defiŶitioŶ of ŶoŶǀioleŶt iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ ;ϭϵϳϯ, 1973b).  Whilst these 
demonstrations still continue on a weekly basis, the next step in this evolution of tactical repertoires has 
been towards nonviolent non-cooperation, which affects the ability of the authorities to maintain 
normalcy in the system (Sharp, 1973a, 1973b), through efforts based on boycott, divestment and 
sanctions. It should be noted that this evolution was not a linear, chronological shift; the different 
actions sometimes occurred simultaneously and one did not fully replace the other. However, the 
influence of one tactic on another can be identified in the order outlined.  
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Activism in the West Bank was not a new phenomenon. Activists from the radical component had 
consistently developed contacts with Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza  from as early as the 
1970s (Warschawski, 2002) and individuals from the liberal Zionist component began conducting 
dialogue activities in the West Bank during the first Intifada (Bardin, 2012). As Shalom Achshav became 
closer to the Palestinian cause in the late 1980s, they also developed contacts with Palestinians 
(Hermann, 2009). However, on most occasions the liberal Zionist component would respect any 
restrictions placed on the meetings and avoided confrontation with the IDF (Hermann, 2009), unlike the 
radical activists who were willing to confront the authorities if necessary. There were members of 
Shalom Achshav who organised demonstrations at checkpoints or by settlements in the West Bank 
during the mid-to-late 90s (Hermann, 2009) however, these activities were not the core of Shalom 
AĐhshaǀ͛s tactical repertoire and were often conducted by their youth wing and core activists.38 As 
explained to the author, the liberal Zionist component halted all such activities in the wake of the 
second Intifada (Golan, 2014b), leaving the radical and human rights components to pursue these forms 
of activism. Given the decline of activities held within Israel proper, a re-balancing of where the main 
forms of activism were held in this phase can be clearly identified, with much greater attention than 
before on acting where the occupation is taking place. 
The evolution in the tactical repertoire identified in Israeli peace activism is mainly observed in the 
radical component and clearly led by them. The human rights and liberal Zionist components have 
employed some of these tactics at times and locations that are felt appropriate and often with specific 
limitations on the use of some of these tactics, such as a stricter limit on what can be considered non-
violent. This fits ǁell ǁith MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭ:ϰϵͿ ďelief that ƌepeƌtoiƌes aƌe liŵited to 
ǁhat is ĐoŶsideƌ ͚feasiďle aŶd iŶtelligiďle͛ to a paƌtiĐulaƌ set of aĐtoƌs, suggestiŶg that taĐtiĐs aƌe diƌeĐtlǇ 
connected to the ways in which the activists frame themselves, the prevailing problems and the 
solutions to the conflict.  
3.1 FROM DEMONSTRATIONS TO HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
As the realities of the second Intifada became clear, along with the futile results of the vigils and 
demonstrations, action became the focus of the radical component of Israeli peace activism and, as 
explained to the author, ͚pƌotest Ŷo loŶgeƌ forms part of the main language of our [the Israeli activists͛] 
ǁoƌk͛ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. The ƌealisatioŶ that ĐuƌƌeŶt taĐtiĐs ďeiŶg eŵploǇed ǁeƌe Ŷot suitable for the 
situation occurred early on in the Intifada, particularly in response to the provocative and violent events 
that sparked the second Intifada, most significantly the inflammatory visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple 
Mount and the killing of thirteen Arab citizens of Israel. According to one activist writing for The Other 
Israel,  
͚A ǁhole Đlusteƌ of aĐtiǀities ǁhiĐh ǁe iŶteŶded to iŶĐlude iŶ this issue [of The Otheƌ 
Israel] became outdated overnight. Events from before the explosion now seem almost 
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irrelevant. These included the campaign launched by Gush Shalom for "Jerusalem -- 
Capital of Two States", with big ads in the papers and an impressive vigil at the foot of 
the Old City walls attended by Israelis and Palestinians; [and] the follow-up in the form 
of a PeaĐe Noǁ ŵaƌĐh uŶdeƌ a Ŷot so diffeƌeŶt slogaŶ…These, aŶd ŵuĐh ŵoƌe, that 
demanded our time and energy seem now to belong to a different era -- an era from 
which we are irrevocably separated by the storm of aroused passions, flying bullets and 
spilled blood that began after that fateful morning when Ariel Sharon managed to pull 
off the supƌeŵe pƌoǀoĐatioŶ͛ ;Kelleƌ, ϮϬϬϬb:3). 
With the ƌealisatioŶ that ͚pƌotest foƌ its oǁŶ sake did Ŷot seeŵ effeĐtiǀe, solidaƌitǇ aĐtioŶs ǁith a 
humanitariaŶ toŶe [ďeĐaŵe] the ŵoďilisiŶg foƌĐe͛ ;Bdeiƌ aŶd Haleǀi, ϮϬϬϮͿ. The fiƌst gƌoup to eŵploǇ 
humanitarian action was Ta͛ayush, a joint Israeli and Palestinian organisation that sent convoys of food 
and clothing to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who were suffering due to closures and 
curfews. Their actions had remnants of the humanitarian groups in the human rights component, such as 
‘aďaŶiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ ZĐhuyot haAda. However, the joint nature of their activism, their grassroots emphasis, 
the focus on justice in their collective action frames and the more confrontational tactics they employed 
later, places them in the radical component. According to an interview between the author and veteran 
peace activist Reuven Kaminer,  
͚Ta͛ayush discovered something, that people in the radical left did not believe in any 
kind of political process so, instead of organising a demonstration with 150 people by 
the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ͛s offiĐe, theǇ said, let͛s fill up a tƌuĐk ǁith goods aŶd go to oŶe of 
the areas and bring theŵ stuff͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
The tactics employed by Ta͛ayush and other groups encouraged the mechanism of brokerage, which 
͚liŶks pƌeǀiouslǇ uŶĐoŶŶeĐted soĐial sites͛ ;MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, ϮϬϬϭ:ϭϬϮͿ. Ta͛ayush was able to 
mediate new relations between Palestinians and Israelis through humanitarian action, which further 
encouraged its use and feasibility. The foundation for joint Israeli-Palestinian action that focused on 
͚doiŶg͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ pƌotestiŶg ǁas ďuilt fƌoŵ these aĐtioŶs aŶd had a sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶfluence in the 
continued evolution of the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism. 
3.2 FROM HUMANITARIAN ACTION TO NON-VIOLENT DIRECT ACTION 
Alongside humanitarian action emerged a conscious and strategic move towards nonviolent 
direct action amongst the radical component, ǁhiĐh deǀeloped iŶto ͚the ĐeŶtƌal stƌategǇ of the Isƌaeli 
peace movement during the recent Intifada͛ ;“ǀiƌskǇ, [no date]). Svirsky explains that whilst there were 
some examples of direct action in the previous phase, it was not a significant or regular part of the 
repertoire of contention until this phase.  
NoŶǀioleŶt diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ ǁas iŶitiated aŶd led ďǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups aŶd iŶdiǀidual ǁoŵeŶ fƌoŵ the radical 
component. For example, members of the Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ stood in front of army bulldozers, 
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chained themselves to olive trees and rebuilt demolished homes (Svirsky, 2004). One activist, Ilana 
Hammerman, employed direct action and civil disobedience by smuggling Palestinians from the West 
Bank into Israel without permits. Through a group she founded, Lo Metsaytot (We Do Not Obey), Israeli 
women have organized different direct actions, such as replacing army signs at the checkpoints which 
instill feaƌ aŶd sepaƌatioŶ, ǁith sigŶs eǆĐlaiŵiŶg that Isƌaelis aŶd PalestiŶiaŶs ͚ƌefuse to ďe eŶeŵies͛ 
(Matar, 2013). Actions that Ta͛ayush conducted in the first few months of 2001, alongside the Koalitziat 
Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ (Coalition of Women for Peace), Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc), ‘aďaŶiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ ZĐhuyot 
haAdam, haMerĐaz l͛IŶforŵazia AlterŶativit and ICAHD, also included tactics that resembled direct 
action such as dismantling roadblocks and filling trenches that had been created by the Israeli army to 
ensure closure of the Palestinian villages (Svirsky, [no date]).The Palestinian olive harvest in particular 
has become a central site for acts of nonviolent direct action, bringing together activists from across the 
components, including Shalom Achshav. They travel to the West Bank in order to assist farmers with 
theiƌ haƌǀest aŶd ͚to guaƌaŶtee the safety of the Palestinians against attacks from the settlers and the 
aƌŵǇ ǁhile theǇ haƌǀest theiƌ oliǀe Đƌop͛ ;Ta͛aǇush, ϮϬϬϭͿ.  
The use of nonviolent direct action can be seen as an evolution from humanitarian action, involving 
disruptive tactics that not only assist Palestinians͛ daily lives but also aim to actively counter certain 
practices of the Israeli authorities on the ground. The forms of direct action employed built on the 
acquired experience of veteran activists in accessing areas of the West Bank and in having the necessary 
relationships with Palestinians. 
The liberal Zionist component has avoided employing direct action, since they were not willing to 
participate in civil disobedience (Svirsky, [no date]) but preferred to stay within the lines of legal protest. 
In conformity with the theory of tactical repertoires, the identities and the framing of the liberal Zionist 
component meant direct action was not a feasible or strategic tactic for them to employ and was not 
part of the tactical repertoire that was available to them. As explained to the author, in the previous 
phase, members of Shalom Achshav ǁould eŶĐouƌage people to joiŶ theŵ foƌ ͚sit-iŶs͛ iŶ the oĐĐupied 
territories however, following the second Intifada they refrained from such activities (Golan, 2014b). In 
this phase some dissident members of Shalom Achshav, frustrated with their lack of movement towards 
nonviolent direct action, participated in the activities of other groups (Golan, 2013). 
3.3 FROM NON-VIOLENT DIRECT ACTION TO NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 
Whilst direct action formed a central part of the activism of the radical component, direct 
action no longer continues to be the most suitable term to describe the majority of the tactics employed 
by the activists. According to an interview with oŶe aĐtiǀist, ͚diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ is supposed to ŵeaŶ goiŶg to 
ǁheƌe theƌe is a ǁƌoŶg doiŶg aŶd ĐhaŶgiŶg it ǁithout askiŶg foƌ aŶǇoŶe͛s peƌŵissioŶ͛ ;WagŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
The actions that have taken place since the construction of the separation barrier, whilst they have 
elements of direct action, such as cutting barbed wire sections of the barrier, cannot be described as 
direct action since they fail to reach a point in which they make a change, such as actually cutting 
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through the wire and crossing the barrier, due to the life-threatening nature of such an act. The 
activities therefore more closely resemble demonstrations, since the activists know in advance they will 
Ŷot suĐĐeed iŶ the ͚diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ͛ ďut aƌe ƌe-enacting the same scene with the IDF and can therefore be 
referred to as nonviolent resistance. The demonstrations used in nonviolent resistance in Israel differ 
from demonstrations in the 1990s in that they are located at the site of the violation and are aimed at 
challenging the Israeli authorities, not at mobilising the Israeli public. Furthermore they tend to be more 
confrontational.  
Regular demonstrations in the form of nonviolent resistance against the separation barrier were 
incorporated in the repertoire of contention of the radical component in 2003 following a four-month 
protest camp formed by Palestinian, Israeli and international activists in the Palestinian village of 
Mas͛ha, ǁhose laŶd ǁas ďeiŶg Đut off due to the eƌeĐtioŶ of the sepaƌatioŶ ďaƌƌieƌ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. This 
marked the starting point of Anarchistim Neged HaGader, a group of Israeli activists that decided to join 
the Palestinian popular struggle against the separation barrier, through direct resistance (Active Stills, 
2009). Each week Israeli activists travel to the West Bank to join Palestinians in resisting the separation 
barrier, which has spread to different Palestinian villages, most notably Bil͛in, Nabi Saleh and Al 
Ma͛asaƌa.39  
The move to nonviolent resistance as a key tactic of the radical groups can be explained by appealing to 
the ŵeĐhaŶisŵ of appƌopƌiatioŶ, ǁhiĐh ͚paǀes the ǁaǇ foƌ iŶŶoǀatiǀe aĐtioŶ ďǇ ƌe-orientating an 
eǆistiŶg gƌoup to a Ŷeǁ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of its ĐolleĐtiǀe puƌpose͛ ;MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, aŶd ϮϬϬϭ:ϭϬϮͿ. 
Following a few years of developing relationships with Palestinian activists and shifting their focus to 
solidarity-based actions, the Israelis joined the Palestinian activists in their popular struggle against the 
separation barrier, which became the site and target of much of the activism of the radical groups. 
Furthermore, the involvement of international activists from the International Solidarity Movement 
(ISM) set the tone of what it meant to act in solidarity with the Palestinian activists, to which Israeli 
activists followed. One activist explained to the author that the aesthetics of nonviolent resistance 
against the separation barrier also has clear influences from the anti-globalisation movement (Sharon, 
2013), exemplifying how tactics can diffuse from the international dimension to a domestic context.
40
  
The use of NVR by the more moderate groups in the radical component, particularly LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ, 
opened the debate over the extent to which such tactics could be considered nonviolent both in 
principle and in practice and led to disagreements within the radical component in the use and 
implementation of nonviolent resistance, allowing the opportunity for small scale innovations, 
modifying the repertoire of nonviolent resistance (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:138) and opening 
the space for new activists to mobilise. Whilst a core member of Anarchistim Neged HaGader explained 
to the author that ͚ǀioleŶĐe is Ŷot ƌeallǇ [theiƌ] taĐtiĐs, oƌ the taĐtiĐs of the deŵoŶstƌatioŶs that [theǇ] 
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 See Kaufman-Lacusta (2010) for a detailed study of joint Israeli-Palestinian resistance against the 
separation barrier. 
40
 See for example Conway (2003) and Graeber (2002). 
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aƌe paƌt of͛ ;“Ŷitz, ϮϬϭϯa), they have received a reputation of being part of violent demonstrations with 
other activists aƌguiŶg that, ͚the ŶoŶ-ǀioleŶt deŵoŶstƌatioŶs aƌe ǀeƌǇ ǀioleŶt…a lot of these 
deŵoŶstƌatioŶs Đƌeate ǀioleŶĐe͛ ;Oƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  EǀeŶ if the aĐtiǀists did Ŷot eŵploǇ ǀioleŶt taĐtiĐs, theǇ aƌe 
criticised because they are fully aware that the demonstrations provoke a violent response from the IDF, 
with rubber bullets and tear gas shot at the demonstrators. However, other activists explained to the 
author that provoking a violent response through nonviolent means is legitimate and does not 
constitute a violent demonstration on behalf of the activists (Rothman, 2013).  
A further argument centres on whether stone throwing (a symbol of Palestinian resistance) constitutes 
violence and, if it does, then Israeli support for a demonstration that involves stone throwing suggests 
that they legitimise the use of violence. Some argued that whilst the activists from Anarchistim Neged 
HaGader aƌe Ŷot eŵploǇiŶg ǀioleŶĐe theŵselǀes, theiƌ pƌeseŶĐe ͚giǀes a seal of appƌoǀal to rock 
thƌoǁiŶg͛ ;‘othŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ, ǁhiĐh puts iŶto ƋuestioŶ ǁhetheƌ this gƌoup ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as ŶoŶǀioleŶt.  
In order to distance themselves from demonstrations involving some level of violence or provocation of 
it, LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ have developed creative methods in order to emphasise the nonviolent nature of 
their protest, signifying small scale innovations. They developed creative ways of demonstrating against 
the Israeli army and the occupation without employing violence or encouraging a violent response from 
soldiers. One activist described to the author that in the activities of LoĐhaŵiŶ L͛Shaloŵ, 
 ͚We aǀoid ǀioleŶĐe ďeĐause the aƌŵǇ ĐaŶ ďe ǀeƌǇ ǀioleŶt; theǇ aƌe just kids aŶd theǇ aƌe 
teƌƌified…ǁe plaǇ footďall iŶ fƌoŶt of the aƌŵǇ, ǁe haǀe floǁŶ kites…we try to come with 
soŵethiŶg oƌigiŶal͛ ;Lesteƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
In a demonstration attended by the author in the Palestinian village of Tulkarem in the West 
Bank, the Israeli and Palestinian activists put on a theatrical performance in front of the IDF that 
highlighted the struggle of the Palestinians. In moderating the way in which they conduct NVR in 
the West Bank, the demonstrations of LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ are less risky than Anarchistim Neged 
haGader and therefore are likely to attract more participants or at least more support in 
general. However travelling to the West Bank is risky for Israelis in itself, especially to areas that 
are prohibited for Israelis to travel to. 
Younger radical activists have also tried to add performance to nonviolent resistance. Some notable 
examples are the activists that dressed up as clowns for the weekly Friday protest in the village of al-
Ma͛asara; desĐƌiďed ďǇ oŶe aĐtiǀist as, ͚the ďitteƌ Ŷose-less clowns with the uniforms and the big 
oversized weapons [referring to the Israeli army] on one side and the sweet clowns on the otheƌ side.͛ 
The aim was to ͚highlight the aďsuƌditǇ of all foƌŵs of ƌepƌessioŶ͛ ;BeŶ-Abba, 2012). A drumming group 
called Yasamba, linked to the transnational anti-globalisation group of the same name, can also be 
found at many of the West Bank demonstrations and in Jerusalem. They create a festival-like feeling to 
the demonstration, encouraging participants to sing and chant. These small-scale innovations link to the 
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theoƌǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚steƌeotǇped peƌfoƌŵaŶĐes lose effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ ;MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, ϮϬϬϭ:ϭϯϴͿ 
and therefore activists look for ways to dramatize the action to re-gain attention. 
3.4 FROM NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TO BOYCOTT 
As activists were becoming exhausted from running back and forth from demonstrations that 
often involved violence; no longer being able to deal with the post trauma, some looked for ways in 
which they could act whilst not having to subject themselves to these risks (Baum, 2013). They felt that a 
new tactic was needed since they had, ͚tƌied eǀeƌǇthiŶg – demonstrations, petitions, and international 
pƌessuƌe͛ aŶd so theǇ felt the Ŷeǆt step ǁould ďe to tƌǇ a ďoǇĐott ;Khulood iŶ “ǀiƌskǇ, ϮϬϬϲͿ.  
Whilst the use of boycott by Israeli activists as a means of opposing the Israeli occupation has its origins 
in the late 1980s with the HaShana HaEsrim v͛AĐhat and was given a tangible campaign by Gush Shalom 
in 1997 with their call to boycott goods that came from the settlements (Avneri, 1997:7), it was not until 
after the outbreak of the second Intifada that Israeli initiatives began to emerge calling for a 
comprehensive boycott of Israel. The first call was initiated in April 2001 by Professor Rachel Giora and 
Professor Tanya Reinhart, collecting an initial 35 signatories calling for a worldwide boycott of Israeli 
goods and avoidance of leisure travel to Israel (Giora, 2010). Similar boycott calls in the first years of the 
second Intifada were made by Israeli academics but, the activist groups and organisations were yet to 
take a stance on this issue or employ this as a key tactic. It was only in response to a number of 
Palestinian calls for a boycott against Israel, starting with a group of sixteen Palestinian civil society 
organisations in August 2002 (Badil, 2002); followed by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and 
Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) in July 2004 (PACBI, 2004); and culminating in the Palestinian Call for 
Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel in July 2005 (BDS Movement, 2005), that the Israeli 
activist response began to gain momentum. Initially, the more established radical groups, such as 
Nashiŵ ď͛ShaĐhor, ICAHD , ACRI and Profil Hadash issued statements supporting the boycott (Giora, 
2010) and conferences were organised to discuss this method of resisting the occupation (Giora, 2010). 
Discussions were then held in 2007 and 2008 amongst the radical component to decide the ways in 
ǁhiĐh the BD“ ĐaŵpaigŶ Đould ďe ďuilt ǁithiŶ Isƌaeli soĐietǇ aŶd ǁhat use Đould ďe ŵade of ͚oƌgaŶised 
Jewish-Israeli endorsement for the ĐaŵpaigŶ͛ ;“Ŷitz aŶd Haƌush, ϮϬϬϴͿ.  
The extent to which BDS is employed depends not only on the component of Israeli peace activism but, 
also on individual groups. Only a small portion of the radical groups are calling for full BDS, mainly those 
involved in Boycott from Within and Anarchistim Neged haGader. Gush Shalom, one of the key players of 
the radical component in the first two phases of Israeli peace activism and the group that first initiated a 
boycott campaign, maintains that boycott of settleŵeŶts oŶlǇ is the ŵost stƌategiĐ ŵethod siŶĐe, ͚a 
boycott must serve the purpose of isolating the settlers and the individuals and institutions that support 
them – ďut Ŷot deĐlaƌiŶg ǁaƌ oŶ Isƌael aŶd the Isƌaeli people as suĐh͛ ;AǀŶeƌi, ϮϬϬϵͿ. This ďƌiŶgs them 
more in line with Shalom Achshav, which supports a boycott of settlement goods, something which they 
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only publicly declared in December 2011 following the passing of the Boycott Law
41
  in Knesset, which 
made a call for boycott an offence against the law (Hartman, 2011). This is in line with the framing 
strategy of Shalom Achshav not to place themselves too far ahead of the Israeli public. 
From the radical component, two means with which to support and implement a boycott have emerged. 
The first was formed by those who decided to join the Palestinian call for boycott, using the 2005 
initiative as their framework. They viewed this as ͚poteŶtiallǇ the ŵost poǁeƌful ŶoŶǀioleŶt ĐaŵpaigŶ 
possible to stop the ongoing war crimes committed in the name of the Jewish people͛ ;“Ŷitz aŶd Haƌush, 
2008). An activist from a group called Boycott from Within explained to the author that the group 
formed ǁith the ǀieǁ that, ͚a ŵessage fƌoŵ Isƌaelis [Jeǁs] Đaƌƌies ŵoƌe ǁeight thaŶ aŶǇ otheƌ ŵessages 
aďout BD“͛ ;NeiŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ, as it encourages the removal of criticisms that BDS in anti-Semitic. This 
group often uses creative performances to communicate about the occupation and the need to boycott 
Israel. One activist told the author that they organised a flash mob at the beginning of a concert of the 
Cape Town Opera in Israel, distributing leaflets with information about South African Apartheid and the 
situation in Israel and Palestine, gaining the attention of the audience without disturbing the concert 
(Rothschild, 2013).  
The second tactic was formed by Koalitziat Nashiŵ L͛Shaloŵ, bringing together a group of economic 
researchers under the group, Mi Marviha? (Who Profits), set up in 2007. Dalit Baum (2013), the director 
of the project, explained to the author that whilst the BDS movement has the potential to be very 
successful, it is unclear how Israelis can boycott Israel if they live and work in Israel. They therefore 
turned their efforts towards corporations who profit from the occupation based on the idea that,  
͚We do kŶoǁ that ŶoďodǇ likes ĐoƌpoƌatioŶs pƌofitiŶg fƌoŵ huŵaŶ ƌights ǀiolatioŶs…ǁe 
know that the occupation is costly but it is costly to the state, while the economy is 
ďeŶefittiŶg thƌough the pƌiǀate seĐtoƌ, folloǁiŶg the pƌiǀatisatioŶ of the ϭϵϵϬs…so 
maybe by focusing on the corporations, we can find a new audience and new allies 
because corporations are not people and because corporate crime goes in many 
diffeƌeŶt diƌeĐtioŶs aŶd ŵaŶǇ people suffeƌ fƌoŵ it͛ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
Mi Marviha? have formed a professional research group, which provides information services and 
research services for BDS campaigns all around the world (Baum, 2011). Baum notes that their database 
of corporations involved in the occupation is not a boycott list and that different methods should be 
used in approaching the different companies (Baum in Nieuwhof, 2009).  
BDS as a tactic highlights the connection between the international dimension and a domestic 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to a ŵeŵďeƌ of BoǇĐott fƌoŵ WithiŶ, ͚oŶĐe Ǉou do BD“ ǁoƌk, Ǉou do a lot of 
gloďal ǁoƌk͛ ;‘othsĐhild, ϮϬϭϯͿ. FiƌstlǇ theǇ aƌe siŵplǇ paƌt of the laƌgeƌ, gloďal BD“ ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŶd 
secondly, a reciprocal relationship in the diffusion of tactics and ideas between the international activism 
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and the domestic activism can be noted in this case. Tactics of the Palestinian and international BDS 
movement, which have conducted campaigns such as approaching artists to not perform in Israel or 
Universities not to collaborate with Israeli institutions, diffused into Israeli peace activism through the 
Boycott From Within group. On the other side, the focus on corporations has had the effect of 
influencing the tactics of the international BDS movement by providing targets for boycott and accurate 
information to base their tactics on.  
BDS is arguably one of the more successful tactics employed by Israeli peace activists. Indications of 
success of the BDS movement can be seen in four areas. Firstly, examples of international institutions 
that decided to divest from Israel, such the decision by Veolia, a service and utility company, to pull out 
from investing in the Jerusalem light rail (Baum, 2011). Secondly, BDS has been gaining attention 
amongst the international mainstream with an article in the print edition of The Economist published in 
February 2014 explaining that international financial institutions are beginning to consider an Israeli 
boycott and Israeli businessmen are becoming increasingly concerned (The Economist, 2014). Thirdly, 
the European Union submitted guidelines in July 7, 2013 that went into effect in January 2014, 
͚foƌďiddiŶg aŶǇ fuŶdiŶg, ĐoopeƌatioŶ, aǁaƌdiŶg of sĐholaƌships, ƌeseaƌĐh fuŶds oƌ pƌizes to aŶǇoŶe 
ƌesidiŶg iŶ the Jeǁish settleŵeŶts iŶ the West BaŶk aŶd East Jeƌusaleŵ͛ ;‘aǀid, ϮϬϭϯͿ.42  
Fourthly, this rise in the BDS movement has resulted in the mobilisation of an anti-BDS campaign both in 
Israel and across the world. Responses to the EU Guidelines and to the international BDS movement by 
Israeli officials suggest that they are concerned about the growing impact of BDS and can therefore be a 
final indicator of the growing success of the movement. Netanyahu came out aggressively towards the 
EU GuideliŶes ;“hiezaf, ϮϬϭϯͿ aŶd desĐƌiďed BD“ as ͚the latest Đhapteƌ iŶ a loŶg aŶd daƌk histoƌǇ of aŶti-
“eŵitisŵ͛ ;NetaŶǇahu, ϮϬϭ4a) and in the 2011 Knesset passed the Boycott Law. These highlight the 
concern Israeli authorities have towards BDS, of which Israeli activists play a part.  
Whilst the eǀolutioŶ iŶ taĐtiĐal ƌepeƌtoiƌes seeŵs to pƌeseŶt ͚Ŷeǁ͛ aŶd iŶŶoǀatiǀe taĐtiĐs, theǇ were not 
dramatic innovations in the tactical repertoire available to the peace movement. Similar tactics had been 
used amongst the more radical groups and even Shalom Achshav in preceding years but had not become 
the main form of activism. According to Taƌƌoǁ͛s theoƌǇ oŶ ͚paƌadigŵatiĐ ĐhaŶge,͛ ǁhat ŵaǇ seeŵ like 
͚suddeŶ ďƌeakthƌoughs͛ iŶ ĐoŶteŶtious aĐtioŶ, aƌe ŵoƌe the ƌesult of the ͚sloǁ, histoƌiĐal eǀolutioŶ of the 
ƌepeƌtoiƌe of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϭϲ-117) and best describes these changes in Israeli peace activism. 
3.5 AN EVOLUTION IN ONLINE ACTIVISM AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA 
An evolution can also be seen in the use of the internet across all three components, which can 
be considered a part of the repertoire of contention of a social movement, as well as a mobilisation 
structure. The different types of online tactics used by Israeli peace activists can be divided into four 
categories: alternative media sites that give attention to activism on the ground; social media as a 
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platform to spread information; activism in the form of blogs; and virtual meeting points for Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
Based on the efforts of Indymedia in the late 1990s, alternative media sites have emerged across the 
components of peace activism in Israel. They aim to provide information about what is happening in the 
West Bank and Gaza and report on Israeli activism. There is a belief amongst all the components that 
there is ͚a gƌoǁiŶg disĐƌepaŶĐǇ ďetǁeeŶ the gƌiŵ ƌealities theǇ oďseƌǀe iŶ the oĐĐupied teƌƌitoƌies aŶd 
the way in which it ǁas aŶd is ƌepoƌted iŶ the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ ŵedia͛ ;OĐĐupatioŶ MagaziŶe, [no date]), 
making it difficult to bring information about the situation of the Palestinians to the established media 
(Raz, 2013). The alternative media sites therefore aim to fill this gap in information. 
For example, Radio Kol HaShalom (Radio All for Peace), which was set up by former Member of Knesset 
and former Director of Shalom Achshav, Mossi Raz, along with his Palestinian counterpart Maysa 
Baransi-Siniora, broadcast the radio show online as well as through a transmitter. On the radical end of 
the spectrum is Magazine HaKibush (Occupation Magazine), which spreads information about what is 
happening beyond the Green Line
43
, as well as recording the various activities of the activists, both 
Israeli and Palestinian. The contributors themselves are mainly activists from the radical and human 
rights ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. WƌitteŶ iŶ EŶglish is a ͚ďlog ďased ǁeď-ŵagaziŶe͛, +ϵϳϮ Mag, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides Ŷeǁs 
articles and opinion pieces on all events and stories that are considered progressive in Israel and 
Palestine. It also documents the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism. As 
explained to the author by its co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, Noam Sheizaf, their aim is to ͚ƌaise 
a diffeƌeŶt ǀoiĐe aŶd ďe paƌt of the politiĐal ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ iŶ EŶglish…[siŶĐe] theƌe is a stƌoŶg 
international dimension to the conflict right now, so it makes sense to be part of it because it influences 
life out heƌe͛ ;“heizaf, ϮϬϭϯa). However, he is clear that the site is run by journalists and not activists, 
unlike Magazine HaKibush and Radio Kol HaShalom, and that their organisational goal, to be a respected 
media outlet, is more important than any political goals. Despite this, a number of the regular writers 
define themselves as peace activists and whilst the site itself may not be described as an activist site, it 
is a tool that activists can use to disseminate information and details about their activities.  
Alongside the spreading of information by these alternative media sites are social media sites, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, which have also been used strategically to spread footage of the realities in the 
West Bank and Gaza and the various anti-occupation and peace activities. Many of the groups operating 
in the West Bank film and take photographs of their events and encounters with the IDF and post them 
to social media sites, to raise awareness of these events. According to the Executive Director of 
B͛Tseleŵ, ͚ǀideo is effeĐtiǀe iŶ gettiŶg people͛s atteŶtioŶ. WheŶ Ǉou haǀe aĐtual eǀideŶĐe of Đƌiŵes 
takiŶg plaĐe it͛s ŵuĐh ŵoƌe likelǇ Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to get the iŶǀestigatioŶ opeŶed…IŶ additioŶ, ǀideo helps 
Ǉou get Ǉouƌ foot iŶ the dooƌ of opeŶiŶg up the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ͛ ;MoŶtell iŶ “uƌƌusĐo, ϮϬϭϯb). One recent 
video succeeded in spreading into the mainstream media. The video showed an IDF officer ramming a 
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rifle in the face of a Danish activist at a West Bank demonstration. As a result of the footage spreading, 
including being picked up by international mainstream media, the officer was discharged from the army 
(Kalman, 2012). Whilst it did not lead to the end of the occupation or a change in policies, it had the 
impact of revealing something to the Israeli public, which according to Bradley Burston from Ha͛aretz,  
͚Forced a moment of pause. Of reflection. Of wondering where we [Israelis] are 
headed…the occupation will never be the same. Not because it has changed in the 
slightest. But because - having seen the merest slice of it - ǁe haǀe͛ ;BuƌstoŶ, ϮϬϭϮͿ.  
A photography collective, ActiveStills, was established in 2005 with this idea as its raisoŶ d͛être, 
speĐifiĐallǇ to ͚shape puďliĐ attitudes aŶd to ƌaise aǁaƌeŶess oŶ issues that aƌe geŶeƌallǇ aďseŶt fƌoŵ 
puďliĐ disĐouƌse͛ ;AĐtiǀe“tills, [no date]). As well as disseminating the photographs online and in public 
spaces, they have also been printed in the mainstream media, which enables the realities to reach a 
wider audience.  
There are also personal blogs written in both English and Hebrew that document the activities and 
thoughts of the activists. A recent conscientious objector and member of a new group in the radical 
component of Israeli peace activism, All That͛s Left, told the author that ͚soŵetiŵes ǁƌitiŶg ĐaŶ 
defiŶitelǇ ďe a tool of aĐtiǀisŵ͛ ;‘othŵan, 2013) and so for some activists, their individual blogs are also 
part of their tactical repertoire. Ilan Landau, who can reach up to 15,000 readers of his Hebrew blog, 
explained to the author that he believes that activism on the ground is much more important but, that 
oŶliŶe ǁƌitiŶg ͚feeds iŶto the ďig piĐtuƌe…ďǇ ĐƌeatiŶg alteƌŶatiǀe politiĐal kŶoǁledge to the 
ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ…Ŷot just iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ďut telliŶg people hoǁ to thiŶk aďout ǁhat is goiŶg oŶ͛ ;LaŶdau, 
2013).  
The use of social media is directly connected to the external environment in which it operates, both 
domestic and international. Through the dissemination of information and opening the space for 
dialogue, the activists provide an alternative portrayal of the situation from mainstream news outlets, 
thus challenging commonly held beliefs and narratives. For those who have access to social media, this 
can have the effect of shifting individual thoughts and ideas on the conflict in an accessible manner. 
However, social media can also be a platform for reaffirming particularistic narratives, especially in 
times of heightened conflict, when the sides often take defensive positions and retreat back to one-
sided narratives or previously held viewpoints. 
The internet is also useful as a mobilizing tool in advertising events and activities to individuals.
44
 The 
significance of the internet as a mobilizing tool lies first in its simplicity in connecting individuals and 
building an online network of supporters towards a cause, as well as allowing for increased connectivity 
between Israeli activists and international activists, strengthening ties and enabling a faster flow of 
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information and diffusion of tactical repertoires. However, the effectiveness of the internet as a 
mobilizing tool should not be exaggerated for reasons including the fact that in the pre-internet period 
hundreds and thousands were mobilised for demonstrations and the limited ability to verify online 
information.
45
 Despite these limitations, Israeli peace activism has made use of the internet to mobilise 
participants. 
4 INNOVATIONS: TOURING THE WEST BANK
46
 
Whilst an evolution in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism most accurately describes 
the main developments in the tactics employed in this phase, particularly for the radical component, one 
key innovation can also be identified: tours. This innovation is seen across the three components with 
little difference between them. Tours can be described as an awareness raising and mobilising tactic and 
has become a significant part of the repertoire of contention of Israeli peace activism. The international 
dimension has played an influential role in the development of the use of tours, with both tourists and 
important foreign figures acting as targets of the tours.  
Tours had been used previously by Israeli peace activists, for example a dialogue group active in the first 
Intifada oƌgaŶised ͚A Taste of PeaĐe͛ to opeŶ theiƌ aĐtiǀities to the ǁideƌ puďliĐ. The aiŵ ǁas to ͚touƌ the 
sites iŶ ǁhat ǁill soŵedaǇ ďe the PalestiŶiaŶ “tate…aŶd ŵeet local PalestiŶiaŶs͛ ;BaƌdiŶ, ϮϬϭϮ:88). This 
tour was sponsored by Shalom Achshav and advertised under their name in order to gain wider support. 
Shalom Achshav also ran their own tours from the mid-1990s to educate individuals about the 
settlements (Hermann, 2009:136) and continue to run politically motivated tours to the settlements and 
outposts iŶ the West BaŶk foƌ Isƌaeli studeŶts, ͚to get ǇouŶg Isƌaelis to see ǁith theiƌ oǁŶ eǇes the ƌealitǇ 
ďeǇoŶd the GƌeeŶ LiŶe͛ ;PeaĐe Noǁ, [no date]). Despite these, the tours that began in the 2000s had a 
very different aim and format, highlighting their innovative nature. The tours were aimed at revealing 
hidden narratives and raising awareness of Palestinian suffering, as part of the human rights 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s goal to ƌeŵoǀe the Isƌaeli ͚state of deŶial͛ aŶd the ƌadiĐal ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s aiŵ to foĐus oŶ 
Palestinian suffering. ICAHD explains the aim of their tours as an attempt to, 
͚GaiŶ aŶ oǀeƌǀieǁ of soŵe of the ŵaiŶ issues faĐiŶg a populatioŶ liǀiŶg uŶdeƌ oĐĐupatioŶ - 
house demolitions, displacement, education, refugees, water, lack of freedom of 
movement, women's issues – aŶd disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ ǁithiŶ the state of Isƌael͛ ;ICHAD, ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
Shovrim Shtika was one of the first groups to run an organised tour with this goal in mind, focusing on 
the Old City of Hebron and led by former combatant soldiers who had served there during the second 
Intifada. TheǇ ďegaŶ ǁith a photo eǆhiďitioŶ iŶ JuŶe ϮϬϬϰ iŶ Tel Aǀiǀ, eŶtitled ͚BƌiŶgiŶg HeďƌoŶ to Tel 
Aǀiǀ͛ ;“haul iŶ BƌoǁŶ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. The use of tours diffused to different organisations and expanded to 
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 The author attended the tours of Shovrim Shtika, Emek Shaveh, Ir Amim and Jerusalem Peace Makers, 
January to July 2013. 
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different areas in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. A radical youth group called Yeledim shel Avraham 
(Children of Abraham) who were active in the later years of the second Intifada, also begun their 
activities with organised tours in Hebron. The location, as explained to the author, was chosen ͚ďeĐause 
it has a shock and awe effect. It is the one place where you have the entire structure of occupation 
ĐoŶdeŶsed͛ ;“haƌoŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. LoĐhaŵiŵ L͛Shaloŵ organise tours aimed at highlighting life under 
oĐĐupatioŶ, ͚to shoǁ ǁhat dailǇ life is like foƌ PalestiŶiaŶs uŶdeƌ ŵilitaƌǇ oĐĐupatioŶ, aŶd thus fill a gap iŶ 
the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌoǀided ďǇ the ŵedia͛ ;CoŵďataŶts foƌ PeaĐe, [no date]Ϳ aŶd ͚ǁith the puƌpose of 
eǆpaŶdiŶg aŶd deepeŶiŶg the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ kŶoǁledge of the aƌea͛ ;CoŵďataŶts foƌ PeaĐe, [no date]). 
Two groups that also focus on revealing hidden narratives and spreading information are Emek Shaveh, 
which runs alternative archaeological tours in Silwan/City of David that the author attended and Ir Amim, 
which ƌuŶs studǇ touƌs iŶ Jeƌusaleŵ to ͚iŶtƌoduĐe participants to the social, economic and political issues 
impacting life in the ĐitǇ͛ ;Iƌ Aŵiŵ, [no date]). The increase in the use of tours and in particular the focus 
on the Palestinian experience in the West Bank has re-cast the space in a different light from the liberal 
Zionist groups. The practice of walking through the occupied territories from the perspective of the 
Palestinians is a different experience, one that reveals the realities and narratives that Israelis arguably 
ignore or deny. 
Zochrot, which also deals with revealing hidden narratives, has been running tours since the start of the 
second Intifada. The focus of these tours is not the West Bank but the unrecognised Arab villages within 
Israel. This is connected to their radical framing that the Israeli occupation began in 1948. Similar to 
other groups, it was explained in an interview between the author and Director of Zochrot that the tours 
began out of a desire of one individual to show others an injustice they had discovered (Bronstein 
Aparicio, 2013). 
Groups that deal with people-to-people activities within the liberal Zionist component also use tours 
similar to those in the late 1980s, aimed at both Israelis and Palestinians participants in order to 
overcome the disconnect between the two sides that has formed due to the separation barrier. These 
include tours by IPCRI to West Bank cities, which were started by a group of Israelis and Palestinians who 
met at a seminar organised by IPCRI and aim to challenge preconceptions and misunderstandings (IPCRI, 
[no date, a]). More informal tours based on a similar motivation are run by Israeli and Palestinian friends, 
such as Visit Israel and Palestine (Shwarczenberg, 2013). The author also attended the tour of a religious 
group, the Jerusalem Peace Makers, who organise tours to Hebron with a focus, not on highlighting the 
occupation but, explaining the dual narrative of the city, with participants meeting and listening to both 
settlers and Palestinians who live there.  
As social movement theory suggests, as a movement approaches difficulties either in participation levels 
or in their interaction with the opposition, the activists use their ͚tools selectively and creatively to 
outguess oppoŶeŶts aŶd iŶĐƌease paƌtiĐipatioŶ͛ ;MĐAdaŵ iŶ Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭͿ. The use of touƌs ďeĐaŵe a 
suitable way both for public outreach at a time where mobilising for mass demonstrations became near 
impossible, and for revealing the complexities of the conflict and notable effects of the occupation, 
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encouraging participants to become more involved as activists or funders. A number of activists 
interviewed explained that their route into activism involved a learning process that was often instigated 
by participation in a tour, which created an impetus to act (Anonymous, B., 2013; Benninga, 2013; Oren, 
2013). However, it must be noted that some level of political awareness and engagement is needed to 
decide to join a tour in the first place. The tours have targeted the Israeli public, politicians, journalists, 
diplomats, school and university students, Members of Knesset and international tourists. However, 
restrictions in movement for Israelis entering the West Bank and general Israeli fear of travelling into the 
West Bank has meant outreach to the Israeli public has remained limited. Furthermore, most tours run 
on the weekend, which means there is direct competition between groups in recruiting participants. 
There is a clear international focus to the tours, with all the groups running tours in English, as well as 
Hebrew and sometimes Arabic. This is connected to the role tourism plays in Israeli society as a means of 
spreading narratives. For example, international officials are often taken to Yad Vashem (Holocaust 
Museum) when making visits to Israel.
47
  The tours of the peace activists therefore target foreign visitors 
in order to highlight the realities of the occupation and encourage them to return to their governments 
and persuade them to put pressure on the Israeli government. There is also a large tourist sector in Israel 
aimed at the Jewish Diaspora. For example, a worldwide organisation, Taglit (Birthright) has given 
hundreds of thousands of Jewish young adults from the diaspora a free trip to Israel since 1999 with the 
aiŵ of ͚stƌeŶgtheŶ[iŶg] ďoŶds ǁith the laŶd aŶd people of Isƌael͛ ;Taglit-Birthright, [no date]). Shovrim 
Shtika has specifically begun to target their tours to Taglit participants who stay on after their organised 
trip has finished (Zonszein, 2011), in order to show them other realities of Israel.  
The introduction of tours across a range of groups and all three components suggests an expansion of 
the tactical repertoire available to the Israeli activists. In conducting tours, Israeli peace activists have 
appropriated a conventional method that is available to and used by different sectors of Israeli civil 
society to challenge Israeli policies and raise awareness of the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank. 
5 IMPLICATIONS: AN EXPANSION AND FRAGMENTATION IN THE TACTICAL REPERTOIRE OF ISRAELI 
PEACE ACTIVISM 
In this phase of Israeli peace activism there is a broader spectrum of tactics being employed 
and more significantly, a fragmentation in the suitability of certain tactics for each component, given the 
ways in which they have framed themselves. The liberal Zionist and the human rights components 
tended to continue with known and contained tactics. The use of contained tactics gives the potential of 
mobilising those who were woken up to activism by the second Intifada ďut Ŷot ͚ƌeadǇ͛ to uŶdeƌgo the 
risks involved in NVDA and NVR  in the West Bank, providing an avenue for new activists to mobilise.  
The radical component moved to progressively more confrontational and disruptive tactics. This points 
to some interesting implications and dynamics. The shift to conducting most of their activities in the 
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West Bank is a direct reflection of the ways in which the radical activists frame their activism, in terms of 
͚haƌŵ ƌeduĐtioŶ͛ aŶd ͚justiĐe.͛ IŶ ƌe-balancing the location of the tactics to predominantly areas where 
human rights violations are taking place, the activists are reinforcing their focus on Palestinian suffering 
and the need to remove the occupation as an end in itself. The activists today are taking greater risks 
than ever before, coming regularly into confrontation with the IDF, being subject to tear gas, rubber 
bullets and occasionally live ammunition at the West Bank demonstrations and sometimes being 
arrested for their activities. Despite the risks, this has had the effect of deepening the relationships 
between the activists, both amongst the Israeli activists and also with the Palestinian activists, 
ĐoŶfiƌŵiŶg the ͚Đo-ƌesistaŶĐe͛ ŵodel ǁheƌeďǇ Jeǁs aŶd PalestiŶiaŶs, ͚deŵoŶstƌate togetheƌ, get 
aƌƌested togetheƌ aŶd get shot at togetheƌ͛ ;Mataƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
The expansion in the use of legal tactics and tours in this phase also points to some interesting 
implications. Legal tactics and tours, although employed differently by each component, provide a way 
to reach out to the Israeli public, decision makers and international community. Both these tactics use 
conventional means for contentious purposes; to highlight the injustices of the occupation and make an 
example of certain aspects. Whilst legal tactics are criticised for the role they may play in reinforcing the 
occupation, they also succeed in ensuring that the issues of the occupation are being constantly debated 
in the highest legal structure in Israel. The tours are useful in raising awareness to the international 
community, both tourists from the Jewish diaspora and foreign influential figures, the realities of 
occupation.  
According to Feinstein (2009), for optimal change, a combination of tactical approaches is required 
(Feinstein, 2009). The variety of tactics available across the spectrum of Israeli peace activism therefore 
suggests greater potential to achieve change. For example, legal action can change individual aspects of 
the occupation, whereas continued demonstrations against the state and the barrier as a whole is 
required for any long term change. Reports on human rights violations, conducted by field researchers, 
bring to light the issues that require solidarity activism or legal approaches. By using multiple tactics, 
both disruptive and contained, the movement will have a better chance of achieving change than 
employing only one tactic, since it provides more entry points for different individuals who wish to 
participate and means the authorities have to respond to different situations, making it more 
complicated than dealing with a known routine.   
Furthermore, the expanded and evolved tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, whilst not having 
an impact on policy, is finding alternative routes through which to gain impact. The small scale actions, 
conducted on the margins of Israeli society, often led by individuals and based on informal networks, 
haǀe soŵe Đleaƌ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs to “Đott͛s ;ϭϵϴϱͿ Weapons of the Weak, whereby overt rebellions are 
uŶlikelǇ ďut ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ foƌŵs of ƌesistaŶĐe͛ ĐaŶ still haǀe a foƌŵ of iŵpaĐt. The ĐoŶtiŶued, ƌegulaƌ effoƌts 
of the activists to chip away at the occupation and reveal the injustices caused by it can be likened to 
suĐh ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ foƌŵs of ƌesistaŶĐe.͛ Whilst the context in which the Israeli activists are operating 
highlights a diǀeƌgeŶĐe fƌoŵ “Đott͛s studǇ siŶĐe these iŶdiǀiduals aƌe Ŷot the ǀiĐtiŵs of the iŶjustiĐes ďut 
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are acting in solidarity of others and therefore experience more difficulties in mobilising participants and 
ĐƌeatiŶg ĐhaŶge, siŵilaƌ taĐtiĐs ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ aŶd theƌefoƌe the poteŶtial foƌ ͚ĐhippiŶg aǁaǇ͛ ĐaŶ ďe 
noted. Further areas in which these tactics can achieve impact will be considered in Chapter 7. The 
following chapter will turn to the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism.  
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CHAPTER 6 
A SHIFTING MAP OF MOBILISATION STRUCTURES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter turns to the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism since the second 
Intifada. Mobilisation structures are the ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌes that suppoƌt aŶd ĐoŶditioŶ ĐitizeŶ 
mobilisation͛ (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:67). As explained in chapter 2, it is useful to follow 
MĐCaƌthǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϰϱ, Figuƌe ϭͿ tǇpologǇ of ŵoďilisatioŶ stƌuĐtuƌes iŶ oƌdeƌ to ideŶtify the different 
structures available to each of the three components and to track changes and continuities from the 
previous phases of peace activism in Israel. A detailed study of civil society organisations in Israel was 
conducted by the European Commission in Israel in 2013. This will help to inform this chapter however 
the mobilisation structures were not mapped as distinctly as will be attempted below and Israeli peace 
activism was not given separate attention from other civil society organisations. 
Israeli peace activism is still in flux, a little unsure of its identity and where it is heading, particularly 
given the shock it faced in the second Intifada. It therefore has many remnants of the characteristics in 
mobilisation structures from the previous phase, such as the importance of informal, familiar networks, 
the central role given to social movement organisations, the predominance of Ashkenazi middle-class 
activists and the heavy reliance on external sources of funding. Despite this, there have been some 
interesting shifts and developments in the mobilisation structures, with some clear fault lines emerging 
between the components that were not seen previously (Figure 6).  
The radical component has focused on small group activities rather than mass mobilisation and there 
has been a return to horizontally structured organisations, with participatory-style decision making, in 
paƌt out of the ƌejeĐtioŶ of the liďeƌal )ioŶist ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s pƌoĐess of iŶstitutioŶalisatioŶ iŶ the ϭϵϵϬs. 
Feminist modes of operating have played an interesting role in influencing these shifts. Enduring 
coalitions have formed in the radical component to pool resources together and is showing signs of 
developing into a social movement community (SMC), ǁhiĐh aƌe the ͚iŶfoƌŵal Ŷetǁorks of politicised 
iŶdiǀiduals, ǁith fluid ďouŶdaƌies, fleǆiďle leadeƌship stƌuĐtuƌes aŶd ŵalleaďle diǀisioŶs of laďouƌ͛ 
(Buechler, 1990:42) and is a new and significant shift. There has also been a greater attempt at 
diversifying the social make-up of Israeli peace activists amongst the radical component to include 
marginalised sectors of Israeli society. However, whilst greater attention is given to this, there has not 
been a significant change. A significant change in composition can be identified with the return of 
younger activists, many of whom were awakened by the events of the second Intifada.  
The human rights component is made up of both grassroots and national professional SMOs. The 
refusenik and humanitarian groups have similar elements to the radical component whereas those 
reporting on human rights violations have developed into national professional SMOs similar to the 
liberal Zionist component, in order to gain legitimacy in their work and ensure steady flows of funding. 
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The liberal Zionist component had to find ways of compensating for the loss of their grassroots support 
by continuing the process of institutionalisation from the 1990s, as identified by Hermann (2009; 2002), 
towards national professional SMOs. Some of the organisations still try to build mass support, such as 
Kol Echad but through institutionalised organisations. The differences across the components further 
highlight the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism in this phase. 
Despite the availability of certain mobilisation structures and the attempts to mobilise, Israeli peace 
activism remains marginalised in Israeli society due to the framing of all components and their numbers 
remain low. This has encouraged one of the most significant changes in the mobilisation structures; a 
shift towards a greater global focus of Israeli peace activism. With an inability to influence the Israeli 
public and government in this phase, activists have become more connected to global movements, with 
the international arena presenting new mobilisation structures. 
This chapter will first disaggregate Israeli peace activism into the different mobilisation structures 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to MĐCaƌthǇ͛s tǇpologǇ (1996:145, Figure 1). It will begin by looking at the formal movement 
structures, turning first to social movement organisations. It will outline and explain the continued 
process of institutionalisation amongst the liberal Zionist groups, the shift to more horizontally 
structured organisations in the radical component and the mixture of SMOs seen in the human rights 
component. It will then consider the informal movement structures, namely the activist networks that 
have moved from the liberal Zionist component to the radical and human rights component. This 
chapter will then look at non-movement informal networks, such as familiar and work networks that 
play a significant role especially amongst the smaller and more radical groups. Finally, in mapping the 
mobilisation structures it will uncover additional mobilisation structures to add to MĐCaƌthǇ͛s typology; 
non-movement movements, which are other social movements that act as mobilisation structures for 
Israeli peace activism, and international mobilising structures, which have become more important in 
this phase. Having mapped the mobilisation structures, this chapter will then consider the shifting 
composition of Israeli peace activism, highlighting the attempts by the radical component to be more 
inclusive, and will explore the issue of funding for Israeli peace activism before turning to some 
implications of these findings. 
2 A CHANGING LANDSCAPE: MAPPING THE MOBILISATION STRUCTURES OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
Movement mobilisation structures can vary across a spectrum of more or less formal and by 
their location in or outside of the movement in question (McCarthy, 1996). Israeli peace activism in this 
phase is made up of an even more diverse set of mobilisation structures than previously, cutting across 
thƌee of MĐCaƌthǇ͛s diŵeŶsioŶs ;ϭϵϵϲ; Figuƌe ϭͿ: foƌŵal movement, informal non-movement, and 
informal movement (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6 Dimensions of movement-mobilising structures in the third phase
48
 
  Non-movement Movement 
Liberal Zionist 
Component 
Informal  Familiar networks  Work networks  Diaspora Jews 
 Activist networks 
Formal   National professional SMOs  Forums 
Radical 
Component 
Informal  Familiar networks  Work networks  Other movements  Transnational social 
movements 
 Activist networks  Dissidents from liberal 
Zionist component 
Formal   Grassroots SMOs  Enduring coalitions  Movement schools 
Human rights 
Component 
Informal  Familiar networks  Work networks  Diaspora Jews  Transnational social 
movements 
 Activist networks  Dissidents from liberal 
Zionist component 
Formal   Grassroots SMOs  National professional SMOs  Enduring coalitions 
 
2.1 FORMAL MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATIONS  
On the more formal end of the spectrum of mobilising structures are social movement 
organisations (SMOs), which represent the main component of the mobilisation structures of Israeli 
peace activism and have done so since the proliferation of such structures in the first Intifada. This term 
defines a range of organisations that vary in their internal structures (McCarthy, 1996:144). There is a 
wide diversity of SMOs in Israel, ranging from grassroots SMOs that are structured horizontally to 
national professional SMOs that have stricter hierarchical forms. In this phase the liberal Zionist 
component has continued a process of institutionalisation towards national professional SMOs that 
began in the end of the previous phase. The radical groups have given greater attention to participatory-
style organisation and built horizontally structured organisations. This was influenced by some of the 
radical groups in the previous phases, as well as the early stages of the liberal Zionist groups. The human 
rights component is made up of a mixture of SMOs, depending on the particular specialisation of the 
group. 
The main change in the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism in this phase has been a scale 
shift from mass mobilisation to small group activities, which has resulted in both a decrease in 
participant numbers for each activity and an increase in SMOs. This is mainly due to loss of the liberal 
Zionist ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s gƌassƌoots suppoƌt ďase, ǁhiĐh aĐĐouŶts foƌ its shift toǁaƌds a national professional 
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organisation in order to maintain some activities. It is furthered by the increase in specialised SMOs in 
the human rights and radical components, which are each focusing on a specific aspect of the situation 
to challenge and therefore tend to be smaller than organisations aimed at mass mobilisation for a broad 
issue. 
2.1.1 THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: CONTINUED INSTITUTIONALISATION 
The liberal Zionist component is most commonly comprised of national professional SMOs, 
which include elements such as a professional office, a large direct mail membership (McCarthy, 
1996:144) and registration with the Rasham Ha͛Amutot (Israeli Registrar for Non-Profits). Shalom 
Achshav was initially considered a grassroots SMO in the 1980s and then became a mixed SMO as it 
became more hierarchically structured, particularly with the hiring of a bigger staff base in the 1990s 
(Golan, 2013). Following the second Intifada and the loss of its grassroots support base, it has morphed 
into a national professional SMO, with weak ties to its membership base and an almost sole focus on the 
Settlement Watch Project. It is therefore now a professionalised SMO amongst many others, with a 
particular specialisation, rather than being a large grassroots movement or acting as a rallying point for 
other groups, as it was in its inception and peak years. Hermann (2002:115) notes that in the case of 
Shalom Achshav, institutionalisation helped to maintain the organisational activities but led to 
͚disseŶsioŶ aŵoŶg those aĐtiǀists ǁho ƌeseŶted the ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s Ŷeǁ, highlǇ iŶstitutioŶal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ.͛  
2.1.2 THE RADICAL COMPONENT: GRASSROOTS, HORIZONTAL STRUCTURES 
Historically within the Israeli peace movement there has been a mixture of hierarchically and 
horizontally structured organisations. In this phase, there was an increased attempt amongst the radical 
component at organising along horizontal structures, in direct contrast to the process of 
institutionalisation that occurred within the liberal Zionist component in the 1990s. The groups 
comprising the radical component tend to be grassroots SMOs, almost exclusively volunteer based and 
built around horizontal structures. The origins of this participatory style of organising can be seen in the 
radical immigrant student groups that formed in the late 1960s, early 1970s. This type of SMO covers 
most of the radical groups, such as Ta͛ayush, Anarchistim Neged HaGader, Lo-Metsaytot and Profil 
Hadash. As explained by Profil Hadash, a feminist organisation that calls for the de-militarisation of 
Israeli society, this form of organisation requires its members to,  
͚PaƌtiĐipate oŶ a ǀoluŶtaƌǇ ďasis, ƌaƌelǇ ǁith ƌeŵuŶeƌatioŶ, iŶ aĐtiǀities that are non-
hieƌaƌĐhiĐal…[and] with some functions paid with small stipends. These, and appearing 
before audieŶĐes aďƌoad, aƌe takeŶ oŶ ďǇ ƌotatioŶ offeƌiŶg eǀeƌǇoŶe a ĐhaŶĐe͛ ;Hilleƌ, [Ŷo 
date]).  
Significantly, these groups do not to register with the Rasham Ha͛amutot due to the following clause, 
which suggests that those organisations that are highly critical of the State of Israel and have anti-Zionist 
or non-Zionist underpinnings are not eligible for registrations, 
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͚AŶ amuta [not-for profit organisation] shall not be registered if any of its objects negates 
the existence or democratic character of the State of Israel or if there are reasonable 
grounds for concluding that the amuta ǁill ďe used as a Đoǀeƌ foƌ illegal aĐtiǀities.͛ 
(Amutot Law, 1980: 3) 
However, not all groups in the radical component have been able to operate solely as voluntary 
organisations. The Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ, a ĐoalitioŶ of ƌadiĐal ǁoŵeŶ͛s oƌgaŶisations, went 
through a process of institutionalisation in the mid-2000s. This process has moved them away from a 
completely grassroots, horizontally structured organisation to a mixed organisation, which tried to 
balance a national office with a grassroots membership. The current co-ordinator of the Koalitziat 
Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ explained to the author that the organisation was a very active voluntary group in the 
radical component in the early years of the second Intifada but, as the activities continued, there was a 
need for a coordinator with a salary (Dak, 2013). Diani (in Tarrow 2011) notes that social movement 
organisations tend to struggle with the balance between creating a strong organisational structure 
whilst ensuring contact with their grassroots base, as Shalom Achshav seemingly failed to do. As further 
explained to the author, the Koalitiziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ has succeeded in maintaining this balance 
mainly due to their constant awareness of this struggle between being an effective organisation through 
its paid staff members, which requires adhering to funding objectives, whilst staying true to their 
political message and the autonomy of the activists (Dak, 2013). It manages to achieve this through 
feminist organising principles, which encourages it to work on the basis of consensus decision making 
(Baum, 2013). This helps to decentralise the power away from the organisational centre and into the 
hands of the activists themselves. However, given they have paid, regular staff they cannot always 
ensure that power is held by activists. 
The ƌadiĐal ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s atteŶtioŶ to hoƌizoŶtal stƌuĐtuƌes aŶd gƌassƌoots aĐtiǀisŵ ĐaŶ ďe eǆplaiŶed 
through three main processes. The first is out of criticism towards the peace industry of the 1990s, a 
term used to denote the peace-building activities that went alongside the political peace process. The 
criticism comes from two angles, one is that individuals earning from their peace work are arguably 
͚pƌofitiŶg fƌoŵ the ĐoŶfliĐt͛ aŶd that theiƌ salaƌies take fuŶds aǁaǇ fƌoŵ diƌeĐt pƌojeĐts oŶ the gƌouŶd. 
“eĐoŶdlǇ the gƌoups ƌefeƌƌed to uŶdeƌ the teƌŵ ͚peaĐe iŶdustƌǇ͛ ǁeƌe those that ƌaŶ aloŶgside the Oslo 
peace process, creating dialogue programs for co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians, and the 
assumptions which underpinned these activities are rejected by the radical activists (Giacaman, 2009). 
Therefore, in order to distance themselves from the peace industry, there has been a greater shift 
towards horizontal structures that promote grassroots voluntary activism on the ground.  
The second driving force towards horizontal structures can be identified in the attention given to 
alleviatiŶg ͚all foƌŵs of oppƌessioŶ͛ (Ball, 2013). Hierarchies are rejected as systems of power that only 
reinforce existing asymmetries in power relations, whether they are built around ethnicity, nationality, 
age, gender or another factor. By ensuring the organisational structures are horizontal, there is an 
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attempt to bring egalitarian framing into the structures and practices of the groups. According to an 
interview with an activist in Tarabut-Hithabrut, they are, 
͚CoŶtiŶuouslǇ tƌǇiŶg to aǀoid oƌ ďe aǁaƌe of the hieƌaƌĐhies ǁithiŶ Tarabut, which is a 
difficult thing. You cannot avoid the fact that power relations to a certain extent replicate 
themselves since there are still existent power relations in society therefore, if you are a 
male academic in your fifties, your opinion and your thoughts are sometimes more 
powerful. It is a continuous struggle within Tarabut but, it is a struggle that is based on a 
deep affiŶitǇ aŶd tƌust͛ ;Ball, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
The third driving force is the shift towards feminist organising principles, as seen in the new feminist 
organisations, which are structured around empowerment and member participation (Ferree and 
Martin, 1995). As Staggenborg (1995) and Martin (1990) note, there is not one form of feminist 
organising and not all feminist organisations are based on consensus decision making and horizontal 
structures. However, amongst some of the Israeli peace organisations, the organising principles have 
been based on these concepts, with acknowledgement of their feminist routes. According to an 
interview with a prominent figure in the radical left, ͚siŶĐe the seĐoŶd Intifada there has been a more 
feŵiŶist peƌspeĐtiǀe [aŵoŶgst aĐtiǀists] aŶd also a ŵoƌe ƌadiĐal ǀieǁ of ǁhat feŵiŶisŵ ŵeaŶs͛ ;Vaƌdi, 
ϮϬϭϯͿ. Paƌt of this is aŶ eŵphasis oŶ the ͚feŵiŶist ideals of ĐolleĐtiǀelǇ, ƌespeĐt aŶd deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛ (Acker, 
1995:138) in their organisational structures. 
One of the consequences of a focus on horizontal structures has been the issue of hidden hierarchies; a 
situation in which groups claim to be horizontally organised but exhibit power imbalances that are often 
structured along gendered-lines. This criticism is often levelled at Anarchistim Neged HaGader, which is 
built on anarchist modes of operation and emphasises egalitarianism and democracy (Snitz, 2013a; 
Pallister-Willkins, 2009). However, as explained to the author by an activist in Anarchistim Neged 
HaGader, 
͚Although allegedlǇ theƌe is Ŷot a hieƌaƌĐhǇ, it is suďtle. Theƌe is oŶe peƌsoŶ ǁho kŶoǁs 
the most things and owns the most power and knows how much money we have and 
which villages we are working ǁith aŶd…he is aŶ oldeƌ ŵaŶ, aŶ aĐadeŵiĐ ŵaŶ, a ŵiddle 
class man and a heterosexual man. These things are not coincidental and many effects will 
ďe suďtle…ǁho is speakiŶg iŶ ŵeetiŶgs, ǁho has ŵoƌe effeĐt iŶ deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg, ǁho has 
the last word and who speaks to the ŵedia͛ ;‘othsĐhild, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
Solidariut Sheikh Jarrah suffered from an undiscussed creation of a hierarchy and in part disbanded 
because this affected the relationship between the core activists. Whilst disagreements over the goals of 
the group following initial success in the neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah also provide some explanation 
for the disbanding of the group, as outlined in Chapter 4, others argue that gender dynamics, along with 
generational dynamics and organisational structure played a role. Sahar Vardi (2013) argues that at 
some point a few individuals began taking a leading role, which she did not feel was necessary. She 
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eǆplaiŶs that ͚it had a ďig effeĐt oŶ a lot of people leaǀiŶg, ŵostlǇ ǁoŵeŶ ďeĐause theǇ did Ŷot feel theǇ 
could ďe iŶǀolǀed.͛ Whilst it is ĐoŵŵoŶ foƌ disagƌeeŵeŶts aŶd poǁeƌ stƌuggles to occur in non-
hierarchical groups, Sahar explained to the author that the participants did not take the time to talk 
through the issues and come to a consensus.  
In contrast, the success of transparent horizontal organising can be seen in a disagreement in Profil 
Hadash over whether individuals, who receive compensation for their work in the organisation, should 
be recognised as employees aŶd ƌeĐeiǀe ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ƌights. Some members argued that they did not want 
to become employers as they would have to abide by certain hierarchical mechanisms. Profil Hadash 
almost halted all other activities whilst discussing this issue; all their energy was put into building 
alternative employment mechanisms that would fit with their horizontal structures (Vardi, 2013). As 
Staggenborg (1995:343) notes, it is common in collectivist-based decision making for groups to focus on 
the process at the expense of their goals.  However, whilst Profil Hadash, which was founded in 1998, 
may have been less effective in the short-term, in the long-term the organisation did not become a 
victim of internal disagreements leading to the break-up of the organisation, because, as a core member 
explained to the author, they ŵade tiŵe to ͚disĐuss eǀeƌǇthiŶg oǀeƌ aŶd oǀeƌ aŶd to listen to every 
poiŶt of ǀieǁ͛ (Dolev, 2013). 
According to Staggenborg (1995) horizontally-structured organisations tend not to last and have shorter 
life-spans than hierarchical and institutionalised organisations. However, from the experience of Israeli 
peace organisations, it seems that the type of organisation structure is less important in explaining their 
trajectories than the level of transparency in the way in which they are structured. Those that are aware 
and transparent in their structure and adapt their work accordingly seem to have a longer life-span than 
those whose structures are hidden or not yet decided upon: Shalom Achshav became aware that it had 
lost contact with its grassroots base and became a highly institutionalised and professionalized 
organisation, which has helped it to run the successful Settlement Watch Project; the Koalitziat Nashim 
l͛Shaloŵ makes sure it constantly assesses the balance between institutionalisation and grassroots 
empowerment, making it one of the most prominent and active groups in this phase; Profil Hadash 
ǁoƌks solelǇ oŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe oƌgaŶisiŶg pƌiŶĐiples aŶd ͚suƌǀiǀed͛ the second Intifada and internal 
disagreements; whereas Solidariut, with its unspoken hierarchical structure, disbanded after a couple of 
years. 
2.1.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: MIXED STRUCTURES 
There are a variety of structures amongst the human rights component, depending on the 
specific focus of the individual groups. For example, the refusal movement is a grassroots, voluntary 
movement that supports and advises those who are in the process of refusing their military service. The 
humanitarian groups also tend to be voluntary, with small groups of individuals choosing one issue to 
dedicate their time to, such as Adaŵ l͛lo Gǀulot (Humans Without Borders). In some cases, there are 
one or two paid staff and Board Members, particularly if they are registered charities. ICAHD is 
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registered as a non-for profit in the UK and whilst it has elements of the radical component, in particular 
the solidarity actions in the West Bank, they also publish reports and disseminate information 
internationally, which accounts for their more formal structure. The human rights organisations tend to 
be the most formal, having developed into national professional SMOs since their foundation in the first 
Intifada, with hierarchical organisational structures, Boards of Trustees and are registered to the 
Rasham Ha͛Amutot. This suits their tactical repertoires since they need to have legitimacy if their 
reports of human rights violations are going to be taken seriously and they need expert fundraisers to 
ensure there is a constant flow of funding for their work. However, as will be discussed later, despite 
their accepted registration to the Rasham Ha͛Amutot, the sources of their funding from international 
bodies are used to delegitimise and question their activities. 
2.1.4 INCREASING ENTRY POINTS TO ACTIVISM 
Social movement organisations have played a central role in the mobilisation of new activists. 
New organisations in this phase, which have developed new ways of framing the conflict and alternative 
methods of acting, have created opportunities for new activists to mobilise. According to social 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt theoƌǇ, ͚ǁould-be activists must either create an organisation vehicle or utilise an existing 
oŶe aŶd tƌaŶsfoƌŵ it iŶto aŶ iŶstƌuŵeŶt of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ ;MĐAdaŵ, Taƌƌoǁ aŶd TillǇ, ϮϬϬϭ:ϰϳͿ, plaĐiŶg 
strong emphasis on the importance of SMOs in the mobilisation of activists. In this phase, some existing 
organisations transformed their structure and purpose to reformulate the SMO in order to remain 
relevant in the changing context or, alternatively, new organisations were formed out of the existing 
ones. This can be seen across components, although most commonly amongst the radical component as 
they gained a larger voice in Israeli peace activism. According to Tarrow (2011:190), early risers in a cycle 
of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ pƌoǀide ͚iŶĐeŶtiǀes foƌ Ŷeǁ ŵoǀeŵeŶt organisations to ďe Đƌeated͛, which is a process 
that can be identified in the formalisation of groups in the radical and human rights components of 
Israeli peace activism. A number of such cases can be identified in this phase.  
Ta͛ayush was the first group to play this mobilising role, acting as a launch pad for other organisations. 
According to Bdeir and Halevi (2002), following the outbreak of the second Intifada, ͚ǁilliŶglǇ oƌ Ŷot, 
Ta͛ayush became central in the mobilisation of activists for the struggle against the occupation and for 
Điǀil eƋualitǇ iŶ Isƌael͛ aŶd ͚ďeĐaŵe a sĐhool foƌ aĐtiǀists͛, highlighted ďǇ the iŶflueŶĐe it has had oŶ 
emerging groups. Some of the newer groups established in the mid to late 2000s were developed from 
Ta͛ayush. For example, it was explained to the author that Anarchistim Neged haGader was developed 
during a Ta͛ayush action (Baum, 2013), shifting the attention of direct action onto the separation barrier. 
Tarabut-Hithabrut was also formed by key members of Ta͛ayush who, following the second Lebanon war 
iŶ ϮϬϬϲ, felt that ͚aĐtiǀisŵ ƌeƋuiƌed a ďƌoadeƌ ǀisioŶ͛ aŶd theƌefoƌe aiŵed to pƌoǀide a ŵoƌe ĐoŶĐƌete 
political movement out of the goals and actions of Ta͛ayush (Tarabut-Hithabrut, 2009). 
The School for Peace at the village of Neve Shalom Wahat al Salam is a further example of a movement 
school. It has consistently trained peace activists, some of whom have gone on to found their own 
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organisations or become leading individuals in anti-occupation activities in the radical and human rights 
components. Examples include human rights lawyer Michael Sfard, who co-founded Yesh Din, and 
founder of Zochrot, Eitan Bronstein Aparicio, which is why founding member of the School, Nava 
Sonnenschein, told the author that she has been focusing on training individuals who have the potential 
to ďeĐoŵe ͚ageŶts foƌ ĐhaŶge͛ ;“oŶŶeŶsĐheiŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
Some organisations also provide entry points for new individuals to participate in peace activism. 
Shovrim Shtika, in particular, provided an entry point for a younger generation of activists, particularly 
those who had recently served their military duty. A central activist in the Sheikh Jarrah protests 
explained to the author that he began his activist journey in a tour of Hebron with Shovrim Shtika, and 
then became active in Ta͛ayush, which led him to the struggle in Sheikh Jarrah (Benninga, 2013). Sheikh 
Jarrah also became a mobilisation site for previously immobilised activists, partly due to its location as 
aŶ ͚iŶ-between space, not Israel proper, not as inaccessible or frightening as the West BaŶk͛ ;GoƌeŶďeƌg, 
2010). Some of the newly mobilised activists gained more confidence to then join the demonstrations 
against the separation barrier or looked for other organisations to become more permanent members 
of, such as Lochamim l͛Shalom. One recently mobilised activist described to the author his journey 
starting from the Sheikh Jarrah protests, 
͚I ǁas Ŷot really involved, and then when Sheikh Jarrah started, I went to take photos 
and saw the injustice there and started getting involved. When you find out what is 
really happening, you have to get involved. I then went to a few demos in Bil͛in and Al-
Ma͛asara. At first I was scared. I started with a smaller demonstration but then you 
realise that it is not as bad and you can avoid the tear gas if you stay at the back and 
walk away when things start heating up. I then decided to join the Bethlehem-
Jerusalem branch of LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ͛ (Oren, 2013). 
One consequence of the process whereby activists move between organisations or set up new 
organisations with a different specialisation is that there tends to be a cross-over of activists. This helps 
to create a sense of community (Vardi, 2013) but, the relatively large number of groups (Appendix 1) 
compared to the number of regular activists, means that numbers tend to remain small at each activity, 
as the activists spread themselves across the organisations and activities.
49
   
2.2 FORMAL MOVEMENT STRUCTURES:  COALITIONS - INCREASING POLARISATION OF 
COMPONENTS 
Both free-standing protest committees that link different mobilisation structures together for a 
temporary campaign and ad-hoc coalitions that have formed around specific longer-term issues had 
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 Reports and interviews, not including the annual Rabin memorials, place the maximum number of 
activists at an event organised by the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism in 
this phase at 5,000 (Baum, 2013; Gutwick, 2013; Wagner, 2013; Omer-Mann, 2011; Shabi, 2010; 
Foldesh, 2002). 
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been part of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism in the previous phase and particularly 
began to emerge in the late 1990s however, in this phase they were strengthened, with more enduring 
coalitions forming, particularly in the radical and human rights components, which are connected on a 
more regular basis. The collective action frames of the liberal Zionist component were too removed 
from that of the radical and human rights components meaning that they have not joined these 
coalitions. This differs significantly from the previous phases where it was the liberal Zionist component 
that acted as a rallying point for all the other groups. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Taƌƌoǁ, Leǀi aŶd MuƌphǇ, ĐoalitioŶs aƌe ͚Đollaďoƌatiǀe, ŵeaŶs-orientated arrangements 
that peƌŵit distiŶĐt oƌgaŶisatioŶ eŶtities to pool ƌesouƌĐes aŶd effeĐt ĐhaŶge͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, Leǀi aŶd MuƌphǇ 
in Tarrow, 2011:191).
50
 The greater presence and deepening of coalitions in this phase conforms to 
soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt theoƌǇ, ǁheƌeďǇ ĐoalitioŶs foƌŵ iŶ ĐǇĐles of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ ǁheŶ ͚Ŷeǁ issues aƌe suddeŶlǇ 
placed on the agenda, old social movement organisations have become set in their ways, and new ones 
aƌe still iŶ the pƌoĐess of foƌŵatioŶ͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϵϮͿ, as has ďeeŶ the Đase foƌ Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ 
in the period since the second Intifada. 
Jerusalem has emerged as a prominent location for organisations to work together in confronting 
certain issues by forming protest campaign committees, although in reality less formal that the term 
suggests. For example, Silwan, a Palestinian neighbourhood in East Jerusalem, which is where the City of 
David is located, became an issue and site for coordination of a number of groups and organisations 
from both the radical and human rights components in the past few years. Ir Amin and Emek Shaveh 
have been working together to form a master plan for the old city in Silwan and sometimes run joint 
tours (Tatarsky, 2013). Solidariut (Solidarity), ‘aďaŶiŵ l͛MaaŶ ZĐhuyot haAdaŵ and ICHAD have also 
been active in Silwan. The situation in Sheikh Jarrah, as described in Chapter 4, also created an 
opportunity for different groups to mobilise together. 
Enduring coalitions, in which different groups, mainly from the radical and human rights components, 
have joined together for re-occurring or continuous campaigns are a significant feature in this phase. 
Two notable examples are the Olive Harvest Coalition and the Coalition Against the Siege and War in 
Gaza. The Olive Harvest Coalition begun in 2002, when a group of Israeli and international organisations 
and groups assisted with the Palestinian harvest of olives, which was being threatened by the actions of 
Jewish settlers. The activity has become a tradition amongst the radical and human rights groups, which 
join together each year for this harvest, both veteran groups, such as Gush Shalom and newly 
established ones since the second Intifada, such as Machsom Watch.
51
 The Coalition Against the Siege 
and War in Gaza was first formed in 2006 with 16 left-wing organisations and was initiated by the 
Koalitiziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ, which organised a range of events in response to Israeli violence in the Gaza 
Strip.
52
 In 2008 it expanded in response to Operation Cast Lead to 28 left-wing organisations, including 
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 See Tarrow (2011:191-192) for a theoretical outline of coalition formation in social movements.  
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 See for example an Olive Harvest Call to Action (The Olive Harvest Coalition, 2008),  
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 See for Coalition Against the Siege on Gaza (2006) for a Campaign overview. 
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organisations that are not normally associated directly with peace activism, such as HaKeshet 
HaDemocratit HaMizrachit (The Democratic Mizrachi Rainbow). 
A core group of organisations and individuals involved in these and other coalitions began to emerge. It 
was explained to the author that they, unofficially and mockingly, referred to themselves as the 
͚CoalitioŶ of CoalitioŶs͛, to denote a regulaƌ ĐoalitioŶ that ǁould ďe ͚foƌŵed, disďaŶded aŶd ƌe-formed 
tiŵe aŶd tiŵe agaiŶ…at alŵost eǀeƌǇ Ǉeaƌ͛s aŶŶiǀeƌsaƌǇ of the oĐĐupatioŶ, haƌǀest seasoŶ, aĐtioŶs 
agaiŶst the “eĐoŶd LeďaŶoŶ Waƌ, ŵilitaƌǇ opeƌatioŶs iŶ Gaza aŶd ŵoƌe͛ ;Mataƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. This Đoalition 
strengthened around the struggle against the security barrier and built regular contacts so that when 
they needed support or wanted to organise an action, they would form a meeting of all those people 
(Matar, 2013).  
Whilst there are difficulties in coordination amongst the groups, due to nuances in their framing and 
tactical repertoires, which continually cause divisions as new issues arise (Tzidikiahu, 2013), the 
enduring coalitions that developed in this phase point towards the formation of a social movement 
community.
 AĐĐoƌdiŶg to BueĐhleƌ ;ϭϵϵϬ:ϰϮͿ, a “MC is ŵade up of, ͚iŶfoƌŵal Ŷetǁoƌks of politiĐised 
iŶdiǀiduals ǁith fluid ďouŶdaƌies, fleǆiďle leadeƌship stƌuĐtuƌes, aŶd ŵalleaďle diǀisioŶs of laďouƌ.͛ At 
this stage, the divisions of activists and activities is more formally split between different SMOs and the 
boundaries less fluid but, the movement of activists between the groups and the situation whereby 
different groups take charge for different campaigns point towards the development of a social 
movement community and has been described similarly by a number of activists (Benninga, 2013; Vardi, 
2013). 
A coalition of liberal Zionist, and some human rights organisations, came together to form the Forum 
Irgunei haShalom. One of the defining features that differentiated this forum from the coalitions of the 
radical and human rights components is that is it centred on discussion rather than the action that 
characterises the coordination amongst the radical and human rights components. According to their 
oƌigiŶal ŵissioŶ stateŵeŶt, ͚the Foƌuŵ Đƌeates a Ŷetǁoƌk to eŶaďle oƌgaŶisatioŶs to shaƌe aŶd deǀelop 
skills needed in a changing political environment, providing them with greater means of communication 
aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ floǁ͛ ;The CeŶtƌe foƌ Neaƌ East Policy Research, [no date]), and according to an 
iŶteƌǀieǁ ǁith its EǆeĐutiǀe DiƌeĐtoƌ, ͚is Ŷot aŶ aĐtiǀist oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ ;FiŶkel, ϮϬϭϯͿ. It ǁas the idea of the 
former Director of the Merkaz Peres l͛Shaloŵ, Ron Pundak, and was officially formed in 2006. Whilst 
there is no overt coordination of the members of the Forum in organising activities, its success lies in the 
kŶoǁledge that the oƌgaŶisatioŶs haǀe ͚soŵe soƌt of safetǇ Ŷet aŶd that people dealiŶg ǁith the saŵe 
problems that they do can discuss, exchaŶge ideas aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐes͛ ;FiŶkel, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
The use of ĐoalitioŶs aŵoŶgst the ƌadiĐal aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights ĐoŵpoŶeŶts puts iŶto ƋuestioŶ the ͚ƌadiĐal 
flaŶk effeĐt͛ ;McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:162), which argues that the moderate groups of a social 
movement tend to join forces in order to distance themselves from the radical wing. In the Israeli case it 
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is the radical groups that have joined forces to distance and distinguish themselves from the liberal 
Zionist groups. 
2.3 INFORMAL MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: DISSIDENTS FROM THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT MOVE 
TO THE RADICALS 
In addition to SMOs, informal networks have been important mobilisation structures for Israeli 
peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ. ͚AĐtiǀist Ŷetǁoƌks͛ aƌe Ŷetǁoƌks of iŶdiǀiduals ǁho aƌe ĐoŶŶeĐted due to theiƌ previous 
involvement in movement activism and have been particularly significant in this phase of Israeli peace 
activism. Activists who had been affiliated with the liberal Zionist component, particularly Shalom 
Achshav, prior to the second Intifada, joined the community of activists that formed the radical and 
human rights components in this phase, due to their disappointment at the hesitancy of the liberal 
Zionist ĐoŵpoŶeŶt iŶ ŵoďilisiŶg agaiŶst the Isƌaeli goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ƌespoŶse to the Intifada and their 
further moderation away from publicly declaring support for the Palestinians. This occurred in the 
previous phases with individuals leaving Shalom Achshav to set up organisations that were more 
relevant, with B͛Tseleŵ a prominent example. In this phase, a leading member of Shalom Achshav 
mentioned to the author that, in particular, the activists of LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ were from the remnants 
of Shalom Achshav, ǁho she desĐƌiďes as ͚ouƌ people…theǇ ǁeƌe iŶ the ŵoǀeŵeŶt oƌ left the 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt…ouƌ hiŶteƌlaŶd͛ ;GolaŶ, 2013). 
Some younger individuals who grew up in Meretz or Avoda youth movements explained to the author 
that they also defected to the radical component, having become radicalised by the second Intifada. 
They became active in groups such as Ta͛ayush and Anarchistim Neged HaGader (Neiman, 2013; 
Rothschild, 2013; Vardi, 2013). Youth movements are an example of one of a number of entry points 
into Israeli peace activism for the younger generation. 
2.4 INFORMAL NON MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: NETWORKS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
Informal networks that are not already part of the Israeli peace movement have also always 
been a significant mobilisation structure for Israeli peace activism, as is commonly found in social 
movement mobilisation (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980 in MĐCaƌthǇ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϰϮͿ.TheǇ aƌe ͚the 
basic structures of everyday life͛ ;MĐCaƌthǇ, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϰϮͿ. IŶ the Đase of Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ iŶfoƌŵal 
networks of friends, families and work colleagues have continued to play a central role in the 
mobilisation of activists, particularly amongst the more marginalised groups in the radical component. 
This was notable in Ta͛ayush activities, with key activists recruited through family or works ties (Vardi, 
2013). Often the activities of the humanitarian groups do not actually require large numbers and 
sometimes only one or two people. Therefore, it is often a case of a friend brings a friend. As explained 
to the author, Adaŵ l͛lo Gǀulot sends a driver to pick up Palestinians from a check point and take them 
to an Israeli hospital or visits patients in hospital (Lester, 2013) and Machsom Watch sends two or three 
women to each checkpoint twice a day to monitor them (Linder, 2013). Whilst a significant pool of 
activists would reduce the amount of time and effort the individuals had to put into their activism, if 
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there are too many people wanting to help there may not be enough activities for them to be involved 
in. As explained to the author, often it is a significant amount of work to coordinate volunteers and the 
organisations do not have the resources for this (Lester, 2013; Linder, 2013). 
Furthermore, given the sensitivity around certain actions and the marginalisation of the collective action 
frames of Israeli peace activism, word of mouth through the familiar, informal networks are the most 
common way to mobilise individuals amongst the radical and human rights components. Shovrim Shtika 
works by asking those who give testimonies whether they can recommend a friend or asking those who 
go on a tour whether they would like to give a testimony (Gavryahu, 2013). Dialogue groups also use 
word of mouth amongst informal networks because, as explained to the author, despite the activity not 
causing risk to the participants, there is a stigma attached to those who are involved in dialogue 
activities due to issues of normalisation, which can be particularly threatening for the Palestinians 
engaged in the activity (Fuchs, 2013).  
For some groups in the radical component, the high level of personal risk of the tactics employed meant 
that little attention was given to active recruitment. According to an activist from Anarchistim Neged 
haGader, ͚ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ ŵoďilise, ǁe do Ŷot eǀeƌ ƌeĐƌuit, paƌtlǇ out of ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ ďeĐause theiƌ liǀes 
are at risk and I would not want to invite someone to ƌisk theiƌ liǀes͛ ;“Ŷitz, ϮϬϭϯa). Therefore, numbers 
remain small and limited to informal connections. 
2.5 NON MOVEMENT MOVEMENTS: INTRODUCING OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Although Ŷot iŶĐluded iŶ MĐCaƌthǇ͛s ŵappiŶg of diffeƌeŶt ŵoďilisatioŶ stƌuĐtuƌes, soĐial 
movements from outside the peace camp have also played a role as mobilising structures for Israeli 
peace activism. One activist explained in an interview with the author that his education in activism 
came from the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender (LGBT) movement before he was awakened by the 
second Intifada to the need to challenge the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Yonay, 2013). A shared message 
can be identified with the foundation of Kvisa Shchora (Black Laundry) in 2001, which represented an 
alignment in ideologies of a component of the LGBT movement and the anti-occupation movement 
(Baum, 2006). There have not been similar shared messages with other social movements since activists 
tend to cross over to the different movements rather than the movements developing a shared 
platform. For example, the social justice movement in Israel did not created an alignment in framing 
with the peace or anti-occupation groups. There are however activists who are involved across causes 
(Rothschild, 2013), with the potential to introduce other activists to Israeli peace activism and therefore 
other movements play a role as a mobilisation structure for Israeli peace activism. 
2.6 INTERNATIONAL MOBILISATION STRUCTURES  
The international community has also become an important mobilisation structure in this phase 
and in some cases international groups and organisations are prioritised over targeting the Israeli public. 
IŶ the pƌeǀious phases the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ plaǇed a pƌiŵaƌilǇ fuŶdƌaisiŶg ƌole, ǁith ͚FƌieŶds͛ 
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groups of certain organisations set up abroad to raise necessary funds for the groups based in Israel. 
Examples include American Friends of Peace Now and Oasis of Peace UK, which supports Neve Shalom 
Wahat al Salam. In this phase the role of the international community goes beyond funding; it acts as a 
target for Israeli peace activists to mobilise and an international voice for their cause.  
The liberal Zionist component and parts of the human rights component continue to try to mobilise the 
Jewish Diaspora since, as one activist explained, there is a general belief amongst Diaspora Jews that 
͚ǁhateǀeƌ happeŶs to Isƌael affeĐts ouƌ liǀes ďeĐause ǁe aƌe Jeǁish aŶd it affeĐts ouƌ politiĐs͛ ;Patiƌ, 
2013). Interviews between the author and some groups confirmed their international focus. Shovrim 
Shtika dedicates 20-25% of their work to influencing the international community, disseminating 
information and conducting speaking tours (Gavryahu, 2013) and Kol Ehad send Israelis and Palestinians 
to speak abroad, to try to build a message of peace (Peretz, 2013). In recent years a new dynamic 
between the Jewish diaspora and Israel has emerged. Independent groups with progressive views 
towards Israel have been set up in the diaspora, such as JStreet in the US and Yachad (Together) in the 
UK, to try to shift the conversation between Israelis and Diaspora Jews towards a re-assessment of what 
it ŵeaŶs to ďe ͚pƌo-Isƌael͛ ;Patiƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. Theƌe is theƌefoƌe a ŵutual ŵoďilisatioŶ ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ 
the progressive Jewish groups in the diaspora and the activist groups in Israel.  
The radical component tends to be linked with transnational social movements, namely the anti-
globalisation movement, the Palestinian Solidarity movement and the international Boycott, Divestment, 
Sanctions movement. There are also close ties to the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), who are 
most notable for activism against the separation barrier.
53
 For those in the radical component, who have 
given up on mobilising the Israeli public, the international mobilising structures have become a key 
target to attract. Anarchistim Neged HaGader is in particular connected to these movements and, as 
explained to the author, believes that theǇ ͚aƌe ŵoƌe aŶ eǆteŶsioŶ of the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ŵoǀeŵeŶt iŶ 
Israel than an eǆteŶsioŶ of the Isƌaeli ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ;“Ŷitz, ϮϬϭϯa). According to one activist, this dynamic 
materialised with the solidarity work with the Palestinians and led to shifts in collective action frames 
and the tactical repertoire, 
͚ThaŶks to the PalestiŶiaŶs iŶǀiting us [to their protests], suddenly you say, I am 
actually part of a global movement, which I was not before, I was part of an Israeli 
movement. If I am part of a global movement then my audience is very different, 
maybe my audience is not the public at all aŶd ŵǇ tools aƌe diffeƌeŶt͛ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
This further shows the role of other social movements in the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace 
activism. As will be discussed in chapter 7, increasing ties to the international dimension, whilst giving 
Israeli peace activism a new audience, has served to further marginalise it domestically. 
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 See Sandercock (2004) and Seitz (2003) for studies on ISM. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
This diverse range of mobilisation structures confirms the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. 
This fragmentation was also identified in the 2013 European Commission that mapped the entire range 
of civil society organisations, of which Israeli peace activism forms a part. The study confirmed that there 
aƌe a ͚ŵultipliĐitǇ of iŶdiǀidual aĐtoƌs dealiŶg ǁith the saŵe field oƌ suďjeĐt͛ ;EuƌopeaŶ Coŵŵission, 
2013:38), which is similar in the realm of peace activism although, the use of coalitions can help to 
alleviate the potential detrimental aspects of such a dynamic. The next section will identify some 
interesting shifts in the identity composition of the activists involved, encouraged by the shifting map of 
mobilisation structures, as well as the shifting collective action frames. 
3 COMPOSITION  
In Israel, peace activism has always been dominated by the Ashkenazi middle-class (Wolfsfeld, 
1988) and there have been difficulties reaching beyond this. Israeli peace activism is often considered to 
be an elitist group, dominated by educated individuals who have both the time and disposable income 
to be part of the activities (Wolfsfeld, 1988). This creates an exclusive nature that can hinder the 
mobilisation of a wider spectrum of participants (Hermann, 2009; Shadmi, 2000; Newman and 
Hermann, 1992). The composition of Israel peace activism continues to be a majority of Ashkenazi, 
educated, middle-class individuals, many of whom are immigrants to Israel from North America or have 
experience living and working in foreign countries. Although there has not been a significant change in 
the composition of Israeli peace activism since its early stages, in this phase there have been greater 
attempts on the part of the radical activists to mobilise different sectors of Israeli society, in order to 
increase the diversity in the socio-demographic characteristics of the activists. 
3.1. THE RADICALS ATTRACTING MARGINAL GROUPS IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 
Given the framing shift of the radical component to Palestinian solidarity and co-resistance, as 
well as a foĐus oŶ ͚all foƌŵs of oppƌessioŶ͛, the mobilisation structures available to this component have 
expanded to include groups that had been previously marginalised from Israeli peace activism. Two 
main shifts towards the mobilisation of marginalised communities can be identified. Firstly, there has 
been a focus on mobilising the more marginalised members of the Jewish Israeli population, such as the 
lower socio-economic sector of the Mizrachi community, whose social mobility remains low as an 
outcome of the way in which they were absorbed into Israeli society, despite a proportion of the 
Mizrachi community improving their socio-economic status and achieving high positions in Israeli 
institutions
54
 and secondly, an increased ability for Arab citizens of Israel to join in with the activities. 
Whilst these mobilising structures have become more accessible, there is still not a pronounced 
membership from these communities.  
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 See Tzfadia and Yiftachel (2004) for a study of the continuing periphery of Mizrachim and Chetrit 
(2000) for a history of the increasing influence of Mizrachim, particularly in the political sphere. 
 137 
 
 
Difficulties in mobilising the Mizrachi community to Israeli peace activism are in part due to the 
traditional relationship between the Mizrachim and Ashkenazim. The state was founded by mainly 
middle class Ashkenazim from Eastern Europe. For the first few decades of the state, they held the 
powerful positions in the government, in the military and in society as a whole. Jewish immigrants from 
Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s became marginalised sectors of society, representing the lower 
classes. They were opposed to globalisation and the peace process as they believed it would lead to 
further socioeconomic inequalities and further perpetuated the view that the Ashkenazi peace camp 
ǁas the ͚soĐietal adǀeƌsaƌies͛ of the Mizrachim (Levy, 2007). 
The Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ has actively tried to attract Mizrachi Jews, mainly through the Mizrachi 
feminist movement (Baum, 2013) and their links to Isha l͛Isha (Woman to Woman), a feminist group 
active in Haifa. However, the effectiveness has been limited. This can be attributed in part to the 
damage that was created in the phase, ͚the ďiƌth aŶd ĐoŵiŶg of age of the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ where, as 
explained to the author, there was a dismissal on behalf of Israeli peace activism, even the radical 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶt, of ͚otheƌ issues of oppƌessioŶ eǆĐept the oĐĐupatioŶ͛ ;Dak, ϮϬϭϯͿ, theƌeďǇ igŶoƌiŶg the 
plight of the Mizrachi community in Israel. The fall out has been a feeling of alienation amongst Mizrachi 
individuals who want to become involved in peace activism. The following has been discovered in a 
recent study of currently active Mizrachi peace activists, 
͚The fiŶdiŶgs iŶdiĐated diffeƌeŶt leǀels of alieŶatioŶ, soŵe ǀeƌǇ high, oŶ paƌt of the 
Mizrachi participants towards the Ashkenazi participants in the same activities. Most of 
the participants expressed feelings of being in the minority, not only numerically but 
also emotionally and cognitively. They felt like an unwanted minority and in some cases 
even sensed antagonism from the Ashkenazi members of the same activities. Some of 
the interviewees expressed extreme hostility to the point of refusing to participate in 
activism events and dialogue meetings with Palestinians along with Ashkenazim and 
chose to attend separate Mizrachi activities and organisations. On the other hand, 
those same participants expressed affinity, identification and a sense of comfort with 
the PalestiŶiaŶs͛ ;HazaŶ, ϮϬϭϯa:4). 
Netta Hazan is herself an active Mizrachi member of LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ and other peace groups and 
explained to the author that when she began becoming active she was naturally drawn to the Palestinian 
activists, since she shared a language and culture with them. However, overtime, she has become more 
comfortable with her Ashkenazi counterparts (Hazan, 2013b). 
Tarabut-Hithabrut has been making a conscious effort to deal with these issues and to mobilise and 
empower activists from marginalised communities in Israel. At an event organised by the group, an 
aĐtiǀist eǆplaiŶed to the authoƌ that, ͚the left wing never counted the working classes as a group they 
should ďe addƌessiŶg͛ ;AŶoŶǇŵous, A., 2013). Therefore they try to work on the basis whereby,  
 138 
 
 
͚We doŶ͛t put ďaƌƌieƌs oƌ ŵake tests foƌ aŶǇoŶe, espeĐiallǇ Ŷot oppƌessed people ďeĐause 
our view is that they should free themselves and that is the basic principle, that they 
should present themselves and free themselves, they are not just victims, they are 
stƌuggliŶg togetheƌ͛ ;Ball, ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
By acknowledging all forms of oppression and connecting them, Tarabut-Hithabrut has enabled an 
expansion of their mobilising structures, creating the opportunity for those from the lower socio-
economic classes to become activists in the broader struggle against oppression, which includes the 
Palestinian struggle. 
The framing shift of the radical left towards Palestinian solidarity and co-resistance has also created an 
opportunity for Arab citizens of Israel to become active in some of these organisations. In the liberal 
Zionist component of Israeli peace activism in the pƌeǀious phases, it has ďeeŶ aƌgued that, ͚theƌe ǁas 
no place for self-ƌespeĐtiŶg Aƌaďs͛ ;KaŵiŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ, aŶd aƌguaďlǇ ƌeŵaiŶs tƌue of the liberal Zionist 
component, due to the lack of attention to Palestinian needs and history. The frame transformation of 
the radical left however has enabled Arab citizens of Israel to become active in grassroots groups such 
as Ta͛ayush and the Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ. 
3.2 THE RETURN OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION ACROSS COMPONENTS 
This phase saw the increased involvement of younger activists, aged in their twenties and 
thirties, across components, through student groups, the graduation of individuals from the liberal 
Zionist youth movements and the excitement brought by the shifting tactical repertoires. Hermann 
(2002) explains that there was a lack of involvement of the younger generation in peace activism in the 
phase, ͚iŶdiǀidual atteŵpts at peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ͛. She argues that the creation of Shalom Achshav in 1978 
mobilised the younger generation, who had not been previously attracted to Israeli peace activism. 
However, over the next two decades, as the age of the activists increased, fewer younger members 
joiŶed aŶd the ͚ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s Ǉouthful iŵage gƌaduallǇ eƌoded aŶd it Đaŵe to ďe ǀieǁed as ŵiddle-aged 
aŶd aŶaĐhƌoŶistiĐ͛ ;Hermann, 2002:117). Youth movements were set up in an attempt to mobilise the 
younger generation. Hermann notes however that, ͚theiƌ pƌeseŶĐe appaƌeŶtlǇ had little effeĐt oŶ the 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s ageŶda, aĐtiǀities, aŶd iŵage͛ ;HeƌŵaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϮ:ϭϭϳͿ. This iŶaďilitǇ to change the liberal 
Zionist movement from within, along with the events surrounding the second Intifada, provides an 
explanation for why the younger members were attracted to the radical and human rights components. 
The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 was also a factor in mobilising young people, creating a group 
kŶoǁŶ as the ͚ĐhildƌeŶ of the ĐaŶdles,͛ ǁho ǁeƌe aĐtiǀe iŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶs suĐh as Dor Shalom (Peace 
Generation) (Lev-Ari, 2002) and later Kol Echad, which focuses on mobilising student support for a two-
state solution. 
The younger generation have not only become members of activists groups and organisations but have 
also iŶitiated aŶd led theiƌ oǁŶ aĐtioŶs. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to oŶe aĐtiǀist, ͚ǁe ĐaŶŶot ǁait aŶd eǆpeĐt that 
someone would come and lead the ǇouŶgeƌ geŶeƌatioŶ…so ǁe haǀe to get up aŶd staƌt stƌuggliŶg aŶd 
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Đƌeate iŶ Isƌael a diffeƌeŶt foƌĐe͛ ;BeŶ “assoŶ iŶ GaƌĐia-Navarro, 2010). Ben Sasson was referring to the 
demonstrations that emerged around East Jerusalem in 2010, such as in Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan. 
Pƌofessoƌ Joel BeiŶiŶ, ǁho has ďeeŶ aŶ aĐtiǀist iŶ Isƌael aŶd has ƌeseaƌĐhed ͚high-ƌisk aĐtiǀisŵ͛ iŶ the 
West Bank (Beinin, 2014), made the following observation on the situation in Silwan,  
 ͚…the ǇouŶg oƌgaŶiseƌs [of the “ilǁaŶ deŵoŶstƌations] are not concerned with 
ideologǇ as suĐh. “oŵe Đall theŵselǀes )ioŶist; soŵe do Ŷot…As suĐh, the Ŷeǁ 
protest generation has a very different social make-up than the mostly older and 
ƌesolutelǇ seĐulaƌist ͚left )ioŶists͛ of PeaĐe Noǁ, the ŶeaƌlǇ defuŶct Meretz party 
and the Labour party. The protests are animated by social networks that have been 
foƌŵed oǀeƌ the last deĐade iŶ stƌuggles agaiŶst Isƌaeli͛s sepaƌatioŶ ďaƌƌieƌ aŶd 
effoƌts to pƌoteĐt the PalestiŶiaŶs of the south HeďƌoŶ hills͛ ;BeiŶiŶ, ϮϬϭϬ:6). 
The difference of the younger activists in this phase is their level of commitment to their cause. This is 
particularly pronounced for members of Anarchistim Neged HaGader, ǁheƌeďǇ ͚oŶe Ŷo loŶgeƌ Đoŵes to 
a demonstration and goes home; rather, the protest peŶetƌates the lifestǇle of the aĐtiǀists͛ ;Leǀ-Ari, 
2002). 
Daǀid NeǁŵaŶ ǁƌote iŶ ϮϬϬϮ iŶ his aŶalǇsis of the ͚falliŶg apaƌt of the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ that, ͚theƌe is a 
need for new, young leadership by people whose lives will be affected by what happens in the next 30 
Ǉeaƌs.͛ He ŵeŶtioŶs that oŶe gliŵŵeƌ of hope ǁas the ĐƌeatioŶ of Ta͛ayush, which has proven to be a 
significant entry point for a number of activists in this phase; opening the doors for the mobilisation of 
younger people.  
Within the mobilisation of the younger generation has been a shifting dynamic in the religious nature of 
peace activism. In previous phases, those espousing a particular religious dimension to their peace 
activism created organisations based around that focus. Examples include Oz ǀ͛Shaloŵ (Strength and 
Peace) and ‘aďaŶiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ ZĐhuyot haAdaŵ (Rabbis for Human Rights). In this phase however, rather 
than creating separate religiously orientated peace and human rights organisations, religious individuals 
have become involved in peace activism alongside those individuals who may see themselves as secular 
oƌ aĐƌoss a speĐtƌuŵ of ƌeligiositǇ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to BeŶ “assoŶ, ͚todaǇ theƌe is Ŷot a ƌeligious left, ďut 
ƌeligious leftists͛ ;“assoŶ iŶ FuƌsteŶďuƌg, ϮϬϭϭͿ. The ĐoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶ of the religious activists has been 
seen most clearly in the Sheikh Jarrah protests. A religious activist who was involved in founding Shovrim 
Shtika explains that his presence at the Sheikh Jarrah protests, alongside a variety of activists, was a ͚full 
and supƌeŵe ƌealisatioŶ of [his] ƌeligious eǆisteŶĐe͛ ;MaŶekiŶ iŶ HassoŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ. The ŵiǆiŶg of ƌeligious 
and secular peace activists is arguably a combination of the liberal and secular renewed interest in 
Jewish learning and the conscious focus on values of human rights by the progressive Orthodox 
communities (Furstenbug, 2011). This further highlights the expanding mobilisation structures of the 
radical and the human rights components that suggest greater inclusivity than in previous phases of 
Israeli peace activism.  
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4 MOBILISATION BEYOND PEOPLE: FUNDING 
Funding is a core concern for not-for-profit organisations and activists groups, especially the 
availability of funds and the potential restraints that external funding may bring (Edwards and 
McCarthy, 2007). Whilst it is difficult to get a full detailed picture of the funding trends and amounts for 
Israeli peace activism, since there is not complete information regarding all funding sources for all the 
groups, it is possible to build a basic picture. According to the European Commission 2013 report on 
Israeli civil society organisations, funds come from three main areas: government sources, self-
generated income and philanthropy (European Commission, 2013). In the case of Israeli peace activism, 
international government sources and philanthropy account for the large majority of funding; national 
funding and self-generated income is low. Three interesting trends can be identified: firstly, that direct 
foreign government funding has ignored the shifting trajectory of Israeli peace activism and continued 
to fund the more liberal Zionist groups; secondly, the central role played by the New Israel Fund as 
directing funds to the human rights component; and thirdly, the innovative ways in which the smaller 
and more radical groups have attracted funding. 
International government funding agencies tend to focus on peace building, conflict resolution and 
human rights related activities, with often the same small pool of grantees receiving support across the 
donors (European Commission, 2013:55-56). From 1993 to 2000, during the peace process, it was 
estimated that USD 20 - 25 million was given to different people-to-people and conflict resolution 
projects in Israel (Baskin and Al-Qaq, 2004), significantly less than other conflict zones (Herzog and Hai, 
2005). It was only in the late 1990s that larger funds, connected to the provision for civil society 
activities stated in the Declaration of Principles, began to come in from the European Union (EU) and 
United States (Herzog and Hai, 2005). For example in 1998 the EU began an annual EURO 5 – 10 million 
͚PaƌtŶeƌship foƌ PeaĐe Pƌogƌaŵŵe͛55 and the US allocated USD 10 million. Despite the shifting political 
opportunity structures and transforming landscape of peace activism in Israel after 2000, these funds 
continued to go to the liberal Zionist groups and those that existed prior to the second Intifada, such as 
Merkaz Peres l͛Shaloŵ and Hug Horim Shakulim.56 Funding to the radical and human rights 
organisations tends to be distributed from third party bodies in foreign countries, such as the NGO 
Development Centre, whose largest contributors are Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland combined and Trocaire, the overseas development agency of the Catholic Church of Ireland. 
Given the political sensitivity surrounding the Israeli peace organisations and the commitment to 
continue the Oslo peace process by the donors, it is unsurprising that the EU, European countries and 
the US do not directly fund the radical and human rights groups. 
The largest funding body for Israeli peace activism is the New Israel Fund (NIF). They direct funds to a 
broad range of NGOs, including those that come under the heading of ͚Ciǀil aŶd HuŵaŶ ‘ights,͛ of ǁhiĐh 
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 The second annual call for proposals was only given in 2001 due to internal EU scandals (Herzog and 
Hai, 2005:30). 
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 See European Partnership for Peace Programme ([no date]) for list of recipients. 
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the Israeli peace and human rights group form a part.
57
 For example, in 2010 the NIF allocated USD 
5,561,160 across the Civil and Human Rights Organisations (NIF 2010). The NIF receives its funds from 
private donors and foundations, including the Moriah Fund, the Open Society Institute and the Ford 
Foundation. In 2013, the Ford Foundation did not renew its five-year USD 20 million donation to the NIF 
for a third time, which was a significant blow to the funding pool for Israeli peace and human rights 
organisations. According to reports, there was no specific reason for their decision not to renew 
funding, other than the foundation had shifted their priorities (European Commission, 2013:56).  
IŶ additioŶ to theiƌ dƌop iŶ fuŶdiŶg, The Neǁ Isƌael FuŶd ǁas the ǀiĐtiŵ of a ͚delegitiŵisatioŶ͛ 
accusation, with a campaign orchestrated by right-wing organisation, Im Tirtzu (If You Will It), claiming 
that the NIF was responsible for the Goldstone Report and included a personal attack on Naomi Chazan, 
former President of the NIF (Chazan, 2010). There were also objections levelled at the NIF due to the 
͚aŶti-Isƌael͛ gƌoups theǇ puƌpoƌtedlǇ suppoƌt ;The AlgeŵeiŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϰͿ. These ĐƌitiĐisŵs aĐtuallǇ had the 
effect of increasing NIFs support abroad, with a rise in donations (Benhorin, 2010), particularly since the 
NIF is not only a funding body but an important organisation in identifying the eroding of democracy in 
Israeli society and leading the fight against it (Chazan, 2012). Given its role, it also acts as an 
international mobilising structure, mainly for the human rights organisations operating in Israel, 
highlighting again the importance of the international dimension in understanding the trajectory of 
Israeli peace activism. 
There are a number of groups in Israel that are not funded by big international donors. These are often 
the radical groups, which are volunteer-based and do not have professional fundraising teams. Time and 
energy are therefore expended to raise the funds needed to conduct the activities, which makes it 
difficult to maintain consistent levels of activities. One successful fundraising campaign was set up on an 
online fundraising platform, Indiegogo, which succeeded in raising USD 21,000 to buy a truck for central 
Ta͛ayush member, Ezra Nawi, who spends his time travelling throughout the South Hebron Hills 
assisting Palestinians (Snitz, 2013b). Given the humanitarian nature of his work, as well as the increased 
global support for the Palestinian cause, the success of this campaign is not surprising. A common 
method of fundraising for the activists groups is to ask individual supporters to donate through web 
pages
58
 and e-mail newsletters tend to include calls for donations.
59
 In many cases the funds are needed 
to pay for legal costs although, as explained to the author, the lawyers are aware that they may never 
receive payment for their work (Wagner, 2013).  
A number of issues arise from this reliance on external, particularly foreign, funding. Firstly, similar to 
the constraints placed on the organisational structure of Bat Shalom in the 1990s; external funders may 
place limitations, impose political views or require certain targets to be met, which can constrain the 
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 For example in 2009 GBP 361,406 was given to ACRI; GBP 24,688 to Machsom Watch and GBP 96,750 
to Ir Amim (NIF, 2009). 
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 See for example the websites of Anarchistim Neged haGader and Centre for Emerging Futures 
(Appendix 1). 
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 The author is on the mailing list for many of the active groups. 
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autonomy of the activists. +972mag found that most of the funding they attracted were from donors 
who were interested in the political aspects of the website and less so its role as a new media outlet, 
which is the focus they had hoped to gain (Sheizaf, 2013b). This could affect the direction that the 
website will need to take and where the funds are directed. Secondly, in this phase in particular, peace 
and human rights NGOs have been subjected to criticisms and attacks over the source of their funding, 
with a stigma attached to those civil society organisations that receive international funding,
60
 as 
support from international donors is seeŶ iŶ Isƌael as ͚aŶ iŶteƌfeƌeŶĐe iŶ iŶteƌŶal affaiƌs of the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ 
;EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ, ϮϬϭϯ:ϱϰͿ. A ͚FoƌeigŶ FuŶdiŶg Laǁ͛ ;Book of “tatutes, ϮϮϳϵͿ ǁas passed iŶ 
Knesset in March 2011 and requires all NGOs to declare the sources of their funding above NIS 20,000 
from foreign governments or third parties linked to foreign governments. Whilst it promotes 
transparency amongst non-for-profit organisations in Israel, it is a watered down law from a bill that 
proposed limiting the amount of foreign funding that NGOs could receive. 
Whilst investment in Israeli peace and human rights projects continued despite the second Intifada and 
new emerging groups were supported through the New Israel Fund, reliance on international donor 
support and lack of support from local philanthropists (European Commission, 2013:56) has left the 
financial position of Israeli peace groups in a precarious position. Jeff Halper from ICAHD reported in 
ϮϬϭϮ to ďe iŶ ͚fiŶaŶĐial Đollapse͛ due to ͚oǀeƌ depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ a feǁ ŵajoƌ doŶoƌs͛ ;Halper, 2012). As the 
European Commission report (2013) identifies, very few civil society organisations, including the peace 
organisations, have self-generating incomes, making them almost solely reliant on external funding. 
5 IMPLICATIONS  
5.1 THE POLARISATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
The mapping and analysis of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism have further 
demonstrated that Israeli peace activism in this phase is polarised and fragmented. The radical 
component has focused on grassroots activities, based on informal networks, with attempts at 
horizontal organising and a more inclusive atmosphere. The liberal Zionist component on the other hand 
has continued with the process of institutionalisation and professionalization, providing specialisation in 
particular areas. The human rights components has elements of both of these, with the human rights 
organisations showing similarities with the liberal Zionist component and the humanitarian groups more 
closely resembling the radical component. 
Hermann (2009:63) argues that the Israeli peace movement never presented a clear strategy or a single 
narrative and therefore there were always difficulties in the level of cohesion. Whilst this statement is 
an accurate explanation of previous activity, a comparison between pre-2000 and post-2000 activism 
shows that in the past Israeli peace activism was more cohesive, with a clearer common objective than 
we can see in the activities today. Evidence for this can be identified from the fact that there no longer 
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 NGO Monitor is an organisation set up to identify and make public the sources of funding of NGOs and 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 143 
 
 
seems to be one organisation directing a collective agenda. Even though Shalom Achshav is still active, it 
no longer acts as a rallying point for all the groups (Simons, 2013a).  
There has not been an agenda put forward that is suitable for all the groups to rally together under 
(Patir, 2013; Sharon, 2013), even during renewed negotiations, wars, or flare-ups in violence, and 
therefore the groups continue to work on issues specifically relevant to their own agendas and through 
means that they feel most connected to, with coordination only under certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, at times the ideological differences between groups have hindered the potential for 
coordinated activities and have meant that certain groups were not willing to work with others, even 
when there was agreement over the particular issue. For example, Oŵetz l͛Sareǀ were not willing to let 
Profil Hadash protest against the situation in Gaza with them as they did not want to be connected to a 
radical feminist group that supported full army service refusers (Dolev, 2013). The nuances in framing, 
as well as the lack of an umbrella organisation or rallying body, means that unification or long-term 
cooperation is unlikely, even within and across the radical and human rights components. This conforms 
to Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϯϭͿ ͚TǇƌaŶŶǇ of DeĐeŶtƌalisatioŶ,͛ ǁheƌeďǇ aĐtiǀist-based organisations or 
ŵoǀeŵeŶts, ǁheƌe iŶflueŶĐe is deĐeŶtƌalised aŶd aĐtiǀists hold autoŶoŵǇ, teŶds to ƌesult iŶ a ͚laĐk of 
coordination and continuity.͛ 
In addition to fragmentation in Israeli peace activism caused by differences between the collective 
action frames and tactical repertoires of the components, the shift in the Israeli economy from a welfare 
state to a neo-liberal economy provides a further explanation for the increase in fragmentation. In 1985 
Israel implemented the Economic Stabilisation Program to combat its economic crisis. This marked a 
significant change from deep government intervention in the economy to one based on market forces 
(Ben-Bassat, 2002:1). A neo-liberalist economy leads to an increase in disintegration and exclusion 
compared to the welfare state, which encourages social cohesion (MacGregor, 1999:92). Furthermore, 
the cutting back of the public sector means a greater role for and intensification of community based 
and non-governmental organisations (Marteu 2009). This can account for the variety of groups dealing 
with issues on the ground and also the move towards a social movement community in the radical 
component. 
There has been an attempt to reduce some of the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism and pool 
resources from a number of small groups through the coalitions. However, these also contribute to the 
polarisation of Israeli peace activism. The increased coordination amongst the radical component, with 
some groups from the human rights component, is pointing towards the development of a social 
movement community, whilst the liberal Zionist component is not included, due to fundamental 
differences in their collective action frames and tactical repertoires. This contrasts to previous phases of 
peace activism where the radical groups were invited to rallies organised by the liberal Zionist activists, 
highlighting the clear shift in this phase.  
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5.2 THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
It can be argued that given the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism, the small numbers of 
active individuals and the lack of support within Israel, at best, advocates abroad have become essential 
to Israeli peace activisŵ ǁith oŶe ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌ statiŶg that, ͚theǇ [Isƌaeli aĐtiǀists] despeƌatelǇ Ŷeed 
allies aďƌoad ǁho ďelieǀe iŶ theiƌ goals, aŶd ĐaŶ help defiŶe aŶd adǀaŶĐe theiƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ;ChaŶdleƌ, 
2011). The international community are acting as a mobilisation structure for Israeli peace activists, 
whilst the Israeli public cannot be mobilised.  
However, the consequence of greater connection to the international community has been further 
marginalisation of peace activism in Israel, as the Israeli public and authorities tend to be wary and 
critical of ties with the international community, particularly in the NGO sector. The empirical and 
theoretical implications of this new dynamic will be further explored in the following chapter, which 
brings together the four powers of movement through a focus on the political opportunity structures 
and cycles of contention. 
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CHAPTER 7  
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: THREE CYCLES OF CONTENTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the overall transformations in Israeli peace activism since the second 
Intifada, which point towards the emergence of a new cycle of contention. A cycle of contention is 
defined as, 
 ͚A phase of heighteŶed ĐoŶfliĐt aĐƌoss the soĐial sǇsteŵ, ǁith ƌapid diffusioŶ of 
collective action from more mobilised to less mobilised sectors, a rapid pace of 
innovation in the forms of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed 
collective action frames, a combination of organised and unorganised participation, 
and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and 
authoƌities͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϵϵͿ  
Whilst the trajectory of Israeli peace activism does not conform to all of the elements of this definition, 
such as the intensity and size of contention, there are a number of elements that have been 
demonstrated, such as transformed collective action frames and innovative repertoires of contention, 
highlighting a new wave of activism. Significant in the case of Israeli peace activism is that different 
cycles can be identified in the three different components of activism. This suggests an extension of the 
theory of cycles of contention, whereby there may be more than one cycle of contention occurring 
simultaneously for different parts of a social movement. In the Israeli case the liberal Zionist component 
continued to demobilise, encouraged by the attribution of threat to mobilisation to the prevailing 
realities; the mechanisms of facilitation, whereby some of the claims of the social movement are 
satisfied by the government (Tarrow, 2011:190) and exhaustion, whereby, in response to prevailing 
ƌealities, ͚people ǁeaƌied of life iŶ the stƌeets͛; along with shifts in their target audience away from the 
ideas they were promoting. The radical component went through a process of radicalisation, which led 
to the attribution of opportunities to the prevailing realities, creating a spiral of opportunities for 
mobilisation. This led to the development of innovative collection action through different mobilisation 
structures. The human rights component continued along their previous cycle, alongside a process of 
externalisation, whereby domestic actors seek to influence external actors, which has brought them 
closer to the international arena.  
In order to identify and explain the cycles of contention, an analysis of how the powers of movement 
interact with each other must be given. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) note that the powers of 
movement do not act in isolation of each other but interact through different relationships that help 
explain the emergence, trajectory and impact of a movement. They note that there are many 
relationships that exist between the powers of movement and the relevance of these depends on the 
questions being asked. This chapter will focus on how Israeli peace activism has transformed and its 
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ongoing development, including barriers to mobilisation and influence, as well as the impact that Israeli 
peace activism has had in this phase. Having focused thus far on the internal powers of movement, this 
chapter will give attention to the external power of movement; political opportunity structures. This 
term refers to factors of the external environment in which the social movement operates that facilitate 
or constrain activism (Gamson and Meyer, 1996), such as the nature of the government, public opinion, 
political culture and domestic and international events (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:13). 
However, according to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) political opportunities structures are only 
opportunities or threats to mobilisation if they are perceived as such; they should not be treated as 
͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ ďut, ŵust ďe seeŶ fƌoŵ the peƌspeĐtiǀe of the social movement actors. The attribution of 
threat, ͚those faĐtoƌs…that disĐouƌage ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϯϮͿ, oƌ oppoƌtuŶities, ͚sets of clues 
that eŶĐouƌage people to eŶgage iŶ ĐoŶteŶtious politiĐs͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϯϮͿ, ďǇ soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt aĐtoƌs 
is therefore crucial. In addition, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:15) note that whilst movements 
may emerge from political opportunity structures, ͚theiƌ fate is heaǀilǇ shaped ďǇ theiƌ oǁŶ aĐtioŶs͛ aŶd 
sĐholaƌs ofteŶ ͚uŶdeƌestiŵate the aďilitǇ of ĐhalleŶgiŶg gƌoups to geŶeƌate aŶd sustaiŶ ŵoǀeŵeŶts 
despite recalcitrant political stƌuĐtuƌes͛ ;Moƌƌis, ϮϬϬϬ:ϰϰϳͿ. This highlights the important role of agency 
and the internal powers of movement. 
In addition, recent theoretical accounts of social movement theory (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, 2001) have attempted to move beyond the approach that treats the powers of movement as static 
factors that correlate and interact with each other and have provided a variety of mechanisms and 
pƌoĐesses that eǆplaiŶ the ͚hoǁ͛ of a soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt tƌajeĐtoƌǇ; the ͚aƌƌoǁs͛ that ĐoŶŶeĐt the ͚ďoǆes͛ 
of the classical social movement paradigm (Tarrow, 2011:190). These will be used to explain the 
different cycles of the three components of Israeli peace activism. 
This chapter will first outline the main shifts in the political opportunity structures in this phase: the 
changes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the outbreak of the second Intifada, the 
disengagement plan and the building of the separation barrier. It will also look at changes in the nature 
of the government and changes in Israeli public opinion. It will then outline shifts in the international 
POS, which is an often understudied area of social movement theory but have played a role in Israeli 
peace activism. This chapter will consider direct shifts in the international arena that affect the POS for 
Israeli peace activism, such as the situation in Gaza, the Arab Peace Initiative and contemporary 
transnational social movements dealing with the issue of Palestine. It will also consider indirect changes 
in the international arena: the global war on terror and the Arab uprisings, which shifted the domestic 
POS. 
Having outlined the main changes in the POS, this chapter will turn to how each of the components 
perceived these changes and how this affected their trajectories. It will identify and explain three cycles 
of contention: the demobilisation of the liberal Zionist component; the emergence of a new cycle of 
contention for the radical component; and the continuation of the human rights component. Three 
models will be built by analysing how the four powers of movement interact with each other in each 
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component and through the dynamic mechanisms and processes. Once the models have been 
explained, it will be possible to identify some key theoretical implications and highlight some areas of 
impact that Israeli peace activism is having. 
2 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
This section will highlight the shifts in the political opportunity structures since the outbreak of 
the second Intifada, considering the main broad change processes, which are changes in the context in 
which a social movement operates, that can be considered an opportunity or threat for a social 
movement to mobilise (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001).  
The progression of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the effects on the ground are significant political 
opportunity structures. The outbreak and continuation of the second Intifada, the disengagement plan, 
where Israel withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West Bank and 
the erection of the separation barrier along the West Bank can be considered broad domestic changes 
that could impact Israeli peace activism. There were also changes in the nature of the Israeli 
government, which has become progressively more right wing, particularly since 2009, and Israeli public 
opinion has shifted further away from the views of Israeli peace activism. If the effect of POS are 
theorised as being objective then these changes would signal the closing of the political opportunity 
structures in Israel and lowers the possibility of Israeli peace activism being able to mobilise and achieve 
change. However, perceived subjectively by each component or group, the shifting political opportunity 
structures actually resulted in different outcomes for the different components, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
International events and policies can also play a role as political opportunity structures that impact a 
domestic social movement. For example, the domestic country may engage in an international conflict, 
the international community may get involved in a conflict, through UN resolutions, military intervention 
or offers to broker a peace agreement. In the case of Israel, the operations conducting by Israeli in the 
Gaza Strip following its withdrawal in 2005 presented opportunities for some groups to mobilise. The 
Arab Peace Initiative, put forward by the Arab League, also represented a change in the POS directly 
related to Israeli peace activism. The growth of international and transnational movements focused on 
the conflict also shifted the POS. Other changes in the international POS that were not directly linked to 
the domestic social movement also had an impact on the ability for Israeli peace activism to mobilise 
and create change. The Global War on Terror and the Arab Uprisings are two important international 
factors to consider in this case and suggest that the wider international context must be taken into 
account when understanding a domestic social movement.  
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2.1 DOMESTIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
2.1.1 THE SECOND INTIFADA  
The failure to reach a peace agreement at Camp David in 2000 between Israel and the 
Palestinians, the return of Prime Ministeƌ Baƌak ĐlaiŵiŶg theƌe ͚ǁas Ŷo paƌtŶeƌ foƌ peaĐe͛ oŶ the 
Palestinian side and the outbreak of the second Intifada in October 2000 signified a new broad change 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “oŵe aƌgue that the outďƌeak of ǀioleŶĐe sigŶified aŶ ͚eaƌthƋuake͛ foƌ 
Israelis (Bar-Tal and Halperon, 2007) however Hermann argues that these events simply confirmed the 
mistrust felt by Jewish Israelis towards the Palestinians (Hermann, 2009:187). Whilst the majority of 
Israeli Jews may have already been mistrusting of the Palestinians before the outbreak of the second 
Intifada, with Hermann (2009: 187) noting that there was only a 3% rise between February 2000 and 
March 2001, from 69% to 72%, in respondents͛ belief that the Palestinians would destroy Israel if they 
were able, there was a fall in the Peace Index from 61.2 in October 1999 to 51.5 in July 2001 (Yaar and 
Hermann, 1999, 2000), signifying a reduction in the belief in the possibility of peace with the 
Palestinians following the outbreak of the Intifada.  
During the second Intifada, Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli towns and cities played a significant 
role (Schweitzer, 2010). The use of arms by the Palestinians led to military responses by the Israeli 
forces, as well as the more discreet tactic of political assassinations (Bregman, 2002:210-224). The 
height of violence from the Palestinian side occurred in 2002, with a total of 53 suicide attacks in Israel 
(General Security Service, 2010). The vicious cycle of violence continued and following a Palestinian 
suicide bombing at a hotel resort in Netanya, the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, 
which was the largest-scale military incursion into West Bank towns since 1967, with the aim of stopping 
the suicide attacks. Israel was criticised for its actions against the Palestinians, which including 
demolition of houses, arbitrary detention, mass closures of business and villages, and the use of torture 
(Amnesty International, 2002). 
2.1.2 THE SEPARATION BARRIER 
 Israel has used a variety of security measures in the latter years of the Intifada and throughout 
the late 2000s and 2010s in order to quell and deter attacks from Palestinians. These have included 
roadblocks, collective curfews and checkpoints. The largest security measure has been the building of 
the separation barrier, which aimed at stopping potential terrorists from the West Bank entering Israel. 
Since the construction of the barrier it has been argued that the number of Palestinian attacks has 
declined by ninety percent (Bard, 2015) and acts as a deterrent. The effect of the barrier of the lives of 
the Palestinians has also been significant. The barrier has been criticised for not following the Green Line 
but cutting into the West Bank, often appropriating Palestinian land. In doing so it has caused a number 
of human rights violations, such as restriction of movement, making it difficult for Palestinians to reach 
their farm land, or the creation of eŶĐlaǀes, ĐuttiŶg off ǀillages fƌoŵ the suƌƌouŶdiŶg aƌeas ;B͛Tseleŵ, 
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2011a). Both the erection and consequences of the separation barrier are important shifts in the POS 
that were perceived differently by the different components of Israeli peace activism 
2.1.3 THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Since the outbreak of the second Intifada, there have been six new governments elected in 
Israel, half of which were headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. The governments have in general been 
progressively more right-wing, particularly since Netanyahu was re-elected in 2009.
61
 Whilst not all 
changes in the government can be considered large shifts in the POS, since their ideological 
commitments or policy preferences were not always significantly different, there are some key changes 
in this period that affected the prevailing political opportunity structures. 
The first significant change was the election of Ariel Sharon and his Likud government in February 2001. 
According to Hermann (2009:189) this marked the end of the Oslo process and the collapse of the Israeli 
left, which has not been able to form a government since Barak became Prime Minister in 1999. The 
͚peaĐe Đaŵp,͛ ŶaŵelǇ the political parties on the left of the political spectrum that were affiliated to the 
liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism has seen declining voting numbers. Meretz and Avoda 
combined held a total of 15.9 percent in the 2013 elections compared with 34.2 percent of votes in the 
1996 elections (IDI, 2013, 1996). Arguably, it has been the inability of the Israeli political left to provide a 
suitable response to the prevailing realities, encouraging the shift rightwards in Israeli voting tendencies 
towards more hawkish positions. 
Sharon was elected again as Prime Minister in 2003, doubling the number of Likud seats to thirty-six. It 
was during this period that he implemented the disengagement plan and started to construct the 
separation barrier, key changes in the POS affecting Israeli peace activism. In 2005 a new centrist 
political party, Kadima (Forward), was set up by some former Likud members and later joined by some 
Avoda members in order to continue with the disengagement plan. In 2006 Ehud Olmert was elected 
Prime Minister as the head of the Kadima party. The Olmert government shifted the POS by moving 
forward with peace talks with the Palestinian Authority however, Israeli peace activists were suspicious, 
some because Olmert was suspected, and later convicted, of corruption, and others because of his 
decision to launch Operation Cast Lead, the first large-scale military action in Gaza.  
The most significant shift in the POS in terms of creating an unfavourable environment for Israeli peace 
activism was the election of Netanyahu and the Likud party in 2009. Since then Israelis have elected a 
progressively more right-wing government headed by Netanyahu. Whilst Likud had always held the 
second largest amount of votes in elections held between 1996 and 2009 and the more pragmatic 
members made efforts to improve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as Sharon, it is the rise of other 
right-wing parties that highlight this shift to the right in voting trends and led to an increasingly more 
right-wing government. For example, Yisrael Beitenu (Israel is Our Home), a right-wing nationalist party, 
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 Netanyahu had previously been the Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999. 
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rose from 2.6 percent of votes in 1999 to 11.7 percent in 2006, joining the ruling party to form Likud 
Beitenu with 23.3 percent of votes in 2013. Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home), a right-wing, 
nationalist religious party, was founded in 2009, receiving 2.9 percent of votes in 2009, which rose to 9.1 
percent of votes in 2013. Yesh Atid (There is a Future), a centrist party, founded in 2012 gained 14.3 
percent of the votes in the 2013 elections (IDI, 2013, 2009, 2006, 1999). Whilst voting trends do not shift 
solely due to views on security, the conflict and the peace process, with the rise of Yesh Atid attributed 
to economic and social issues, since 2000 perceptions of security have influenced voting trends and 
therefore further marginalised peace voices.  
As will be explored in the sections below, the governments of Netanyahu have actively sought to limit 
the voices and actions of all components of Israeli peace activism and so his continued position as Prime 
Minister has significantly affected the POS for Israeli peace activism. 
2.1.4 PUBLIC OPINION 
Public opinion represents a further aspect of the external environment that can affect the 
tƌajeĐtoƌǇ of a peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt. IŶ HeƌŵaŶŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ studǇ of the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt she ŵakes 
explicit the need to consider public opinion as a distinct mobilising factor. As she argues, in this phase of 
Israeli peace activism the opinions of the Israeli public became less and less in line with that of Israeli 
peace activism. 
Since the outbreak of the second Intifada three shifts in Israeli public opinion can be identified. There is 
an increased feeling of personal insecurity with the second Intifada and the rockets fired at Israel from 
Gaza, as well as increased mistrust towards the Palestinians. At the same time there is a belief that the 
status quo in the West Bank is the best option both economically and in terms of security. Thirdly, there 
has been increasing anti-Arab sentiments within Israel. These shifts have meant that there is an 
increasing disparity between the ideas and actions of Israeli peace activism and those of Israeli public 
opinion.  
In general public opinion in Israel can be determined by the security situation. When there is a threat, 
such as during the Intifada and during the Gaza flare-ups, there is a general retreat to a nationalistic 
mentality where fear and insecurity dominates and the public unify under this. Furthermore, support for 
all three main Gaza operations since 2008 has been high amongst the Israeli public. In December 2008, 
60 percent of respondents supported a military operation in the Gaza Strip (Midgam Poll in Klein, 2014). 
In November 2012, only 24 percent of respondents supported a cease-fire with Hamas (Channel 2 Poll in 
Times of Israel, 2012) and in July 2014, 96 percent of respondents felt that Israel had used an 
appropriate amount of force against Hamas during Operation Protective Edge (Yaar and Hermann, 
2014b). These figures highlight the extent to which the Israeli public supported the operations in Gaza 
and therefore the unlikelihood of them mobilising in anti-war activities. 
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Alongside feelings of increased personal insecurity, there has been an increased mistrust of the 
Palestinians as negotiating partners since 2000, as identified by the Negotiations Index. There has been 
a drop from 51.5 percent support of peace negotiations from respondents in 2001 to 46.4 percent 
support in July 2013 (Yaar and Hermann, 2001, 2013).
62
 The Index gives a general picture of declining 
support for negotiations. 
Although there have been some perceptions of personal insecurity in Israel, it is at the same time 
argued that since the end of the second Intifada, the actual threat for Israelis has been fairly low 
compared with other periods. In particular regards to the occupation, the Israeli public are satisfied with 
the status quo and therefore do not see an urgent need to change the situation (Warschawski in Sela, 
ϮϬϭϯͿ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to WaƌsĐhaǁski, ͚the ŵajoƌitǇ has Ŷo ƌeasoŶ to ďudge, so it ǁeŶt hoŵe…TheǇ͛ƌe 
asleep, theǇ͛ƌe liǀiŶg ǁith a seŶse that Ŷothing is urgent. From a security standpoint, we have never had 
it so good.͛ Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to GidoŶ LeǀǇ, ͚Isƌaelis do Ŷot ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ aŶǇthiŶg aďout the 
oĐĐupatioŶ…theǇ do Ŷot Đaƌe at all, it is Ŷot oŶ theiƌ ageŶda, oŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ it is ďeĐoŵiŶg less and less 
oŶ the ageŶda͛ ;LeǀǇ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. TheǇ aƌe theƌefoƌe uŶlikelǇ to ŵoďilise agaiŶst it. 
A third shift has been increasing racist anti-Arab sentiments on the streets in Israel, as well as disdain for 
͚leftists.͛ There has been changing attitudes towards Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel, partly due 
to the Gaza conflicts and partly due to the fact that Israelis and Palestinians no longer interact as they 
did ďefoƌe the sepaƌatioŶ ďaƌƌieƌ, ŵeaŶiŶg steƌeotǇpes aŶd feaƌ of the ͚Otheƌ͛ iŶĐƌease. By extension, 
those who call for solidarity with Palestinians are also treated with suspicion, at best. For example, a 
High “Đhool teaĐheƌ ǁho ŵade Ŷegatiǀe ĐoŵŵeŶts aďout the IDF aŶd eǆpƌessed ͚eǆtƌeŵe left͛ ǀieǁs 
was threatened with dismissal after a student reported him (Raved, 2014). Whilst there had always 
existed disdain for leftists in Israel, with one incident where peace activist Emil Grunzweig was killed by 
a grenade thrown by an Israeli Jew at a Shalom Achshav rally, there has been an increase in racist 
sentiments in Israel and by extension, a rise in disdain towards the peace activists. This increase in 
racism is signified by a wave of anti-Arab violence within Israel in the 2010s, with attacks against Arab 
citizens of Isƌael, suĐh as the ͚lǇŶĐhiŶg͛ of an Arab teenager in Jerusalem in 2012 (Hasson, 2012). Such 
attacks present an internal rift between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel. 
These shifts in Israeli public opinion will affect the liberal Zionist and human rights groups that are 
concerned with mobilising the Israeli public but are less likely to be perceived as a threat by the radical 
component, which is not interested in changing Israeli public opinion. 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
There have been a number of changes in the international POS. How they are perceived by the 
activists and how they interact with the domestic opportunity structures will determine the impact on 
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 The Negotiations Index is an aggregate of the answers to two questions: support for negotiations and 
likelihood any negotiations will lead to peace. The aggregate of the two questions leads to a scale of 0 to 
100, with 0 being a total lack of support and belief and 100 being full support and belief.  
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the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. The conflicts with the Gaza Strip presented opportunities for the 
radical and human rights components to mobilise in anti-war activities and out of humanitarian 
concerns. The Arab Peace Initiative presented a potential opportunity for the liberal Zionist component 
to mobilise; transnational social movements provided an opportunity for the more radical groups to 
reach out to the international dimension; the global war on terror indirectly affected the domestic POS 
by reinforcing and legitimising military steps to combat terrorism; and the Arab Uprising had some 
impact in restricting POS for Israeli peace activism.  
2.2.1 THE SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP 
In 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, evacuating the settlements and 
removing the IDF, thus shifting the realities again. Despite the disengagement, Israel has continued to 
ĐoŶtƌol the ďoƌdeƌs of the Gaza “tƌip; ǁith soŵe aƌguiŶg that theǇ haǀe eŶfoƌĐed aŶ illegal ͚ďloĐkade͛ 
;ChoŵskǇ aŶd PappĠ, ϮϬϭϭͿ, ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg ĐoŶtƌol of Gaza͛s sea aŶd aiƌ spaĐe aŶd the eŶtƌǇ aŶd eǆit 
points. In 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian national elections and took over Gaza by force in 2007. After 
Hamas took over Israel increased the restrictions on Gaza but these ǁeƌe eased iŶ ϮϬϭϬ ;B͛Tseleŵ, 
2011b).  
Since the early 2000s there have been rockets fired intermittently towards Israel from the Gaza Strip, 
with thirty Israeli civilian fatalities (Nguyen, 2014), increasing the fear of Israeli citizens, particularly 
those in Southern Israel. There have been three major operations of the IDF in Gaza, in 2008/9, 2012 
and 2014. Israel has ďeeŶ ĐƌitiĐised ďǇ the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ foƌ its ͚eǆĐessiǀe use of foƌĐe͛ 
against the Gaza Strip (UN, 2014: GA/SPD/574) and concerns have been raised over the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Gaza (OCHA, 2014, 2012, 2009). The situation in Gaza has therefore presented 
a further shift in the POS but, perceived differently by the different components, acting as a mobilising 
opportunity only for the radical and human rights components.  
2.2.2 THE ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE 
The Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was adopted by the Arab League in March 2002, was a 
direct change in the POS connected to Israeli peace activism. It represents an example of how aspects of 
the international arena could open opportunities for domestic peace activism. The Saudis initially put 
forward the API in the early 1980s, however it did not initially pass the Arab League. According to the 
think tank Molad, the Saudis were able to push the initiative in the early 2000s because of regional 
events: the second Intifada, the Septeŵďeƌ ϭϭ attaĐks aŶd IƌaŶ͛s desiƌe foƌ ƌegioŶal poǁeƌ. The API ǁas 
adopted due to the desire for Saudi Arabia to improve their image in the West following 9/11, where 
fifteen of the nineteen terrorists were citizens of Saudi Arabia, coupled with the fear from other Arab 
countries that the escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the failure of the Arab countries to 
curb it, would lead to unrest in those Arab countries (Molad, [no date, b]). 
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Certain elements of the API would be very difficult to sell to Israelis but there are key points that could 
help promote it as the basis of negotiations. These are the clauses that state that the Arab nations 
ǁould affiƌŵ ͚seĐuƌitǇ foƌ all the states of the ƌegioŶ͛ ;API, ϮϬϬϮ:ϯ.ϭͿ aŶd ͚estaďlish Ŷoƌŵal ƌelations with 
Isƌael͛ ;API, ϮϬϬϮ: ϯ.ϮͿ. These stateŵeŶts suggest the ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of Isƌael aŶd the desiƌe to Đƌeate peaĐe 
and stability in the region. Most significantly, these statements were initiated by the Arab world, rather 
than imposed by a third party. The left had ofteŶ ďeeŶ ĐƌitiĐised foƌ Ŷot pƌoǀidiŶg aŶ aŶsǁeƌ to Isƌaelis͛ 
security concerns, leading to its loss in credibility. This initiative provided an answer for the Israeli left to 
push. 
However, despite these initiatives, the Israeli governments in this phase have not been receptive 
towards the API. The Sharon government was too heavily concerned with the second Intifada 
(Teitlebaum in Eyadat, 2011); Olmert showed interest (Moran, 2007) but was removed from Office 
before anything could come of it and according the Netanyahu, the API is outdated and does not take 
into account the rise of Hamas and ISIS (Keinon, 2014). There has therefore never been a clear positive 
response from the Israeli government towards the API. However, the Arab League has continued to 
ratify the initiative, even with the turmoil in the Arab world, at the Baghdad summit in 2012 and again at 
the Doha summit in 2013.  
This change in the POS presents a potential opportunity to those peace groups that promote negotiated 
peace agreements, as it gives them something to mobilise the Israeli public around and call on the 
government to respond to. However, since the Israeli government has not yet been willing to base 
negotiations on the API, whilst regional and international events and discourses had the potential to 
open the POS for Israeli peace activism, the centrality of domestic political opportunity structures 
counter-acted the opportunities presented by the international arena. This scenario seems particularly 
likely in issues of peace and security. 
2.2.3 TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
The BDS Movement and other transnational social movements dealing with the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict have also shifted the international political opportunity structures. The BDS 
Movement was launched iŶ ϮϬϬϱ afteƌ the PalestiŶiaŶ Đall, ǁith the aiŵ of ͚takiŶg effeĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ to eŶd 
Isƌaeli iŵpuŶitǇ aŶd hold Isƌael aĐĐouŶtaďle uŶdeƌ iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͛ ;BD“ MoǀeŵeŶt, [Ŷo date]Ϳ. The 
movement has had the effect of raising awareness of the Palestinian situatioŶ aŶd Isƌael͛s aĐtioŶs 
around the world. Although direct causality cannot be determined, a number of companies have 
divested from Israel, such as Dutch pension fund PGGM and large supermarket chains across Europe 
have boycotted products from the settlements, such as SuperValu in Ireland.
63
 Whilst Israel claims that 
there has yet to be an impact on its economy (Coren and Zrahiya, 2015), the BDS Movement is clearly 
gaining support and achieving successes. 
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 For a list of ͚BD“ suĐĐesses͛ see The PalestiŶe Poƌtal ;[Ŷo date]Ϳ. 
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2.2.4 THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
The ͚Gloďal Waƌ oŶ Teƌƌoƌ͛ plaǇed aŶ iŶdiƌeĐt ƌole iŶ ƌeiŶfoƌĐiŶg the Đlosed politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ 
structures in Israel. The September 11 attacks coincided with the first year of the second Intifada and 
legitimised and encouraged the steps Israel was taking to combat the Intifada. According to Eiland 
(2010:ϯϬͿ, ͚suddeŶlǇ, it ďeĐaŵe legitiŵate ͞to fight teƌƌoƌ͛͟ aŶd Aƌafat, ǁho had ďeeŶ suppoƌted ďǇ the 
international community in his struggle against the Israeli occupation, was now being confronted to stop 
the Palestinian terrorism. The changes in the international arena gave Israel the green light to use 
necessary measures to curb Palestinian terrorism, including the military incursions and political 
assassinations, which shifted the domestic POS in favour of military action over peace agreements. 
The campaign against terrorism that followed led by the United States, the rise of extremist groups in 
the Middle East and the increasing prominence of Iran have been used by different Israeli governments 
in the 2000s and 2010s as means to justify their policies towards the Palestinians, by equating the 
threats felt by Israel with the threats felt by the US and the West. These real and perceived threats have 
enabled Israeli governments to bolster their security rhetoric and military action, presenting opposing 
ideas to that of Israeli peace activism. This has been a significant factor in further marginalising the ideas 
of Israeli peace activism across all components. 
The then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon used the opportunity to liken the Palestinian terrorists in Israel to 
the terrorists that targeted the US and called for coordination in eliminating such threats. He stated in a 
CNN broadcast,  
͚Waƌ agaiŶst teƌƌoƌ is aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ǁaƌ, a ǁaƌ of a ĐoalitioŶ of the fƌee ǁoƌld agaiŶst 
all the terror groups and against whoever believes they can pose a threat to freedom. 
This is a war between the good and the bad, between humanity and those who are 
blood-thiƌstǇ͛ ;“haƌoŶ iŶ CNN, ϮϬϬϭͿ. 
Shimon Peres, the then Foreign Minister, remarked aloŶg siŵilaƌ liŶes that, ͚the fight agaiŶst teƌƌoƌ is aŶ 
international struggle of the free world against the forces of darkness who seek to destroy our liberty 
aŶd ouƌ ǁaǇ of life. I ďelieǀe that togetheƌ ǁe ĐaŶ defeat these foƌĐes of eǀil͛ ;Peƌes iŶ CNN, Ϯ001). In 
2002 the US Senate agreed that Israel and the US were ͚eŶgaged iŶ a ĐoŵŵoŶ stƌuggle against 
teƌƌoƌisŵ͛ ;GƌegoƌǇ, ϮϬϬϰ:ϭϵϬͿ aŶd the esseŶĐe of the suiĐide attaĐks iŶ Isƌael ǁeƌe ͚ideŶtiĐal to the 
attaĐks oŶ ouƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ of “epteŵďeƌ ϭϭ͛ ;GƌegoƌǇ, ϮϬ04:191).  
The above comments were made at the height of the second Intifada when Israel was subjected to 
suicide bombings. Since his election in 2009, Netanyahu has continued to make similar statements, 
likeŶiŶg Haŵas to I“I“, aƌguiŶg that theǇ aƌe ͚ďƌaŶĐhes of the saŵe poisoŶous tƌee͛ ;NetaŶǇahu, ϮϬϭϰďͿ. 
NetaŶǇahu aĐtuallǇ edited a ďook pƌeĐediŶg the “epteŵďeƌ ϭϭ attaĐks eŶtitled, ͚Teƌƌoƌisŵ: Hoǁ the 
West CaŶ WiŶ͛, which highlighted the need for coordinating Western forces, of which he includes Israel, 
against terrorism (Netanyahu, 1987). Whilst US policy towards Israel has not been entirely consistent 
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thƌoughout the ϮϬϬϬs aŶd ϮϬϭϬs, ǁith ǀaƌǇiŶg leǀels of ĐoŶdeŵŶatioŶ foƌ Isƌael͛s aĐtioŶs aŶd diffeƌeŶt 
attempts towards a peace process, there has been general support for Israel without significant 
pressure for them to change their policies (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006), given the West͛s fight agaiŶst 
terrorism and the stƌategiĐ positioŶ of Isƌael as ͚the oŶlǇ deŵoĐƌaĐǇ iŶ the Middle East.͛ AĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
Keohane and Nye (1972), national security tends to be considered of greater significance than 
͚tƌaŶsŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts͛ suĐh as uŶiǀeƌsal ƌespeĐt foƌ huŵaŶ ƌights, ǁhiĐh eǆplaiŶs AŵeƌiĐa͛s 
support for Israel despite the human rights abuses inherent in the occupation. This has therefore 
marginalised the peace promoting voices or anti-occupation voices in Israel since they are perceived as 
contrary to the security discourse and actions, which are prioritised over the concerns that Israeli peace 
activism was voicing. 
2.2.5 THE ARAB UPRISINGS 
The Arab uprisings that began in 2011 were a further change in the international POS that could 
have shifted the Israeli POS for peace activism. However they were mainly focused on internal issues 
relevant to each country and did not address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Katz, 2013), despite some 
small groups giving attention to the issue (Anonymous, 2015). However, there were some security-
related fears from within the Israeli government that the power vacuums created would be filled by 
extremist Islamists and that the agreements with Egypt and Jordan would be nullified (Netanyahu, 
2011). This presented a threat to Israeli peace activism, since Israel was concerned with securing their 
borders and maintaining the buffer zones between the Arab countries, including the West Bank. The 
agreements have so-far been upheld but, the continued uncertainties could allow Israel to use them to 
justify their hawkish security-rhetoric and policies. However, this only reinforces similar rhetoric and 
policies that were developed in response to the Global War on Terror and therefore does not represent 
anything new. 
In terms of activism, the Arab uprisings had little impact on the efforts within Israel, with little attention 
given to the uprisings amongst Israeli peace activists.
64
 Some inspiration was seen in the J14 social 
justice protests, which emerged in the summer of 2011, namely the diffusion of slogans from the 
Egyptian protest.
65
 Gamson (2011) notes that the influence was not connected to the ͚iŶjustiĐe͛ 
component, since the protests in Israel were dealing solely with domestic issues but, was connected to 
the agency component of collective action frames, whereby the activists were inspired by the external 
events to change their own circumstances. Given the social justice movement chose to ignore the 
occupation, no link however, can be made with Israeli peace activism.  
Furthermore, although beyond the scope of this dissertation, the uprisings also had little impact on the 
Palestinian popular movement who were mainly quiescent throughout the wave of uprisings across the 
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 The vast majority of the activists interviewed did not reference the Arab Uprisings. 
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 At a Jϭϰ ƌallǇ oŶ ϲ August ϮϬϭϭ a laƌge plaĐaƌd Đited the Tahƌiƌ slogaŶ iŶ AƌaďiĐ, ͚Go!͛ aŶd the phƌase 
͚EgǇpt Is heƌe͛ iŶ Heďƌeǁ ;AĐtiǀe“tills iŶ “heizaf, ϮϬϭϭďͿ. The ĐeŶtƌal ĐhaŶt ǁas ͚the people deŵaŶd 
soĐial justiĐe,͛ ǁith eĐhoes of the EgǇptiaŶ, ͚the people deŵaŶd the fall of the ƌegiŵe,͛ ;GoldŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
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Arab world, with only a small movement emerging that called for unity between Fatah and Hamas, 
which led to talks and a temporary reconciliation agreement (Beinin, 2011). They too were more 
concerned with internal issues than regional changes. 
It is clear, therefore, that events and norms in the international arena can have the effect of closing or 
reinforcing closed domestic political opportunity structures for a social movement, even if not directly 
connected to movement. Having outlined the key shifts in the POS in this phase of Israeli peace activism, 
this chapter will now consider how the POS were perceived by each component of Israeli peace activism 
and how the four powers of movement interacted with each other for each component. A different cycle 
of contention for each component will be identified and explained. 
3 CYCLE ONE: DEMOBILISATION OF THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT 
Having been active for decades pushing a two state solution, the liberal Zionist component of 
Israeli peace activism witnessed their efforts bring about a political peace agreement in the early 1990s, 
which meant they no longer needed to mobilise to the extent they had done in the preceding years. The 
stagnation of the peace agreements in the mid-1990s then encouraged the liberal Zionist component to 
try to re-mobilise. However, the combination of the shifts in the POS in the early 2000s meant they were 
now unable and unwilling to mobilise in the manner they had done previously. A threat was attributed 
to the shifting POS, meaning conditions were, in general, not considered ripe in this phase for the liberal 
Zionist component to mobilise for their goals, which led to their demobilisation. The collective action 
frames that centred on the particularism of liberal Zionism meant that they focused on promoting peace 
for the continuity and security of Israel, rather than out of concerns for the plight of the Palestinians. 
The new realities made it difficult for them to mobilise their resources, in particular because public 
opinion had shifted further away from the ideas of Israeli peace activism (Hermann, 2009:191). The 
relationship between the liberal Zionist component and the different governments since 2000 also 
contributed to their demobilisation. Furthermore, counter-movement dynamics from the settler 
movement played a role in reducing the opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise and 
further contributed to its demobilisation. All factors combined, their cycle of contention drew to a close. 
Two mechanisms contributed to the way in which the liberal Zionist groups responded to the shifting 
POS: exhaustion, from the strain of being active on the streets for decades and facilitation of the two-
state solution by Israeli governments, at least in their rhetoric. Some groups continued with certain 
activities however, the activities have either become more contained or have lost any form of 
influence.
66
 Figure 7 highlights the cycle of contention for the liberal Zionist component, which will be 
unpacked in the following sections. 
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 Hermann (2009) provides a comprehensive study of the demobilisation of the liberal Zionist 
movement. 
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Figure 7 The demobilisation of the liberal Zionist component
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3.1 ATTRIBUTION OF THREAT TO THE SHIFTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
3.1.1 THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND PERCEIVED AS THREATS TO MOBILISATION 
The realities following the failure of Camp David in 2000 and the outbreak of violence were 
perceived as threats to mobilisation for the liberal Zionist component, particularly due to the Israeli 
authoƌities͛ harsh measures towards the Palestinians (Hermann, 2009:191). The violence perpetrated by 
the Palestinians also caused fear and hatred amongst Israeli society, including members of Israeli peace 
activism. Despite the repressive actions of the IDF towards the Palestinians during the Intifada, the 
liberal Zionist component did not perceive it as an opportunity to mobilise. Whilst it has been argued 
that a peace movement mobilises against impending wars and/or eruptions of violence, which provide a 
stimulus for action (Cortright, 2008; Meyer, 2004; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002), the liberal Zionist 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛s ƌespoŶse, oƌ laĐk of, to Isƌael͛s aĐtioŶs agaiŶst the second Intifada requires a different 
explanation. Hixon (2000: xiii) notes that peace movements are not necessarily pacifist in nature; rather 
theǇ ŵoďilise to pƌoŵote ͚ŶatioŶal ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ toǁaƌd uŶiǀeƌsal Đodes of ďehaǀiour which the state is 
violating͛. It can be suggested along these lines that, as a result of the specific nature of the second 
Intifada, the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism did not believe the state to be violating 
universal codes of conduct since the personal security of Israelis was being violated and the state has a 
duty to protect its citizens in the face of violence. In the case of the second Intifada, the fear felt by 
Israelis, as explained by Jones (2005), highlights why, in such circumstances, a peace movement may not 
present an anti-war voice, 
͚“uĐh ǀioleŶĐe [PalestiŶiaŶ suiĐide ďoŵďiŶgs], ofteŶ iŶdisĐƌiminate in its choice of 
targets, is seen as a strategic threat to Israel since at its heart lies the atavistic fear 
that suĐh ǀioleŶĐe deŶies the legalitǇ, if Ŷot the ƌealitǇ, of the otheƌ͛ ;JoŶes, ϮϬϬϱ:ϭ-
2). 
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With the safety of individual Israeli civilians threatened on a daily basis, the mainstream public were not 
against the Israeli government and IDF using force to protect its citizens, as highlighted by the large 
electoral margin in the election of Ariel Sharon, the man responsible for not preventing the Sabra and 
Shatilla massacre (Hermann, 2009:191), and therefore the liberal Zionist peace activists were unable to 
ŵoďilise agaiŶst Isƌael͛s aĐtioŶs. 
In the immediate wake of the Intifada, demobilisation can also ďe eǆplaiŶed ďǇ Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϵϴͿ 
mechanism of exhaustion. As described by a veteran activist, 
͚The peaĐe-minded ordinary people, who for nearly three decades could be relied on to 
come out in their hundreds and thousands once or twice a year (and sometimes more 
frequently when the situation clearly demanded it) have disappeared from the streets 
siŶĐe that fatal tiŵe iŶ ϮϬϬϬ͛ ;Kelleƌ and Zilversmidt, 2008:13). 
Having been active for decades in promoting a two-state solution, the activists finally saw their 
ideas reach a political agreement, only for them to crumble with the failure of the Camp David 
talks in 2000 and the outbreak of the second Intifada.  
The disengagement plan is an example of how the mechanism of facilitation leads to demobilisation of a 
social movement. Although conducted unilaterally by Israel, in essence, withdrawing from the Gaza Strip 
and parts of the West Bank is what the liberal Zionist component had been pushing for. Hermann 
(2009:227) notes that whilst the moderate elements of Israeli peace activism did not actively support 
the disengagement plan, inaction in opposing the plan highlighted their agreement with it. There were 
some that criticised the unilateral nature of the plan (Hermann, 2009:228) but in general their silence 
showed their compliance. Given that the majority of public opinion was consistently in favour of the 
disengagement (Hermann, 2009:226), it is unsurprising that the liberal Zionist groups and in particular 
Shalom Achshav took this approach. However, this meant it was compliant in the policies of a right-wing 
government. 
3.1.2 THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT: A COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP 
The shifts in the nature of the government in this phase points to the closing of the political 
opportunity structures for those wanting to influence the government on issues of peace and security. 
Firstly, as explained above, some of the ideas of the peace movement were facilitated by the 
government so, they did not need to mobilise and secondly, the shift towards progressively more right-
wing governments meant the liberal Zionist components no longer had allies in the government and 
their ideas were removed from the hawkish positions of the coalitions. However, there are some 
developments that the classical political process model does not account for, which can be seen in the 
complicated relationship the liberal Zionist component has traditionally had with the Israeli government. 
These developments further increased the attribution of threat that the liberal Zionist component gave 
to the possibility of mobilisation. 
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The model assumes that having elite allies in the government will open the opportunities for challengers 
to yield influence (Tilly, 1978). In accordance with the model, despite the break-down of the Camp David 
Summit and the violence that broke out in 2000, the political opportunity structures should have been 
open at that point for the liberal Zionist component to influence the government.  This is because they 
had access to the some Members of the Knesset who were closely aligned with Shalom Achshav, such as 
Naomi Chazan and Mossi Raz of Meretz and Yossi Beilin of Avoda. However, the close affiliation Shalom 
Achshav had with members of the ruling coalition did not encourage mobilisation. Whilst there may 
have been private meetings to try and persuade the political elites to continue with negotiations, they 
did not publicly try to lobby the government (Gordon, 2003). There a number of reasons for this, similar 
to the situation when Rabin was Prime Minister. Firstly, the opportunity may have been open in terms 
of access to the government but it was closed in terms of finding a suitable framing of the situation; it 
was not clear what to protest against and therefore the activists were paralysed in terms of an agenda. 
Secondly, they did not want to undermine the government and give leverage to the opposition and 
therefore chose to remain silent. Thirdly, they were concerned that in associating with the governments 
of ‘aďiŶ aŶd Baƌak, the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s uŶpatƌiotiĐ iŵage ǁould taƌŶish the goǀeƌŶŵeŶts͛ effoƌts at 
peace. The relationship between the government and a social movement is therefore more complex 
than the political process model assumes. If the organisation or movement is too close to the 
government, it can create difficulties in challenging it, at least publicly, even when there is a desire to do 
so; what is conventionally argued to be an opportunity was not actually perceived as such by the liberal 
Zionist component at this point. 
In general, therefore, the liberal Zionist component has tended to be more comfortable in the 
opposition, where they can publicly mobilise to criticise the government. However, in this phase they 
have been unable to present a viable alternative to the centrist and right-wing governments, since the 
idea of the two-state solution has been taken up by the consecutive governments in this phase, at least 
in their rhetoric. This is a further example of facilitation, whereby some of the claims of the challengers 
are satisfied and therefore the need for them to mobilise is reduced. As Hermann (2009) argues, the 
liberal Zionist component therefore became politically irrelevant. Their political irrelevancy is 
highlighted by the inability of Shalom Achshav to get ͚its people͛ iŶ the KŶesset. The liberal Zionist 
component has often had members who have been elected as Members of Knesset. In this phase 
however, the Director of Shalom Achshav, Yariv Oppenheimer, did not receive a place in the Knesset 
having been listed 27
th
 on the Avoda list.  
3.1.3 ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION TURNING AWAY 
The shift in Israeli public opinion in this phase was also perceived as a threat to mobilisation for 
the liberal Zionist component, further contributing to its demobilisation. Given the desire of the liberal 
Zionist component to mobilise the Israeli public, they toned-down their positions to resonate more 
closely with public opinion however, they have yet to find a collective action frame that resonates. 
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Shalom Achshav tried to resonate with the Israeli public by transforming their collective action frame to 
iŶĐlude the idea of ͚seĐuƌitǇ,͛ aƌguiŶg that a tǁo-state solution is the only way to ensure that Israel 
would be secure. However, the situation in Gaza has succeeded in putting into question the concept of 
͚laŶd foƌ peaĐe͛ aŶd peaĐe aĐtiǀists haǀe Ǉet to fiŶd a ĐoŶĐƌete, peaĐeful security-orientated answer to 
the rockets being fired into Israel.  
The move of Israeli public opinion away from the ideas of Israeli peace activism has led to declining 
mobilisation structures for the liberal Zionist component and therefore an inability to mobilise 
resources. In the previous phase mass grassroots support was the biggest resource for the liberal Zionist 
groups. However, in this phase, given that individuals do not believe there is a partner to negotiate with, 
there has been little motivation to mobilise to pressure the government into negotiations. Furthermore, 
a poll conducted in August 2009 found that 41 percent of respondents felt that Shalom Achshav had 
caused damage to Israel (Maagar Mohot Survey Institute in Lerner, 2009). Given the Israeli public is the 
target audience of the liberal Zionist component, their shift away from the ideas of the liberal Zionist 
component accounts for demobilisation. 
3.2 FROM PROACTIVE TO REACTIVE ACTIVISM 
 Whilst the goal of the liberal Zionist component is to lobby the government to negotiate a two-
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the above factors have meant that they have been 
unable to mobilise for proactive measures. Their activism has therefore shifted to reactive initiatives. 
Most notably Shalom Achshav has focused much of their resources on the Settlement Watch Project, 
which monitors the building of settlements in the West Bank, producing regular reports on activities in 
the Settlements, both of illegal outposts and government approved building works. This specialisation 
highlights the shift from a mass grassroots movement to the institutionalisation of an NGO with skilled 
employees. It is this area of their activism that brings them closer to the radical and human rights 
component, since they are focused on the realities on the ground.  
3.2.1 COUNTER-MOVEMENT DYNAMICS 
The Settlement Watch Project has had the effect of exacerbating tensions between Shalom 
Achshav and the settler movement, which represents the main counter-movement of the liberal Zionist 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶt. A ĐouŶteƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt is defiŶed as a ͚ŵoǀeŵeŶt that ŵakes ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ Đlaiŵs siŵultaŶeouslǇ 
to those of the oƌigiŶal ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ;MeǇeƌ aŶd “taggeŶďoƌg, ϭϵϵϲ:ϭϲϯϭͿ aŶd plaǇs aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole iŶ 
the dynamics of a social movement, acting as a threat to mobilisation. The Israeli peace movement has 
traditionally been in direct opposition to the settler movement, with Shalom Achshav and Gush Emunim 
representing the two main responses to the 1967 war respectively: land for peace or annexation. Gush 
Emunin has arguably achieved its goals to a greater extent that Shalom Achshav (Newman and 
Hermann, 1982). A number of reasons can be cited for this. For example, Gush EŵuŶiŵ͛s view that the 
Arabs are perpetual enemies was often in line with general public opinion (Newman and Hermann, 
1982: 524). Furthermore, Gush Emunim had clearer links with the government, with Newman and 
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HeƌŵaŶŶ aƌguiŶg that theǇ haǀe ͚ďeĐoŵe aŶ eǆtƌa-parliamentary implementational arm of the policies 
pursued by the Likud goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ ;NeǁŵaŶŶ aŶd HeƌŵaŶŶ, ϭϵϴϮ:ϱϮϱͿ. By contrast, Shalom Achshav, 
had more complicated ties with the government. It was also the tactical repertoires of the settler 
movement that enabled much of its success since they actively went and created facts on the ground by 
building outposts from the start of their campaign, rather than solely trying to lobby the government or 
influence the public. Shalom Achshav has therefore tended to play a reactive role in confronting Gush 
Emunim and settlement building, particularly since the creation of the Settlement Watch Project in 
1990. They try to bring to the attention of the Israeli public and the international community the 
expansion of the settlements.  
This opposition from the settlers has become violent in this phase, ǁith a stƌategǇ of ͚pƌiĐe-tags͛ ďeiŶg 
used ďǇ eǆtƌeŵe Isƌaeli settleƌs, ďegiŶŶiŶg iŶ ƌespoŶse to Aƌiel “haƌoŶ͛s disengagement plaŶ. ͚PƌiĐe-tags͛ 
are acts of vengeance by extremist settlers against the removal of settlements in Gaza and the West 
Bank. According to journalist Amos Harel,  
͚The eǆtƌeŵe ƌight has sought to estaďlish a 'ďalaŶĐe of teƌƌoƌ,' iŶ ǁhiĐh eǀeƌǇ state 
action aimed at them – from demolishing a caravan in an outpost to restricting the 
movements of those suspected of harassing Palestinian olive harvesters – generates an 
iŵŵediate, ǀioleŶt ƌeaĐtioŶ͛ ;Haƌel, ϮϬϬϴͿ. 
Most ofteŶ the ͚pƌiĐe-tag͛ attaĐks aƌe aĐts of ǀioleŶĐe oƌ ǀaŶdalisŵ agaiŶst the IDF aŶd PalestiŶiaŶs ďut 
members of Shalom Achshav have also been subjected to similar attacks in more recent years. For 
example, in September 2011 threats were painted near the apartment of the head of Shaloŵ AĐhshaǀ͛s 
“ettleŵeŶt WatĐh PƌojeĐt, ǁith the ǁoƌds ͚PƌiĐe Tag MigƌoŶ68͛ aŶd ͚PeaĐe Noǁ, the eŶd is Ŷeaƌ͛, and in 
November 2011 the Jerusalem office of Shalom Achshav was evacuated following a bomb threat 
(Friedman, 2015). Whilst leaders of the settler movement (Shragai, 2008), Israeli rabbis (AFP, 2011) and 
Netanyahu (Keinon and Lazaroff, 2011) have condemned these acts, there have been relatively few 
arrests of the perpetrators and little attempts to stop the vandalism. According to a report by Yesh Din, 
ďetǁeeŶ ϮϬϬϱ aŶd ϮϬϭϯ oŶlǇ ϴ.ϱ% of iŶǀestigatioŶs opeŶed agaiŶst ͚pƌiĐe-tags͛ iŶ the West BaŶk 
resulted in indictment (Yesh Din, 2013).   
This opposition has led Shalom Achshav to fuƌtheƌ eŵphasise that the settleŵeŶts aƌe ͚the ŵaiŶ 
oďstaĐle to peaĐe͛ ;OfƌaŶ iŶ Gal, ϮϬϭϮͿ, ǁhiĐh eŶĐouƌages ƌetaliatioŶ fƌoŵ the settleƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt. Whilst 
this acts as a threat to mobilisation, since it makes activists wary, it also confers some relevancy on 
Shalom Achshav, since the opposition suggests that the settlers feel threatened by the activities of 
Shalom Achshav. 
 
                                                          
68
 Migron is the name of an outpost in the West Bank, which was deemed as illegally built on Palestinian 
land by the Supreme Court and ordered to be dismantled. 
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3.3 ATTRIBUTING THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
 Different aspects of the international arena have been perceived as threats, whilst others as 
opportunities for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise. The operations in Gaza did not have the 
effect of re-mobilising the quietened liberal Zionist component and it has only been the radical and 
human rights groups that have responded. This follows a similar pattern to that during the second 
Intifada, ǁith the ƌadiĐal aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights ĐoŵpoŶeŶts ƌeaĐtiŶg agaiŶst Isƌael͛s aĐtioŶs aŶd ĐalliŶg foƌ 
an end to violence, whilst the liberal Zionist component was more hesitant. The perception that the 
situation in Gaza was not an opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise is linked to their 
focus on particularism. At times of crisis the liberal Zionist component are forced to choose between 
particularism and universal values (Greenstein, 2014), and along with the Israeli public tend to retreat to 
theiƌ paƌtiĐulaƌistiĐ, ŶatioŶalistiĐ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes, falliŶg ͚sileŶt ǁheŶ siƌeŶs staƌt to ǁail͛ ;‘az iŶ Fƌaseƌ, ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
According to an activist from the liberal Zionist component, whilst she was against the operations in 
Gaza, she found that her companions in the peace camp justified the Israeli attack as a response to the 
Haŵas ƌoĐkets. “he Ŷotes that, ͚the ǁidespƌead seŶse that theƌe ǁas ͞Ŷo ĐhoiĐe͟ has peƌŵeated aŶd 
deeplǇ diǀided the Isƌaeli peaĐe Đaŵp eǀeƌ siŶĐe͛ ;ChazaŶ, ϮϬϬϵͿ. Shalom Achshav did decide to mobilise 
against Operation Protective Edge in 2014, joining a protest of an estimated ten thousand Israelis under 
the slogan, ͚ĐhaŶgiŶg diƌeĐtion: towards peace, away from war͛, a month after the hostilities broke out 
(+972 mag, 2014). Shalom Achshav were careful to wait until the extent of the damages and casualties 
caused by the operation had been determined, rather than protesting the operation in and of itself, a 
further example of how the collective action frames of each group or component determine when an 
opportunity to mobilise is perceived.  
Kol Echad (One Voice), who are attempting to build a movement of students within the liberal Zionist 
component, based on support for a two state solution, also responded to Operation Protective Edge, 
ǁhiĐh foĐused oŶ ĐoŶĐepts of ͚peaĐe͛ aŶd ͚ŶegotiatioŶs.͛ The diffeƌeŶĐe is that Kol Echad has a sister 
movement, Kol Echad Palestine, and therefore could not stay silent. A Facebook post shows a statement 
from Kol Echad in response to the 2014 operation, 
͚We at OŶeVoiĐe aƌe uŶited iŶ askiŶg ouƌ politiĐal leadeƌs to ƌeĐogŶize that the 
preservation of life must always be paramount. This dangerous escalation and the tragic 
loss of civilian life are proof that the status quo is unsustainable. That is why we are calling 
for a mutual ceasefire to ensure the safety of innocent lives. Those of us committed to an 
end to conflict and occupation, and the realization of a two-state solution, understand that 
ǀioleŶĐe ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ aĐhieǀe a just peaĐe͛ ;OŶe VoiĐe, ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
This takes a non-confrontational approach, careful not to place blame in any direction.  
In order for the liberal Zionist component to remain relevant, they need to present a solution that is 
viable for both the Israeli public and Israeli government in a way that answers the concerns that have 
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arisen in this phase, which they can push and mobilise behind (Patir, 2013). Without proof that there 
ǁas ͚a paƌtŶeƌ foƌ peaĐe͛ aŶd ǁith deep seĐuƌitǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs, peaĐe iŶitiatiǀes haǀe Ŷot held ŵuĐh 
grounding amongst the Israeli public and there has been a lack of alternatives coming from Israeli peace 
activism. The Arab Peace Initiative was seen as a potential answer. 
Whilst the API was first introduced in 2002, it was not until after the end of the second Intifada and the 
2007 Arab summit, where Saudi Arabia further encouraged the initiative, that Israeli civil society, mostly 
from the liberal Zionist component attributed this as an opportunity to mobilise (The Centre for 
Democracy and Community Development, 2014). The Forum Irgunei haShalom established a task force 
to consider responses to the API, IPCRI promoted the API through various means, including Track II 
Diplomacy workshops and Shalom Achshav organised a demonstration in Jerusalem. Kol Echad has in 
particular continued to promote a two-state solution based on the API, through a variety of activities.  
The API itself is more of a declaration than a peace agreement and required an Israeli declaration in 
response. In 2011 former security chiefs developed the Israeli Peace Initiative as the Israeli reply to the 
API. Forty people signed it, including former chiefs of the Shabak (General Security Service) and Mossad 
(Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations). In 2014 they launched a new organisation, Mefakdim 
l͛ŵaaŶ BitaĐhoŶ Yisrael ;CoŵŵaŶdeƌs foƌ Isƌael͛s “eĐuƌitǇͿ, ǁhiĐh ǁas set up iŶ diƌeĐt ƌespoŶse to the 
API, ĐalliŶg foƌ ͚the Isƌaeli puďliĐ to eŶĐouƌage Isƌael͛s politiĐal leadeƌship to eŵďaƌk oŶ a ƌegioŶal effoƌt 
as aŶ appƌopƌiate ƌespoŶse to the Aƌaď PeaĐe IŶitiatiǀe͛ ;Efal, ϮϬϭϰͿ. The gƌoup of ϭϱϬ high-ranking 
offiĐeƌs aƌgued that, ͚those ǁho Đlaiŵ ƌegioŶal seĐuƌitǇ-political arrangements and peace with the 
PalestiŶiaŶs ǁill uŶdeƌŵiŶe seĐuƌitǇ aƌe flat ǁƌoŶg…ǁe kŶoǁ that peaĐe agƌeeŵeŶts…aƌe ĐƌitiĐal to the 
seĐuƌitǇ of Isƌael͛ ;Efal, ϮϬϭϰͿ. GiǀeŶ theiƌ positioŶs as ĐoŵŵaŶdeƌs of the IDF aŶd the Shabak, their 
endorsement of the API gives it some legitimacy amongst Israeli society. The API, it seems, represents a 
potential opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise around. However, as noted, 
consecutive Israeli governments have failed to endorse the API and, most recently, Netanyahu has 
marked it as no longer relevant, suggesting mobilisation around the API would be fruitless at this stage. 
3.4 THE DEMOBILISATION OF THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT 
The attribution of threat to mobilisation in response to the shifts in the POS in this phase 
explains the inability for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise their resources and therefore has led 
to their demobilisation. The mechanisms of exhaustion and facilitation, along with the collective action 
frame of liberal Zionism and counter-movement dynamics, have also played a role in the demobilisation 
and political irrelevancy of the liberal Zionist component, bringing their cycle of contention, which 
peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to a close. The attempts to remain relevant through the 
Settlement Watch Project have been the most significant aspect of Shalom Achshav in this phase and the 
opposition to the project suggests that activities which directly deal with realities on the ground and aim 
to ƌeǀeal ͚hiddeŶ ƌealities͛ aƌe peƌceived as a threat. This is more in-line with the tactics used by the 
human rights component, even though the framing behind it is different. It also suggests that perhaps 
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the liberal Zionist component, particularly Shalom Achshav, aƌe ͚lǇiŶg loǁ͛, focusing on one area and 
maintaining their networks until they perceive an opportunity to mobilise in a new cycle of contention, 
when the Israeli public is ready. The radical component, in the meantime, is engaged in a new cycle of 
contention, developing innovative collection action frames and mobilising different resources, filling the 
space left by the liberal Zionist component.   
4 CYCLE TWO: A NEW CYCLE OF CONTENTION FOR THE RADICAL COMPONENT 
Unlike the liberal Zionist component, the radical component attributed opportunities to the 
shifting POS, which meant they felt the situation was ripe to mobilise. This was mainly due to the process 
of radicalisation that occurred in the outbreak of the Intifada, which shifted the ways in which they 
perceived the situation. These shifts took them further away from the Israeli state narrative and 
mainstream thinking, which meant they were able to be more confrontational and innovative in their 
collective action, enabling them to appropriate organisational resources to advance their activism, 
signalling a new cycle of contention (Figure 8). Those that attribute opportunities to the initial broad 
ĐhaŶges aƌe kŶoǁŶ as ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌs͛ iŶ a ĐǇĐle of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ, aĐtiŶg as iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ďƌokeƌs ;Taƌƌoǁ, 
2011:201-202), signalling to others that the time is ripe to mobilise, highlighting the role of the radical 
groups in setting the agenda of Israeli peace activism. However, their radicalisation, combined with the 
shift rightwards in Israeli public opinion and the Israeli government meant that the radical component 
experienced some repression. Given this and their inability to have influence domestically, the radical 
component perceived opportunities to mobilise in the international arena. This helped them to maintain 
momentum but furthered the levels of repression. Figure 8 highlights the emerging cycle of contention 
for the radical component, which will be detailed in the following sections. 
Figure 8 A new cycle of contention for the radical component 
 
 
 
 
4.1 ATTRIBUTION OF OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SHIFTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
4.1.1 RESPONDING TO THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND 
The early risers in this cycle of contention were from the radical component, namely Ta͛ayush 
and the Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ, amongst others. They perceived the breakdown of the Camp David 
talks, the shooting of thirteen Arab citizens of Israel in October 2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the 
Intifada as opportunities to mobilise. The radical component radicalised their positions and tactics by 
seeking to counter the separation discourse in Israel and show solidarity towards the Palestinians, rather 
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than accept there was no partner for peace. “iŵilaƌ to Coƌtƌight͛s ;ϮϬϬϴ:ϭͿ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ that iŶ soŵe 
historical cases of peace movements the idea of ͚peaĐe͛ ƌeƋuiƌed ͚the aĐtiǀe pƌoŵotioŶ of ƌights aŶd 
eƋualitǇ foƌ all͛, the ƌadiĐal aĐtiǀists aĐkŶoǁledged the grievances of the Palestinians and their 
frustration of living under occupation, which encouraged the radical component to mobilise against the 
actions of the Israeli authorities in the second Intifada. TheǇ also ďegaŶ to ƌealise that ͚deĐlaƌatioŶs do 
Ŷot alǁaǇs staŶd the test of ͞ŵoŵeŶts of tƌuth͛͟ ;Bdieƌ aŶd Haleǀi, ϮϬϬϮͿ aŶd theƌefoƌe Đhose to 
͚pƌotest ďǇ doiŶg͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Ta͛ayush, one of the ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌs͛, ͚at the OĐtoďeƌ ϮϬϬϬ ǁateƌshed, the 
Isƌaeli Left ǁas deliŶeated oŶĐe agaiŶ, aŶd the goals of the stƌuggle Đleaƌeƌ thaŶ eǀeƌ͛ ;Bdieƌ aŶd Haleǀi, 
2002). 
Despite further peace talks in the 2000s and 2010s between the Israeli government and Palestinian 
Authority, there was a sense of disillusionment amongst the radical component with regards to the 
political process. Combined with unilateral moves by the Sharon government and strengthened by a 
progressively more right-wing government headed by Netanyahu, the radical component further 
radicalised during the second Intifada. Rather than pushing a peace agreement, the radical activists 
turned their attentions to dealing with issues on the ground, thus taking a mainly reactive approach to 
challenging the occupation. The realities external to Israeli peace activism have therefore affected their 
trajectory but, when and how the activists chose to respond is dependent on internal factors.  
The ways in which the radical component perceived the outbreak of the second Intifada, the 
continuation of the occupation, confrontations with settlers, the building of the separation barrier and 
the situation in Gaza presented opportunities for organisational appropriation, which meant acquiring 
resources for their activities, both in the form of social movement organisations and through individual 
activists. Different groups emerged with a particular specialisation, with each identifying a certain 
element of the prevailing realities to challenge, often based on previous experience in and expertise of 
the field. According to an interview with a veteran activist, 
͚DiffeƌeŶt gƌoups haǀe speĐialised iŶto diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of aĐtioŶs…ďased oŶ field aĐtioŶ 
aŶd diffeƌeŶt stƌategies aŶd also ďased oŶ speĐialisatioŶ… so, different groups became 
very, very good at what they do and they collect knowledge about how to do a certain 
aĐtioŶ aŶd do it ǁell͛ ;Bauŵ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
As the groups responded to prevailing realities they gained more knowledge of the field, evolving and 
opening up new opportunities for other groups to emerge, finding new ways to act and developing their 
own specialisation, creating a spiral of opportunities for the radical component to mobilise, whereby the 
reaction to one opportunity creates further opportunities to act. This is clearly seen by tracing the 
evolution of the radical component from Ta͛ayush to Solidariut. 
As Operation Defensive Shield changed the conditions on the ground, Ta͛ayush acknowledged the need 
for a reassessment in strategy. In the first years of the second Intifada, whilst they had entered 
Palestinians villages and towns, their activities had been non-confrontational and resembled the 
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humanitarian groups that were operating in the human rights component. Delivery of aid requires the 
assistance of the IDF to get through the checkpoints and therefore the activists had to develop good 
relations with the authorities. Furthermore, initially the group wanted to be non-ideological in order to 
be open to a spectrum of activists (Hermann, 2009:193). However, a few days after Operation Defensive 
Shield began, on 1 April 2002, Ta͛ayush deĐided to joiŶ a ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoup ǁho ǁeƌe aĐtiǀe agaiŶst the 
occupation for a demonstration at A-Ram checkpoint, which was violently dispersed by the army (Bdier 
and Halevi, 2002). The response from the IDF marked a shift in the relationship between the army and 
the activists, which deteriorated as repressive efforts of the IDF in the West Bank increased and the 
activists attempted to confront them to assist the Palestinians. Bdeir and Halevi (2002) note that whilst 
Ta͛ayush were not immune to opposition that emerged, they were able to respond due to the 
experience they had from working in Israel and the territories and the solid network they could 
mobilise. The response of the authorities could have been perceived as a threat to the activists but, by 
using existing resources and evolving their strategies, they perceived and created opportunities to 
continue to challenge the occupation.  
The actions that continued throughout the Intifada enabled the emergence of Anarchistim Neged 
HaGader, which identifies its roots in Ta͛ayush. AŶarĐhistiŵ Neged HaGader emerged as a distinct group 
amongst the radical component around the planned construction of the separation barrier. They argued 
that the barrier would lead to new forms of oppression towards the Palestinians, including separating 
people from their farm lands or cutting villages in two (Anarchists Against the Wall, [no date]). In 
contrast, Shalom Achshav supported the idea of the barrier, as long as it was built along the Green Line 
(Friedman and Etkes, 2006). The barrier itself became a target and site of protest, which shifted both the 
tactical repertoires and the relationship with the Palestinians. As noted, the Israeli Jews attend the 
demonstrations against the barrier as guests of the Palestinians, thus creating a direct link between 
Palestinian activism and the evolution of Israeli peace activism. 
The tactics used by the radical component comes with a certain level of risk, particularly those who 
confront the IDF. The high-risk nature of this type of activism has had a direct impact on mobilisation, 
showing a further interactive connection between the powers of movement. On one hand, it has 
reduced the mobilisation potential of those activist groups engaged in these demonstrations due to the 
risk involved and the taboo of confronting the IDF. On the other hand, it has encouraged tighter bonds 
ďetǁeeŶ the aĐtiǀists, ǁhiĐh has helped deǀelop the ͚ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ that is felt aŵoŶgst the radical 
activists. 
The mobilisation in Sheikh Jarrah can also be explained through this spiral of opportunities and 
represents a peak in the activism of the radical left. Through organisational appropriation, they were 
able to make use of existing mobilisation structures that had developed and strengthened through the 
previous decade; they benefitted from the experience of activists in the field; and were able to build on 
relationships that had been made with Palestinian activists. The opportunity was further expanded 
through the general opposition to Netanyahu from the political left, unlike the Zionist-left͛s ĐoŵpliaŶĐe 
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with Sharon in the mid-2000s, which enabled joint mobilisation across the components of Israeli peace 
activism. Following the peak of activism in Sheikh Jarrah, which lasted around two years, the individual 
groups, specialising in their specific areas, continue to act, mobilising against specific injustices. New 
groups have also emerged, basing their activism on these radical forms. One suĐh gƌoup is All That͛s Left, 
a ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe uŶeƋuiǀoĐallǇ opposed to the oĐĐupatioŶ͛ ;All That͛s Left, ϮϬϭϱͿ. TheǇ aƌe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ 
focused on mobilising young, new immigrants and developing a Jewish diaspora angle of resistance. 
Conventional protests that challenge the authorities have also been employed by the radical component 
in response to the realities on the ground. In this phase, unlike the liberal Zionist component, the 
situation in Gaza was perceived as an opportunity for the radical activists to mobilise. For some of the 
younger generation, Operation Cast Lead in 2008 was the first time they questioned the actions of the 
IDF and the idea that Israel only ever acted in the name of peace, as explained to the author in an 
interview with a young activist (Rothman, 2013). Such sentiments created an impetus to join the more 
radical avenues of peace activism. For those who were already involved in activism, Gaza was another 
case of injustice to protest against. In Haifa, an alliance of Jewish and Arab residents held 
demonstrations twice daily following the start of the operation. Jaffa also became the site for anti-war 
pƌotests fƌoŵ the fiƌst opeƌatioŶ, ǁith Jeǁs aŶd Aƌaďs pƌotestiŶg togetheƌ ďǇ the Ŷeighďouƌhood͛s CloĐk 
Tower and in 2014 protestors gatheƌed iŶ ‘aďiŶ “Ƌuaƌe uŶdeƌ the ďaŶŶeƌ ͚Jeǁs aŶd Aƌaďs ‘efuse to ďe 
EŶeŵies.͛ The taĐtiĐs eŵploǇed ƌetuƌŶed to deŵoŶstƌatioŶs iŶ Isƌaeli toǁŶs aŶd Đities, siŶĐe aĐtiǀists 
were unable to enter Gaza and act in solidarity with the population there. However, a key difference 
was that the demonstrations were jointly held between Israelis and Arab citizens of Israel, which was 
enabled by the relationships built up over the previous eight years of solidarity activism. According to 
veteran activist Hannah Safran, the ƌespoŶse to the Gaza opeƌatioŶs shoǁed that ͚soŵethiŶg else has 
deǀeloped oŶ the ƌuiŶs of the old )ioŶist left͛ ;“afƌaŶ, ϮϬϬϵͿ.  
For the radical component, the situation in Gaza therefore presented a further situation that required 
solidarity with the Palestinians. This solidarity activism has further marginalised the radical component 
both with the Israeli public and the Israeli government. However, unlike the leading radicals in the 
previous phase of activism, such as Gush Shalom, these activists are increasingly less concerned in 
influencing the Israeli public or government.  
4.1.2 TURNING AWAY FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC  
The relationship between the radical component and the government is different from that of 
the liberal Zionist component. The reactive nature of their activism suggests that the activists did not 
perceive an opportunity to influence the government however, they did perceive opportunities to 
challenge the realities on the ground, which encouraged the shift in tactical repertoires. According to 
Anarchistim Neged HaGader, ͚diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ is the deŵoĐƌatiĐ aĐt ǁheŶ deŵoĐƌaĐǇ stops fuŶĐtioŶiŶg͛ 
(Anarchists Against the Wall, 2004:50), emphasising the perception that the opportunities were closed 
to influencing the government through accepted political routes. This assumes that the activists would 
 168 
 
 
ultimately want to influence the government however, in some cases this may not be the goal of the 
activists. It has been argued that the more radical fringes of peace activists in Israel are not in fact acting 
as claim-bearers attempting to persuade the government to change their policies with regards to certain 
issues (Gordon, 2010; Hallward, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009). As explained to the author by an activist 
in the radical component, there is a feeling that they did not want to attribute legitimacy to an 
institution they do not believe in and therefore their goals were to change the realities on the ground by 
bypassing the government (Schwarczenberg, 2013). Pallister-Wilkins (2009), in her study of Anarchistim 
Neged haGader, argues that the lack of claim making, the use of direct action and the challenge to the 
legitimacy of the state, necessitates an alternative theoretical approach from social movement theory. 
She argues that this form of activism brings into question the assumptions of the state-centric approach 
of social movement theory. What Pallister-Wilkins fails to understand about social movement theory is 
that it does not necessarily have to be state-centric. The state is one factor amongst others that can 
influence or be influenced by a social movement. Specifically, social movement theory does not specify 
government policy change as a necessary goal of a social movement organisation and thus a pre-
requisite to the application of the different variables of the theory. The relationship between the radical 
component and the Israeli government does suggest further complexities than the political process 
ŵodel alloǁs foƌ ďut poiŶts to a situatioŶ that ĐaŶ ďe desĐƌiďed as ͚politiĐs ďeǇoŶd the state͛ ;WapŶeƌ, 
1995), whereby a social movement can yield influence and create change without appealing to the 
government.  
Given that Israeli public opinion has been turning away from the ideas and beliefs of the liberal Zionist 
component, it is even further away from those of the radical component. However, the radical 
component has become less concerned with influencing the Israeli public. 
4.2 INCREASING REPRESSION 
 Opposition towards the radical activists has been more repressive than towards other 
components. It is not so repressive that the activists are unable to mobilise but, it has hindered the 
numbers they are able to mobilise due to the risks that such repression brings. Repression can be 
identified through surveillance and arrests of activists, violence from the authorities towards the 
activists, as well as the implementation of certain laws that seek to constrain the voices of the radical 
component. 
4.2.1 ARRESTS 
The Israeli authorities had previously monitored the radical left wing activists and groups. One 
particular example was in 1988 when the authorities temporarily closed the Merkaz l͛IŶforŵatzia 
Alternativit. The organisation was accused of providing assistance to illegal Palestinian organisations 
who were involved in orchestrating and perpetuating the first Intifada. Despite being found innocent of 
30 out of 31 charges based on the 1950 Anti-terrorism Law, the Director, Michael Warschawski was 
sentenced to 20 months in jail. According to Warschawski, the reason for the discrepancy in the 
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seŶteŶĐe leŶgth aŶd the Đhaƌge ǁas ͚to ǁaƌŶ the Isƌaeli peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt Ŷot to get too Đlose to the 
ďoƌdeƌ͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ:ϭϮϵͿ, ďǇ this he ŵeaŶt Ŷot to Đƌoss the liŶe ďetǁeeŶ ďeiŶg a ĐƌitiĐ of Isƌael͛s poliĐies aŶd 
aligning with the enemy. Organisations have continued to be targeted and investigated when they come 
too close to the line. For example, in 2011 those who worked for Profil Hadash, the anti-militarization 
feminist organisation, were called into the police for questioning and had their computers confiscated. 
Whilst there were no charges, one member explained to the author that it harmed the organisation by 
delegitimising its activities and making members feel uneasy (Dolev, 2013).  
Individual activists have also been put under surveillance and have been subject to arrests, particularly 
those from Anarchistim Neged HaGader. In 2007 the Shabak aƌgued that it is oďligated ͚to thǁaƌt 
subversive activity of parties that wish to harm the character of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, 
even if their activity is carried out using the tools afforded them by democracy, based on the principle of 
͚defeŶsiǀe deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛͛ ;Boulus aŶd Yakiƌ, ϮϬϬϳͿ. Whilst this is geŶeƌallǇ diƌeĐted at Arab citizens of 
Israel with nationalist goals, it also includes those Jewish activists who are seen as aligning with the 
͚eŶeŵǇ͛, ǁhiĐh applies paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ to those fƌoŵ the ƌadiĐal ĐoŵpoŶeŶt. Foƌ eǆaŵple, iŶ the eaƌlǇ daǇs 
of Ta͛ayush, some activists were arrested when they engaged in humanitarian action during the Intifada 
(Svirsky, 2001b)
69
 and in 2012 around a dozen activists of Anarchistim Neged HaGader were called for 
questioning by the Shabak. The co-ordinator of the Koalitziat Nashiŵ l͛Shaloŵ explained to the author 
that the arrests of activists led them to develop training programmes so that activists know what to 
expect and how to deal with it. Examples include learning what is supposed to happen during an 
investigation and who to approach for assistance; emotional support through low-cost psychologists; 
and explanations of the rights of a detainee in such situations (Dak, 2013). 
4.2.2 VIOLENCE FROM THE AUTHORITIES 
In this phase the IDF and the police have also been more violent towards Israeli peace activists 
than previously. For some, this has helped their cause, whilst for others it has done little to elevate their 
message. This is connected to the framing of the action, the type of tactic used and the identity of the 
opposition forces. In the Sheikh Jarrah protests the activists tried to stay within the legal limits of 
protests by applying for permits when they organised marches and ensuring protestors kept off the 
roads, as directed by the police.
70
 Some protestors disobeyed this and the police began to crack-down 
on the protests. According to activists David Shulman (2010) and Gil Gutwick (2013), the attempts by the 
police to supress the protests led to the mobilisation of more activists. The first big clash happened in 
mid-DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϬϵ aŶd the ͚ďig ďaŶg of Sheik Jarrah happened following that, helped by the media 
atteŶtioŶ͛ ;GutǁiĐk, ϮϬϭϯͿ. This is a ĐoŵŵoŶ ƌesult of ǀioleŶt suppƌessioŶ of ŶoŶ-violent activism; 
where the activists gain legitimacy for maintaining their non-violent stance in the face of repression 
                                                          
69
 See Shulman (2007) for an account of Ta͛ayush, detailing the situations where the IDF close off certain 
areas to prevent actions taking place and the activists have to decide whether they are willing to violate 
closed military zones and risk arrest. 
70
 The authoƌ atteŶded a Ŷuŵďeƌ of these pƌotests iŶ ϮϬϭϬ aŶd ǁitŶessed the oƌgaŶiseƌ͛s ƌeƋuests foƌ 
protestors to remain on the pavement. 
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(Sharp, 1973a, 1973b). Combined with the other factors that encouraged mobilisation in Sheikh Jarrah, 
the repression from the police encouraged further mobilisation.  
The violence in the West Bank protests, which are more lethal than in Sheikh Jarrah, have not had a 
similar impact. The fact that the Israeli activists are confronting the IDF in their protests alongside 
Palestinians breaks a taboo in Israeli society. For a while the presence of Israelis at these protests 
restrained the army (Dana and Sheizaf, 2011) however, as the protests continued, the IDF used more 
repressive means and have developed new methods, such as skunk water to disperse the protests. To 
date over twenty Palestinians have been killed in these demonstrations—most often by direct hits from 
allegedly less lethal weapons such as rubber-coated metal bullets and tear gas canisters but sometimes 
ǁith liǀe aŵŵuŶitioŶ ;B͛Tseleŵ, ϮϬϭϱa). The IDF is considered an important institution in Israeli society, 
seen as a pillar in ensuring the safety of Israelis and Israel against external threats, as well as being 
peƌĐeiǀed as a ͚people͛s aƌŵǇ͛ due to ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ ĐoŶsĐƌiptioŶ, whereas the police force deals with 
criminal activity and is a private institution, therefore confronting the police is perceived differently 
from confronting the IDF. Despite the violence towards Israelis, the protests in the West Bank have 
therefore not received sympathy from within Israel. 
The surveillance, arrests and violence from the IDF increases the risk of the activism and therefore 
reduces mobilisation potential. The ability of opposition forces to either repress activities or de-
legitimise the groups in the eyes of the public suggests that ultimately domestic political opportunity 
structures will determine whether activism can continue or not and whether they can have an impact. 
However, Israeli peace activists have found ways to innovate and evolve in order to bypass any 
constraints imposed by opposition forces through shifts in tactics, framing processes and attempts to 
influence the international community. Furthermore, if the activists are not interested in appealing to 
the state because they know that they cannot make a difference or do not wish to legitimise the 
institution, then they employ direct action to create immediate change on the ground, as can be seen 
with some of the more radical groups in this phase, particularly Ta͛ayush and Anarchistim Neged 
HaGader. According to an interview with a member of the anti-militarisation group Profil Hadash, ͚the 
ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ǁe aĐt iŶ Neǁ Pƌofile…it ĐaŶŶot ďe affeĐted ďǇ eǆteƌŶal, political developments, events 
and so on. Different paths that we decided to take were not the result of wars, Intifadas, Palestinian 
politiĐs oƌ aŶǇthiŶg of the soƌt. It ǁas iŶteƌŶal͛ ;Doleǀ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. This highlights the ŶeĐessitǇ of politiĐal 
opportunities to be perceived in order to exist as a threat or opportunity.  
4.2.3 LAWS 
A number of laws have been proposed and some implemented that have the potential to limit 
and delegitimise the voices of dissenters. They can arguably be seen to target Arab citizens of Israel and 
those that identify with the Palestinian struggle. Relevant to the radical component are two laws, the 
͚Nakďa Laǁ͛ aŶd the ͚AŶti-BoǇĐott Laǁ͛ The ͚Nakďa Laǁ͛ ǁas eŶaĐted iŶ MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϭ aŶd giǀes 
authorisation to the Israeli Finance Minister to ƌeduĐe state ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs to aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s fiŶaŶĐes 
foƌ aŶǇ ͚aĐtiǀitǇ that is ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to the pƌiŶĐiples of the state͛ ;Adalah, ϮϬϭϭͿ. This iŶĐludes ƌejeĐtiŶg 
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Isƌael as a ͚Jeǁish aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ state͛ aŶd ŵaƌkiŶg Isƌael͛s IŶdepeŶdeŶĐe DaǇ as a daǇ of mourning, as 
is done by Palestinians who refer to it as the Nakba. Whilst this may seem financially harmful, in reality 
groups in violation of this law are unlikely to receive state funding in the first place due to their activities 
and framing. The law is more obviously harmful to Arab citizens of Israel, whilst also drawing a line at 
which critical discourses are permitted in Israel, thus marginalising further those groups who try to raise 
awareness of the Palestinian Nakba and question the character of the State of Israel. 
The ͚AŶti-BoǇĐott Laǁ͛ ǁas passed iŶ JulǇ ϮϬϭϭ aŶd ͚pƌohiďits the puďliĐ pƌoŵotioŶ of ďoǇĐott ďǇ Isƌaeli 
citizens and organisations against Israeli institutions or illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It 
enables the filing of Điǀil laǁsuits agaiŶst aŶǇoŶe ǁho Đalls foƌ ďoǇĐott͛ ;Adalah, ϮϬϭϮ:ϵͿ. As a ͚Điǀil 
ǁƌoŶg͛ it is Ŷot a ĐƌiŵiŶal offeŶĐe ďut, iŶdiǀiduals oƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶs ĐaŶ Đall foƌ a Điǀil laǁsuit if theǇ feel 
they have been discriminated against due to a boycott by another individual or organisation. The law 
also includes the removal of tax exemptions for organisations calling for a boycott. This clearly affects 
those Israeli organisations that are either members of the international BDS movement or have called 
for a partial boycott, such as Gush Shalom. In the wake of this law, some organisations involved in peace 
activism had to make public statements to distance themselves from the boycott debate out of financial 
concerns. For example, +972mag, who report on activism, stated that some of their writers support it 
and some do not but, as an organisation, they were unable to openly discuss this issue because of the 
Ŷeǁ legislatioŶs. The Editoƌs ĐoŶĐluded that ͚outƌight Đalls foƌ ďoǇĐott, diǀestŵeŶt aŶd saŶĐtioŶs hold 
far too great a risk for our site – a ƌisk ǁe aƌe Ŷot iŶ a fiŶaŶĐial positioŶ to take͛ ;‘eideƌ, ϮϬϭϭďͿ. 
Coŵpaƌed ǁith the ͚Nakďa Laǁ͛ this has gƌeateƌ fiŶaŶĐial iŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ ďut 
perhaps more significantly, serves to silence those who wish to voice opposition against the occupation. 
Israeli peace activists from across the spectrum responded in partiĐulaƌ to the ͚AŶti-Boycott Law͛, 
aƌguiŶg that the laǁ is ͚aŶti-deŵoĐƌatiĐ͛ aŶd haƌŵs the deŵoĐƌatiĐ Ŷatuƌe of Isƌael. Foƌ the liďeƌal 
Zionist component, particularly Shalom Achshav, this created an opportunity for them to amplify their 
ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵes aŶd ŵake use of the gƌoǁiŶg puďliĐ aŶgeƌ toǁaƌds the ǁaǀe of ͚aŶti-
deŵoĐƌatiĐ͛ legislatioŶ, ǁith ͚the futuƌe of a Jeǁish aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ Isƌael͛ ďeĐoŵiŶg theiƌ ŵoďilisiŶg 
frame in the wake of these laws. For the first time, they openly called for a boycott of settlement 
pƌoduĐts ;Lis aŶd )aƌĐhiŶ, ϮϬϭϭͿ aŶd headed a FaĐeďook dƌiǀe uŶdeƌ the slogaŶ, ͚“ue ŵe, I ďoǇĐott 
settleŵeŶt pƌoduĐts͛, ǁhiĐh ƌeĐeiǀed ϴ,ϱϬϬ ͚likes͛ ;GƌeeŶďeƌg, ϮϬϭϭͿ. Gush Shalom, who was the first 
gƌoup to pƌopose a ďoǇĐott of the settleŵeŶts appealed to the “upƌeŵe Couƌt agaiŶst the ͚AŶti-Boycott 
Laǁ,͛ ĐlaiŵiŶg it ǁas ͚uŶĐoŶstitutioŶal,͛ as it ǀiolates the ƌight to Fƌeedom of Expression (Art.7 cited in 
Keller, 2011). Furthermore it argued that boycott is a legitimate method of engaging in discourse in a 
liďeƌal deŵoĐƌaĐǇ ;Kelleƌ, ϮϬϭϭͿ. Foƌ a shoƌt peƌiod of tiŵe iŶ ϮϬϭϭ, these laǁs, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ the ͚AŶti-
BoǇĐott Laǁ͛ Đaught the attention of the Israeli public and encouraged them to react. However, the 
flames died down and did not succeed in re-invigorating the liberal Zionist component into sustained 
activism against the occupation. The fact there was little response to the Nakba Law highlights the 
connection between political opportunity structures, framing and tactical repertoires. Opposing the 
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͚AŶti-BoǇĐott Laǁ͛ oŶ the gƌouŶds of deŵoĐƌaĐǇ pƌeseƌǀatioŶ fits iŶto the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe 
however, upholding the right to commemorate the Nakba is beyond what is deemed acceptable. 
4.3 TURNING TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
Given the lack of responsiveness internally and the repression towards the radical activists, 
some have begun to turn their attentions abroad by connecting with transnational advocacy networks. 
This has provided new targets for Israeli peace activism. Transnational movements that present ideas in-
line with those of the radical activists act as both mobilisation structures and political opportunity 
structures, enabling the appropriation of new resources, mutual diffusion of tactical repertoires and 
increased potential to have influence. The global BDS Movement has been particularly important in 
furthering the efforts of the radical component of Israeli peace activism. This helps to bolster those 
groups working on BDS in Israel, providing them with additional resources beyond their own small 
numbers.  
Three mechanisms can be seen in the connection between the radical component and the international 
community: global framing, transnational diffusion and externalisation (Tarrow, 2011:235). Global 
framing, where domestic issues are given broader meaning than the original collective action frames, 
can be seen amongst the radical activists who connect the oppression of the Palestinians to all forms of 
oppression, which is reflective of the global justice movement. By making this connection, greater 
support can be garnered for the Palestinian cause. Transnational diffusion, where similar tactical 
repertoires and framing are spread across borders, is a two-way dynamic whereby information and 
tactics are diffused between Israeli activists and international activists, leading to innovation in tactics 
and helping to motivate the Israeli activists. Externalisation can be seen in particular in the links with 
transnational social movements.  
Whilst the pressure from the international dimension has not forced Israel to change its policies, the 
radical component has been given momentum through increased material capacity and normative 
support. However, turning attentions abroad has further reduced the legitimacy of the activists in Israel, 
which in turn led to further opposition towards the radical activists. The activists have responded by 
continuing to develop innovative collective action and maintain their cycle of contention. 
4.4 A NEW CYCLE OF CONTENTION 
 The ways in which the radical component perceived the shifting POS: the realities on the 
ground, the nature of the government and public opinion, has led them to attribute opportunities to 
mobilise in response to these shifts, thus enabling a new cycle of contention. Radicalisation in their 
collective action frames in response to the prevailing realities enabled them to mobilise to challenge the 
realities and created a spiral of opportunities for others to mobilise. As the early risers appropriated 
resources and developed innovative collective action, other groups formed, mobilised and specialised 
on targeting certain aspects of the prevailing realities. Given the shifts in the government and Israeli 
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public opinion, the radical groups were unable to have any influence in these areas however, they 
decided not to focus on trying to change those positions but instead continued to employ reactive 
activism on the ground. This often led to repressive measures by the Israeli authorities, which 
encouraged further innovative collective action amongst the activists, as well as a focus on 
opportunities in the international arena. This, as will be explored in more detail when considering the 
human rights component, increased the repression domestically but, enabled the continued 
mobilisation of the radical component. 
5 CYCLE THREE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: A CONTINUED CYCLE OF CONTENTION 
The human rights component of Israeli peace activism continued their efforts from the previous 
phase, attributing opportunities to the shifting political opportunity structures to act. This led to a 
continuation of their cycle of contention, which emerged in the first Intifada (Figure 9). The collective 
action frames and tactical repertoires are less confrontational than the radical component, due to their 
desire to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the Israeli public and to put pressure on the Israeli 
government to change their policies and practices towards the Palestinians. This is highlighted in the 
mission statement of the most established and largest human rights organisation in Israel, B͛Tselem, 
which states that they aim, 
͚To doĐuŵeŶt aŶd eduĐate the Isƌaeli puďliĐ aŶd poliĐǇŵakeƌs aďout huŵan rights 
violations in the occupied territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among 
the Isƌaeli puďliĐ, aŶd help Đƌeate a huŵaŶ ƌights Đultuƌe iŶ Isƌael͛ ;B͛Tselem, [no date, a]). 
In order to have influence, this requires more contained, but still innovative, tactical repertoires and 
collection action frames. They attribute opportunities to act to the realities on the ground, continuing to 
monitor and report on policies and actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in some cases protest 
these actions and provide humanitarian services. Despite their attempts to influence the Israeli public 
and Israeli government, initially there was a lack of response from these, given their attitudes to the 
conflict. The human rights component therefore turned their attention to perceived opportunities in the 
international dimension. This led to more innovative collective action, which diffused from the 
international dimension however, this caused increased attempts at repression from within Israel, from 
both the government and civil society, which served to further marginalise their voice and opposition 
against them. This led them to develop different collection action frames and repertoires. This in turn 
encouraged a cycle of repression and innovation. Figure 9 identifies the continued cycle of contention 
for the human rights component, which will be explored in the following sections. 
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Figure 9. The continued cycle of the human rights component 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 ATTRIBUTING OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SHIFTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
5.1.1 RESPONDING TO THE SECOND INTIFADA  
 The second Intifada was seen as an opportunity to continue efforts to protect Palestinian 
human rights and to hold Israeli society and government accountable to standards of human rights in 
the occupied territories by continuing to produce reports on the events that were happening. In 2001 
and 2002 B͛Tseleŵ published the largest number of reports on human rights violations in the occupied 
territories since the years of the first Intifada. They included some information on the violence caused 
by Palestinians, however; most of the reports focused on violence and human rights violations towards 
the Palestinians.
71
 The second Intifada was perceived as an opportunity for some new groups to 
emerge, often in cases where individuals wanted to reveal and challenge the prevailing realities but the 
organisational avenues did not exist. Two significant groups in particular emerged in response to the 
second Intifada, Machsom Watch, which monitored the checkpoints and Shovrim Shtika, which 
collected testimonies of soldiers who served in the occupied territories. Similar to the reactive nature of 
the radical component, other events and policies of the Israeli government and IDF in this phase have 
presented opportunities for the human rights component to mobilise and also enabled them to 
sometimes join the radical groups or share resources. Whilst they were more confrontational than the 
liberal Zionist component, they still aimed to influence the Israeli public and therefore used more 
contained tactics than the radical component by monitoring and reporting on what was happening in 
the occupied territories. The continued efforts of the humanitarian groups and conscientious objectors 
also helped sustain the human rights component in this phase.  
5.1.2 MOBILISING AGAINST THE SITUATION IN GAZA 
 The human rights organisations were particularly active in response to the situation in Gaza. In 
November 2006 nine organisations issued a joint statement on the ͚Gaza huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ Cƌisis͛ ;B͛Tseleŵ, 
2006) and following each of the three major operations in 2008/9, 2012 and 2014 produced reports of 
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Isƌael͛s use of foƌĐe iŶ the Gaza stƌip.72 These reports aimed at holding Israel accountable for its actions 
by highlighting to the Israeli public, the Israeli Supreme Court and the international community what 
happeŶed duƌiŶg the opeƌatioŶs aŶd to applǇ pƌessuƌe oŶ Isƌael to  ͚ƌespeĐt the ďasiĐ huŵaŶ ƌights of 
residents of the Gaza Strip, and that all parties respect international humanitaƌiaŶ laǁ͛ ;B͛Tseleŵ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. 
As noted, most of the Israeli public felt that the operations in Gaza were justified and therefore there 
was limited response to reports of the human rights groups. However, their reports both on the 
situation in Gaza and other issues in the occupied territories have been used in Supreme Court cases 
and international reports, such as the Goldstone Report. 
During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, a new group of refuseniks emerged. For the first time a group 
from Unit 8200, an elite military intelligence unit, refused to conduct their reserve duty. Whilst they 
claim that they had made the decision to refuse to conduct their reserve duty in the occupied territories 
before the conflict broke out, the 2014 Gaza crisis opened an opportunity for them to publicly express 
their refusal (Beaumont, 2014). Whilst the numbers were small, with only 43 soldiers declaring their 
refusal, they received a large amount of media attention and harsh condemnation from the authorities, 
highlighting the significance of their actions.
73
  
The conflict with Gaza was also perceived as an opportunity for a group of Gazans and Israelis from the 
South of Israel, Kol Aher (Other Voice), to emerge. They protested the situation in Gaza and called for a 
peaceful resolution. They held a number of activities with the aim of promoting a diplomatic solution to 
the conflict and ending the blockade on Gaza (Kol Aher, 2014). The political opportunity structures in 
this case do hinder their work, since the Israelis and Gazans are no longer allowed to meet in person as 
they had done before the Israeli withdrawal. However, as explained to the author, they communicate 
via e-mail and telephone, maintaining contact even during heightened times of conflict (Chaitlin, 2013).  
Whilst these groups aim to educate the Israeli public and influence the Israeli government by attempting 
to represent a legitimate voice in the discourse in Israel, as evidence by their contained tactical 
repertoires and registered NGO status, aside from the conscientious objectors, their efforts to achieve 
change was met by a limited response internally. Therefore, the human rights component began to look 
for opportunities in the international dimension. 
5.2 ATTRIBUTING OPPORTUNITIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
With the lack of response in Israeli society, the human rights organisations have turned their 
atteŶtioŶs aďƌoad, thƌough a pƌoĐess of eǆteƌŶalisatioŶ, ǁhiĐh is ǁheƌe ͚doŵestiĐ aĐtoƌs taƌget eǆteƌŶal 
actors in attempts to defend their iŶteƌests͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϮϯϱͿ, ďǇ oƌgaŶisiŶg touƌs foƌ foƌeigŶ ǀisitoƌs 
in Israel, disseminating their reports abroad and conducting international speaking tours, both as an 
awareness raising tactic and for fundraising. Turning their attentions abroad suggests a situation 
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reflective of the boomerang process (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), where domestic actors appeal to open 
political opportunity structures in the international arena, alongside international mobilisation 
structures, to help put pressure on their state when they cannot influence their own public or 
government due to closed domestic political opportunity structures.  
Europe has been a particular target for the human rights component. The discourse in parts of Europe is 
in line with different parts of Israeli peace activism, which presents signs that the international political 
opportunity structures for Israeli peace activism are open. There was widespread condemnation for 
Isƌael͛s ͚dispƌopoƌtioŶate use of foƌĐe͛ iŶ the Gaza opeƌatioŶs74 and the European Parliament endorsed 
the Goldstone Report (Phillips, 2010), which concluded that Israel was guilty of a number of war crimes 
and human rights violations.
75
 There have also been calls from European governments to apply sanctions 
on Israel and the EU has reĐogŶised PalestiŶe ͚iŶ pƌiŶĐiple͛ ;BeauŵoŶt, ϮϬϭϰͿ. These deǀelopŵeŶts 
provide an open avenue for Israeli peace activists to disseminate their reports, particularly those dealing 
with human rights violations and injustices.  
Whilst these connections help to increase the material capacity of Israeli peace activism, expand their 
mobilising structures and identify where they can have influence internationally, they have however, not 
been received well domestically. The level of repression towards the human rights component increased 
in the 2010s and further reduced the leverage of the human rights component internally, with the 
groups criticised for demonising and delegitimising Israel (NGO Monitor, 2015). This suggests some 
interesting dynamics between international opportunity structures and domestic opportunity structures.  
5.3 INCREASING OPPOSITION AND ATTEMPTS AT REPRESSION 
Efforts within Israel to silence and delegitimise these voices have come from both from civil 
society and the government. Whilst these attempts at repression can affect all components of Israeli 
peace activism, it is particularly significant to the human rights organisations in the human rights 
component, as the radical component is not concerned with legitimacy in Israel and the liberal Zionist 
groups have not been confrontational enough to be subjected to such opposition; the human rights 
organisations have therefore been the primary target of this opposition. 
5.3.1 LAWS 
AloŶgside the ͚Nakďa Laǁ͛ aŶd the ͚AŶti-BoǇĐott Laǁ͛ disĐussed iŶ ƌelation to the radical 
component was the passing of The ͚NGO FoƌeigŶ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt FuŶdiŶg Laǁ͛, ǁhiĐh paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ affeĐts 
the human rights component. It was passed in February 2011 and requires NGOs to regularly submit 
financial reports on funding received from foreign governments and public donors. Initially it included 
clauses that forbade foreign donations to organisations engaged in certain activities or rhetoric. These 
were however removed after some opposition and the more moderate law was put forward (NGO 
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Monitor, 2010). The aim behind the law seems valid; to ensure greater transparency and accountability 
of NGOs by highlighting the involvement of foreign governments in political matters. It was argued, 
however, to be purposefully discriminatory against human rights NGOs (El-Ad, 2011). Since all NGOs 
already have to register their financial details it is argued that the goal of the law is actually to 
discourage foreign funding (Adalah, 2012:14). Settler groups tend to be funded by private individuals, so 
are beyond the remit of this law and organisations such as the Jewish Agency for Israel and the World 
Zionist Organisations are exempt, increasing suspicion that the law was directed at the human rights 
organisations and not NGOs in general.  
The ͚NGO FoƌeigŶ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt FuŶdiŶg Laǁ͛ has ďeeŶ paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ haƌŵful toǁaƌds the huŵaŶ ƌights 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs. TheǇ fƌaŵe theŵselǀes as ďeiŶg paƌt of a huŵaŶ ƌights ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŶd Ŷot the ͚peaĐe 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛, aiŵiŶg to pƌoduĐe aĐĐuƌate aŶd Đƌediďle ƌepoƌts oŶ the huŵaŶ ƌights situation in the West 
BaŶk aŶd Gaza. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this laǁ has the effeĐt of ͚puďliĐlǇ delegitiŵisiŶg͛ these gƌoups aŶd opeŶiŶg 
them up to state scrutiny (Lerman, 2010). The Israeli public however, did not take issue with these 
attempts to limit the work of the human rights organisations. As noted, in cases of threat, the Israeli 
public retreats to a security discourse and prioritise their security above all. According to the War and 
Peace Index, the security discourse in the Gaza Operation in 2008/9 trumped human rights concerns, 
with 57% of Israelis agreeing that national security is more important than ensuring there are no human 
rights violations (Yaar and Hermann, 2010).  
5.3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY 
A number of NGOs have been founded to directly challenge the human rights component of 
Israeli peace activism, such as Im Tirtzu (If You Will It) and NGO Monitor. Im Tirtzu was set up in 2006 to 
͚stƌeŶgtheŶ aŶd adǀaŶĐe the ǀalues of )ioŶisŵ iŶ Isƌael͛ ;Iŵ Tiƌtzu, [Ŷo date, a]). Their mission statement 
actively positions themselves against Israeli peace activists, particularly the human rights and radical 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to theiƌ ǁeďsite, ͚a ŵajoƌ poƌtioŶ of Im Tirtzu's efforts is devoted to combating 
the campaign of de-legitimization against the State of Israel and to providing responses to Post-Zionist 
and Anti-)ioŶist pheŶoŵeŶa,͛ ;Iŵ Tiƌtzu, [Ŷo date, a]). This was most notably seen in their campaign 
against the Neǁ Isƌael FuŶd, ͚The NIF WatĐh͛, which criticises the activities of the NIF and their grantees, 
which Im Tirtzu ďelieǀe to ďe agaiŶst the IDF aŶd Isƌael͛s state poliĐies.76 However, a Jerusalem Court 
ruled that aspects of Im Tirtzu had resemblances to fascism, which marked a blow to their attempts to 
be seen as a mainstream movement protecting the State of Israel (Sheizaf, 2013c).  
NGO Monitor has proven to be a more substantial force against Israeli left-wing and human rights 
organisations. It is an NGO watch-dog that ͚pƌoǀides iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd aŶalǇsis, pƌoŵotes aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ, 
and supports discussion on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to advance human rights and 
huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ ageŶdas͛ ;NGO MoŶitoƌ, [Ŷo date]Ϳ, ǁith the aiŵ of eŶdiŶg ͚the pƌaĐtiĐe used ďǇ ĐeƌtaiŶ 
self-deĐlaƌed ͞huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ NGOs͟ of eǆploitiŶg the laďel ͞uŶiǀeƌsal huŵaŶ ƌights ǀalues͟ to pƌoŵote 
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politiĐallǇ aŶd ideologiĐallǇ ŵotiǀated ageŶdas͛ ;NGO MoŶitoƌ, [Ŷo date]Ϳ. As a ƌeseaƌĐh oƌgaŶisatioŶ 
they seek to make information about NGOs transparent and available to the public. One way in which 
they do this is by identifying and making public the funding sources of NGOs. According to an interview 
between the author and the Legal Advisor of NGO Monitor one of the main motivations is that foreign 
governments tend to provide funding to certain organisations but are unaware that sometimes these 
organisations then use that funding to fund organisations in Israel and Palestine, which might promote 
ideas or goals that are contrary to the foreign government from where the funding originated (Herzberg, 
2013). Making this information available seems like a positive step in improving the accountability of 
NGOs in Israel. 
However, NGO Monitor has received a backlash from the NGOs that it researches, arguing that the 
organisation is part of a wider attempt to delegitimise dissenting voices in Israel and is regarded as a 
diƌeĐt oppositioŶ foƌĐe to Isƌaeli peaĐe aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights aĐtiǀisŵ. It is aƌgued that it is ͚Ŷot aŶ oďjeĐtiǀe 
ǁatĐhdog… [ďut] a paƌtisaŶ opeƌatioŶ that suppƌesses its peƌĐeiǀed ideologiĐal adǀeƌsaƌies͛ ;‘eŵez iŶ 
Kessel and Klochendler, 2010). Further criticism claims that NGO Monitor is merely a pawn of the 
Netanyahu government, since the founder and Director, Gerald Steinberg, has previously worked for 
and was closely affiliated to the government during the early years of the organisation, thus questioning 
its status as an NGO, with suggestions that it has more characteristics of a Government Operated Non-
Governmental Organisation (GONGO) (Gurvitz and Rotem, 2014). 
It is difficult to verify the various claims against each other but, what is clear is that the organisations are 
engaged in a ͚ǁaƌ of ǁoƌds͛, attempting to gain the high-ground to ensure that their discourse is not 
discredited. Given the views of the Israeli public and other opposition forces at play in this phase, NGO 
Monitor is succeeding in reinforcing their negative views towards Israeli peace activism. Derfner (2013) 
notes that iŶ ƌespoŶse to NGO MoŶitoƌ͛s ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the oƌigiŶs of the fuŶdiŶg of Shovrim Shtika, the 
Israeli public, who were once interested in the soldiers testimonies, became distracted by the funding 
issue. Sheizaf (2012b) also argues that by focusing on sources of funding, NGO Monitor succeeds in 
avoiding engagement in the discourse of the left-wing and human rights groups. 
5.4 THE CONTINUATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT 
 The human rights component seems to be attempting to build a middle-ground between the 
liberal Zionist and radical component. Whilst they challenge the situation in order reveal the realities of 
the occupation and hold the government accountable to its policies and actions, it is not too 
confrontational, particularly in the tactics employed, which tend to focus on reporting and 
documentation. Despite their attempts to influence Israeli public opinion and the Israeli government, 
there was little attention given to their efforts. However, later in this phase, in particular due to their 
efforts to reach out to the international dimension, they have experienced increasing opposition and 
attempts at repression. Despite this, they have continued steadily with their collective action, 
representing a continued cycle of contention. 
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6 IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
The case of Israeli peace activism has shown that the international dimension can provide both 
mobilisation structures, as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as acting as political opportunity 
structures. The connection between domestic social movements and the international arena have been 
theorised in a number of ways. Keck aŶd “ikkiŶk ;ϭϵϵϴͿ deǀeloped the ͚ďooŵeƌaŶg pƌoĐess,͛ ǁheƌeďǇ 
domestic actors who are unable to have influence internally, due to closed domestic political 
opportunity structures, seek assistance in the international arena. They connect with civil society actors 
through transnational advocacy networks in order to try to influence international institutions or foreign 
governments to take up their issues and put pressure on their government. Keck and Sikkink (1998:29) 
note that the effectiveness of international pressure, whether in the form of material sanctions or moral 
condemnation, will depend on how vulnerable the target state is to these. 
Tarrow (2005:147-8), in considering how domestic actors become involved in transnational activism, 
suggests a refinemeŶt iŶ the ďooŵeƌaŶg pƌoĐess though a ͚Đoŵposite ŵodel of eǆteƌŶalisatioŶ͛. He 
aƌgues that the Ŷatuƌe of the ͚ďloĐkage͛ of the doŵestiĐ politiĐal oppoƌtuŶitǇ stƌuĐtuƌes ǁill lead to 
different trajectories of externalisation in the boomerang process and therefore a different outcome. He 
argues that a lack of response will create a different pathway from a repressive response.
77
 The 
collective action of Israeli peace activism during the second Intifada received a lack of response in the 
domestic realm, which led Israeli peace activists to turn their attentions abroad. In response to the Gaza 
conflicts and further human rights violations in the West Bank, the activists focused their framing on 
solidarity and human rights discourses in part to appeal to the international community to put pressure 
on Israel. The government and Israeli civil society then shifted their response and began to use 
repressive measures to limit the activities of Israeli peace activism, particularly the human rights NGOs. 
Tarrow (2005) stops at the first process of externalisation and does not consider the stages when the 
͚ďooŵeƌaŶg͛ ƌetuƌŶs to the doŵestiĐ settiŶg. He does Ŷot ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ the doŵestiĐ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵaǇ 
change how they view and confront the social movement once it has connected with the international 
community. In the case of Israeli peace activism, the connections made with the international 
community have reduced the legitimacy of the domestic social movement and increased repression; 
where there was once a lack of response, there is now repression. Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 
;ϭϵϵϵͿ theoƌise a ͚spiƌal͛ ŵodel, ǁhiĐh states that if the doŵestiĐ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt does Ŷot ƌespoŶd to the 
fiƌst set of iŶteƌŶatioŶal pƌessuƌes, theŶ the ͚ďooŵeƌaŶg͛ is thƌoǁŶ out agaiŶ iŶ oƌdeƌ to iŶstigate 
fuƌtheƌ pƌessuƌe. LiŶkiŶg Taƌƌoǁ͛s ŵodel of eǆteƌŶalisatioŶ ǁith the spiƌal ŵodel Đould pƌoǀide aŶ 
understanding of how interactions between a social movement and international political opportunity 
structures affects domestic political opportunity structures and therefore the trajectory of the social 
movement. 
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This would help to explain the direct links between a domestic social movement, the international arena 
and the state. However this ignores the indirect links that the international environment may have with 
a social movement. As shown, there are external factors in the international arena that, although are 
not directly connected to the domestic social movement, can still affect its trajectory and ability to 
create change. In the Israeli case, the US led War on Terror and to some extent the Arab Uprisings have 
plaǇed a ƌole iŶ ƌeiŶfoƌĐiŶg Isƌael͛s seĐuƌitǇ ƌhetoƌiĐ aŶd eŶaďliŶg it to fuƌtheƌ, or at least maintain, its 
policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians, which marginalises the voices of Israeli peace activism. It is not 
enough, therefore, to only look at the actors and processes directly involved in linking the domestic 
social movement to the international arena, indirect connections must also be considered. 
6.2 THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM 
Having considered the powers of movement and how they interact with each other, identifying 
the transformations in Israeli peace activism through the different cycles of contention since the second 
Intifada, it is possible to note some areas in which peace activism is having an impact. The opposition 
towards Israeli peace activism suggests that these groups and individuals are yielding some power. This 
is most notable through government attempts to limit the influence and activities of the groups, as well 
as direct attacks from civilians towards peace activists. Much of the opposition is directed towards 
Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel but, by extension, Israeli Jews who act in solidarity with 
Palestinians, or show concern for their predicament, are also considered with suspicion. This is nothing 
new, however the increased solidarity activism and rights-based framing has placed the Israeli activists 
closer to the Palestinian cause, thereby heightening opposition towards them. The links to the 
international arena furthered the opposition, particularly towards those promoting a human rights 
discourse. Therefore, whilst it is true that Israeli peace activism has not been able to influence Israeli 
public opinion and has not changed government policy towards the Palestinians, it is not the case the 
Isƌaeli peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ is iƌƌeleǀaŶt. GolaŶ Ŷotes that ͚the ĐaŵpaigŶ agaiŶst these gƌoups, aŶd deŵaŶdiŶg 
action to restrain them, appear to [suggest] that the peace and human rights NGOs have had, and will 
contiŶue to haǀe, aŶ iŵpaĐt oŶ ŵatteƌs of ǁaƌ aŶd peaĐe͛ ;ϮϬϭϰď:Ϯϴ-10). Impact must therefore be 
sought outside the policy and public opinion arenas, which can be done by considering in equal measure 
all the powers of movement. Furthermore, a broader understanding of impact that considers 
mobilisation, cultural shifts and the role of the movement in norm entrepreneurship, in addition to the 
policy arena (Bernstein, 2003; della Porta, 1999; Staggenborg, 1995), will provide a more detailed 
analysis. 
The impact of Israeli peace activism can be identified in three main areas. Firstly, in turning towards the 
international community the activists are helping feed international pressure on Israel, as well as 
mobilising more resources. Secondly, the activists are creating closer relationships with the Palestinians, 
ƌejeĐtiŶg the sepaƌatioŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe iŶ Isƌael aŶd huŵaŶisiŶg the ͚Otheƌ͛. This ĐhalleŶges the ǁidespƌead 
fear and mistrust of Palestinians, which gives weight to hawkish policies. Thirdly, Israeli peace activists 
are, as they always have been, engaged in norm entrepreneurship, developing new ideas surrounding 
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the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is clear from the cycles of contention that it is the radical and human 
rights components that are having such impacts, with only the Settlement Watch Project from the 
liberal Zionist component affecting such change. Given that Israeli peace activism is still in flux, finding 
its feet following the second Intifada, these areas of impact have interesting implications for the future.  
6.2.1 TURNING TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 The shift towards the international community has had the impact of generating a larger 
audience for Israeli peace activism, as well as influencing the internal dynamics of activism. By 
identifǇiŶg taƌgets iŶ the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ aŶd seekiŶg to ƌeǀeal to theŵ the ƌealities of Isƌael͛s 
aĐtioŶs iŶ the West BaŶk aŶd Gaza “tƌip, the aĐtiǀists Đould aƌguaďlǇ ďe ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to Isƌael͛s gƌoǁiŶg 
international isolation (Golan, 2014a), which could then encourage the government to change its 
policies. By making use of their knowledge and research on the ground, they highlight the violations in 
human rights, monitor settlement expansion, provide information on corporations that profit from the 
occupation and give a voice to the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. This then gives groups 
abroad leverage to mobilise support and lobby their governments to put pressure on Israel. However, as 
shown this has had the effect of further reducing the legitimacy of Israeli peace activism within Israel, 
with opposition groups and the government employing tactics aimed at discrediting the work of the 
activists. Such opposition suggests there is fear of the impact or potential impact of Israeli peace 
activism in the international arena. 
6.2.2 NEW RELATIONSHIPS 
A key shift in activism in this phase has been the relationships developed with Palestinian 
activists. In the case of solidarity activism, the Israeli activists are required to acknowledge the unequal 
power relations and attempt not to reinforce them in their activism. In doing so, the Israeli activists are 
acknowledging their privileged position, enabling the Palestinians to take control of liberating 
themselves from oppression. Groups such as the Hug Horim Shakulim and LoĐhaŵiŵ l͛Shaloŵ have also 
created new relationships by bringing shared experiences of bereavement or combat. These shifts serve 
to, on the one hand de-huŵaŶise the ͚Otheƌ͛, aŶd oŶ the otheƌ aĐkŶoǁledge the asǇŵŵetƌies ďetǁeeŶ 
the two sides. This goes against the state narrative towards the Palestinians, which presents them as the 
enemy, aŶd those ǁho ǁoƌk ǁith theŵ aƌe ďƌaŶded as ͚tƌaitoƌs͛.78 It is interesting, therefore, to note 
the dialectic whereby peace activists are exhibiting greater partnership with Palestinians amid greater 
exclusion of the Palestinians by Israeli society. By contradicting the separation paradigm and challenging 
mainstream views on the Palestinians, new forms of activism have been developed, with the potential 
for more innovation in the future. 
                                                          
78
 For example, a number of protests were held criticising those who spoke out in joint Jewish and Arab 
pƌotests agaiŶst the opeƌatioŶs iŶ Gaza iŶ the ϮϬϬϬs aŶd ϮϬϭϬs, ǁith ĐhaŶts iŶĐludiŶg ͚Death to leftists͛ 
aŶd ͚Leftists aƌe tƌaitoƌs͛ ;Lazaƌeǀa, ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
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An interesting conflict has arisen in the new dynamic between Israeli and Palestinian activists. The shift 
to Israeli activists considering themselves guests of the Palestinian activists has created some debate 
over appropriate dress-code. Some groups explicitly ask activists to dress appropriately in their e-mail 
correspondence (Shalif, 2013). This has created conflicting beliefs amongst some radical activists. As 
explained to the author, for those activists who espouse a feminist outlook, whilst also acknowledging 
the asymmetrical relationship between the Palestinians and the Israelis, they are sometimes conflicted 
oǀeƌ ǁhetheƌ to dƌess ͚ŵodestlǇ͛ ǁheŶ goiŶg to West BaŶk ǀillages, iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith the Đultuƌe of 
the Palestinians, or not feeling they should be constrained by any form of dress code (Rothschild, 2013). 
The new relationships between the Palestinian and Israeli activists have therefore further opened the 
debate over the differences between the two sides.  
6.2.3 NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The marginalisation of Israeli peace activism within Israel and the clear demarcation between 
the radical component and the liberal Zionist component has given the radical component room to be 
more radical than previously, placing solidarity and justice at the core of the radical collective action 
frames. In doing so they have created new collective action frames, which challenge mainstream views 
on the conflict. This has enabled an evolution in the tactical repertoires, opened up new mobilisation 
structures and allowed for the shifting relationships with the Palestinians and with the international 
community. These changes mirror the dynamics of Israeli peace activism from previous phases where 
the radical components developed innovative collective action, built experience in the field and 
nurtured contacts with the Palestinians. In the previous phases, these developments diffused into the 
liberal Zionist component, which was able to mobilise popular support for a negotiated settlement that 
later diffused into government policy. Given the demobilisation and political irrelevancy of the liberal 
Zionist component, the human rights component is playing the role of attempting to influence the Israeli 
public and government and is being influenced by the collective action frames of the radical component. 
Developments have brought new ideas surrounding the conflict, its origins and ways to challenge it, with 
a greater emphasis on a rights-ďased disĐouƌse ƌatheƌ thaŶ a disĐouƌse of ͚peaĐe͛. Whilst there is a lack 
of support for these ideas amongst the Israeli public and government, as evidence by the growing 
opposition, this opposition actually suggests that the rights-based discourse and revealing of hidden 
realities could have some influence. 
7 CONCLUSION 
 There have been a number of shifts in both the domestic and international political opportunity 
structures in this phase of Israeli peace activism. There have been changes in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, most significantly the outbreak of the second Intifada, the disengagement of the Gaza Strip and 
parts of the West Bank, and the construction of the separation barrier. Israeli public opinion has shifted 
more rightwards and the Israeli government has become progressively more right wing. In the 
international dimension, the global war on terror has changed the dynamics in the international arena, 
the Arab uprisings created uncertainty in the Middle East, Israel has engaged in conflicts with Hamas in 
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Gaza, the Arab League put forward the Arab Peace Initiative and there has been an increase in the 
strength of transnational social movements dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, how 
these shifts affected Israeli peace activism depended on whether or not the groups attributed to them 
opportunities or threats to mobilisation.  
The three cycles of contention identified show that the ways in which the components of Israeli peace 
activism framed themselves, their tactical repertoires and their mobilisation structures determined 
whether or not they perceived the changes as opportunities or threats. The liberal Zionist component 
went through a period of demobilisation due to their perception that there was not an opportunity to 
mobilise. This was due to exhaustion from decades of activism, which meant they lost some of their 
human resources; facilitation, whereby the government satisfied some of their demands and their focus 
on the particularism of Zionism, which meant they did not want to stray too far ahead of Israeli public 
opinion in aligning with the Palestinian cause. Given Israeli public opinion moved further away from 
ideas of peace and reconciliation with the Palestinians and the government became progressively more 
right wing, the liberal Zionist groups lost their target audience. Furthermore, counter-dynamics from the 
settler movement hindered their activities and any opportunities to mobilise around the Arab Peace 
Initiative were blocked internally. Therefore, as conventionally argued, the liberal Zionist component of 
Israeli peace activism became paralysed and demobilised.  
The radical component, however perceived the changes in the POS as opportunities to mobilise, given 
their radicalisation in the outbreak of the second Intifada, which led them to act almost solely in 
solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians. This led to an evolution in their tactical repertoires and the 
emergence of a new cycle of contention. Despite the small numbers and their marginalisation amongst 
Israeli society, as well as increasing repression from the authorities, they appropriated new 
organisational and social resources, through new SMOs, coalitions and new activists, enabling them to 
continue to challenge the prevailing realities. The human rights component also perceived the changes 
as opportunities to continue their activism, particularly in revealing the hidden realities of the 
oĐĐupatioŶ aŶd iŶ ĐhalleŶgiŶg the authoƌities͛ poliĐies aŶd pƌaĐtiĐes. GiǀeŶ the laĐk of ƌespoŶse 
domestically, they turned their attentions to the international dimension, where they perceived 
opportunities to mobilise and yield influence. This led to increasing opposition and attempts at 
repression internally however, this did not paralyse their activities and they continue to confront the 
situation. 
Certain international opportunity structures, most notably the global war on terror, has had the effect of 
further closing the political opportunities within Israel, as the government gained legitimacy in fighting 
terrorism militarily. However, this has not limited the efforts of the radical and human rights 
components who consistently find ways to challenge the shifting realities. Impact beyond the policy 
arena has been identified, namely stronger ties with the international community, new relationships 
between the Israeli activists and the Palestinians and shifting discourses surrounding the conflict. It is by 
approaching Israeli peace activism through the internal dynamics: collective action frames; mobilisation 
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structures; and tactical repertoires that enabled a more detailed understanding of how the three 
components perceived the shifting political opportunities, highlighting the different cycles of 
contention, the continued efforts of the peace activists and potential impact of Israeli peace activism.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation looked at the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second 
Intifada in 2000 and, in doing so, provided a detailed understanding of this sector of Israeli society. In 
particular it has challenged the conventional argument that the Israeli peace movement was paralysed 
following the outbreak of violence in 2000, arguing that it was only the liberal Zionist component that 
went through a period of demobilisation. This dissertation has shown that the liberal Zionist component 
were unable and unwilling to mobilise to the extent they had done previously, due to a combination of 
exhaustion from decades of activism, facilitation of some of their goals by the government, the decision 
to moderate their collective action frames to focus solely on the peace and security of Israel, and the 
strength of counter movement dynamics. However, this dissertation has also outlined two further 
components of Israeli peace activism that did not demobilise in the wake of the second Intifada but 
continued to mobilise, presenting new ways to frame and challenge the conflict. The radical groups 
experienced a new cycle of contention, developing more confrontational collective action frames, an 
evolution in their tactical repertoires and an expansion in their mobilisation structures. The human 
rights component were able to maintain their cycle that emerged in the first Intifada by continuing to 
reveal hidden realities, unearthing human rights violations, and finding ways to balance their concern 
for the Palestinians with influencing the Israeli public and government. 
The dissertation approached Israeli peace activism through social movement theory, in particular 
through the four powers of movement: collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation 
structures, and political opportunity structures, as well as the dynamic approach initially put forward by 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). By giving equal weight to the internal dynamics of Israeli peace 
activism and not solely considering how the external factors impact a social movement, this study has 
provided a more detailed understanding of the internal features of Israeli peace activism and how the 
different components interact with each other. This enabled the discovery that the three components 
went through different cycles of contention post-2000, due to the ways in which they perceived and 
interacted with the political opportunity structures, and confirmed the argument that Israeli peace 
activism has become polarised and fragmented, rather than paralysed.  
The typology developed has also provided a novel lens through which to understand Israeli peace 
aĐtiǀisŵ. Whilst pƌeǀious studies haǀe ideŶtified ͚ŵodeƌate͛ aŶd ͚ƌadiĐal͛ gƌoups, theǇ failed to ideŶtifǇ 
the human rights component as having a distinct trajectory and did not distinguish between these 
components as clearly. The typology helps to unearth greater understanding of the characteristics of 
Israeli peace activism and how the different elements interact with each other, uncovering some 
interesting dynamics. 
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The empirical study also enabled a reflection on some of the theoretical foundations of social 
movement theory. In particular, it has identified new framing processes; discovered an interesting 
finding when it comes to small scale tactics in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism that 
eǆpaŶds oŶ “Đott͛s ;ϭϵϴϱͿ ǁoƌk; provided additional dimensions to MĐCaƌthǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϲͿ tǇpologǇ of 
mobilisation structures and shown that the level of transparency in the organisational structure 
determines whether an organisation is able to maintain activities. It has also shown the need for a 
greater appreciation of how gender affects a social movement and, through a consideration of the 
connection between Israeli peace activists and the Rabin and Barak governments, it has shown that the 
political process model with respect to access to the government is more nuanced than currently 
conceived. It has also discovered that different cycles of contention can operate amongst activists who 
are engaged in the same area of contention; and it has helped to shed more light on the connection 
between the international arena and a domestic social movement. 
This chapter will conclude this dissertation by bringing together the main findings of the study in three 
sections: the transformation of Israeli peace activism post-2000; the theoretical contributions; and the 
responses to the research question posed at the beginning of this dissertation. 
2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM SINCE THE SECOND INTIFADA 
 The framework used in this dissertation identified three phases of Israeli peace activism. The 
fiƌst phase ďegaŶ iŶ the afteƌŵath of the ϭϵϲϳ ǁaƌ aŶd is defiŶed as ͚iŶdiǀidual aŶd dispaƌate atteŵpts 
at peaĐe aĐtiǀisŵ͛. The seĐoŶd phase ďegaŶ iŶ 1977 following the election of the first right-wing 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt iŶ Isƌael aŶd the fouŶdiŶg of Isƌael͛s laƌgest aŶd ŵost prominent peace group, Shalom 
Achshav. This peƌiod ĐaŶ ďe desĐƌiďed as ͚the ďiƌth aŶd Đoŵing of age of the peace movement͛. The 
third phase, the focal point of this study, began in the wake of the second Intifada and is still continuing, 
although this study concludes in September ϮϬϭϰ. It is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ͚the polaƌisatioŶ aŶd 
fragmentation of Israeli peace activism; three cycles of conteŶtioŶ͛. These distiŶĐt peƌiods aƌe 
demarcated by significant changes in the internal characteristics of Israeli peace activism. Whilst the 
political opportunity structures did play a role in the emergence or demobilisation of elements of Israeli 
peace activism, how these external factors were perceived and how the components chose to respond 
to them is equally, if not more significant, in explaining their trajectories, which justifies demarcating the 
periods by the internal shifts. 
Chapter 3 provided an historical overview of Israeli peace activism in the first two phases through the 
lenses of the four powers of movement, in order to provide a point of comparison for the third phase. In 
the first phase of Israeli peace activism the focus was on ceding the land acquired in the 1967 war. Two 
components emerged, a liberal Zionist and a radical component, with the liberal Zionist component 
ĐalliŶg foƌ the ĐoŶĐediŶg of the teƌƌitoƌies iŶ eǆĐhaŶge foƌ peaĐe ǁith Isƌael͛s Aƌaď Ŷeighďouƌs ǁheƌeas, 
the radical component was focused on negotiating with the PLO, who they considered the true 
representatives of the Palestinian people. Tactical repertoires and mobilising structures were limited in 
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this phase as extra-parliamentary activism was not prominent in Israeli society and the attempts at 
peace activism were still in their infancy. However, the norm entrepreneurship and agenda setting role 
of the radical component can be seen in this phase, where their collective action frames and tactical 
repertoires were more confrontational than the liberal Zionist component. In the next phase the liberal 
Zionist component began to employ some of the ideas and tactics that the radical component had 
pursued in the first phase, namely recognition of and meeting with the PLO. The second phase 
represents the birth of and coming of age of a peace movement. The liberal Zionist and radical 
components matured, developing innovative collective action frames and tactical repertoires. This study 
identified a human rights component that emerged in response to the first Intifada, focusing on 
reporting on the human rights violations, challenging Israeli policies and providing humanitarian 
services. Whilst the liberal Zionist component was the largest and most prominent voice of the peace 
movement, able to rally large numbers from the mainstream Israeli public, it was the radical and human 
rights components that were constantly challenging the liberal Zionist component to pursue more 
confrontational collective action frames, more disruptive tactics and expand their mobilising structures, 
which highlights the importance of studying these components despite their marginalisation. Despite 
some different perceptions and responses to the political opportunity structures and different cycles of 
contention in this phase, the three components could be seen rallying together under the banner of 
͚tǁo states foƌ tǁo peoples͛. The characteristics and dynamics identified and analysed in this chapter 
proposed a novel way to approach the history of Israeli peace activism and provided a point of 
comparison for the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. 
The following four chapters were divided according to each of the powers of movement, identifying the 
characteristics of each component following the outbreak of the second Intifada and explaining both the 
continuities and shifts. Ultimately, what was identified was the polarisation and fragmentation of the 
Israeli peace movement across each of the powers of movement, signalling three different cycles of 
contention, with the liberal Zionist component going through a period of demobilisation, the human 
rights component continuing its cycle from the first Intifada and the radical component experiencing a 
new cycle of contention. This challenges the conventional argument that the peace movement was 
paralysed and shows that approaching Israeli peace activism through internal dynamics allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of its trajectory. 
The differences in the components are most clearly identified through their collective action frames. 
Chapter 4 showed that the ways in which the radical component framed the second Intifada highlighted 
theiƌ ƌoles as ͚eaƌlǇ ƌiseƌs͛ aŶd Ŷoƌŵ eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs, ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the ageŶda settiŶg ƌole that KaŵiŶeƌ 
(1996) highlighted in the earlier phases. However, in this phase the liberal Zionist component moved 
away from the positions of the radical component, moderating their messages further in order to try to 
still resonate with mainstream consensus, which no longer believed there was a partner for peace on 
the Palestinian side and had become more fearful of them with the suicide bombings and the rockets 
from Gaza. This led to the polarisation in Israeli peace activism. The human rights component seems to 
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be balancing the two poles of the liberal Zionist and radical components. However, they are more 
closely associated with the radical component due to their attention to the Palestinians yet, they are still 
concerned with influencing the Israeli public and government. Despite the marginalisation of the ideas 
of the radical and human rights component, given their role as norm entrepreneurs in the previous 
phases, it is important to consider the ideas they are presenting in this current phase in order to identify 
shifting discourses around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Some interesting framing shifts and processes occurred in this phase, particularly amongst the radical 
component. The key collective action frames include the focus on Palestinian suffering, co-resistance 
and solidarity with the Palestinians, aŶd ƌejeĐtioŶ of the teƌŵ ͚peaĐe͛ iŶ faǀouƌ of teƌŵs suĐh as ͚justiĐe͛ 
aŶd ͚eƋualitǇ͛. The coŶĐepts of ͚haǀe͛ aŶd ͚haǀe-nots͛, privilege and oppression also informed their 
collective action frames. The human rights component continued with the collective action frames from 
the previous phase but amplified them given the continuation of the occupation. Human-rights based 
framing became even more significant and there was an emphasis on revealing hidden realities of the 
occupation. Gender-based framing was also identified as having shifted in this phase. 
Chapter 5 identified and explained the continuities and shifts in the tactical repertoires of each of the 
components of Israeli peace activism. The way in which the components framed the prevailing realities 
and the origins of the conflict had a clear influence on their tactical repertoires, which expanded in this 
phase. Similar to the collective action frames, the radical component were pushing the bar in terms of 
the level of confrontation, whilst the liberal Zionist component stuck to contained collective action in 
order not to alienate their target audience, the Israeli public. The human rights component also tended 
to employ contained tactics in order to ensure credibility of their activities. Many of the tactics 
employed in the previous phases continued to be employed by all components, conforming to the 
theory of repertoires of contention, whereby activists tend to employ tactics that they are familiar with 
(Tilly, 1995). However, demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities, which had been the main tactic 
employed in the previous phases, were no longer used to the same extent, since the public was less 
likely to participate. Other tactics maintained their importance such as conscientious objection, research 
and documentation of the realities on the ground. People-to-people activities were less prominent, 
given constraints imposed by the second Intifada and the building of the separation barrier. Legal tactics 
increased in their importance and use, particularly for the human rights component however, there was 
much debate over its effectiveness. 
The radical component experienced an evolution in their repertoire of contention, continuously finding 
new ways to confront the occupation. They continued with the humanitarian-based solidarity that had 
begun in the end of the previous phase, in order to assist Palestinians in the short term. This evolved to 
nonviolent direct action, with the aim of changing the facts on the ground. Nonviolent resistance then 
became the key tactic of the radical component, protesting alongside and in solidarity with the 
Palestinians, under the framing of co-resistance. Towards the middle of the 2000s this then evolved to 
different levels of boycott, divestment and sanctions, which has brought the radical component closer 
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to the international arena, a new and important dynamic in this phase. The confrontational nature of 
these tactics is made available due to their confrontational collective action frames. Such tactics are not 
available to the liberal Zionist component, since they do not want to alienate the Israeli mainstream 
public. 
One clear innovation can be identified across all three components; tours became a significant 
awareness raising tactic, as well as a mobilising tool. Many of the tours were directed towards foreign 
visitors, in an attempt to make them aware of the realities of the occupation, again highlighting the 
increasing emphasis on the international community. It also highlights the ability for Israeli peace 
activism to continue despite the inability to influence the Israeli public. Tours, similarly to legal 
measures, are an interesting tactic since they are a conventional and widely used activity in Israeli 
society yet, they are used by Israeli peace activism as a way to bring attention to the occupation.  
The expansion of the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism has meant there are more 
opportunities for individuals to participate, finding an activity that is most suitable for them. It also 
means there are multiple avenues that are challenging the occupation and working towards peace in the 
region. The combination of tactics suggests potential for greater success than only employing one form 
of tactic. On the other hand, the variety of activities, often held simultaneously, has meant that numbers 
attending or participating in each activity have been low. Furthermore the increase in the risk of the 
tactics employed discouraged mass participation. 
The shifts in both the collective action frames and tactical repertoires have meant there has also been a 
shift in the mobilising structures of Israeli peace activism. This was explored in Chapter 6, which began 
by mapping the shifting mobilisation structures. Given the marginalisation of all components of Israeli 
peace activism, familiar informal networks are still an important mobilisation structure, as are existing 
activist networks and social movement organisations. In this phase a number of activists that had been 
involved in the liberal Zionist component joined or set up groups within either the radical or human 
rights components, since they were frustrated by the lack of response from the liberal Zionist 
component, particularly Shalom Achshav, and therefore appropriated new ways to challenge the 
situation. The emergence of groups in the human rights component provides the most pertinent 
examples. All components made use of international mobilisation structures, showing signs of the 
boomerang process (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The notable difference is that the liberal Zionist 
component continued to appeal to the Jewish diaspora, mainly for funding, whereas the radical and 
human rights components connected with transnational social movements, such as the anti-
globalisation movement and the BDS movement. There was a clear distinction in the organisational 
forms across the components, with the liberal Zionist component having gone through a process of 
institutionalisation and therefore made up of mainly national professional SMOs. The radical component 
was almost solely made up of grassroots, horizontally organised, voluntary SMOs and the human rights 
component contained a mixture, again reflective of their collective action frames. Enduring coalitions 
also played an important role in pooling resources, particularly due to the number of small groups that 
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were operating, and suggests the formation of a social movement community amongst the radical and 
human rights components.  
Some other interesting mobilising dynamics were unearthed. Linked to their framing, the radical groups 
tried to reach out to marginalised groups in Israeli society by connecting their oppression to that of the 
Palestinians. This was to combat the criticism that Israeli peace activism had been made up of mainly 
elite Ashkenazim, which alienated other groups within Israeli society. The younger generation became 
more active, drawn into activism by the exciting collective action frames and tactical repertoires, with 
many of them inspired to act because of the events in the second Intifada. Funding continued to be a 
challenge for Israeli peace activism. The New Israel Fund played an important role in the development of 
the human rights component but faced some strong opposition for allegedly supporting groups that 
promote BDS or demilitarization.  
The study of the shifting mobilisation structures highlighted four interesting shifts in Israeli peace 
activism. Firstly, it further confirmed the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism due to 
the differences amongst the components. Secondly, it identified expanding points of entry to activism, 
with the emergence of new groups each specialising in a certain area. Thirdly, it identified a rise in 
horizontally structured organisations with an emphasis on participatory-style decision making, in part 
due to the ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵes of ͚eƋualitǇ͛ aŶd iŶ paƌt due to a foĐus oŶ feŵiŶist oƌgaŶisiŶg 
principles, highlighting the particular role that gender plays. Finally, one of the most significant dynamics 
drawn from this chapter is the increasing role of the international community as mobilisation structures, 
acting as targets for Israeli peace activism, particularly as the Israeli public became less interested in the 
messages the peace activists are presenting.  
Chapter 7 considered the overall transformations in Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada by 
considering how the powers of movement interact with each other, through an analysis of how the 
components perceived and responded to the prevailing political opportunity structures. Similar to the 
previous phase, whilst shifts in the political opportunities enabled the emergence of certain forms of 
activism, it was how the components perceived these changes and how they chose to act or not act that 
determined their trajectory. The detailed exploration of the internal dynamics of each component in this 
phase enabled an understanding of how each responded to the prevailing realities. In doing so, the 
chapter identified distinct cycles of contention for each of the three components, confirming the 
polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism and suggesting some refinements to the theory 
of cycles of contention. 
The liberal Zionist component was paralysed in the wake of the second Intifada as they were unable and 
uŶǁilliŶg to ĐhalleŶge the pƌeǀailiŶg ƌealities, suĐh as Baƌak͛s ƌhetoƌiĐ that theƌe ǁas Ŷo paƌtŶeƌ foƌ 
peace, the building of the separation barrier and the conflicts with Gaza, leading to their demobilisation. 
Furthermore, the Israeli public, the target audience of the liberal Zionist component, shifted more 
towards the centre and right of the Israeli political spectrum and the parties most closely associated 
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with the liberal Zionist components lost their support base. Some attempts were made to support peace 
initiatives in this phase but there was little support for these from the Israeli public. Therefore, beyond 
the Settlement Watch Project, the liberal Zionist component became irrelevant and their cycle of 
contention, which had peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, demobilised.  
The radical component, on the other hand, experienced a new cycle of contention, which emerged in 
the first Intifada, continuously challenging the prevailing realties, presenting innovative collective action 
frames, evolving their repertoire of contention and appealing to other mobilisation structures. They 
experienced a spiral of opportunities due to their reactive activism, which confronted various injustices, 
with their peak in activism seen in the Sheikh Jarrah protests. Significantly, they began to turn away 
from the Israeli public and government, which released them from the state narrative and enabled them 
to be more confrontational. Their focus shifted instead to the international dimension.  
The human rights component experienced a continuation in their cycle of contention that emerged in 
the first Intifada, with more groups emerging to reveal the hidden realities of the occupation. Whilst 
they wanted to appeal to the Israeli public, their critical position towards the policies and actions of the 
Israeli government meant they were marginalised in Israeli society. They therefore also turned towards 
the international dimension. For both the radical and human rights components, their attempts to 
influence the international dimension and the diffusion of tactics and injection of resources from 
transnational networks meant they were able to maintain momentum despite the closed political 
opportunities within Israel. However, their connections with the international community were not 
welcomed within Israel and they began to receive a significant amount of opposition. However, this only 
encouraged further activism, particularly with a focus on the international arena and through legal 
avenues. 
Chapter 7 also identified the main opposition forces towards the different components of Israeli peace 
activism. The liberal Zionist component mainly received opposition from the settler movement, given 
their attention to the settlements as the main obstacle to peace. The radical component was subjected 
to more violent and repressive opposition, with the arrests of activists, investigations into organisations 
and violence from the IDF. Certain laws also attempted to restrict their activities. The human rights 
component also received a significant amount of opposition, mainly attempts to silence or delegitimise 
their voices. Further laws affected how the groups operated and risked their funding opportunities and 
civil society groups emerged to challenge the discourse of the human rights organisations. The level of 
opposition suggests that Israeli peace activism is by no means irrelevant but, is perceived as a threat 
within Israel, particularly due to the increase in international connections and greater alignment in the 
framing of Israeli peace activism and some parts of the international community. Chapter 7 also 
highlighted the link between the international environment and Israeli peace activism, which in this case 
served to reinforce the security discourse in Israel and therefore further marginalise peace or anti-
occupation voices. The theoretical implications of this dynamic were explored and will be returned to 
below.  
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Finally the chapter outlined the impact of Israeli peace activism in this phase. In general an analysis of 
the political opportunities in Israel has highlighted the centrality of the discourse of security. This has 
meant that, whilst extra-parliamentary voices on issues of peace and security have been more widely 
accepted, the possibility for them to influence policy and practice has been slim, since the security 
rhetoric tended to be in opposition to the ideas of Israeli peace activism. However, whilst they are 
unable to influence much of the Israeli public or government perspectives on security, there are signs 
that impact is being had elsewhere. Firstly, the relationship with the international community, as a new 
and strengthening dynamic, has the potential to generate larger audiences for Israeli peace activism and 
for other governments and international organisations to put more pressure on Israel to end the 
occupation and engage in peace negotiations. Secondly, new relationships are being built between the 
Israeli activists and Palestinian activists, which is a rejection of the separation discourse in Israel and 
open up new avenues for activism. Finally, as has always been the case, Israeli peace activism, 
particularly the radical component, are acting as norm entrepreneurs, continuously developing new 
collective action frames surrounding the conflict, presenting new ideas of ǁhat ͚peaĐe͛ ŵeaŶs aŶd 
challenging mainstream views. This in turn is opening up new possibilities for confronting the situation. 
Given the diffusion of the idea of a two-state solution from the radical component to government 
policy, it is important to identify and consider the ideas and messages that the radical component and 
the human rights component are promoting in this third phase of Israeli peace activism and further 
emphasises that Israeli peace activism was not paralysed in the wake of the second Intifada. 
3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 The empirical study has facilitated a reflection on some of the theoretical foundations of social 
movement theory. A number of examples within the study of Israeli peace activism point to areas in 
which aspects of social movement theory need to be refined, highlighting the theoretical contributions 
of this dissertation. As a case study, Israeli peace activism contributes details to each of the internal 
factors of social movement theory: various framing processes were used, innovative tactical repertoires 
were employed and Israeli peace activism was constituted by new forms of mobilisation structures. 
Furthermore, impact has been conceived in areas beyond influencing the government or policy, adding 
to those studies that suggest there are broader areas of impact. Finally, this study has unearthed four 
areas of social movement theory in which refinements are needed: cycles of contention; the role of 
gender dynamics; the relationship between a government and a social movement; and the dynamics 
between the international dimension and a domestic social movement.  
3.1 FRAMING PROCESSES 
 In outlining and analysing the shifts in the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, this 
dissertation has identified some interesting framing processes in Israeli peace activism. The liberal 
Zionist groups engaged in frame transformation and amplification in order to try to re-sell the idea of a 
two-state solution to the Israeli public, by connecting it to the issue of Israel as a Jewish and democratic 
state. The radical component used a range of framing processes to frame the prevailing realities. They 
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engaged in frame transformation, shifting fƌoŵ the ĐoŶĐept of ͚peaĐe͛ to that of ͚haƌŵ ƌeduĐtioŶ͛, ͚Đo-
ƌesistaŶĐe͛, ͚eƋualitǇ͛ aŶd ͚justiĐe͛. TheǇ also used fƌaŵe eǆteŶsioŶ to ideŶtifǇ the oĐĐupatioŶ as oŶe 
example of cases of oppression in Israeli society that need to be challenged. These processes had a 
direct impact on their tactical repertoire. The human rights component, whilst there was not a 
significant shift in their framing, did engage in frame amplification by focusing more explicitly on a 
rights-based discourse. This brought them more in line with the framing of the radical component. This 
study also showed, through the case of the demonstrations in Sheikh Jarrah, that a simple injustice 
frame identified by radical activists acting in solidarity with Palestinians can hold resonance amongst a 
larger audience. The specific nature of this particular case, as a fairly clear cut injustice towards the 
Palestinians, its location near West Jerusalem and the Hebrew University, and the low-risk involved for 
participants, compared with protests in the West Bank, explained how it mobilised more individuals and 
became a prominent issue. This has the potential to provide insights into the optimum conditions 
needed for successful mobilisation for future campaigns of the radical component in Israel, as well as 
provide suggestions for other social movements. Identifying these framing processes provide both 
interesting details of the shifts in the characteristics of Israeli peace activism, as well as additional 
examples for the theory of collective action frames. 
3.2 TACTICAL REPERTOIRES 
 The phase of Israeli peace activism following the second Intifada highlighted both an evolution 
and expansion in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism. It showed that rather than using large 
campaigns, the whole spectrum of Israeli peace activism are engaged in multiple ways of gradually 
chipping away at the situation, through revealing realities on the ground, engaging in resistance 
activities, organising people-to-people activities, providing humanitarian aid, using legal measures and 
ĐoŶduĐtiŶg touƌs. This has soŵe siŵilaƌities to “Đott͛s ;ϭϵϴϱ) Weapons of the Weak, whereby overt 
ƌeďellioŶs aƌe uŶlikelǇ ďut ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ foƌŵs of ƌesistaŶĐe͛ ĐaŶ still haǀe a foƌŵ of iŵpaĐt. However, this 
case provides an interesting fiŶdiŶg that highlights a diǀeƌgeŶĐe fƌoŵ “Đott͛s studǇ, ǁheƌeďǇ those ǁho 
are acting in this manner are not necessarily the victims of the injustices but are acting in solidarity with 
others. They therefore experience more difficulties in mobilising participants but have different avenues 
through which they can act and yield influence than those who are the direct victims of certain 
injustices. Whether this affords the activists more or less chances of achieving impact needs further 
study. 
3.3 MOBILISATION STRUCTURES 
 Israeli peace activism is formed of a wide variety of mobilisation structures, many of which 
ĐoŶfoƌŵ to MĐCaƌthǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϲͿ tǇpologǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, theƌe are additional structures which he does not 
include: non-movement movements and international mobilisation structures. Non-movement 
movements are social movements which are not part of the social movement in question but act as a 
mobilisation structure for it. In the Israeli case, this included the LGBT movement, the global BDS 
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movement and to some extent the social justice movement in Israel. The cross-over between 
movements and the involvement of activists from other movements can help to strengthen the 
movement in question and should be considered as a further dimension of mobilisation structures. 
Ceadel ;ϮϬϬϬ:ϴͿ ideŶtifies a ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ͛ ŵoǀeŵeŶt iŶ his study of peace movements, which are those 
ǁho aƌe agaiŶst ǁaƌ ͚as aŶ eǆpƌessioŶ of a broader associational purpose͛, which refers to movements 
outside the peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt that shaƌe the saŵe ŵessage aŶd goal. This is siŵilaƌ to ͚ŶoŶ-movement 
ŵoǀeŵeŶts͛, however this study of Israeli peace activism has shown that this mobilisation structure can 
be important for all types of social movements. International mobilisation structures have also been 
shown to play an increasing role in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism in the phase following the 
second Intifada, through diaspora Jews and transnational social movements engaged in support for the 
Palestinians, and should also ďe iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶ MĐCaƌthǇ͛s tǇpologǇ. 
In addition, the study of mobilisation structures discussed the relative effectiveness of horizontal, 
decentralised organisations versus hierarchical, centralised organisations. It discovered that in the Israeli 
case, neither suggested greater effectiveness than the other. What was more significant was the level of 
transparency in the organisational form. Hidden hierarchies or undiscussed developments towards a 
hierarchy led to the disbanding of a group or organisation whereas, active decisions to shift or maintain 
either horizontal or hierarchical organisation helped to maintain the longevity of an organisation. When 
the activists and staff were in agreement over the organisational structure there was less turmoil and 
disruption than where there was a disagreement, no matter the particular form of organisation. This is 
an interesting discovery that can be explored in other social movement organisations. 
3.4 THE IMPACT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 This study also showed that a social movement can have impact in areas beyond policy change 
or influencing public opinion. Following a framework of social movement impact based on Staggenborg 
(1995) and della Porta (1999), it explored impact in terms of influencing the policy arena, mobilising the 
public, affecting prevailing culture and engaging in norm entrepreneurship. This dissertation discovered 
that Israeli peace activism has succeeded in mobilising previously immobilised participants, particularly 
by providing multiple areas in which they can get involved. New relationships have also developed with 
Palestinian activists engaged in the same areas of contention, which enables the diffusion of further 
tactical repertoires and collective action frames. Connections have been made with the international 
dimension, which also affects the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. Most significantly, Israeli peace 
activism is re-framing the ways in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perceived, shifting the 
disĐouƌse aƌouŶd ĐoŶĐepts of ͚peaĐe͛ aŶd foĐusiŶg ŵoƌe oŶ a huŵaŶ-rights based discourse, which is 
receiving some opposition in Israeli society, suggesting that this is having an impact on the situation. 
Focusing on smaller and alternative areas of impact of a social movement, as opposed to large policy 
changes, provides a more detailed understanding of the effect it can have. The impact other social 
movements may be having should also be explored in this manner. 
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3.5 CYCLES OF CONTENTION 
The shifts in Israeli peace activism throughout its history highlighted certain cases where new 
waves of activism emerged, signalling a new cycle of contention. However, their characteristics did not 
fully conform to the traditional definition of a cycle of contention yet, there were clear, dramatic 
changes that should be considered new cycles of contention. This suggests that the definition needs to 
be more flexible to incorporate different types of cycles.  
Furthermore, the identification of three distinct cycles of contention suggests an extension of the 
theory. Following the second Intifada each of the components of Israeli peace activism, despite focusing 
on the same area of contention, experienced different cycles of contention, with the liberal Zionists 
demobilising, the human rights component continuing similarly as previously and the radicals 
experiencing a new cycle of contention. This confirms the claim that political opportunity structures 
must be perceived in order to exist as opportunities or threats to mobilisation but, it needs to be made 
more explicit that this can result in different components of the social movement experiencing different 
cycles of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ. Whilst Taƌƌoǁ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ does ideŶtifǇ a ͚ƌadiĐal flaŶk effeĐt͛ ǁheƌeďǇ the moderate 
groups tend to mobilise together in order to distance themselves from the radical groups, this does not 
accurately describe the Israeli case and overlooks that a new cycle in the radical component emerged. In 
the Israeli case, it was the radical components that joined together to distance themselves from the 
liberal Zionist component, who were not responding or challenging the prevailing realities. As such, it 
was the radical component that continued to mobilise whilst the liberal Zionists demobilised. 
Approaching a social movement through the typology set out in this study will assist in identifying these 
different cycles. 
3.6 GENDER DYNAMICS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Gender dynamics have played an important role in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism, 
influencing in particular, framing and mobilisation structures and in turn, responses to the political 
opportunity structures. Specific collective action frames based on gendered framing, whether through 
ĐoŶĐept of ͚ǁoŵeŶ as ŵotheƌs͛ oƌ ǀaƌious feŵiŶist ideas, such as the connection between the 
occupation and the oppression of women in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, can be seen 
throughout the second two phases of Israeli peace activism. Often women were the early risers in a 
cycle of contention, responding to the changing realities and impact on the Palestinians, and their 
frames tended to be more confrontational, radicalising over the years. Gendered elements to 
organisational structures were also identified, with feminist modes of organising influencing the 
increase in decisions made through consensus and horizontal organisational structures, identified 
amongst the radical component. The prevalence and impact of gender dynamics in the trajectory of 
Israeli peace activism suggests that a gendered theory of social movements is required rather than 
appƌoaĐhiŶg the issue ďǇ studǇiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶts, as has teŶded to ďe the Đase. 
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3.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT 
A number of examples highlighted in both the second and third phase of Israeli peace activism 
suggest that the relationship between a social movement and the government is more nuanced than the 
political process model allows for, particularly in the Rabin and Barak governments. The political process 
model argues that opportunities are more open to influence the government if the movement has elite 
allies within the government. Whilst this was sometimes the case, in other cases when the liberal Zionist 
component of Israeli peace activism had allies in the government, they were unable to challenge it, even 
if they disagreed with the way the government was moving forward. They may have privately lobbied 
the government but publicly they could not be confrontational. This was because they did not want to 
undermine their allies, give leverage to the opposition, or ruin the image of the government through 
association with peace activists. It seems that when a social movement becomes too close to the 
government, it is unable to challenge it. This suggests the political process model with respect to elite 
allies needs to be more nuanced. Furthermore, it should be recognised that not all social movement 
actors seek to influence the government and therefore the government should not be posited as the 
central variable in determining the trajectory of a social movement. 
3.8 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION AND A DOMESTIC SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT 
This study has also highlighted some important connections between a social movement and 
the international dimension. While some of these connections have already been theorised, some 
aspects require further theorisation. Attempts by social movements to reach out to the international 
community have been explored, both in seeking new mobilisation structures through international and 
transnational social movements and in finding open political opportunity structures in governments and 
international organisations in order to have influence. This was best theorised by Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) through the boomerang process and Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink͛s ;ϭϵϵϵͿ spiƌal ŵodel. 
Tarrow (2011) has also provided useful insights into the mechanisms and processes that connect the 
international dimension to the domestic social movement, such as the mechanism of diffusion and the 
process of externalisation through global framing. These have all provided helpful ways in which to 
understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. 
However, there are three connections that have been under theorised and require further exploration. 
FiƌstlǇ, Taƌƌoǁ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ͚Đoŵposite ŵodel of eǆteƌŶalisatioŶ͛ Ŷeeds to ďe iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶto the 
boomerang process and spiral model in order to understand how the response of the domestic 
government, whether unresponsive or repressive, or a mixture, may affect the domestic social 
movement and in turn the next boomerang that is thrown out if the first one is not facilitated. A second 
connection to consider is the changes in the international environment that are directly connected to a 
domestic social movement and may increase its opportunity to mobilise to create change, such as the 
Arab Peace Initiative. If the domestic movement perceives this as an opportunity, it can provide it with 
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added momentum. However, how the domestic government and public respond to the international 
shift will affect the level of influence. This suggests a three-fold dynamic between changes in the 
international political opportunity structures, a domestic social movement and domestic political 
opportunity structures. A final under theorised element of social movement theory is the connection 
between indirect aspects of the international environment and a social movement. As shown, in the 
Israeli case, the Global War on Terror had the effect of further marginalising Israeli peace activism within 
Israel, even though there was no explicit link. In exploring a social movement, a consideration of the 
international environment and how changes might affect the domestic political opportunity structures 
within which the social movement operates, must also be considered. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has made three main contributions to the literature. Firstly, in providing a 
detailed analysis of the trajectory of Israeli peace activism post-2000; through a three-fold typology, this 
study has shown that not all components of Israeli peace activism were paralysed in response to the 
second Intifada. Secondly, it has provided a further case study through which to explore social 
movement theory and, in doing so, has highlighted areas in which refinements and extensions are 
needed. Thirdly, it has identified new collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation 
structures and the impact of Israeli peace activism. 
This study used the fours power of movement to identify and explain the shifting trajectory of Israeli 
peace activism since the second Intifada. It outlined three components of Israeli peace activism: a liberal 
Zionist component, a radical component and a human rights component. In doing so, this dissertation 
has further contributed to the literature. A greater understanding of the dynamics of Israeli peace 
activism has been provided by exploring how the different components interact with each other and by 
providing a more nuanced understanding of how they interact with the prevailing political opportunity 
structures. This has the potential to help illuminate other social movements as it shows that individual 
groups within a social movement can be clustered together and a similar trajectory identified. This 
trajectory may be different for different clusters of groups within the same social movement. 
Acknowledging this enables a more detailed understanding of both the characteristics and the trajectory 
of a social movement than if the movement is treated as one unit of analysis or if the different groups 
and organisations are studied in isolation of each other. 
This dissertation used social movement theory in order to explain the shifts in each of these 
components. It disaggregated the collective actions frames, the tactical repertoires and the mobilisation 
structures in order to provide a more detailed exploration. It then looked at how these internal 
dynamics interact with the external environment. In doing so this this dissertation has answered the 
main overriding research question set out in the beginning: how has the nature of Israeli peace activism 
transformed since the second Intifada?  It has argued that whilst the cycle of contention for the liberal 
Zionist component demobilised, which meant it no longer acted as the strongest part of the Israeli 
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peace movement, a new cycle of contention emerged for the radical groups and the human rights 
component continued their activities from the previous phase. This has meant that the radical groups 
aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ ͚ŶippiŶg at the heels͛ of the liberal Zionist component but have filled the space they left 
and are often challenging the human rights groups to be more confrontational and highlights the 
polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. These changes have led to shifts in the 
collective action frames, with the radical component no longer interested in the political peace process 
but focusing on the realities on the ground in solidarity with the Palestinians. The human rights 
component report and assist the situation of the Palestinians but use less confrontational collective 
action frames and tactical repertoires than the radical component, so they can reach out and influence 
the Israeli public. There has been an evolution in the tactical repertoire of the radical component, 
shifting from humanitarian aid to non-violent direct action to non-violent resistance to boycott. The use 
of tours has provided an innovative shift across the components of Israeli peace activism and is linked to 
their desire to influence the international community. The radical component has also attempted to 
diversify the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism by trying to be more inclusive. Horizontal 
grassroots mobilisation structures have also played a greater role, based on the collective action frames 
of the radical component. Despite these shifts, Israeli peace activism as a whole is smaller and more 
marginalised than it had been in previous phases. This has meant that there is little ability or even desire 
to influence the Israeli public or government. However, impact has been identified in other areas, 
including the building of relationships with the Palestinians, increased connections with the 
international community and shifting discourses surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
This dissertation also provided insights into the secondary themes outlined at the outset. It has shown 
that the relationship between the government and a social movement is more nuanced than the 
political process model allows for. It also identified cases where activists do not actually want to 
influence the government. It has shed new light on the connection between the international dimension 
and a domestic social movement, highlighting both direct and indirect factors that influenced Israeli 
peace activism. It has also highlighted the need for a more gender aware approach to social movement 
theory and identified ways in which gender has influenced the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. It has 
also shown the possibility of multiple cycles of contention in one social movement and has outlined 
some keys areas of impact beyond the policy arena or government that Israeli peace activism has 
achieved. These have presented interesting theoretical implications to be further explored by 
considering different case studies that are comparable to the Israeli case. This could then lead to further 
refinements and strengthening of the theory in each of these areas. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ISRAELI PEACE GROUPS
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An extended version of a list found in Hermann (2009:267-275)    
Name of Group 
(Hebrew) 
Name of Group 
(English) 
Year 
Establishe
d 
Description Form of Contention 
Still 
Active? 
Componen
t 
Website 
  +972 mag 2010 Alternative news outlet 
analysing and reporting 
about the occupation 
Awareness raising 
through media 
Y Media: 
Radical/hu
man rights 
http://972mag.com/  
  Active Stills 2005 Uses images and 
photographs to raise 
awareness and struggles 
against the occupation 
and inequality 
Protest/awareness 
raising through 
images 
Y Radical http://activestills.org/  
Ad Kan Enough is 
Enough 
2002     N Radical n/a 
Adaŵ l͛lo Gǀulot Humans 
without Borders 
2002 Giving humanitarian and 
medical aid to Palestinian 
families living in the 
Occupied Territories.  
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.humans-without-
borders.org/  
  All Nations Café 2003 Team of Israelis, 
Palestinians and 
Internationals eating and 
campaigning together 
Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.allnationscafe.org/ind
ex.php  
  All That͛s Left 2013 A collective unequivocally 
opposed to the occupation 
and committed to building 
the diaspora angle of 
resistance. 
Non-violent direct 
action, non-violent 
resistance, 
humanitarian aid 
Y Radical http://www.allthatsleftcollective.c
om/  
  
 
2
0
0
 
Anarchistim 
Neged haGader 
Anarchists 
Against the Wall 
2003 Protest in different 
Palestinian villages against 
the Wall.  
Non-violent direct 
action, non-violent 
resistance 
Y Radical http://www.awalls.org/  
Arba Imahot Four Mothers 
Movement 
1997 Organised mass 
demonstrations and 
encouraged public debate 
on war with Lebanon 
Demonstration N Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.4mothers.org.il/peilut
/backgrou.htm  
Ariga Weave/Web 1995 Web-based, independent 
news from Israel, 
emphasizing the peace 
process 
Online Media N Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.ariga.com  
  Association of 
Forty 
1988 Recognition of the Arab 
Unrecognised Villages in 
Israel. Provides legal 
advice to villagers 
subjected to house 
demolition orders 
Advocacy, legal 
tactics 
N n/a   
Atid Acher A Different 
Future 
2005 Provides free 
communications and 
public relations work for 
organisations in which 
Israelis and Palestinians 
work together 
Support for peace 
groups 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
  Beyond Words 1995 Coexistence program 
including training in verbal 
and nonverbal 
communication 
Dialogue N Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.beyondwords7.org/  
  Bil͛iŶ 
Committee of 
Popular 
Resistance 
2005 Palestinian group 
organising activities 
against the Separation 
Baƌƌieƌ iŶ Bil͛iŶ 
Weekly 
demonstrations, with 
theatrical elements. 
Non-violent 
resistance 
Y Palestinian http://www.bilin-village.org/  
  
 
2
0
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B͛Tseleŵ In Our Image – 
The Israeli 
Information 
Centre for 
Human Rights in 
the Occupied 
Territories 
1989  It endeavours to 
document and educate 
the Israeli public and 
policymakers about 
human rights violations in 
the Occupied Territories, 
combat the phenomenon 
of denial prevalent among 
the Israeli public, and help 
create a human rights 
culture in Israel. 
Human rights 
awareness, legal 
tactics, research and 
information 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.btselem.org/  
Baderech el 
haSulcha 
Sulha Peace 
Project 
2000 a group of Israelis and 
Palestinians who meet 
regularly to encounter the 
other, creating potential 
for cooperation 
Dialogue and 
spiritual activism 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.sulha.com/  
Bat Shalom Daughters of 
Peace 
1993 Dialogue and cooperation 
with twin Palestinian 
organisation 
Dialogue Y Radical Website no longer active  
Besod Siach Besod Siach – 
Open Discussion 
Groups 
1993     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Bitter Lemons Bitterlemons 2002 Weekly e-zine of editorials 
representing Israeli and 
Palestinian perspectives 
on current events and 
developments relating to 
the occupied territories 
Awareness through 
media 
Y Radical http://www.bitterlemons.net/  
  
 
2
0
2
 
  Bringing Peace 
Together 
2004 Programme is a 
multifaceted group aiming 
at bringing together 
representatives of 
different peace 
movements in order to 
exchange visions and 
experiences with each 
other and thus bridge the 
gap between Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
Dialogue and 
network 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Bustan Shalom Peace Garden 1999 An Israeli NGO working in 
the Bedouin and Jewish 
communities in the Negev 
region of Israel since 1999, 
promoting sustainability 
and capacity building from 
within the communities 
we work. 
Environmental action Y Human 
Rights  
www.bustan.org  
  Care and 
Learning – In 
Defence of 
͚ChildƌeŶ UŶdeƌ 
OĐĐupatioŶ͛ 
1987 To help and support 
Palestinian children by 
setting up a network of 
comŵuŶitǇ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
homes 
Humanitarian action N Human 
Rights 
http://www.rightlivelihood.org/m
er_khamis_speech.html  
  Centre for 
Emerging 
Futures (CEF) 
2003 Grassroots Partnership 
holding Global Village  
Square meetings 
Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
www.emergingfutures.org  
  Crossing 
Borders 
1994 
(1999) 
Israeli, Palestinian and 
Jordanian youth group 
Dialogue and 
Education 
N n/a http://crossingborders.dk/  
  
 
2
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Dai l͛Kiďush End the 
Occupation 
1987 An independent Israeli 
coalition of political 
groups and individuals, 
both Jewish and Arab, The 
group expressed a clear 
message of solidarity with 
the Palestinian struggle for 
self-determination. Their 
main goal was to influence 
Israeli public opinion to 
accept a just solution for 
the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and to build a 
democratic society in 
Israel 
Demonstration, Non-
violent action 
N Radical n/a 
Derech 
haShivyon 
Way of Equality 1996     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Dor Shalem Entire 
Generation, An 
1995 Originally Dor Shalom. 
Changed name in order to 
remove political 
connotations 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Dor Shalom Peace 
Generation 
1995 Set up in response to 
assassination of Rabin 
with the aim to get 
support from the public 
for peace 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
  
 
2
0
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Du Kiyum Negev 
Coexistence 
Forum 
1997 Provide a framework for 
Jewish-Arab collaborative 
efforts in the struggle for 
civil equality and the 
advancement of mutual 
tolerance and coexistence. 
NCF, also known as 
͞Dukiuŵ͟ iŶ Heďƌeǁ, is 
unique in being the only 
Arab-Jewish organisation 
that remains focused 
solely on the specific 
problems confronting the 
Negev. 
Developmental 
projects – civil 
society 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.dukium.org/eng/  
  Economic 
Cooperation 
Foundation 
1990 non-profit, non-
governmental track II 
think tank based 
Research Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.ecf.org.il/  
Ecopeace 
Mizrach Tichon 
EcoPeace 
Middle East 
1994 Brings together Jordanian, 
Palestinian, and Israeli 
environmentalists for the 
promotion of cooperative 
efforts to protect their 
shared environmental 
heritage 
Environmental 
projects 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.foeme.org/www/?mo
dule=home  
Emek Shaveh Emek Shaveh: 
Archaeology in 
the Shadow of 
Conflict 
2009 Views archaeology as a 
resource for building 
bridges and strengthening 
bonds between different 
peoples and cultures, and 
hence as an important 
factor impacting the 
dynamics of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
Education, Tours, 
reports 
Y Human-
Rights 
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Emun Trust 2006 Building mutual trust 
through people-to-people 
activities. WoŵeŶ͛s 
organisation 
Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.trust-emun.org/  
Gisha Legal Centre for 
Freedom of 
Movement 
2005 Uses legal assistance and 
public advocacy to protect 
the rights and  the 
freedom of movement of 
Palestinians, especially 
Gaza residents 
Human rights 
protection, legal 
tactics 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.gisha.org/  
Gush shalom Peace Bloc 1992 Produced bulletins and 
attended demonstrations. 
Aim to influence public 
opinion 
Awareness raising, 
demonstrations, 
boycott 
Y Radical http://gush-shalom.org/  
Ha Televisia Ha 
Chevratit 
Israel Social TV 2006 Independent media 
organisation (NGO) 
working to promote social 
change, human rights and 
equality 
Awareness raising 
through media 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://tv.social.org.il/en  
haAguda 
l͛ZĐhuyot 
haEzrach 
ď͛Yisrael 
Association for 
Civil Rights in 
Israel (ACRI) 
1972 Deals with the entire 
spectrum of rights and 
civil liberties issues in 
Israel and the Occupied 
Territories. Aims to ensure 
Isƌael͛s aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ aŶd 
respect for human rights, 
by addressing violations 
committed by the Israeli 
authorities in Israel, the 
Occupied Territories, or 
elsewhere. 
Legal tactics, 
research and 
information/ 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/  
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haEm 
HaChamishit 
The Fifth 
Mother 
2002 Aim to bring forward into 
the public arena this 
feminine voice as well as 
our maternal experience. 
They call for use of our 
expertise in solving 
conflict through dialogue 
with Palestinians, bridge-
building activities and 
advocacy in the media 
Dialogue and raising 
feminine voice 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
haForum 
l͛Haskama 
Ezrachit 
CitizeŶ͛s AĐĐoƌd 
Forum between 
Jews and Arabs 
in Israel 
2000 Works to bridge the socio-
economic gaps between 
Israel's Jewish and Arab 
citizens. Develops and 
implements community 
development and political 
advocacy programs that 
are concrete models for 
large-scale social change 
that can be used all over 
the State of Israel. 
Development/advoca
cy 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.caf.org.il/  
HaGesher - 
Nashim 
Yehudiot 
ǀ͛Araǀiot 
l͛shaloŵ 
ď͛HaŵizraĐh 
Hatichon                       
The Bridge- 
Jewish and Arab 
women for 
Peace in the 
Middle East 
1975 Gathered Jewish,  Arab 
and Palestinian women to 
promote the status of 
women, and peace in the 
Middle East 
Dialogue Y Radical http://www.iflac.com/ada/html/br
idge.html  
haKav haYarok The Green Line, 
Students Draw 
the Line 
2002   Demonstrations N Radical n/a 
Hal͛aa haKiďush Down with the 
Occupation 
1985     N Radical n/a 
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Halonot Windows-
Channels for 
Communication 
1991 Joint Israeli-Palestinian 
organisation that strives 
for a future based on 
justice in the forms of 
ending occupation, ending 
discrimination and ending 
violations of human rights. 
Dialogue and 
education 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.win-peace.org/  
haMercaz 
haBeinleumi 
l͛Shaloŵ 
International 
Centre for 
Peace 
1982     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
haMerkaz 
l͛IŶforŵatzia 
Alternativit 
Alternative  
Information 
Centre, The 
1984 A Palestinian and Israeli 
grassroots organisation to 
promote the human and 
national rights of the 
Palestinian people and a 
just peace for Palestinians 
and Israelis by collecting 
and disseminating data 
from the occupied 
territories 
Research and 
Information  
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.alternativenews.org/e
nglish/  
Hamidrasha 
l͛deŵoĐratia 
ǀ͛l͛shaloŵ 
Adam Institute 
for Democracy 
and Peace 
1986 Works to breakdown 
stereotypes, enhance 
understanding of 
democratic principles and 
promote peaceful 
coexistence 
Education Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.adaminstitute.org.il  
haMifkad 
haLeumi 
People͛s 
Referendum 
(The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Initiative 
2003 Independent initiative 
with highly publicised 
media campaign to 
support resumption of 
renewed negotiations and 
signing of an accord. 
Sticker campaign 
Gain support from 
public 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.mifkad.org.il  
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haMizrach el 
haShalom 
East for Peace 1983 Exclusively Mizrachi peace 
group of mainly young 
intellectuals. Call for 
social, economic, political 
reforms. 
Awareness raising, 
Demonstration 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
haMoatza 
haYisraelit 
l͛Shaloŵ Yisrael-
Falestin 
The Council for 
Peace and 
Security  
1988 Intellectual circle, which 
made public declarations 
and developed close 
relation with the PLO 
Awareness raising Y Liberal 
Zionist 
website no longer active  
haMoatza 
haYisraelit 
l͛Shaloŵ Yisrael-
Falestin 
Israeli Council 
for Israeli-
Palestinian 
Peace 
1975 Considered a two-state 
solution to the conflict, 
believed in negotiations 
with the PLO 
Secret dialogue and 
negotiations 
N Radical n/a 
haMoked 
l͛HagaŶat 
haPrat 
Centre for the 
Defence of the 
Individual 
1988 Israeli human rights 
organisation whose main 
objective is to assist 
Palestinians of the 
Occupied Territories 
whose rights are violated 
due to Israel's policies.  
Humanitarian action, 
legal tactics 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.hamoked.org/home.a
spx 
haOt The Sign 2002     N     
haShana 
haEsriŵ ǀ͛EĐhad 
21
st
 Year 1988 Disseminated intellectual 
accounts of the roots and 
implications of the 
occupation and the 
detailed the ways in which 
refusal should be 
expanded beyond the 
military to other areas.  
conscientious 
objectors 
N n/a n/a 
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HaTnua 
l͛Shaloŵ 
uBitachon 
The Movement 
for Peace and 
Security 
1968 Cautioned against 
permanent Israeli 
presence in the territories 
occupied during the and 
proposed contact with 
Arab leaders willing to 
negotiate 
Lobbying N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
haTnua 
l͛TiyoŶut 
Acheret 
Movement for 
Another 
Zionism 
1975     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
haVaad 
haYsiraeli Neged 
Harisat Batim 
Israeli 
Committee 
Against House 
Demolition 
1996 Legal appeals to stop 
house demolitions. Try to 
prevent demolitions by 
acts of passive resistance. 
Non-Violent Direct 
action, legal tactics, 
tours 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.icahd.org/  
haVaad haZiburi 
Neged Inuyim 
Public 
Committee 
Against Torture 
in Israel 
1990 PCATI advocates for all 
persons - Israelis, 
Palestinians, labour 
immigrants and other 
foreigners in Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) – in order 
to protect them from 
torture and ill treatment 
by the Israeli interrogation 
and law enforcement 
authorities 
Advocacy/humanitari
an action, reports 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/en/
odot  
haVaad l͛Dialog 
Yisraeli-Falesinai 
Committee for 
Israeli-
Palestinian 
Dialogue 
1988 Group of Israelis and 
Palestinians meeting to try 
to find a resolution to the 
conflict 
Dialogue, 
negotiations 
N Radical n/a 
haVaad 
l͛Solidariut iŵ 
Bir Zeit 
Committee for 
Solidarity with 
Bir Zeit 
1981 Support for Bir Zeit 
University in Ramallah, 
which was closed by Israeli 
authorities 
Demonstration N Radical n/a 
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haVaad 
l͛Solidariut iŵ 
Hevron 
Hebron 
Solidarity 
Committee 
1993     N Radical n/a 
haVaad Neged 
haMilchama 
ď͛LeǀaŶoŶ 
Committee 
against the War 
in Lebanon 
1982 Against the war in 
Lebanon 
Demonstration N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
haVaad Neged 
haYad haKasha 
Committee 
Against the Iron 
Fist 
1986     N Radical n/a 
Hayalim Neged 
Shtika 
Soldiers against 
Silence 
1982 Opposed ongoing 
presence of Israeli soldiers 
in Lebanon 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
haYoŵ haShǀi͛i Seventh Day, 
The 
2002 Call for an end to the Six 
Day War and creation of a 
Jewish Democratic State 
by compiling and 
disseminating relevant 
articles 
Awareness raising Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.7th-day.co.il/hayom-
hashvie/seventh.htm  
Horim Neged 
Shtika 
Parents Against 
Silence 
1983 Originally Mothers Against 
Silence – protest the first 
Lebanon War 
Demonstration N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Hug Horim 
Shakulim 
(Mishpachot 
Shakulot 
Nifgaot Terror 
l͛ŵaaŶ 
haShalom) 
PaƌeŶt͛s CiƌĐle -
Association of 
Bereaved 
Families in the 
Middle East 
1995 Palestinian Israeli 
organisation of over 600 
families, all of whom have 
lost a close family member 
as a result of the conflict. 
Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.theparentscircle.org/  
Imahot l͛MaaŶ 
Shalom 
Mothers 4 
Peace 
2002   Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Imahot Neged 
Shtika 
Mothers 
Against Silence 
1982 Opposed ongoing 
presence of Israeli soldiers 
in Lebanon 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
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Imut Mental Health 
Workers for the 
Advancement of 
Peace 
1988 A group of mental health 
professionals, providing 
services to those suffering 
mental illness and 
researching the 
psychological barriers to 
peace 
Humanitarian 
service, research 
N Human 
Rights 
n/a 
Indymedia Indymedia Israel 1999 A network of individuals, 
independent and 
alternative media activists 
and organisations, offering 
grassroots, non-corporate, 
non-commercial coverage 
of important social and 
political issues 
Awareness raising 
through media 
Y Radical http://www.indynewsisrael.com/a
bout  
  Interfaith 
Encounter 
Association 
1994 Dedicated to promoting 
peace in the Middle East 
through interfaith 
dialogue and cross-cultural 
study 
Interfaith Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.interfaith-
encouter.org/  
IPCRI IPCRI 1988 Organises public 
conferences, peace 
education workshops, 
Track II Diplomacy 
Meetings and writes policy 
papers, promoting a two 
state solution 
Education, research 
and information, 
tours, dialogue 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.ipcri.org/IPCRI/Home.
html 
  Israel-
Palestinian 
Science 
Organisation 
2004 Cooperation and dialogue 
through scientific research 
projects 
Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.ipso-jerusalem.org/  
Ir Amim Ir Amim (City of 
Nation/City of 
People) 
2004 Educational about the 
situation in Jerusalem 
Tours, reports Y Human 
Rights 
http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/  
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Ir Shalem Ir Shalem- 
Jerusalem 
(Front of Peace 
Now) 
1995     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Irgun haNashim 
haBeinleumi 
l͛Shaloŵ 
ď͛MizraĐh 
haTichon 
International 
WoŵeŶ͛s 
Commission 
2005 Organise international 
conferences to share ideas 
Idea sharing N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Isha ͚Isha Woman to 
Woman – Haifa 
Feminist Centre 
1983 Grassroots feminist 
organisation in Israel and 
one of the leading voices 
of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights in the 
country. 
Dialogue, 
demonstrations, 
education, research 
Y Radical http://www.haifawomenscoalition
.org.il/  
  Jerusalem 
Peace Makers 
2004 Network of independent 
interfaith peace-builders 
dedicated to encouraging 
understanding and 
reconciliation by providing 
information; backing  up 
peacemakers in their 
outreach, promoting 
dialogue, visiting and 
contact 
Interfaith dialogue, 
tours 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://jerusalempeacemakers.org/  
  Israeli-
Palestinian 
Peace Coalition 
2002 Group of leading 
politicians, academics, 
NGOs, cultural figures who 
were concerned for 
absence of formal peace 
process 
Coordination, 
campaigns 
N n/a n/a 
  Just Vision 2003 Raise awareness and 
support for peace using 
public education 
campaigns such as award 
winning films and other 
Raising awareness, 
education 
Y Radical http://www.justvision.org/  
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educational tools 
Kav Adom Red Line 1988 Demonstration for a 
withdrawal from Lebanon, 
more aggressive than 
others 
Demonstrations N Radical n/a 
Kaǀ l͛Oǀed Workers hotline 1989 Committed to protecting 
the rights of 
disadvantaged workers 
employed in Israeli and by 
Israelis in the Occupied 
Territories, including 
Palestinians, migrant 
workers, subcontracted 
workers and new 
immigrants 
Humanitarian action, 
legal tactics 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.kavlaoved.org.il/  
Keshev Keshev – The 
Centre for the 
Protection of 
Democracy in 
Israel 
1998 Promotes a more 
moderate media and 
public discourse through 
educational activities, by 
counselling journalist and 
by publishing research on 
Israeli media coverage.  
Media monitoring Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.keshev.org.il/en/abou
t-keshev/aboutkeshev.html  
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Koalitziat 
Nashim 
l͛Shaloŵ 
Coalition of 
Women for 
Peace 
2000 Feminist organisation 
against the occupation of 
Palestine and for a just 
peace bringing together 
women from a wide 
variety of identity and 
groups. Initiates public 
campaigns and education 
and outreach programs, 
working to develop and 
integrate a feminist 
discourse on all levels of 
society 
Non-violent 
resistance, non-
violent direct action, 
education, training 
Y Radical http://www.coalitionofwomen.org
/?lang=en  
Kol Aher Other Voice 2007 A grassroots volunteer 
initiative comprised of 
citizens from the 
communities bordering 
the Gaza border aiming to 
end the siege and the 
attacks on both sides 
Advocacy and Protest Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.othervoice.org  
Kol Echad One Voice 2002 Grassroots consensus 
building amongst 
moderates, leadership 
development workshops, 
mobilisation training 
seminars. 
Education, training, 
demonstrations  
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.onevoicemovement.o
rg/ 
Kvisa Schora Black Laundry 2001 Direct action group of 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, 
transgenders and others 
against the occupation 
and for social justice 
Direct action N Radical http://www.blacklaundry.org/eng-
index.html  
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  Leading Leaders 
for Peace 
2011 A group of individuals 
from all walks of life who 
are united under the 
single resolution of having 
our leaders meet, sit, and 
work together to reach a 
just solution to the conflict 
here. They call for the 
solidarity of various peace 
groups 
Dialogue, 
demonstrations 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.leadingleadersforpeac
e.com/ 
Lochamim 
L͛Shaloŵ 
Combatants for 
Peace 
2005 Organise meetings 
between previous Israeli 
and Palestinian 
combatants, lecture series 
in public forums, create 
joint projects and 
participate in 
demonstrations. 
Bi-National activism. 
Non-violent 
resistance, tours 
Y Radical http://cfpeace.org/  
Lo-Metsaytot We Do Not 
Obey 
2010 Women conducting acts of 
civil disobedience to 
support Palestinians 
Direct Action Y Radical http://www.lo-metsaytot.org/  
Machon Arik Arik Institute 2004 Raise awareness of peace 
and reconciliation through 
workshops, educational 
activities and PR 
campaigns – non Political 
Awareness raising/ 
education 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
www.peacewecan.com  
Machon 
haNegev 
l͛Estrategiyot 
shel Shalom  
u͛PituaĐh 
Negev Institute 
for Strategies of 
Peace and 
Development 
1998  Promotes peace and 
development, focusing on 
the centrality of the civil 
society. NISPED conducts 
programs of education, 
training, project 
development and 
consultancy 
Education – civil 
society 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.nisped.org.il/  
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Machsom 
Watch 
Machsom 
Watch 
2002 Women stand at 
checkpoints in the West 
Bank and monitor soldiers 
actions against 
Palestinians, providing 
detailed reports 
Reports, 
humanitarian 
assistance, tours 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.machsomwatch.org/e
n/ 
Magazin 
haKibush 
Occupation 
Magazine 
2004 Website providing 
information and 
commentary on the 
ongoing developments in 
the Occupied Territories in 
Hebrew and English in 
order to bring to light the 
realities of the Occupation 
Awareness raising 
through media 
Y Radical http://www.kibush.co.il/  
Mahut haChaim Peace Begins 
with Me 
2003 Raise public awareness to 
their common 
responsibility and ability 
to make peace 
Lectures N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Mapat 
haShalom 
Peace Quilt 1989     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Martzim Neged 
haShlita 
haKfuya 
ď͛ShtaĐhiŵ 
Lecturers 
Against 
Imposed Rule in 
the Territories 
1987     N Radical n/a 
Mate haShalom 
sel HaZafon 
Peace 
Movement 
Coordinating 
Committee in 
Haifa and the 
North 
1988     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Mate Tnuot 
haShalom 
Peace 
Movement 
Headquarters 
1997 Set up to organise a 
demonstration in support 
of President Bill Clinton 
Attempted protest N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
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Mechuyavut 
l͛Shaloŵ 
V͛l͛Tsedek 
Chevrati 
Commitment to 
Peace and 
Social Justice 
1998 Focuses on the crossroads 
where the peace and 
social justice agendas 
meet. 
Reporting, research 
and information 
N Human 
Rights 
Website no longer active 
Mefakdim 
l͛ŵaaŶ BitaĐhoŶ 
Yisrael  
Commanders 
foƌ Isƌael͛s 
Security 
2014 Non-partisan movement 
of veteran senior security 
officials (IDF, Mossad, Shin 
Bet and National Police 
Force) who seek to 
promote a regional 
political-security initiative 
to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and 
normalize relations with 
moderate Arab states. 
Reports, lobbying Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://en.cis.org.il/  
  mepeace.org 2007 Online network of 
peacemakers worldwide 
Online transnational 
advocacy network 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://mepeace.org/  
Merkaz Peres 
l͛Shaloŵ 
Peres Centre for 
Peace 
1997 Promotes peacebuilding 
between Israel and its 
Arab neighbours, and in 
particular between Israelis 
and Palestinians.  
Dialogue, education Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.peres-center.org/ 
Mi Marviha? Who Profits? 2007 Dedicated to exposing the 
commercial involvement 
of companies in the 
continuing Israeli control 
over Palestinian and Syrian 
land. 
Disseminating 
information 
Y Radical http://whoprofits.org/  
  MidEast Web 
for Coexistence 
1999 News and information 
website designed to 
provide balanced news 
reporting and publicise 
dialogue, peace building 
projects 
Online media N Liberal 
Zionist 
http://mideastweb.org  
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Mifgash Encounter 2010 Educational organisation 
that focuses on building 
educational programmes 
on mediation skills 
Peace education and 
mediation 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://mifgash.org.il/  
Mishmarot 
haShalom 
Guards of Peace 1995 Set up in response to 
assassination of Rabin, 
Held weekly vigils 
Demonstration N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Moatza Bein 
Datit Meta͛eŵet 
ď͛Yisrael 
Inter-religious 
Coordination 
Council in Israel 
1991 Uses teachings of the 
three monotheistic 
religions to promote 
reconciliation and 
coexistence 
Education Y Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active   
Mohot shel 
Shalom 
Minds of Peace 2009 Implements Israeli-
Palestinian public 
negotiating assemblies, 
called Minds of Peace 
Experiments aiming to 
create the social 
conditions for peace in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
by grass roots effort to 
involve the public in the 
peacemaking 
Dialogue and grass-
roots involvement 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://mindsofpeace.org/  
Molad The Centre for 
Renewal of 
Israeli 
Democracy 
2013 An independent, non-
partisan Israeli think tank 
that works to reinvigorate 
Israeli society by injecting 
new ideas into all spheres 
of public discourse. 
Reports, policy 
recommendations 
Y Radical http://www.molad.org/en/  
Nashiŵ ď͛LaǀaŶ Women in 
White 
1997     N   n/a 
Nashim 
ď͛shaĐhor 
Women in Black 1988 Weekly silent vigils in 
town centres 
Demonstrations Y Radical n/a 
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Nashim Bonot 
Tarbut Shalom 
Women 
Engendering 
Peace 
2000     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Nashiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ 
Asirot Politiot 
Women for 
Political 
Prisoners 
1988 Supported Palestinian 
women in Israeli jails 
Demonstrations, 
direct action, 
humanitarian aid 
N Radical n/a 
Nashiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ 
Kdushat 
haChayim 
Women for the 
Sanctity of Life 
1996     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Nashim Neged 
Plisha l͛LeǀaŶoŶ 
Women Against 
the Invasion of 
Lebanon 
1982 Against the Invasion of 
Lebanon 
Demonstrations N Radical n/a 
Nashim 
ǀ͛Shaloŵ 
Women and 
Peace 
1989 Brought together Jewish 
and Arab feminists striving 
for peace 
Dialogue N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Neled We will give 
Birth 
1989     N   n/a 
Netivei Achva FƌieŶdship͛s 
way 
1983     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Neve Shalom-
Wahat al Salam 
Oasis of Peace 1977 Jointly established Jewish 
and Arab village. Has a 
bilingual school and school 
for peace 
Peace education, 
training, dialogue 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://wasns.org/  
Nisan Nisan Young 
Women Leaders 
1995 Dedicated to the 
advancement of young 
women in Israel. Nisan's 
innovative programs 
develop the leadership 
potential of Jewish and 
Arab Israeli young women 
Training, dialogue N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Ohel haShalom The Peace Tent 2005 Erected a tent in 
Palestinian village 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
  
 
2
2
0
 
Oŵetz L͛Sareǀ Courage to 
Refuse 
2002 Wrote letter to 
government refusing to 
serve in the Occupied 
Territories 
Conscientious 
Objectors 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.seruv.org.il/defaulten
g.asp  
  Open House 
Centre 
1991 Further peace and 
coexistence among Israeli 
Arabs and Jews in 
Jerusalem 
Encounter and 
Cooperation 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active   
Ossim Shalom Social Workers 
for Peace and 
Welfare 
1990 Israeli  organisation 
comprised of Jewish and 
Arab social workers, 
calling for the use of 
dialogue 
Humanitarian 
assistance and 
dialogue 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.ossim-
shalom.org.il/article/9537.aspx  
Oz ǀ͛Shaloŵ Strength and 
Peace 
1975 Aimed to persuade 
religious Zionists that 
annexation and control of 
another people ran 
counter to Jewish values 
and teachings 
Education N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
  Oznik Media 2000 News service and art 
gallery 
Awareness raising 
through media 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://oznik.com/about_oznik.htm
l 
Palestinaim 
ǀ͛Yisraeliŵ 
l͛ŵaaŶ e Aliŵut 
Palestinians and 
Israelis for Non-
violence 
(branch of IFOR) 
1985 People who believe the 
conflict in the Middle East 
and its causes are best 
addressed through 
nonviolent activism by the 
two peoples 
Demonstration N Radical Website no longer active 
  Peace Research 
Institute in the 
Middle East 
(PRIME) 
1998 PRIME's purpose is to 
pursue mutual coexistence 
and peace- building 
through joint Israeli and 
Palestinian research and 
outreach activities. 
Research, education Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://vispo.com/PRIME/  
  
 
2
2
1
 
Pitchim Daf 
Hadash l͛Shaloŵ 
Turning a new 
page for peace 
2011 Facebook group bringing 
Israelis, Palestinians and 
Internationals who believe 
in peace together 
Social network Y n/a https://www.facebook.com/newp
age4peace  
  Popular Struggle 
Coordination 
Committee 
2005 Reports on and 
coordinates the different 
demonstrations against 
the Separation Barrier 
Coordination. Non-
violent resistance 
Y Palestinian http://www.popularstruggle.org/  
Profil Hadash New Profile 1998 Activities against the 
militarization of Israeli 
society, aiming to 
transform it into a civilian 
one. Feminist organisation 
Information, support 
for conscientious 
objectors 
Y Radical http://www.newprofile.org/englis
h/ 
Proyekt Schunat 
Volfson 
Wolfson 
Community 
Project - Acre 
1990     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
‘aďaŶiŵ l͛ŵaaŶ 
Zchuyot 
haAdam 
Rabbis for 
Human Rights 
1989 Orthodox, Reform, 
Conservative, 
Reconstructionist and 
Renewal Rabbis working 
to protect human rights of 
Palestinians. Take groups 
of Israelis to assist 
Palestinian farmers with 
olive harvesting/legal 
work 
Humanitarian action, 
legal tactics 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://rhr.org.il/eng/  
Radio Kol 
haShalom 
Radio All for 
Peace 
2004 A joint Israeli-Palestinian 
radio station, aiming to 
help resolving the conflict 
by bridging information 
between the two sides. 
Awareness raising 
through journalism 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.allforpeace.org/  
Reshet Isƌaeli WoŵeŶ͛s 
Peace Net 
1983 Coordinating Committee 
of WoŵeŶ͛s gƌoups 
Coordination, 
demonstrations 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
  
 
2
2
2
 
Reshet 
haShutfut 
haYehudit-
Araǀit ď͛Yisrael 
Coexistence 
Network in 
Israel 
2002 Network of organisations 
dealing with Jewish-Arab 
coexistence in Israel 
Coordination, 
awareness raising, 
dialogue 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
‘ofiŵ l͛ZĐhuyot 
ha͛Adaŵ 
Physicians for 
Human Rights 
1988 Promote a more fair and 
inclusive society in which 
the right to health is 
applied equally for all. 
Focus on the right to 
health in its broadest 
sense, encompassing 
conditions that are 
prerequisites for health 
Humanitarian action Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.phr.org.il/default.asp?
PageID=4  
Sadaka-Reut Friendship 1982 Arab-Jewish Youth 
Partnership educates and 
empowers Jewish and 
Palestinian Israeli youth 
and university students to 
pursue social and political 
change through bi-
national partnership. 
Education  Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://en.reutsadaka.org/  
  Seeds of Peace 
Centre of 
Coexistence 
1993 Support Israeli and 
Palestinian teens in 
becoming leaders for 
peaceful coexistence 
within and between their 
communities 
Education, dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.seedsofpeace.org  
Shalom Achshav Peace Now 1978 Organised mass 
demonstrations, petition 
the Israeli government, 
disseminate information. 
Currently focused on 
stopping settlement 
expansion 
Demonstrations, 
tours, legal tactics, 
lobbying, research 
and information 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://peacenow.org.il/eng/  
  
 
2
2
3
 
Shani - Nashim 
Neged haKibush 
Israeli Women 
Against the 
Occupation 
  Called for greater 
involvement of women in 
politics, expressed 
concerns over effects of 
repression in the occupied 
territories. 
Education, 
demonstrations 
N Radical n/a 
Shministim Seniors - New 
high-School 
Refuseniks 
Movement 
2004 Letter to Prime Minister 
refusing to conduct 
national service in the 
Occupied Territories  
Conscientious 
objectors 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.shministim.com/  
Shovrim Shtika Breaking the 
Silence 
2004 Collects and disseminates 
testimonies of soldiers 
who served in Hebron 
Testimonies, lectures 
and public 
campaigns, Tours 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.breakingthesilence.or
g.il/  
Shuvi Women for the 
Withdrawal 
from Gaza 
2004 Support the idea of 
disengagement from Gaza 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Shvil haZahav Middleway 2002 Promoting peace and a 
stop to the violence of the 
Intifada 
Dialogue, peace 
walks 
N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Solidariut Sheikh 
Jarrah 
Solidarity 
Sheikh Jarrah  
2009 Weekly demonstrations, 
identified by drumming 
group. Assists with legal 
battles. Held annual 
concert. 
Demonstrations Y Radical http://www.en.justjlm.org/  
Studentim 
l͛ŵaaŶ 
haShalom 
Student Union 
for Peace 
1996     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Ta͛ayush  Come 
Together/ 
Partnership 
2000 Direct humanitarian action 
– deliveries of food, 
blankets, clothes and 
medication to Palestinians 
Humanitarian action, 
non-violent direct 
action, legal action 
Y Radical http://www.taayush.org/  
  
 
2
2
4
 
Tarabut-
Hithabrut 
Come Together 2006 Aims to address the 
division in Israeli 
oppositional politics 
between struggles against 
the occupation and 
struggles against 
inequality and for social 
justice within Israel itself 
Active in different 
campaigns across 
Israel/Palestine. 
Brings new ideas and 
analysis to 
discussions 
Y Radical http://www.tarabut.info/en/home
/ 
  The Jerusalem 
Link 
1994 Coordination committee 
of activities between the 
Jeƌusaleŵ WoŵeŶ͛s 
Centre (Palestinian 
organisation) and 
BatShalom (Israeli 
organisation) 
Dialogue, 
coordination 
N Radical Website no longer active  
  The Young 
Israeli Forum 
for Cooperation 
2002 To encourage dialogue 
between young Israeli, 
Palestinian and European 
students and political 
activists. Some of the 
Israeli participants that 
attended the conference 
decided to establish a new 
organisation that would 
allow them to contribute 
to youth-based projects 
promoting Israeli-
Palestinian peace and 
better Israeli-European 
relations. 
Dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.yifc.org.il/  
Ul tzad Smol On the Left Side 2006 OŶliŶe ͚left-ǁiŶg͛ 
newsletter 
Awareness raising 
through media 
Y Radical http://on-the-left-side.org.il/  
Vaad haShalom 
haYisraeli 
Israeli Peace 
Committee 
1950     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
  
 
2
2
5
 
Vaad haYotsrim Committee of 
Jewish and Arab 
Creative Artists 
1988     N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
  YALA Young 
Leaders 
2011 Facebook-based 
movement dedicated to 
empowering young Middle 
Easterners to lead their 
generation to a better 
future, through dialogue 
and engagement 
Online transnational 
advocacy network 
Y n/a https://www.facebook.com/yalaYL  
  Yasamba 2010 Part of an activist anti-
capitalist transnational 
network, using samba as a 
form of political action, 
inspired by carnival, to 
confront and critique 
systems of domination 
and directly support 
everybody struggling 
against exploitation, 
discrimination and 
oppression.  
Creative protest Y Radical http://rhythms-of-
resistance.org/spip/  
Yaldei 
haMizrach 
haTichon 
Middle East 
ChildƌeŶ͛s 
Alliance 
1988 working for the rights of 
children in the Middle East 
by sending  humanitarian 
aid, supporting projects 
for children 
Humanitarian action Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.mecaforpeace.org/  
Yaldei Yisrael Peace Child 
Israel 
1988 Teach coexistence using 
theatre and the arts.  
Education, dialogue Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.mideastweb.org/peac
echild/  
  
 
2
2
6
 
Yesh Din There is Justice 2005 publish reports and 
disseminate information 
on human rights abuses; 
take legal actions and 
engage in direct advocacy 
with the authorities in 
order to remedy the 
situation; and work with 
the media to encourage 
debate on these issues. 
Human Rights 
awareness, legal 
tactics 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.yesh-din.org/  
Yesh Gvul There is a 
Limit/Boundary/
Border 
1982 Organised peace campaign 
advocating political 
conscientious objection 
Conscientious 
Objectors 
Y Human 
Rights 
http://www.yeshgvul.org/en/abou
t-2/  
Yisrael Shelanu, 
HaTnua Letmura  
Our Israel: The 
Movement for 
Change 
1973 Demonstration of reservist 
solider for Israeli 
government to take 
responsibility for failure to 
anticipate 1973 attacks 
Demonstrations N Liberal 
Zionist 
n/a 
Yisraelim Mitoch 
Bchira 
Israelis by 
Choice/Immigra
nts Against 
Occupation 
1988     N Radical n/a 
Yotzmat 
Kopenhagen 
International 
Alliance for 
Arab-Israeli 
Peace 
1996 Unofficial, semi-diplomatic 
peace initiative 
Peace initiative N Liberal 
Zionist 
Website no longer active 
Yozmat Geneva Geneva 
Initiative 
2003 Educate and campaign 
about realistic steps and 
solutions needed to 
achieve peace through 
different NGOs that 
support the Initiative 
Education, proposed 
peace agreement 
Y Liberal 
Zionist 
http://www.geneva-accord.org/ 
  
 
2
2
7
 
  
Zochrot Remembering 2002 The main goal is to bring 
knowledge of the 
Palestinian Nakba to 
Jewish-Israeli people 
through organising tours 
for Jews and Arabs to 
Palestinian villages 
destroyed in 
1948;  hosting workshops 
and lectures; organising 
encounters between 
Palestinian refugees and 
the Israelis who live on 
their lands 
Education/ 
awareness raising 
Y Radical http://www.zochrot.org/en/  
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